Ideal World War Two RN

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Subject: Ideal World War Two RN
earlm 5/4/2008 3:13:32 PM

With hindsight what should the RN have done to be the best force possible for WW2? 1. Obtain better AA fire control from US. 2. Obtain US carrier based aircraft through lend lease. 3. Introduce a dual purpose 4.5-5" gun. (US 5"/38?) 4. Scrap the R class. 5. Save money on KGV and arm them with R class turrets with higher elevation. 6. Modernize Hood 7. Modernize Repulse

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larryjcr 5/12/2008 5:58:34 PM

On Strategy Page is a thread where I give a complete answer about Halsey. He forced Kincaid into a carrier battle beyond US land based air cover during the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. I blame him for First Guadalcanal, the Battle of Bull's Run, the two typhoons, the botched mess that is Leyte Gulf, bungling the follow up naval campaign that allowed the Japanese to reinforce Ormoc by sea. There were numerous other botched decisions that Halsey made for which I wish he had been relieved.

Herald .

And as I replied in that thread, Halsey and Kincaid HAD to prevent the Japanese carriers from getting within attack range of Henderson to protect the US lodgement on Guadalcanal. That meant fighting them on the way in.

What changed since Midway? Nothing. You DON'T move your carriers out of range of your land-based air cover when you are that badly outnumbered and if you have land-based air cover to help, nor do you move along a predictable threat axis to neet an enemy head on.

At Leyte Gulf, Halsey's orders from Nimitz and King made the Japanese carriers his primary target if the chance to attack them "presented itself or could be created." Without the knowledge (that we have, but he didn't) that those CVs carried little or no actual striking power, he HAD to view them as the primary threat, and reacted accordingly. Halsey did what his superiors expected of him: act agressively to destroy the carriers. It was Spruance's preceived failure to do so at Philippine Sea that led to the wording of Halsey's orders.

Just because your orders don't make sense and your command arrangements are confused-doesn't excuse BUNGLING and criminal STUPIDITY.

Let me remind you of what was the REALITY when the Bull chased after Ozawa.

1. The follow up reconnaissance launched by Bogan found Kurita had turned around and was headed straight for San Bernardino Strait and that those ships appeared to be in good order and formation.
2. US Army reported San Bernardino channel lights were lit up like a Christmas spectacle. Somebody expected somebody to make a night run through the Strait.

3. Mitscher, Bogan, Lee, et al, and just about anybody American in TF 38, who had the contact reports, who could work calipers and read a map expected Kurita to show up off Samar to throw Kruger a Birthday Party that very morning.
4. Where was 40% of Task Force 38 when Ozawa showed up? That would be John McCain of Task Group 38.1. He was R&R at Ulithi! FIVE of the biggest and best of America's carriers weren't even on hand when that IDIOT Halsey opened Leyte Gulf. he didn't recall McCain until Samar started. Actually he didn't recall McCain at all. That was his panicked staff that yelled for help putting out the call in his name. McCain didn't get there in time to do much except join in the chase after Kurita escaped.

YOU CAN'T ALIBI HALSEY FOR THIS. I would have shot him for criminal negligence after Kincaid convened the inpromptu board of naval inquiry.

Here's why 1.

Here's why 2.

The 'botched mess' was the result of the divided authority and lines of command that came down to Halsey from above. That was the fault of Nimitz, King and MacArthur. A bad arrangement, especially when combined with Halsey's tendancy to 'make war by memo' rather than plan, which resulted in repeated failures by both sides to co-ordinate with each other. Samar was not the only occasion where MacArthur's people assumed something without checking it, and Halsey acted without making sure others knew what he was doing.

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Herald12345 5/12/2008 9:49:20 PM

Herald: You must tell me what was your source for the stuff you put up on the morning strike. I've read at least a dozen different accounts of this and I have NEVER heard anything like this!! Now, my sources include, but are not limited to SHATTERED SWORD ( a book you mention, but appearantly have not read) and Lord's INCREDIBLE VICTORY. I include Lord's book because he was the first one to successfully work out exactly who had attacked what ship. His analysis has stood for over thirty years without being seriously challenged.

Then READ him again. As for Shattered Sword-read that again as well. You quote from it, but you quote wrong..

There are at least three claims in you account that are clearly attempts to 'rewrite history'. I'll shorten that to referring to them as 'crocks' as point them out as I go. Again, I'd really like to know the source you used for them!

