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Herald12345 I said you didn't know what you were talking about and you juist keep digging that hole. 5/19/2008 5:02:47 PM

Battle-space management, something about which you evidently know nothing, is something, I'm about to take you to school in.

Tomorrow. Same Bat time same Bat channel.

Herald

Maybe I can same us both some time. First, the difference between battle-space management and Battle-space Management.

Battle-space Management is the current attempt to systamatize the use of three elements into military planning and operations.

First: The use of business management methods. This was introduced by Robert McNamara, and became chic during the late 1970s and 1980s. It threw out the leadership model of military command in favor of a 'management' model. It did work -- largely due to the fact that we weren't actually in a war at the time.

Second: The concept of Joint Operations. This was imposed on the military by members of congress following the Jimmy Carter, Iran fiasco. This was actually a result of mis-management at the top depriving the forces involved of adequate preparation and training time, but gave certain political figures a chance to show off their supposed brilliance. It was an attempt to reduce the cost of the military by regularizing the use of elements of different services on the same missions.

Third: The concept of Network-centric Warfare. The collection of data from a maximum number of sources, then to be processed by extensive data-management resources and finally disseminated as intelligence and orders to all elements involved.

Battle-space management is not pertient to our current discussion of events in the 1941-5 historical period. As a minimum, it requires both an extremely robust, very secure, very reliable and very high capacity communications system, and an ability to handle and corrilate massive amounts of information. During the 1941-5 period, neither of these requirements could be met. Communications were very limited in capacity, often unreliable, rarely secure and always vulnerable to failure, and data management was limited to what the staff could write down, and compare. A non-starter.

Battle-space management, on the other hand, COULD be taken to be a label (jargon) for the command requirement that an admiral or general have the ability to grasp the space-time relationships of the battle field, which is a concept about as old as war. I assumed that you were using the term in the latter sense, as the former meaning it, as I've pointed out, completely invalid to this discussion. In this, latter sense, it is, as I've said, simply a new term for a set of very old principles.

Battle space management is a technical term that applies to the USE OF FORCE IN SPACE/TIME and has NOTHING to do with the McNamara BS.

It also is a subset of the leadership skillset and has nothing to do with McNamara. It does have something to do with RUSSIAN military theory theory based on their WW II experience.

I'm busy right now, so I will try to explain it to you after hours.

Ciao.

Herald

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larryjcr 5/20/2008 11:36:43 AM

Battle-space management, something about which you evidently know nothing, is something, I'm about to take you to school in.

Tomorrow. Same Bat time same Bat channel.

Herald

Maybe I can same us both some time. First, the difference between battle-space management and Battle-space Management.

Battle-space Management is the current attempt to systamatize the use of three elements into military planning and operations.

Why do you think the term 'management' is used here? Back to the McNamara BS (properly labelled) of substituting a management model for the traditional leadership model of command.

Still, I'd much rather debate facts than jargon. Such as the FACT that there is absolutely no evidence to even suggest that any unit except VB3 from YORKTOWN took part in the attack that destroyed HIRYU. A point (along with several others) to which you have yet to respond.

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larryjcr one more thing 5/20/2008 11:44:58 AM

Oh, and your claim that Spruance should be credited with the sinking of TAIHO and SHOKAKU by submarines outside his command because they occurred 'in his battle space', is self evident nonsense. Even if (and I don't agree to the premise) that could be argued, they were NOT in his battle space at the time, as they were well beyond the range of his strike capability.

From the point of view of both King and Nimitz, after a year and a half of waiting for them to come out, TF38 was offered a chance to destroy the Japanese carrier force, but failed due to Spruance's over caution, getting only a singe, relatively slow, conversion carrier.

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Nichevo 5/20/2008 3:37:39 PM

I thought I had understood from the thread that kills are credited to those who brought them about. If Spruance, as Herald describes in contrast to the Japanese, conceived and tailored the 'battlespace' beyond a tactical level - in other words, strategically - then sub kills by subs he positioned even half the world away, of vital and relevant enemy capital ships, for that very purpose would seem to have to count also.

If he set up kill zones across a big SLOC that would feed the enemy in his battle, and got big hits, why is that not smart? And, in the military parlance of these 'credits' or 'awards' (which I always thought, in the old days (i.e. wooden ships), were credited to the SHIP, ha ha!), is to go under the name of the administrative unit of his command even if detached from another force, why do you resist the notion of it going under his command?

