Again with the simplistic, childish name calling in place of proper assessment.

 

Consider the situation for the opposing admirals at the end of the day. 

Nagumo: His mission was to get the heavy reinforcement convoy through against air opposition from Henderson and the US carriers.  He'd failed, and the convoy had been forced to delay its advance.  He lost a CVL and had damage to one of his remaining CVs.  He'd lost nearly forty a/c to the 'KAKUs' alone, and recovering the survivors of the RYUJO still left him short a/c not to mention with a disorganized air group.  After Midway, he was NOT about to commit himself to attacking a land base if there was any chance of US carriers around, so his first concern for the next day is locating Fletcher.  Everything else would have to wait.  Moreover, he was getting thin on fuel.  One more day of serious operations would probably be all he could have before he had to pull back north to fuel.

 

Fletcher:  His mission was to prevent a major naval operation against Guadalcanal.  He had forced the convoy back and killed RYUJO, damaged SHOKAKU and protected Henderson from any major air attack.  He'd have liked nothing better than to join WASP and SARATOGA and go after Nagumo, who was clearly vulnerable, while he'd lost only 26 a/c, including those from Henderson.  But he had three problems.  ENTERPRISE was damaged.  He'd have remembered Midway, too.  If TF16 had covered YORKTOWN instead of running off to hunt cripples, that Japanese sub might not have gotten in.  The loss of a damaged CV was a high price for sinking a damaged CA.  Fletcher learned from the things that went wrong and tried not to repeat errors.  SARATOGA was packed to the rafters (literally) with the a/c from  ENTERPRISE.  There was no room to respot or rearrange them.  All he could do was service and launch the ones at the front of the flight deck.  It would take at least half a day to get things organized to fight, unless he was willing to shove 35-40 a/c overboard to give himself working space.  And those a/c were priceless at that time.  And SARA was thin on fuel.  Half a day was about all he'd have before he had to pull out and hit the oiler.  So the price of half a day to go after Nagumo would be increased risk to ENTERPRISE and the loss of very valuable a/c.  On the other hand, he could take a day to fuel, reorganize, fly off a/c while WASP covered, and be back with WASP, full fuel bunkers and two full air groups the day after.  He made his decision.  And remember, those a/c he DIDN'T shove overboard ended up on Guadelcanal.

 

So Nagumo hunted for a day and found nothing, while the CACTU a/c gave to convoy a good punch and sent it running back to Rabaul, then pulled out to fuel.  Fletcher came back to find Nagumo and the reinforcement convoy gone, and the approaches to Guadalcanal his to control.  He is given credit for winning the battle, even by historians who dislike him, because he did win it.  Well, in the real world, he won it, you world view is another thing.

As a result of considerable study during this discussion, I have concluded that not only did Raymond Spruance NOT 'perform brilliantly' at Midway, but, as far as the critial first strike was concerned, he didn't even perform competently.

 

He failed to do one of those things expected of a competent commander: effectively supervise his immediate subordinates.

 

This was not his fault.  He simply lacked the technical knowledge and experience to do the job, which is to say: he was not competent.  Nimitz knew that when he appointed him, but it shouldn't have made any sense.  If the TF16 senior officers, Browning, Murrey and Mitscher, had performed at the level that Nimitz had a right to expect, then Spruance's incompetence wouldn't have mattered.  The trouble is that they failed, and he could do nothing but stand there and watch them do it.

 

Understand the plane prepared by Nimitz, Fletcher, Spruance and Noyes.  It was based on one misconception that effected the Americans' view of what was going on, and the decisions that they made.

 

From the de-crypt intelligence they knew that the Japanese were sending a force of 4 CVs against the island and that half the a/c would be used to attack while the rest were held in reserve.  Assuming that Japanese doctrine was similar to US, they expected Nagumo to divide his carriers into two seperate forces of two each -- one to attack the island, and one to remain in support, probably about 50 miles away to the west or northwest.  They DIDN'T expect all four carriers to be with the attacking force.

 

Under the plan, TF17 with Fletcher and YORKTOWN would wait NNE of Midway, performing the needed patrols and searches.  TF16 with ENTERPRISE and HORNET under Spruance would wait with them, with decks spotted to launch the most powerful possible combined strike by both air groups.  When the Japanese attack force was spotted, TF16 would move SW as quickly as possible into range and lauch a co-ordinated two air group strike to overwhelm it and destroy the two CVs while they were engaged in the strike on the island.  It was essential that these two ships be eliminated, so the attack was deliberately intended to be as powerful as possible.  Splitting the two US TFs was part of the plan.