Attend:

At the time the ENTERPRISE dive bombers, and the YORKTOWN strike arrived, the original Japanese formation had been badly dispersed by the attempts of HIRYU and SORYU to evade the attacks of VT8 and VT6. Both US pilots and Japanese survivors agree the carriers were arranged in a rough line from NNE to SSW. According to the Japanese, the single carrier at the north end was SORYU with HIRYU about a third of the way down going south, and KAGA and AKAGI close together at the south end.

That was close to accurate, and falls in what I told you about the Japanese maneuvering independently to avoid bombs and torpedoes, isn't it? It is also functionally meaningless to your point.

McClusky had been given a poor estimate of the IJN fleet location by Browning. He flew the outward leg, found nothing and spent more than an hour doing a box search, trying to find something. Eventually, he spotted a DD "going somewhere in a hurry". Hoping it was going to the carriers, McClusky, leading VS6 and followed by VB6 led by Dick Best, flew the direction the DD had been going, and found the Kido Butai.

Again this is correct. So what? McClusky made the decision to follow the arrow. He was one of the astute pilots I mentioned.

Max Leslie, leading VB3 from YORKTOWN along with VT3 and some fighters led by Jimmy Thatch [Thach], was given a very accurate estimate of the IJN location and a very well plotted course by Murr Arnold, YORKTOWN's air ops officer. He flew directly to the Kido Butai from YORKTOWN, aquiring sight of the IJN carriers before reaching the end of his outward leg. Both Arnold and Leslie did letter perfect jobs.

Max Leslie guessed, and Thach followed him delayed by ten minutes. We have nothing from Yorktown except reconstructed after action reports so whatever the revisionists write you have to take with skepticism. It was MASSEY who found the Japanese.

Quoted from that link I gave you.

1. Organization of Yorktown Air Group:

Group Commander - Lt.Comdr. Oscar Pederson, USN.
VB-3 - 18 SBD's - Lt.Comdr. M.F. Leslie, USN.
*VF-3 - 25 F4F-4's - Lt.Comdr. J. Thach, USN.
VT-3 - 12 TBD's - Lt.Comdr. L.E. Massey, USN.
**VS-5 - 18 SBD's - Lieut. W.C. Short, USN

*VF-3 was composed of 16 VF-42 pilots and 11 VF-3 pilots.
**VS-5 was composed of 10 VB-5 pilots, plus 8 from the Saratoga

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larryjcr 5/12/2008 10:23:30 PM

Harald, did you read your own numbers?? You posted that effective radar range at Midway was 30 miles and the proper separation of TFs was 30 miles, but it wouldn't matter because all the CAPs would intercept all the incoming. The F4F wasn't that fast. Given even zero time for decision making and issuing orders, F4Fs couldn't get to another ship 30 miles away in time to stop attacking a/c detected at 30 miles range before they were over their target!!

I know my own numbers, Larry, but can you do math?

55 km separation is 55,000 meters.
Average cruise for a Wildcat at 4000 meters altitude is about 100 mps. You need nine and a half minutes to cover 30 nautical miles at 191 knots. Since the slower Japanese need the same time OR MORE to get over Yorktown once detected , you will show up at about the same time they do. As happened. Why do you think that Americans SELECTED that distance of separation? It was the detection range limit damnit!

Actually, the 72 ftr AG didn't come into use until AFTER the Turkey Shoot. At the time, the standard VF complement of an ESSEX class carrier was still 36 planes, same as it had been at Guadalcanal. Of course the VF were F6Fs rather than F4Fs and they came from a LOT MORE air groups.

The 72 fighter defense was a result of Okinawa. The VFs varied by carrier but the INCREASE [Marines] was already in the works BEFORE the Turkey Shoot.

Air Group 4.

The 5" 38 cal. was a good example of a WW2 medium/heavy AAA weapon. Similar weapons included land based guns like the German 88mm. They were intended to use pre-set, time fused ammo to lay flak bursts in front of enemey a/c. The VT fuse made them very, VERY much more effective, but they were already shooting down enemy a/c before the VTs came along. Perhaps you think they, and the 1.1s were a JOKE, but you never tried to fly into them. The Japanese pilots who did, certainly didn't think that there was anything funny about them.

I happen to know something about ballistics and AAA statistics Larry. It took the Germans about 5000+ 8.8 cm shells to down a B-17. THAT never changed. At sea the 8.8cm was virtually useless against dive bombers.

