I see you've put in more, I'll get to things in order, still working my way  thru the big one at the bottom of page one.

 

I'll need to go back to sources for a proper total, but your claim that NO IJN a/c were lost to USN AAA at Coral Sea is not credible.  In fact, at least two Kates were shot down by YORKTOWN AAA in the initial attack on that ship. 

 

You put a lot of info on the IHN 25mm vs USN 1.1 inch, but didn't include the most improtant item: number manufactured.  The USN was well aware of the failings of the 1.1 inch, but it was what they had, so they compensated by installing a LOT of them, and everything else they could find.  This was an ongoing process throughout 1942, and getting exact lists of weapons carried at any particular time is difficult at there was also a lot of 'unofficial' installations, however, from Chesneau's AIRCRAFT CARRIERS OF THE WORLD the following is AAA armament of the four IJN carriers lost at Midway, at the time of their destruction.

AKAGI: 12x4.7" dp, 14x 25mm.

KAGA : 12x4.7" dp, 26x 25mm

SORYU: 12x5" dp, 28x 25mm

HIRYU: as for SORYU

 

for USS LEXINGTON  at Coral Sea: 12.5" dp, 5x3" AAA, AT LEAST 12x1.1" quad mounts (48 tubes), AT LEAST 18x 20mm, plus a large but unknown number of the old water cooled .50 cal. AAMG.  Again, it was known that there had been at least some 'unofficial' installations, but exactly what is not known, or, at least, I can't find it.

 

Both the IJN and USN pilots considered the US AAA was both more instense and more effective than the Japanese.

By Midway, the AAA loading of all US warships had increased again, and it increased still farther during the Solomons campaign. 

 

I notice that even you are forced to conceed the effectiveness of USN AAA at Santa Cruz, and try to credit that to the use of the VT fuse.  Sorry, Harold.  Not unless you're 'rewriting history'.  The VT fused shell was NOT used at Santa Cruz.  The first shipment didn't get beyond Pearl Harbor until November of '42, and the first use in action against Japanese a/c was by USS HELENA in January of '43.  The effectiveness of the AAA at Santa Cruz was entirely the result of putting more and more guns aboard.

 

Note also, that even when the Bofors guns were installed, a number of the old 1.1 inch often remained.  ENTERPRISE carried a 1.1 inch quad mount on its extreme bow throughout its wartime service.  There appearantly wasn't room to put a 40mm there, and having the 1.1 was better than nothing.

Harald, did you read your own numbers??  You posted that effective radar range at Midway was 30 miles and the proper separation of TFs was 30 miles, but it wouldn't matter because all the CAPs would intercept all the incoming.  The F4F wasn't that fast.  Given even zero time for decision making and issuing orders, F4Fs couldn't get to another ship 30 miles away in time to stop attacking a/c detected at 30 miles range before they were over their target!!

 

Actually, the 72 ftr AG didn't come into use until AFTER the Turkey Shoot.  At the time, the standard VF complement of an ESSEX class carrier was still 36 planes, same as it had been at Guadalcanal.  Of course the VF were F6Fs rather than F4Fs and they came from a LOT MORE air groups.

 

The 5" 38 cal. was a good example of a WW2 medium/heavy AAA weapon.  Similar weapons included land based guns like the German 88mm.  They were intended to use pre-set, time fused ammo to lay flak bursts in front of enemey a/c.  The VT fuse made them very, VERY much more effective, but they were already shooting down enemy a/c before the VTs came along.  Perhaps you think they, and the 1.1s were a JOKE, but you never tried to fly into them.  The Japanese pilots who did, certainly didn't think that there was anything funny about them.

Pay a little attention Herald while I remind you of a couple of things.  The HIRYU launched TWO attacks on the US forces off Midway, both of which hit YORKTOWN, not because they couldn't find TF16, but because TF17 was the closer target and the strikes were EACH only strong enoug to attack ONE target!!! 

 

In the first attack, by one squadron of dive bombers (18), the YORKTOWN CAP, with very limited support from TF16 a/c, and TF17 AAA destroyed 11 Vals on their way in.  Seven dropped bombs getting three hits, two were destroyed on the way out.  Loss rate of about 70%. 

In the second attack, by one squadron of torpedo bombers (18) the Japanese got two hits for the loss of 13 a/c with three of the survivors badly shot up.  Same loss rate.

