I will say I was throwing a rhetorical bomb there...I would ask did Britain need 15 BB and BC's in 1939?  And when I speak of carriers I am referring to the CVE's more than the CV type of carrier.

 

Britain didn't really need Fleet Carriers, but carriers for ASW and limited ASuW and for AAW over its convoys.  It needed flying boats and long-ranged land aircraft to attack U-boats and to perform maritime surveillance.  It didn't really need to focus, or to focus so much on the surface action.

 

The RN's problem was it's admirals and the RAF's generals (Air Marshals?), British Flag Officers, the RN wasn't air-minded and ASW-minded enough and the RAF was focused on the mantra "The Bomber Will Always Get Through.?  

 

Britain, rightly thought, that it would be fighting under the umbrella of land-based air, Britain, Malta, Singapore, Hong Kong, etc., etc.  It didn't need the USS Saratoga or the Essex Class CV's, but it sure needed a bunch of CVE's and the equivalent of the Martlet and Tarpon, in 1939, plus a large number of frigates/DE's and the like...Being air-minded isn't necessarily building the USS Nimitz, or the USS Essex, it's building an air force that meets your needs, on land and sea.

I'll take a stab...in a Herald-esque way that bears no relations to the actual fiscal/diplomatic rules on the ground at the time; and

freely admitting that Herald, Larry and a host of others are far more technically literate than I am; and 

Realizing that hindsight is 20:20 and much of this is hindsight; and 

With the following caveats/axioms:

   1. Britain had as potential enemies, in the following order of threat:

        A. Germany

        B. Japan

        C. Italy

   2. Britain could only fight Germany or Italy; it could not fight Japan.  The RN was too small and too logistically constrained to fight Japan except as a minor player defending Singapore and the Malay Barrier, with the United States providing the BULK of the combat power.  Further, the Italian Navy was not that great a fleet, materially, logistically-fuel oil, or in the human dimension, operating in an environment that allowed air power to operate to it's maximum extent.

   3. Germany's threat was U-boat and the FW-200, not the Tirpitz and that Britain would need to focus on that threat far more than any surface threat Germany made.

   4. Finally, that Britain did not need the Saratoga, or the Yorktowns, or the Essex class CV's.  It was NOT going to fight in the mid-Pacific, without the aid of land-based air.  Britain was going to fight under the umbrella of land-based air, and that it's carriers needed to be smaller and more focused on ASW and scouting than the US or Japanese carriers.

 

1. Adopt the Oerlikon 2 cm gun much sooner.  This was a fine light AAA, and until the rise of the Kamikaze and increased air craft speeds a very good and lethal piece of ordnance.  This is a good AAA well into 1944.

2. Adopt the Bofors 4 cm gun much sooner.This was ANOTHER fine piece of AAA, much better than the 2dr. Pom-Pom and would have served the RN well into 1944/45, again the Kamikaze might have stretched it's lethality, but that wasn't until 1944, and for the British in a very minor way.

3. Rather than the 5.25" DP adopt the 4.7"/12 cm DP Mk XI L/50.  According to what little I have read, on-line, this would have been the better DP weapon, with a more manageable shell weight, and capable of being fitted into the same mountings as the 5.25".  The result would have been a higher rate of fire, for AAW, and a greater weight of shell down range for ASuw, again due to the higher rate of fire.  It could have been fitted with the proximity fuse for the later faster threat or the Kamikaze threat.

4. Adopt the US Fire Control System for AAW, as I understand that the US had better directors and computers for this sort of thing.

 

Results: Better AAW capacity than the British went to war with.  This might have made the Mediterranean Theatre less of a problem, the Murmansk runs less deadly, and might have eroded the German air threat in the Mid-Atlantic faster.

 

1. Stand down some of her 66 cruisers.  I realize that Imperial policing is one of the prime missions, but this is about the IDEAL RN, for 1939-45, not the RN for 1919-39.  Fewer cruisers might have freed up moneys and tonnage for other vessels.