Before the RP fuse it took about 2000-2500 5 inch bore shells to down a small fast naval attack aircraft. After the RP fuse that dropped to 400-500 shells per aircraft splashed. That is still a lot of shooting to get one VAL

Lesson here is don't compare a medium caliber German AAA gun with a mediocre director system with a USN large caliber AAA gun equipped with a mediocre optical director later vastly improved with direct radar laying and equipped with an RP fused shell. One more thing. VT or clock-timed fused AAA shells were around for quite a while among everybody including the Japanese {that 3.9 inch AAA gun I mentioned]. Its the RADIO PROXIMITY fuse that is the USN 1944 difference and the kicker.

And yes, until those changes came in, naval AAA beyond 1500 meters slant range, no matter whose it was, was a statistical joke.

Herald

If they 'selected' that distance for the reason you give, then one must conclude that they were fools. The whole point of a CAP is to intercept well out from the ship and kill all the way in. If they don't reach the attackers until they're over the target ship, they're totally ineffective as a defense. And that is just what happened with the CAP form ENTERPRISE in the second attack on YORKTOWN. When you figure speed, re

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larryjcr 5/12/2008 10:38:17 PM

I see you've put in more, I'll get to things in order, still working my way thru the big one at the bottom of page one.

Take your time and get it RIGHT. This last post of yours is a MESS.

I'll need to go back to sources for a proper total, but your claim that NO IJN a/c were lost to USN AAA at Coral Sea is not credible. In fact, at least two Kates were shot down by YORKTOWN AAA in the initial attack on that ship.

I think that the total at Coral Sea was less than fifteen altogether-far less. ZILCH was SARCASM as in not main cause of losses.

You put a lot of info on the IHN 25mm vs USN 1.1 inch, but didn't include the most improtant item: number manufactured. The USN was well aware of the failings of the 1.1 inch, but it was what they had, so they compensated by installing a LOT of them, and everything else they could find. This was an ongoing process throughout 1942, and getting exact lists of weapons carried at any particular time is difficult at there was also a lot of 'unofficial' installations, however, from Chesneau's AIRCRAFT CARRIERS OF THE WORLD the following is AAA armament of the four IJN carriers lost at Midway, at the time of their destruction.

AKAGI: 12x4.7" dp, 14x 25mm.

KAGA : 12x4.7" dp, 26x 25mm

SORYU: 12x5" dp, 28x 25mm

HIRYU: as for SORYU

for USS LEXINGTON at Coral Sea: 12.5" dp, 5x3" AAA, AT LEAST 12x1.1" quad mounts (48 tubes), AT LEAST 18x 20mm, plus a large but unknown number of the old water cooled .50 cal. AAMG. Again, it was known that there had been at least some 'unofficial' installations, but exactly what is not known, or, at least, I can't find it.

Kaga.

Lexington.

Shokaku.

Yorktown

Get MUCH better sources, Larry. The American and Japanese carriers were not that far apart as AAA artillery was concerned and your numbers are WAY off..

Both the IJN and USN pilots considered the US AAA was both more instense and more effective than the Japanese.

What aviators saw and what was bombed/shot down are two different things and I said this. Please don't readback to me what I wrote. I said that the Japanese reported that US AAA was violent, and the Americans reported that Japanese AAA was pretty as in being a technicolor fireworks show. Neither was very effective in 1942 compared to fighters.

By Midway, the AAA loading of all US warships had increased again, and it increased still farther during the Solomons campaign.

Again with the fairy tales. LOOK at Shokaku at Coral Sea.

I notice that even you are forced to conceed the effectiveness of USN AAA at Santa Cruz, and try to credit that to the use of the VT fuse. Sorry, Harold. Not unless you're 'rewriting history'. The VT fused shell was NOT used at Santa Cruz. The first shipment didn't get beyond Pearl Harbor until November of '42, and the first use in action against Japanese a/c was by USS HELENA in January of '43. The effectiveness of the AAA at Santa Cruz was entirely the result of putting more and more guns aboard.

I never said a damned thing about the VT fuse at Santa Cruz. What I SAID was that you were delusional about American naval AAA , that there was NO VT or RP fuses in our 5 inch shells or radar directors distributed for AAA IN THE FLEET in quantity; before the Turkey Shoot. I also pointed out

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larryjcr 5/12/2008 11:14:22 PM

Herald: You must tell me what was your source for the stuff you
put up on the morning strike. I've read at least a dozen
different accounts of this and I have NEVER heard anything like
this!! Now, my sources include, but are not limited to
SHATTERED SWORD ( a book you mention, but appearantly have not read)
and Lord's INCREDIBLE VICTORY. I include Lord's book because he
was the first one to successfully work out exactly who had attacked
what ship. His analysis has stood for over thirty years without
being seriously challenged.

