Herald

Your claim that I lied OR that you 'showed the lie" is a blatant falsehood.  Your apperantly paranoid obsession that anyone who disarees with you is either a liar, a criminal or a mental defective is taking the  fun out of what iss otherwise an enjoyable debate.  Please try and get a grip and argue FACTS instead of invective!!

   I only use wiki for entertainment NEVER for useful information.  In fact I'm hesitant to use ANY internet source due to the difficulty of establishing credibility.

 

Not endurance, but cruising range at full load is the critical factor.  Launch and formating time is required of both carrier and land based. a/c.  In any event, your logic is flawed by three FACTS which you ignore.  One: The A20 was not (as of Eastern Solomons) an effective anti warship system.  Formation, mid level attacks were ineffective.  Individual low level attacks were only slightly more effective, and suicidally dangerous.  Two: The carriers had the advantage of MOBILITY.  The land based a/c had to FIND the ships before they could attack.  The land base was a known location allowing the carriers to choose time of attack.  Three: In the absence of effective, escort with sufficient range (P38s) any attempt at low level attack against a force with a CAP would only result in the slaughter of the A20s or B25s.  I notice that you made no comment about P38s in your response.  Face it, Herald.  At this point in time, land based attack by US a/c against a carrier task force was not a viable tactic.  The Japanese tried it using torpedoes, and their record of success wasn't very impressive against anyone with a viable CAP.

 

 

Eastern Solomons stopped the first major Japanese attemt to counter invade Guadalcanal.  That was Fletcher's objective.

 

School time.  Basics.  Victory and defeat can be assessed on three levels: tactical, operational and strategic.

 

Tactical: Determination by counting losses, with due  consideration for the relative advantages of both sides.

Operational: Which side achieved its objective and which side did not.

Strategic: The effect of the outcome of the battle on the larger, future conduct of the campaign and war in general.   

Re Eastern Solomons:

Tactical.  Damage to SHOKAKU and ENTERPRISE cancel.  Both were back for the next round.

              Sinking of RYUJO and losses in a/c and aircrews heavily in favor of US

              Clear but not decisive victory for Fletcher.

 

Operational.  Fletcher's mission was to prevent a major counter-landing with support of heavy naval forces against the Guadalcanal lodgment.  Nagumo's mission was to suppress Henderson Field and support a major assault on the lodgement.  Fletcher accomplished his mission.  Forcing the withdrawl of the Japanese carrier force before it could do any meaningful damage to Henderson Field made reinforcement of Japanese forces on Guadalcanal by units with the heavy weapons that were really needed, hopelessly costly and left only the piecemeal efforts of Tanaka's destroyers.  Operational victory for Fletcher.

 

Stategic.  The primary effect of Eastern Solomons was that the Guadalcanal lodgement remained in US hands and the campaign continued.  Japan lost a small flight deck and a lot of a/c and aircrews it couldn't replace any time soon.  The IJNAF continued to bleed out trying to suppress Henderson with land based attacks, while the time remaining before massive reinforcement of US forces in the Pacific put the Japanese on the defensive permanently continued to burn away.

While not as decisive as the strategic results of Coral Sea or Midway, it was certainly favorable to the US position.  Victory for Fletcher.

 

 

Again, name calling in place of thinking.  Halsey's orders were what they were.  The Japanese presented him with EXACTLY the situation covered by his orders.  Under those oreders his PRIMARY MISSION became the destruction of the carriers.  You are basing your entire (so called) logic on YOUR knowledge (from historyical record NOT available to Halsey) that Ozawa had no striking force and that his mission was purely that of decoy.  Halsey DIDN'T KNOW THAT.  As far as he was concerned, the carriers were the most serious threat to the invasion forces -- the one kind of threat that they had no defense of their own agains.  He had no reason to think that they would HAVE TO COME TO HIM.  Rather, he had to assume that they would launch from beyond his range and use land bases to further extend their range.

   You are accusing Halsey of stupidity for not knowing what he had no way of knowing. 

The chain of command between Kincaid and Halsey did indeed, go thru WASHINGTON.  Kincaid was under MacArthur, not Nimitz.  The link between the two went all the way to Marshall and King, it DIDN'T stop in Pearl.

 

Will continue this later.  Got a thunderstorm coming up and want to shut down my computer

On a minor note, re Guadalcanal, I recall a chat with a friend back in college...the superiority of radar gunnery...supposedly there was a night battle...a radio call:  "Clear the Slot!"...and the Japs got absolutely murderized...

does anyone recall this occasion?  I could be mixed up; my google-fu does not avail.  When and where was this battle?