2. After 1919, stand down all but the Queen Elizabeths and the Hood.  Britain faced no surface threat in the 1920's, and these 6 vessels plus HMS Nelson and Rodney would have sufficed.  Start the King George V's sooner, bringing them on-line in period 1939-40.  As that happened the British might have stood down Malaya and Barham.  Again this might have freed up money, crew and tonnage for other purposes.  My proposal leaves Britain in 1940 with 11 Capital Vessels.  This would seem more than enough to combat the Regia Nautica, in conjunction with land and sea based attack squadrons, and the fairly small surface threat of the Kriegsmarine.  Everyone talks or sings about the Bismarck, but she was only ONE vessel, backed up by 2 battle cruisers.  The Kriegsmarine was NOT that potent a surface threat.

JKFY, I'd agree with much of what you say, I would raise one or two points though.

 

It is easy to decry now, how many BBs the RN kept on, it's worth noting that no Navy really understood the changing dynamic of carrier aviation in naval warfare, Why else does the US have 8 BBs parked in Pearl harbour in 1941 - or the Japanese build the Yamato. As late as the Leyte Gulf, Halsey was desperately hoping to engage Japanese BBs in a good old fashioned line vs line engagement.

 

Thus, the size of the RN is based on being able to fight both Germany and Japan effectively, based on the idea that BBs still reigned supreme. The spanner in those works is the fall of France. Looking back, it's easy to see how much British planning was based on having France on board, to take on the bulk of the mediterranean assignment, as well as making sure there are no bases in France for U-boats to operate out of. In that respect, the smaller pre war ASW force is a reasonable gamble based on the far smaller number of U-boat sorties available if France stays in the fight. As it was the fall of our gallic neighbours chucked that into dissarray

 

Thus, I find it hard to berate the admiralty too much for that decision, as it was, there is not much the Navy eventually did do in the Atlantic that was wrong, the RN adapted quicker, both in technology and tactics than Doenitz' U-boats and Horton was definately a top class commander. It's probably the RNs finest hour in WW2.

 

Where I am adamantly on side with you is carrier aviation. It speaks volumes for British capacity to muddle through and make things work with two six inch nails and some duct tape, that the FAA actually had a decent war. Taranto stands at the pinnacle of that, showing the admiralty where it should have been paying more attention.Of course, the RAF had been able to marginalise the naval aviators for years, such that they inflicted a crippling blow on the Italian navy with a dozen ancient biplanes... it's simply ridiculous.

 

The seafire, was never going to be an ideal naval aircraft, two short legged with very poor landing characteristics for carrier aviation, yet it was made to work and did very well against the Japanese in 1945. However, my first choice would be the sea hurricane, rugged, simple, with decent handling and comparable to the F4F and superior to the Buffalo, as well a being available first.I would definately welcome the SBD into the FAA in large numbers, while not a brilliant aircraft on paper, it's combat record is brilliant. There is not much wrong with later British developments in the realm of the barracuda and Sea fury.

 

In terms of carriers, the armoured decks continue to be controversial, clearly they had some uses but were probably outwayed in terms of their effects on the Carriers primary function. Having said that the Illustrious class was made to carry far more aircraft than it should have done for it's 28,000 tonnes, the Malta class, had it come to bear, would have been far more in line with the Essex class CVs as operated by the US. I think, the best thing to do would be to start with the Ark Royal, move on to slightly up armoured versions of that ship and then hopefully onto thwe malta class.

 

Arguably, unlike the USN, which largely fought the war it had been preparing for. The RN found itself far removed from it's pre war notions. All sensible and rational decisions being rendered obsolescent by the need to fight alone for a year and a half. While no doubt, the British fully intended for the US to take the brunt of the pacific campaign, it probably is wrong to simply write of the British as defending the Malay barrier alone. It had been fully intended to send a strong fleet to the Pacific, In this context, the idea of keeping all those major surface units makes sense. The need to fight an ASW war with Destroyers and Corvettes, largely by itself (by itself, I refer to the whole british commonwealth) was an unforseen circumstance. Thus, for me, the only thing that stops the RN of 1939 from being a balanced 'ideal' force is the total lack of a decent carrier force in 39. Everything else is subject to crystal ball gazing to know that france will fall etc etc. Had the RN been able to send a decent force of 3-4 carriers, backed up by a strong fleet as intended, it would have made a big difference to the allied forces in the pacific in 42 (even if it gets outstripped later on). As it was, even had it been able to send a strong force, it would have been unbalanced with the lack of a decent FAA aircraft.

Good points by all!  The politics behind military decisions are usually ignored.