Then READ him again. As for Shattered Sword-read that again as well.
You quote from it, but you quote wrong..

There are at least three claims in you account that are clearly
attempts to 'rewrite history'. I'll shorten that to referring
to them as 'crocks' as point them out as I go. Again, I'd
really like to know the source you used for them!

Attend:

At the time the ENTERPRISE dive bombers, and the YORKTOWN strike
arrived, the original Japanese formation had been badly dispersed by
the attempts of HIRYU and SORYU to evade the attacks of VT8 and
VT6. Both US pilots and Japanese survivors agree the carriers
were arranged in a rough line from NNE to SSW. According to the
Japanese, the single carrier at the north end was SORYU with HIRYU
about a third of the way down going south, and KAGA and AKAGI
close together at the south end.

That was close to accurate,
and falls in what I told you about the Japanese maneuvering
independently to avoid bombs and torpedoes, isn't it? It is also
functionally meaningless to your point.

McClusky had been given a poor estimate of the IJN fleet location by
Browning. He flew the outward leg, found nothing and spent more
than an hour doing a box search, trying to find something.
Eventually, he spotted a DD "going somewhere in a hurry".
Hoping it was going to the carriers, McClusky, leading VS6 and
followed by VB6 led by Dick Best, flew the direction the DD had been
going, and found the Kido Butai.

Again this is correct. So
what? McClusky made the decision to follow the arrow. He was one of
the astute pilots I mentioned.

Max Leslie, leading VB3 from YORKTOWN along with VT3 and some
fighters led by Jimmy Thatch [Thach], was given a very accurate
estimate of the IJN location and a very well plotted course by Murr
Arnold, YORKTOWN's air ops officer. He flew directly to the
Kido Butai from YORKTOWN, aquiring sight of the IJN carriers before
reaching the end of his outward leg. Both Arnold and Leslie did
letter perfect jobs.

Max Leslie guessed, and Thach
followed him delayed by ten minutes. We have nothing from Yorktown
except reconstructed after action reports so whatever the
revisionists write you have to take with skepticism. It was MASSEY
who found the Japanese.

Quoted from that link I gave you.

1.
Organization of Yorktown Air Group:

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larryjcr requests 5/12/2008 11:26:07 PM

Which link are you talking about?? Several of yours have gotten me only failure to connect notices.

Why do you insist of burning SP's capacity with long reprint posts that, for the most part contribute nothing to the question at hand?

The interrogation of the KAGA officer, interestingly, doesn't mention the bomb hit that struck the island itself and killed most of the ships senior officers. Other than that, his account conforms to that in SHATTERED SWORD, pages 248-250. Four bombs that went off in the upper hanger deck. One thru the forward elevator, one just forward of the bridge, near the starboard side, one slightly aft of amidships and somewhat to port and one just at the starboard, forward corner of the aft elevator. Since the hit to the island, and the second mentioned above were very near each other, some confusion could be expected.

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larryjcr attacks on SORYU 5/12/2008 11:41:13 PM

Perhaps you should read your own sources, Herald.

The interrogation of the SORYU XO supports the account that I gave, fully. He reports three bomb hits, made by about 12 a/c all attacking at the same time, in three groups coming down on the ship from three different angles. Very close to Leslie's group of 14, one of which (Leslie himself) didn't have a bomb to drop. Nothing about any a/c attacking later, after Leslie's group finished with the CV. Nobody from another group (ENTERPRISE) wandering by to attack later.

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larryjcr Primary sources 5/13/2008 3:50:10 AM

The interrogation of Capt. Amagi (former air officer of KAGA I find particularly interesting, as it contains several statements that are demonstrably false. I wonder if it was his memory of a high stress incident from over three years previous, or if he was jerking his interviewers around deliberately.

For example, he states that no KAGA a/c were on the attack on Midway. The flight records of all four carriers were saved, and we know exactly how many a/c were launched, when, for what purpose and what happened to each. KAGA sent 18 Vals 1 reccon Kate and 9 Zekes on the Midway attack. It also added two Zekes to the CAP in the same launch. The total Midway strike was of 110 a/c in nearly equal groups from each carrier. AKAGI and KAGA each contributed a squadron of Vals and a Kate, HIRYU and SORYU each contributed a squadron of Kates, and each of the four ships sent 9 Zekes.

According to both persons involved in the planning of the Midway operation, and the planning documents, the northen attack was NOT a diversion, and Yamamoto didn't really want it laid on at the same time, but had to accept it to get cooperation in the Midway operation. In this case, Amagi might well not have known and simply reacted to the way the question was framed as the USN was convinced that it had been a diversion.