It is really rather petty anyway as presumably we did not supply billions of dollars of our best iron to the Navy to provide anybody with scalps.. You should perhaps realize, btw, that outside the well informed minority such as yourselves, even people who have done a fair bit of reading may have done it a long time ago. I have the coffee-table books at home from when I was a kid, like Hogg's, and I read books on Midway and, oh, They were Expendable, and other books like that, CPT Lawson's, also fictionalizations like James Michener's, in my childhood, but I obviously have nowhere near the amount of detail that is apparently available to people like you, who I presume also have day jobs ;>

If you blame Spruance you must excoriate Halsey. For that matter I am a Fletcher man since, oh, fourth grade. You guys have the advantage of hindsight, you know.

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Herald12345 The lesson 5/22/2008 3:51:42 PM

LARRY WRONG AS USUAL:

Herald I only mentioned Tulagi because you did. The Japanese a/c had longer range than the US carrier planes. Fletcher and later Kincaid HAD to meet them north of the Solomons to protect Henderson Field from attack.

There were far too few a/c on Henderson to be a threat to the IJN CV force. They could be deadly against the transports as long as they were operational. The Japanese CVs were supposed to deal with that. The US CVs were supposed to prevent them from doing so. That was the whole point of both the Easter Solomons and Bismark Sea. At Midway, the Japanese didn't want to damage the air base -- they wanted to use it themselves -- and once the a/c (warned by radar and the PBY report) were in the air, the most serious damage the airstrike could do was inflict casualties by air battle. At Guadalcanal, they were perfectly willing to wreck the airstips if they could, and a carrier strike was a much better means than high level bombing.

The Japanese as you can see from the geography can be dragged across American land-based air if you fight your air battle and use your battle-space the RIGHT way.

link

Map. no. 1....

The point you miss, Larry, is the PHYSICS of battle. In naval air warfare in 1942, the WEATHER GAUGE as well as the sheer range of aircraft gives the attacker the advantage, if he can exploit it. Now, Larry, where do you put your American carriers when your land based P-38s out-range the Japanese carrier-borne Zekes, and your A-20 Havocs do likewise over the Vals and Kates? You do realize that Henderson Field is your critical decision point and that you can exactly predict what routes the Japanese have to use to attack it? Its BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT. The winds blow west to east, Your airpower range circles are known quantities. You know where submarines cannot operate because of the shallow water and constricted channeling? HMMMMMM. Combine those rather obvious 1941 data points along with the technology of the day anjd figure it out. Spruance did repeatedly.

At Bismark Sea, the land based air had MUCH more experience against ships than ANY US Army a/c had in June (or Sept) of the previous year, and they had a method of attack, skip bombing, that had been deveopled in the mean time. They also had fighters with both the range and performance to prevent Japanese fighters from interferring. NONE of those factors were true during the Guadalcanal campaign.

CREF above, Larry.

Not being rediculous at all. Halsey WAS following his orders. Several officers at various levels suggested splitting the TF in various ways, but NOBODY opposed going after the IJN CVs. I've gone over the problems of dividing TF38 before.

Halsey wasn't following orders, which was to support MacArthur. THOSE were his PRIMARY orders and his first mission objective.

I never said divide TF-33. I never advocated dividing TF-33. Halsey, the idiot, ACTUALLY did THRICE. He sent McCain to Ulithi. Then during the Battle of Bull's Run he left Bogan behind with no heavy surface ship support and rode south with the whole six battleship battleline when he was Kincaid prodded. Then after Nimitz told him to get his junior ensign dumb-ass back to where the hell he was supposed to be, he LEFT LEE TO REFUEL THE DESTROYERS THAT HE, HALSEY JUST RAN OUT OF GAS, as he, HALSEY, ran south with just TWO battleships. At the end he left the Third Fleet split FOUR ways out of mutual contact and support of each other. So pardon me if I, in Kincaid's place after getting authorization, would have shot him, Halsey, on the quarterdeck of the Iowa, and made sure the WHOLE US command affected learned about it. What Halsey did during Bull's Run constituted crimi

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larryjcr 5/22/2008 8:47:20 PM

If you blame Spruance you must excoriate Halsey. For that matter I am a Fletcher man since, oh, fourth grade. You guys have the advantage of hindsight, you know.

The subs were not in Spruance chain of command. If they were, then I would credit them to him. Note that Herald refuses to acknowledge credit to Fletcher for the three IJN CVs killed at Midway by TF16 although Fletcher was OTC.