The control of RN a/c by the RAF during the 20s and early 30s was a disaster when the FAA finally was established.  They didn't have decent a/c as the RAF didn't put money into developement for carrier planes, and they didn't have the TIME to remedy the problem.  Add that few if any of even the mid-rank pilots went to the RN rather than stay with the RAF, meaning that nobody of serious rank in the RN really had much idea of what should get piority attention.  The Skua was a decent dive bomber, but not as good as either the SBD or Val, and the FAA ended up trying to use it as a fighter, for lack of better.  The money spent on the Roc was a total waste.  The Albacore wasn't enough better than the Swordfish to justify developement, and by the time the Barracuda was available, the US was producing the far superior Avenger/Tarpon. 

 

The story in RAF Coastal Command was a bit better, but even there it was only the availability of US built a/c that save the situation.  Fortuantely the Catalina and Hudson were there in place of the 'less than entirely successful' Lerwick and Botha.  Of the prewar Coastal types, only the Beaufort was a genuine success.  At that, Coastal was always playing second fiddle to Bomber Command for funds and a/c.  At one point, Harris actually demanded that Coastal be abolitshed and the a/c be given to Bomber Command.  He claimed that with the additional a/c he could bomb Germany into surrender in two months, so ignoring the U-boats would not be a problem!!!!

 

With the advantage of hindsight, the RN could have started out building something like the COLOSSUS class ships instead of the ILLUSTRIOUS type.  Smaller, not as fast, but much cheaper, and with a simialr a/c capacity.

Part of the problem with a/c capacity of RN carriers was that they DIDN'T like to leave a/c on deck, and didn't design a/c to be treated that way.  That's why ARK ROYAL (22,000 tons with no deck armor) was listed as carrying 72 a/c, while the USS WASP (14,700 tons) carried up to 84.  The USN did expect to leave a/c on deck, and it went into the design of the planes from Grumman, Vought, Douglas, etc.  To the RN, a/c capacity was what fit into the hanger.  To the USN it was the number that could be carried with room left for flight operations, and to shift the a/c around onboard.

 

The Seafire was never really up to carrier operations, which is why the late war RN effort in the Pacific used a lot more Corsairs!  Although half of the RNs fighter squadrons at that time, were equiped with Seafires, only one of the five CVs they sent to the Pacific carried them.  Of the other four, one carried Hellcats and three carried Corsairs.  The Seafire was nice enough in the air, if you didn't need range, but the losses in deck crashes due to the compareatively weak, narrow landing gear were too serious a problem, and, unlike the US built a/c, you couldn't just leave them out in the salt spray.

Seeing as things have gotten back on track,

(and very much more maturely, I might add...excellent last few posts guys),

I'll borrow JFKY's layout:

 

Britain's potential enemies:

I'd change the priorities, making Italy second and Japan third.

With continental Europe out of its reach due to the loss of France, keeping the fascist Italians at bay was a greater logistics burden (needed to secure ports and airfields in Africa) than what little bit the RN contributed in the first couple years in the Pacific (not saying they didn't contribute anything worthwhile, but the USN could've handled most Pacific ops when Imperial Japan went on the offensive. That, and better consolidation of operating with the Australians and other sympathetic allies in the region might've saved a few British vessel from the Japanese).

Italy was able to play a sizeable support role for the Germans, what with airfields, ports, and other military assistance. Japan for the most part was alone at that end of the world (

(If I were Britain and had major concerns of Japanese Pacific activity, I might have considered sending aid (money, hardware) to Russia to "encourage" them to act more aggressively at the Japanese in the northwestern Pacific, perhaps even so far as finding a means to get RN ships some support at Pearl, the Aleutians, even the eastern-most Russian ports, if little more than refueling and crew rest (the US port facilities would've afforded greater accomodation than the Russians'),

even though that amounts to a considerable open ocean distance that would've needed to be skirted to avoid squaring off against the brunt of the Japanese suface fleet (not to mention sub threat).

 

The solution to Germany's U-boats, IMO,

would've been utilizing all those night raids to damage the sub pens and other German-supporting ports on the northwestern European coast as often as possible, if not putting them out of commission outright then at least undoing all the repairs the Germans did during the daylight, perhaps even the aerial mining of harbors (wasn't a lot of global commercial shipping at risk back in those days).