Herald

Appologies, this is going to take a while.  The thunderstorm I mentioned resulted in a lot of tornado damage so I will be doing a LOT of overtime in coming days.  Will finish my responses as I get the time.

You whole logic structure attacking Halsey's decision is invalid.  It is all based on OUR knowledge, ex post facto, that Ozawa was on a decoy mission.  Halsey didn't know that.  As far as he could know, Ozawa's carriers were a target of opportunity that had to be attacked as quickly as possible to keep them from escaping, as they'd escaped Spruance at P.S.  He had to assume that they were there to launch a strike, then flee north.  He could not just wait for Ozawa to come to him, because he had no reason to think that would happen.  The reason the Japanese decoy was so effective was that NO USN aviation admiral would believe that the Japanese would willingly sacrifice CARRIERS.

 

You comment about Halsey's 'pre battle orders' is in error.  Kincaid's belief that Halsey had withdrawn surface warships from his carrier escorts to form a battle line came from 'overhearing' a preparatory order Halsey transmitted to his own forces at about 1512 hours.  This order was then amplified by TBS instructions that the battleship TF was to be form ONLY on his further order.  Kincaid was advised of the intercept and ASSUMED that the preparatory order had been exicuted.  So did Nimitz as Pearl, which resulted in the infamous 'the world wonders' message.  For a good account of this you can check out Clark Reynolds THE FAST CARRIERS.  The battleship TF was only formed much later, when Halsey was actually striking Ozawa's carriers, to be sent forward to finish off cripples.  It was NOT formed at the time of the message Kincaid's people evesdropped on.

 

I will agree that the Japanese plan was as very good.  But it did NOT depend on anyone's stupidity.  That obsession of yours is showing again.  It depended on American underestimation of the Japanese willingness to ruthlessly sacrifice what was, after all, the backbone of their fleet.  Win or lose, the IJN would be finished as anything like a balanced naval force.  It had nothing to do with counting on stupidity.  THEY didn't consider Halsey stupid, and in any rate, didn't know it would be Halsey rather than Spruance in command.  They offered up a decoy that they KNEW would HAVE to draw a response.  Mitscher (who was pretty much a man without a job under Halsey) would have reacted the same way. 

 

In questioning Spruance's tactics at the Philippine Sea, I am hardly alone.  Nimitz and King both did at the time.  Since then, your hero, Samuel Eliot Morison (and it is, indeed, spelled with one 'r' unless the printers have been making the same mistake, consistantly, for the last fifty years) as well as many other writers have been highly critical, on the same basis as my own comments.  Spruance could have moved west under cover of night and been within range to meet Ozawa's forces with immediate counter strikes, and doing so would NOT have involved any increased risk to the invasion forces.

 

More later, got to go for now.

Couple more detail items before I have to go back to work.

For someone who seems to be claiming a serious background in military logistics, you seem to be lacking in some of the basics.

 

Your claim that the fact that McCain's TG was recalled proved that it didn't NEED to replemish.  WRONG ON BASICS.  It is a basic concept that replemishment should  ALWAYS occur BEFORE the force is depleted in consumables to the point it can no longer fight, specifically so that it can be recommitted if that is required.  The fact that McCain could be recalled, simply proves that Halsey's staff had established a proper replemishment cycle.  If it had been impossible to recall McCain due to lack of consumables, THAT would have been a clear indication of logistical incompetence. 

 

As to radar on the Avenger.  The first model, the TBF-1 was built in several versions, including the TBF-1E, equiped with surface search radar.  When the later TBM-3 was introduced, the radar became standard equipment.  There was also a TBM-3E with much better radar (this version was used in night bombing attacks on ships).  By late 1944, even the much smaller Dauntless had radar in the last model produced, the SBD-6.  Note that in the USN designation system of the time, the letter following the subtype number indicated special equipment of some kind: E for electronics, C for special armament, etc. 

Since the CVEs responsibilties included providing ASW protection for the invasion force, and that the TBM-3E was considered especially suitable for ASW work due to its ability to detect small radar targets, such as a conning tower, they would have had a fairly high proportion of -3Es.

 

Wrong on the use of the A20 against major warships

Wrong on the range of the A20.

Wrong on availability of P38s in August and October of '42 in the Solomons.

Wrong on radar equiped TBMs in late 1944.

Wrong on fleet logistical replemishment

 

By the way, if you MUST google for information, I would suggest you can find some good stuff at Combinedfleet.com on the Japanese, and at microworks.net/PACIFIC for the USN.

 

Will go on to other points next time I have the chance.

 

 

Sorry, my error.  The SBD first was equiped with radar in the earlier -5, rather than the -6.