I don't actually BLAME either Halsey or Spruance. Both made command decisions based on the information available to them, that were wrong, but defensible. Halsey's error at Leyte resulted from his orders, as well as his own near obsession with destroying the Japanese CVs. Spruance's at Philippine Sea were the result of his failure to adapt his thinking to carrier operations insead of surface forces.

Actually this whole thing started originally because I support Fletcher and Herald seems to be obsessed with the idea that anything that went wrong in the same theatre with him HAD to be his fault, and anything that went right under his command HAD to be due to someone else.

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larryjcr add on 5/22/2008 8:55:22 PM

Spruance never claimed to have 'taylored the battlespace' or anything of the kind. He tied TF38 to the invasion zone out of fear that Japanese surface forces would somehow get around him and threaten the transports. The space-time relationship wouldn't have allowed that. Any force that did manage to flank TF38, and by some miricle avoided early detection, would still have been far too weak to be a threat in view of the strength of the escort and bombardment forces in company with the transports.

ComSubPac always had picket subs spotting for IJN force movements, and shifted and added to them when an operation was coming up. The Japanese (and the subs) would still have been in the same area if Spruance had allowed TF38 to move west. The only difference would be that TF38 would have been within range to strike back at the Japanese CVs the first day, instead of standing on the defensive, then engaging in a two day chase in order to get one, very long range strike back at them.

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larryjcr 5/22/2008 10:23:52 PM

LARRY WRONG AS USUAL:

Herald I only mentioned Tulagi because you did. The
Japanese a/c had longer range than the US carrier planes.
Fletcher and later Kincaid HAD to meet them north of the Solomons
to protect Henderson Field from attack.

There were far too few a/c on Henderson
to be a threat to the IJN CV force. They could be deadly
against the transports as long as they were operational. The
Japanese CVs were supposed to deal with that. The US CVs were
supposed to prevent them from doing so. That was the whole
point of both the Easter Solomons and Bismark Sea. At Midway,
the Japanese didn't want to damage the air base -- they wanted to use
it themselves -- and once the a/c (warned by radar and the PBY
report) were in the air, the most serious damage the airstrike could
do was inflict casualties by air battle. At Guadalcanal, they
were perfectly willing to wreck the airstips if they could, and a
carrier strike was a much better means than high level bombing.

The Japanese as you can see from the
geography can be dragged across American land-based air if you fight
your air battle and use your battle-space the RIGHT way.

http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2193/2514288876_c93bee341f_b.jpg

" target="_blank">link ">link

Map. no. 1....

The point you miss, Larry, is the
PHYSICS of battle. In naval air warfare in 1942, the WEATHER GAUGE as
well as the sheer range of aircraft gives the attacker the advantage,
if he can exploit it. Now, Larry, where do you put your American
carriers when your land based P-38s out-range the Japanese
carrier-borne Zekes, and your A-20 Havocs do likewise over the Vals
and Kates? You do realize that Henderson Field is your critical
decision point and that you can exactly predict what routes the
Japanese have to use to attack it? Its BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT. The
winds blow west to east, Your airpower range circles are known
quantities. You know where submarines cannot operate because of the
shallow water and constricted channeling? HMMMMMM. Combine those
rather obvious 1941 data points along with the technology of the day
anjd figure it out. Spruance did repeatedly.

At Bismark Sea, the land based air had
MUCH more experience against ships than ANY US Army a/c had in
June (or Sept) of the previous year, and they had a method of attack,
skip bombing, that had been deveopled in the mean time. They
also had fighters with both the range and performance to prevent
Japanese fighters from interferring. NONE of those factors were
true during the Guadalcanal campaign.

CREF above, Larry.

Not being rediculous at all.
Halsey WAS following his orders. Several officers at various
levels suggested splitting the TF in various ways, but NOBODY opposed
going after the IJN CVs. I've gone over the problems of
dividing TF38 before.

Halsey wasn't following orders,
which was to support MacArthur. THOSE were his PRIMARY orders and his
first mission objective.

I never said divide TF-33. I
never advocated dividing TF-33. Halsey, the idiot, ACTUALLY
did THRICE. He sent McCain to Ulithi. Then during the Battle of
Bull's Run he left Bogan behind with no heavy surface ship support
and rode south with the whole six battleship ba

Quote Reply

larryjcr one last point 5/22/2008 10:36:24 PM

One item I failed to include in that last. You commented that by 'a simple side slip' Ozawa would get around the Fast Carriers an assume a central position.