And tying up German fighters by needing them to focus more on defending their own coasts means that the Me110s and Ju88s attacking England wouldn't have had as much defensive escort...possibly (German fighters would've worn out quickly and become maintenance hogs if they were required to perform daily as escort fighters into Enland's airspace, only to become defenders of their own turf at night when the British began an intensified coastal bombing campaign.

 

Add to that, a larger production of sloops, corvettes, and DEs that were primarily tasked at ASW. Plus, more of these with adequate AA armament could've kept those Condors at the outer edges of convoys, and perhaps even CAM ships could've come about sooner (even a Buffalo catapulted off a deck could've challenged a Condor out beyond any protective fighter cover of its own).

 

Add to that yet again, would be a rapid ramp up of activity to build support facilities in Iceland, the southern coastal areas of Greenland, and as much of the northeastern Canadian coast as could be afforded.

There's also the fact that the German ships weren't above heading for shelter in South America. A stronger Caribbean presence, allowing patrols to reach into the tropical Atlantic region, could've challenged that.

It's all about money: even going into debt, Britain couldn't have done it alone.

American Lend-Lease could've included building those bases, manned by as many personnel as the US had volunteers for(initially, officially in non-combat support roles, so's not to offend anyone before the Japanese attack on Pearl).

 

And I'd have upped the defensive screen on the eastern coasts of England, everything from AA batteries to the huge coastal guns that kept the German navy as close to the French coastline as posible during their transitting from the North Sea to the Med (a very promising place to mine the hell out of, near the French coast just beyond the range of British heavy coastal guns).

 

I'd have included more recce patrols to keep tabs on who was sailing what thru the Channel, as often as possible (Sunderland production, and numerous other flying boats, would seen an increase, perhaps even more alert fighters- the faster Spits, along hidden revetments as close to the coast as possible, to react quicker to the approaching German air wings...more of an RAF worry than the RN).

 

 

WRT the 20mm Oerlikon, a damn fine gun for its day.

If we're going to talk about improving En

Some good points.

Sorry, however, but the Typhoon wouldn't make it as a carrier a/c.  Its ground handling qualities were horrible.  The flight controls were useless below about 100mph.  Keeping it pointed the right direction on take off required some very VERY careful use of wheel brakes, and landings were made HOT!  Trying to do a full-stall landing in one would be close enough to deliberate suicide as to make no difference.  A lot of this was fixed in the Tempest V, but there was still the liquid cooled engine to consider unitl the Tempest II became available.

 

There were reasons the USN used ONLY air cooled engines in carrier a/c.  They were lighter and more compact for the power they put out, required less maintainence and, above all, the radiators of the liquid cooling systems were very vulnerable to the effects of saltwater spray.  As I posted earlier, the USN demanded a/c that could be stored on deck.  This was the ONLY real drawback to the Firefly, which was otherwise an excellent carrier a/c and was really what put the British back into the carrier a/c game with some credibility.  With the advantage of hindsight, Fairy should have put the effort wasted on the Albacore and Barracuda into developing the Fulmer into the Firefly more quickly.  Note that when the RN finally built a real carrier fighter, it was developed from the smaller version of the Tempest II, into the Sea Fury. 

 

This is fun to talk about, but as you said, the money, manpower and resources would have to come from somewhere else.  Even using hindsight to see what WOULD have been better, ignores the realities of budget, national will, and service polititcs, all of which enter the decision-making process big time!

Actually, I was grasping at straws in suggesting the Typhoon or Tempest, as I couldn't really think of any other suitable British aircraft (I'd completely forgotten about the Fulmar and Firefly, and agree they should've pushed for the Firefly sooner (even if it wasn't using an air-cooled radial!).

 

The only other possibly-formidable aircraft I would've thought of would've been the Westland Whirlwind, but only because its cluster of four 20mm's in its nose would've made mincement out of any aircraft that got in front of it, even if the rounds-per-gun was woefully inadequate by US carrier aircraft standards.

But I'd have wagered the Whirlwind would've been a nightmare to handle on a carrier.

The only remaining choice would've been the Sea Mosquito, if not trying to push the Hornet into development and production sooner.

 

But again, the worst thing that the British did was keep using aircraft made out of organic materials (wood and cloth) in use on ships subjected to salt water and the generally thick humidity that accompanies the ocean.

I can understand their predicament though: other than trees and sheep, they didn't have a ton of natural resources to harness (aluminum, iron, manganese, etc), no where near the extent the US had.