 

When TF17 finsihed recovering a/c it would follow TF16 SW.  By the time Fletcher caught up, it was expected that the stike on the attack group would have been made, and the support group would have been located.  It would then be Fletcher's job to attack the support group.  It was hoped that he could sink a carrier, but in any event it was crititcal that he keep that second pair of carriers busy until TF16 had recoverd and rearmed its a/c.

 

When the Midway PBY reported a force of '2 CVs and BBs' the expectations seemed confirmed.  All was going according to plan.  Fletcher sent to Spruance: "Proceed southwesterly and attack eneemy carriers as soon as definitely located.  I will follow as soon as planes recovered."  The execution ordered for Spruance and TF16s part in the plan.  Spruance had only one decision to make: exactly when to launch the actual attack, and that was really the decision of Browning, since Spruance didn't have the know-how or experience himself. 

 

The irony is that with all four Japanes CVs together, the planned, massive strike would have certainly wrecked at least three and quite possibly all four.  When Fletcher arrived, he'd have had nothing to do except finish off the cripples Spruace's force left him, and Spruance would actually deserve the credit he's been given.  If they had just followed the plan and performed at a reasonable level of competence, Spruance's inability to supervise them would not have mattered.  Instead, they blew it!!

 

Browning misjudged the location of the Japanese force and the closing speed of TF16 and plotted a strike on empty ocean.  He handed his flawed plan to Spruance who had no way of recognizing the problems, and rubber stamped it.

 

Murrey, who was Spruance's air task force commander, (part of the job Fitch had at Coral Sea) as well and ENTERPRISE CO, failed to make any arrangement for either coordination of the two air groups, or even to assure uniformity of lauch methods.  He also failed to ensure that ENTERPRISE was properly prepared to the launch.  As a result, the launche was slow and the resultant strike was badly fragmented, not the intended, massive blow.

 

Mitscher got his strike up, but in a way the burned far too much fuel in the escort fighters.  His CAG, Ring, then led the gr

Aside from Larry's and Herald's discussion over who should be blamed v. credited for what, the events of Midway point to the absolute fallacy of set piece games where you assume one side will do this there-fore we will do that as a counter move. Once the puck drops and the game starts the randomness of fate and seemingly insignificant small events takes over. It is then up to the individuals in the field to make up for the predictable ignorance of the enemy's exact position and exact intentions.

 

Much of Japanese and US Naval leadership training of the period was spent trying to set up set piece matches to take out the enemy in some brilliant stratagem or another. In the end it came down good or bad decisions by the people carrying the spears and no small measure of blind luck.

 

Check Six

 

Rocky

You are repeating yourself onj your assertions, Larry  WITHOUT proof as well as being wrong on FACT, Will try to get to you ASAIC.

 

Wait until I catch up on work.

 

Herald 

 

Name the FACT that you contest and I'll be more than happy to provide the source, Herald. 

 

The comment about 'set piece' battles is quite correct.  Unless you have the advantage of an overwhelming force, you have to count of the guys at the pointed end to win for you -- which is the core of the 'melee' school of tactics as opposed to the 'formalist' and of the 'leadership' style of command as opposed to the 'management' model. 

At Midway, the USN guys at the pointed end reacted more correctly more often than the IJN and as a result are credited with winning the fight. I would argue we lost some terrific opportunities but you take the victories you get not the ones you could have had.

 

I love study of the South Pacific War because it drives home those points so exquisitely!

 

Check Six

 

Rocky

 

Witchcraft indeed, or maybe something close to a miracle. 

A large portion of luck that McClusky found the Japanese at all.  But that he did so, and began his attack at virtually the same time that Leslie (VB3) did so from the other direction, with no coordination between them at all -- there had to have been less than two minutes difference -- is enough to make you believe in just about anything.

Dauntlesses and radars, dates and ships operated from.

 

Avengers same.

 

That will do for starters: you are really starting to bore me with your recycledl opinions stated as fact, Larry. How about putting up cited DATA?

 

Herald