Have you been drinking funny kool-aid??

The scouting circle of the Fast Carriers was over 300 miles. Ozawa had timed his approach to put him within striking range at daylight -- that meant close enough to reach the US carriers IF they stayed near Saipan (which they did, on Spruance's orders). He wouldn't have been any farther east if Mitscher had moved west, and there is simply NO WAY that you can seriously argue that he could have gotten beyond Mitscher. Lockwood's subs had reported his position and Spruance KNEW how far he could come. That's why he NEVER made any such silly claim himself. It was ALWAYS that he was worried about some kind of fast, surface force coming from the north or south, getting behind Mitscher that worried him. There was no way that Ozawa could do it, and Spruance and Mitscher (and anyone else who can read a map) all knew it.

Quote Reply

Herald12345 5/23/2008 12:47:46 AM

FIRST UP HERALD, I DO NOT LIKE BEING CALLED A LIAR BY SOMEONE I'VE CAUGHT LYING IN PRIOR POSTS!!!! Try putting up an arguement that makes some sense, and doesn't ignore historical reality, instead on falling backj on lies and insult!!!

I have called you a liar on point and showed the lie. You have a problem with it? TOUGH.

Try reading your own map! The Japanese don't need to come within range of any land base strike a/c except those from Henderson -- and since Henderson is a known location and the Japanese had longer ranged a/c, even that claim is a farce! As is your claim that the USAAF had P38s in the Solomons at the time of the carrier battles. The first P38s didn't arrive (loaned my McArthur) until November! Also, your statement that the A20 outranged the Kate and Val is incorrect. The pre-G model of the A20 had a range with maximum payload of just over 1000 miles, marginally less than that of the Kate, and about 100 miles less than that of the Val.

Try looking at the geography and the air coverage as well as the prevailing winsds Larry. As i said you don't know the first thionmg about the subject or you would see the threat axis drawn for you and the approach routes laid out. No more BS, from you, Larry,. this is MY subject area. I prepared the damned map and i know exactly what it says.since I LAID IT OUT FOR YOU.

The A-20 had an air endurance radius of of one hour out from its base which is about the same as that of most carrier borne aircraft of the day. Don't look at Wiki and read a number like 1300 km for a Val or 1600 km for a 1900 km for a Kate or 1600 km for a havoc and try to tell me what the radius of an aircraft was. Carrier planes had to burn up almost a third of their air time to form uop a strike or to land. their effective reach is not some range number McGee. Its measured in roughly in thirds of air endurance time whereas a landbased plane is measured in fourths especially when under BURDEN. Its just one of those little factoids that you conveneinetly don't have, which explains why the Japanese struck at about 225 to 250 miles while Americans teneded at least wearly in the war to strike at no greater than 150 miles range if they could help it. The functional radius of the Havoc burdened was about 300-350 miles or 1 HOUR, McGee, so you've just stepped on Mr. Johnson again.

Eastern Solomons was a clear victory for Fletcher, by any REASONABLE standard. Your claim otherwise is either an out rght LIE or the result of mental defect (since that seems to be the way you think a debat should be conducted). Fletcher sank a CVL, seriously damaged a CV, and prevented the Japanese from knocking out Henderson, in return for serious damage to a CV and a very favorable K/L ratio in a/c. NO WAY that can be called a defeat by anyone with any grasp at all!!

The Eastern Solomons did not stop the Japanese from pursuing their objectives . At least the Coral Sea defeat fletcher suffered accomplished that much. At best you could argue a tactical draw; where the carrier forces were almost evenly matched and neuitralized each other. Fletcher was unable to drive the Japanese off. THAT under the circumstances is an American DEFEAT.

Ref Halsey's orders: quote: "If a situation presents itself, or can be created, to destroy a major portion of the enemy's carriers, THAT BECOMES YOUR PRIMARY MISSION!!!

But Halsey was too stupid to create it and was too stupid to recognize [as apparently are you] that if he had stayed put as was planned he would get his opportunity to exercise the option to whack those carriers as Ozawa had to attack to draw him off. san Bernardino. Ozawa had no choice in this.

What part of THAT don't you understand?? Any claim on your part that he WAS NOT following orders is another CLEAR FALSEHOOD. How many times do I have to make this simple point! You don't even offer a counter arguement, you just deny it as if that somehow proves something!!

What part of stupid d

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