Ref radar on TBMs and SBDs.  The podded radar on the wingtip was AIR SEARCH RADAR used on F6F-3Ns, etc.  The surface search radar used antenna under the wing that looked rather like an inverted 'T' with a long stem and short cross piece.  This was fairly high drag, and could be dismounted if the mission didn't require its use.  Check out enough photos of TBMs and SBDs in flight and I'm sure you'll find it.  There are some good ones of SBDs in Tillman's DAUNTLESS DIVE BOMBER OF WORLD WAR TWO.

 

The subs did NOT report straight to Spruance, nor did he issue them ordereds.  This was just common sense as their command and control arrangements were thru ComSubPac in Hawaii.  Fifth Fleet could, and did monitor their messages to Pearl, (and any report with useful intelligence information was routinely retransmitted to them by ComSubPac), but had no effective way of sending messages directly to the subs anyway.  Any 'orders' from Spruance would go as requests to Lockwood.  ComSubPac always had arrangements to deploy boats in conjunction with any major operation, both for purposes of scouting and to take advantage of any targets provided by Japanese reactions to the operation, which is what happened here.  Due to the fact that the subs speant so much time submerged, where they were out of contact unless they chose to transmitt, sending messages to them required special schedualling arrangements.  It just wasn't practical for the fleet to do that directly.

 

Again, sorry this is taking so long.  Have had very little free time the last few days due to a very serious local situation that's had me doing a LOT of overtime.  When things get back to normal, I'll do a better job of replying to some of this stuff.

The type of radar you were thinking of (with a leading edge mounted pod) was APS.  This was for air interception and was used by the F4U2, F6F3/5N and was mounted in at least some TBM3Es. 

 

The radar mounted in the SBD-5/6, non-specialized TBM3s and retro fitted to many TBM1s and TBF1s was either ASB or the later, very similar ASV.  These were also mounted in nearly every patrol type not equiped with something better.

 

The TBF-1E and the TBM1E and 3E carried ASH which did have a pod, but it was mounted on a bomb-rack like mounting unter one outer wing panel, and could be dismounted.  It reduced a/c speed by 2-5 kts due to drag with similar effects on range.

 

The TBF1D, and TBM1D and 3D as well as most of the -1Cs and -3Cs carried ASD type.

 

You should check out some items that you seem to have missed on the Hyper War site you like so much.  As I've said before, it's not useful as a source for what happened, but very good for what the people involved THOUGHT happened.

 

  I refer you to the section listing 'lessons learned from Leyte Gulf'.  Notably the remarks by CTG38.4 (that would have been Davison.

 

  Several months after the battle, he did not understand why the Japanese carriers had been there at all, and believed that they had made "a grave error" in not withdrawing them.  He presumed that they had launched air strikes and were either waiting for new air groups, or waiting to recover the strikes he believed they had launched.  As far as he was concerned, the chance to destroy them had been a wonderful opportunity for the USN.

"No circumstances more favorable to ourselves could be hoped for."

 

Even after the fact, the idea that the Japanese would have sacrificed their carriers as a decoy was simply unthinkable.  He didn't occur to him after the fact, as it didn't occur to Hasley at the time.  That was why it work.  Not a matter of the Japanese depending on anyone's studpidity at all.  They were depending on the fact that they were sacrificing any real ability for the IJN to influence the future of the war, in return for what whould have been, at the very best, a delay of a few weeks in the American advance against Japan.  This simply didn't make any sense at all to the Americans.

 

 

It was stupid because the primary objective of the battle was to protect the landing forces.  No matter if the carriers were a fat juicy target.  No matter if, somehow, there was an even more desirable target sitting where they were doing the same thing.  Halsey's mission was to protect the landing forces.  Bait, is bait, is bait.  He knowingly sacrificed his primary mission for pride and trying to put a couple flattops on his belt.  It is by the sheer tenacity of the Taffy's and foolishness of the Japanese they did not further exploit his stupidity.  Besides, there were ways to go after what he wanted without being SO dumb about it  

It was a stupid move on Halsey's part.  Competent analysis has shown this, repeatedly.  

Herald

Since you insist that ComSupPac's boats reported directly to Spruance and took orders directly from him, how about citing a source for your claim.  In the past, I've caught you trying to peddle full blown BS and called you on it, and when, after repeated demands, you finally came up with a source, it DIDN'T support your inventions of 'fact' at all, now did it??

The a/c on Saipans' airfields had been destroyed before Ozawa arrived.  The DBs and TBs spent their time beating up the airfields and providing support attacks, but they were launched becasue Spruance had chosen to place the Fast Carriers on total defensive, and Mitscher wasn't DUMB enough to wait to be attacked with serviced attack a/c on his ships!  He ordered them flown off to get them out of the way.