There are always problems dealing with primary source material. It's not too bad with technical data. You just have to find out if the source had the oportunity and expertise to perform the tests in question, if there were likely to be any ulterior motive slanting the tests for good or bad, and check the details of the methodology used. Fairly straightforward.

A personal account, like these interrogation reports, is much more difficult to assess. It's like doing a crime investigation by questioning witnesses. The accounts of the same incident by two different witnesses are often very different. The witnesses are excited and their preceptions are often distorted. There are methods of sorting that out, but the two big rules are to take the statement as soon after the incident as possible, and not to let the witnesses have contact with each other before taking the statement. Obviously, in the interrogation accounts, both of these requirements have been lost. Some statements are likely to be quite accurate, others much less so. To assess the difference, and sort out the accurate material within a statement from the mispreceptions that always slip in requires a lot of cross checking between statements and comparison to other records. That's why I only read stuff like this out of interest, and never trust any particular comment made. I don't have the time to properly assess them myself, so I leave that to experts who specialize in it.

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larryjcr Killing escorts 5/13/2008 11:33:00 AM

In an earlier post I remarked on US subs deliberately attacking escorts in preferrence to cargo ships. You replied that they only attacked escorts in self defense or to get to the cargo ships.

Not so!

In early 1944 ONI became aware of the shortage of escorts in the IJN. The target priority list that was part of the orders given sub commanders was altered to reflect the situation. Escort ships were given priority over cargo ships as targets. Major warships had first priority in the order CVs, BBs, CAs and CLs, then tankers, then escort ships, with cargo ships having lower priority.

Not only were US subs deliberately attacking escorts, that was the policy from ComSubPac.

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Herald12345 5/13/2008 1:20:41 PM

You seem to be obsessed with twisting time to try and make a point.

Please try and follow.

I've twisted nothing. I've commented on the history, especially where the revisionists get it wrong..

Nimitz deliberately chose Fletcher as the carrier commander afloat for the active threatre at the time, the SOPAC, not Spruance.

This is inaccurate. Nimitz didn't have much choice about the commanders for his carriers. Fletcher was already there . Noyes was coming over from the Atlantic. Fitch was already slotted, Halsey was down with the crud, and Spruance was the one he tagged BY CHOICE for a slot he could fill. Where he had a choice he made a choice. Ghormley was yet to fail for health. Turner was expected to handle the Guadalcanal naval landing. Seniority slotted Fletcher not accomplishment into the carrier flag.. .

Spurance became Chief of Staff for CinCPac, a job he was slated for before Midway. The Fifth Fleet command came well over a YEAR LATER, where Spruance and Mitscher replaced Pownell, who had failed his 'try out' for the part. It was not anything Nimitz had planned for him in June of 1942. With US forces in the Central Pacific growing and Pownell proving unsuitable, and with more complex operations planned, Spruance was given the planning and supervision of the fleet, and Mitscher got command of the fighting force. As of June, 1942, Nimitz had had very little direct contact with Spruance and had picked him for Chief of Staff on his reputation. Fifteen months later, when he was looking for someone to oversee Fifth Fleet, that had changed.

Herald:

You seem to be obsessed with twisting time to try and make a point.

Please try and follow.

I've twisted nothing. I've commented on the history, especially where the revisionists get it wrong..

Nimitz deliberately chose Fletcher as the carrier commander afloat for the active threatre at the time, the SOPAC, not Spruance.

Pownall [spelled with an A] failed at Marcus Island as a task group commander. What tryout? He was never intended as a fleet commander-maybe a carrier admiral-but like Fletcher failed. Mitscher was never a good choice, but he was next senior and at least he was aggressive. Spruance after Midway was the golden boy.

Fletcher's staff from YORKTOWN transferred to ASTORIA with him. That was not a consideration in his decision to leave Spruance in command rather than going aboard HORNET at the end of 4 June.

His staff was scattered and had to be transferred to him from rescue ships. Astoria had no air operations or an admiral who keep things straight in his own head as to who was doing what to whom. Communications sure weren't there. What choice was there? Command dislocation that severe means that you shift to the next echelon unit set up to direct. Airops doesn't work from a cruiser too well if you don't have a air plot. Astoria didn't .

Halsey was not sent to SOPAC to do the 'details of the fighting'. He was sent in as theatre commander to replace Ghormley who had lost everyone's confidence. Halsey didn't really want Ghormely's job. He'd rather have had Fletcher's, not just be

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