 

I kind of liken it to the example of an elderly yet prideful parent trying desperately to prove to its much-mightier child that the parent wasn't so totally decrepid and still had some strength left,

refusing to accept that she needed more help in her ever-increasingly-battered state,

instead of just accepting it and saying, "my child, I need more help, NOW!"

 

But there again, that all comes back on America's pre-war isolationist mentality, even if there were those eager amongst our ranks to join the fight.

It's just too bad for Japan (and Germany in the long run) that they didn't plan out to attack more than Pearl (Panama Canal, as was mentioned over @ Furashita's Navy), attacks that would've more effectively debilitated America's warbuilding capabilities for a longer period: if we would've had to have diverted far more resources and effort along our wesern seaboard to fend off rumors of Japanese invaders, England might not've gotten sufficient early Lend-Lease to help her hold off the German hordes in the eastern North Atlantic region and going into the Battle of Britain (not if she'd need to have provided the resources for her own ships and other resources that her American child so generously provided).

What if US raw materials shipments had been delayed or stopped altogether by a rising U-boat menace, enough that it would've weakened England's war production by perhaps just enough percentage points that she just wouldn't have had the strength to fend off those final raids, opening her up ripe for German paratroop detachments to raid onto English soil and wreak havoc and terror and fear amongst her citizens even more (the Home Guard would've put up a valiant fight, but against well-trained Wermacht or SS crack paratroop squads, they would've been easy prey).

 

The question here then might be,

in order for Britain tgo have improved the RN into a more credible and capable force (using the hindsight we have today),

how could she have best gone about swaying her allies (principally, the US) for greater support?

This'll most likely reach deeper into 1930's-, even 1920's- era, international politics moreso than anything to do with just adopting which weapons sooner, and building more or less of which ships and aircraft.

 

Perhaps a better intel network could've alerted the British to just how capable the German war machine was becoming, and she then could've better prepared accordingly (even going so far as suggesting Hood may have actually been better prepared for her match with Bismarck, for example: an accompanying carrier,

even with torpedo-armed Swordfish, 20mm-cannon-and-AP-bomb-armed Fireflys, and Sea Hurricanes (with 20mm cannon and those 60-lb rockets?) at the ready,

could've stopped the mighty German ship there and then (the cannon fire and rockets could've kept the gun crews uneasy whilst the Swordfish ran home the kippers and the Fireflies dropped the AP bombs thru the roof),

or convinced her captain to continue trying to avoid the British altogether rather than challenge them,

which also could've generated a considerably different outcome for several later battles )...

 

... I will admit: all the what-if weapons speculation is good to get the blood flowing more vigorously in one's brain.

 

T

All too true.

By the way, the Japanese wouldn't have had to go to Panama to do much more damage than they did.  Nimitz himself later said that if they'd destroyed the fleet's fuel tank farm at Pearl the war would have lasted another two years!! 

 

Most folks aren't aware that by the end of February Nimitz's Task Force 1 contained seven old battleships, just one less than at Pearl Harbor, and he was constantly bombarded by King in Washington to do something with them.  Nimitz was aware (as King appearantly was NOT) that the OBBs couldn't operate without carrier support, they were too slow to operate with the CVs without dangerously reducing the carriers movements, and burn a LOT of oil, of which Nimitz NEVER had enough to go around.  The shortage of modern oilers to supply ships at sea, and tankers to move the stuff repeatedly came close to crippling operations during 1942.  So Nimitz spent a lot of time trying to convince King to leave the OBBs on the west coast, instead of sending them out to Pearl and burning the fuel CinCPac had to transport.

 

Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.

it's worth noting that the sea fury came from the Typhoon/tempest lineage and was an excellent carrier fighter.... it arrived a couple of months late to see the war though.

 

that would probably get my vote

Dogtag, Lend lease didn't begin until 1941. From the fall of France onwards we were screaming for help. We got the 50 destroyers off of you guys which was great, but in the BoB, we were on our own.

 

It's not evens o much to do with a lack of materials, the empire and commonwealth gave us access to the raw materials required, however, there were pre-conceived notions about airplanes, and what the FAA needed.... with no real guiding hand in naval aviation, it's no wonder we built so many lame ducks, or, in the case of the sea fire, had to rely on conversio of good land based planes, depsite their patent unsuitability.