 

The problem here was that Spruacne was a 'formalist' to his fingertips.  Historically, there have been two schools of naval tactics, formalism and meleeist.  Formalist demand tight control of their forces and a very 'formal' engagement plan.  The Meleeist method is to close as quickly as possible to inflict maximum damage.  Spruance, was a battleship-cruiser admiral who had headed the Naval War College and his staff was almost entirely made up of surface officers like Moorer and Turner.  Hence the need to go on the defensive.  To a formalist, it is much more important to avoid any risk of losing, that to it is to win.  Spruance got advice from Mitscher's staff (including Burke) as well as from Washington warning that the Japanese would launch from beyond his range if they could.  Mitscher had calculated that if TF58 started westward at 0100 hours, it would be within 200 miles of Ozawa's force at 0500 -- ideat striking range.

 

The original purpose of forming Lee's battle line (according to Spruance himself) was to destroy the Japanese if they offered battle, or to finish off cripples if they didn't.  The trouble was that Lee DIDN'T WANT to fight a night action.  That would carry a serious chance of losing badly.  The USN still had a very keen respect for the Japanese torpedoes and their skill in using them.  Mitscher's plan would have avoided that by keeping some distance open, but not enough for the Japanese to strike from beyond range.  Spruance, basing his justification on a single submarine report of Japanese ships to the southwest (this was actually a group moving NE to join Ozawa) feared an attempt to get around his southern flank.  This ignored the fact that any such force would be too weak to be a threat to Oldendorf who had seven battleships and two hundred a/c from the CVEs, and that TF58 would still be within range to sent strikes back eastward in the very unlikely event that they were needed.  So Spruance fell back on formalist tradition and formed a sort of battle line of carrier task groups close to the objective rather than closing to destroy the enemy. 

 

Mitscher recalled his fighters from over the island airfields --by then there wasn't much for them to do there -- when radar detected the incoming Japanese strikes and launched his SBDs, SB2Cs and TBMs with orders to orbit east of Guam during the battle.  Due to the need to steam into the wind (from east) for flight operations, TF58 moved away from the Japanese during the battle.  During the battle, Mitscher, at Montgomery's suggestion, ordered the strike a/c to crater the airfields which cost the Japanese most of the few a/c that actually made it that far.  At the beginning of the day, the Japanese had 373 carrier a/c and about 50 on the island airfields.  More than 300 were shot down for the lose of 18 F6Fs and 12 US carrier bombers by the end of the day, but as far as 5th Fleet was concerned, the Japanese fleet remained entact.  Only later did they get notification from ComSubPac of attacks on the two CVs.

 

Your history is as poor as your spelling of the name of your primary source: Samuel Eliot (with one l) Morison (with one r).  Look it up, instead of just shovelling BS. 

By the way, you keep saying that 'history says' that Eastern Solomons was a defeat for Fletcher.

Just WHAT history says that??  Care to cite me the source of your wisdom, or are you making things up AGAIN.  Even Morison admits of Eastern Solomons that "it is generally accounted an American victory."  Quote from his THE TWO OCEAN WAR, Chapter VII part 3.

By the way, the very first radar equiped carrier a/c to see combat was a TBF-1 with an ASB-1 set, belonging to VT10 on the ENTERPRISE that went out in October, 1942. 

 

Later TBM-3Es sometimes carried the APS air search radar along with the  ASH surface search sets.  Those with the ENTERPRISE's specialized night air group, later in the war, did have it.

As to your picture, since the ASH, ASB and ASV radars were all underwing, they would not be visible with the wings folded, even if the particular a/c pictured were so equiped.

 

As to your maps and circles, the map of the Eastern Solomons battle doesn't matter.  At the time, as I've pointed out, land based Army bomber types like the A20 and B25 were not effective against heavy warships, and without long range fighter cover, would be slaughtered anyway.  I know of only one occassion when a Japanese carrier was hit by an Army bomber while at sea.  JUNYO was 'successfully' bombed by a B26 operating from Dutch Harbor during the northern attack in June of 1942 (same time as Midway).  Unfortunately, the weapon making the direct bomb hit was a torpedo, which crashed through the flight deck, but didn't explode (of course, since it never had a chance to arm).

 

The circles on the Philippine Sea map don't mean anything either.  Since Ozawa had no way to get past Mitscher to achieve a central position, talking about the advantages of such a position is meaningless.  Mitscher knew how far Ozawa could advance, and planned to go just far enough west to be within striking range.  He DIDN'T want to risk a surface engagement, which would be throwing away his strength and accepting the one style of combat where the Japanese could still fight effectively.