 

As neither of the attacks was strong enough to attempt to strike more than one carrier, operating the two TFs as a single force COULD NOT POSSIBLY endanger more ships!!!  The attack might have been against ENTERPRISE or HORNET instead of YORKTOWN, but it wouldn't and couldn't have been against more than one ship!!  Had the two TFs operated at a single force, CAP would have been more effective.  In the second attack of the actual battle, ENTERPRISE F4Fs had to wait to be released to aid YORKTOWN's defence and arrived too late to help.   The incoming attackers would be up against the concentrated AAA of, not just 1 CV, 2 CAs and 5 DDs, but, rather, 3 CVs, 7 CAs, 1 CLAA and 16 DDs.  Result would, inevitably have been, more Japanese a/c shot down coming in, fewer total hits and more Japanese a/c shot down going out.

 

I asked for an example of dispersion actually working and you offered Midway.  WRONG PICK!  Midway is the perfect example of the FAILURE of dispersion.  Dispersion didn't protect ENTERPRISE and HORNET at Midway.  It just doomed YORKTOWN.  

and having the 1.1 was better than nothing.

Kaga.

Lexington.

Shokaku.

Yorktown

Get MUCH better sources, Larry. The American and Japanese carriers were not that far apart as AAA artillery was concerned and your numbers are WAY off..


What aviators saw and what was bombed/shot down are two different things and I said this. Please don't readback to me what I wrote. I said that the Japanese reported that US AAA was violent, and the Americans  reported that  Japanese AAA was pretty as in being a technicolor fireworks show. Neither was very effective in 1942 compared to fighters.




I never said a damned thing about the VT fuse at Santa Cruz. What I SAID was that you were delusional about American naval AAA , that there was NO VT  or RP fuses in our 5 inch shells or radar directors distributed  for AAA IN THE FLEET in quantity;  before the Turkey Shoot. I also pointed out that it was YOU who had the idea that these American AAA miracles were on hand sometime in time for the Solomons campaign or near its close. Remember I pointed out the Chicago Pianos on the Enterprise at Midway?

Herald:  You must tell me what was your source for the stuff you put up on the morning strike.  I've read at least a dozen different accounts of this and I have NEVER heard anything like this!!  Now, my sources include, but are not limited to SHATTERED SWORD ( a book you mention, but appearantly have not read) and Lord's INCREDIBLE VICTORY.  I include Lord's book because he was the first one to successfully work out exactly who had attacked what ship.  His analysis has stood for over thirty years without being seriously challenged.

 

There are at least three claims in you account that are clearly attempts to 'rewrite history'.  I'll shorten that to referring to them as 'crocks' as point them out as I go.  Again, I'd really like to know the source you used for them!

 

Attend:

At the time the ENTERPRISE dive bombers, and the YORKTOWN strike arrived, the original Japanese formation had been badly dispused by the attempts of HIRYU  and SORYU to evade the attacks of VT8 and VT6.  Both US pilots and Japanese survivors agree the carriers were arranged in a rough line from NNE to SSW.  According to the Japanese, the single carrier at the north end was SORYU with HIRYU about a third of the way down going south, and KAGA  and AKAGI close together at the south end.

McClusky had been given a poor estimate of the IJN fleet location by Browning.  He flew the outward leg, found nothing and spent more than an hour doing a box search, trying to find something.  Eventually, he spotted a DD "going somewhere in a hurry".  Hoping it was going to the carriers, McClusky, leading VS6 and followed by VB6 led by Dick Best, flew the direction the DD had been going, and found the Kido Butai. 

Max Leslie, leading VB3 from YORKTOWN along with VT3 and some fighters led by Jimmy Thatch, was given a very accurate estimate of the IJN location and a very well plotted course by Murr Arnold, YORKTOWN's air ops officer.  He flew directly to the Kido Butai from YORKTOWN, aquiring sight of the IJN carriers before reaching the end of his outward leg.  Both Arnold and Leslie did letter perfect jobs. 

 

Crock #1.  The YORKTOWN fliers were 'lost'.  Far from it, they were about the least, 'lost' of any of the USN formations there.

 

Both Leslie and McClusky picked the nearest IJN carrier, got into position as quickly as possible and attacked as soon as they reached position.  Their attacks were effectively simultanious.  (This is the 'incredible luck' of Midway.  That the two units, operating totally independently of each other, by pure luck, made what amounted to a coordinated attack).  The Japanese agree that the attacks of KAGA and SORYU came first, and at the same time.  Leslie and McClusky both reported that they attacked a fleet with nothing to indicate any damaged ships, and pulled out after their attacks to see a carrier at the opposite end of the formation on fire.

 

Crock #2  The YORKTOWN fliers homed on McClusky.  McClusky was far to tight for fuel to stooge around trying to guide someone else to the location.  In fact, he lost more a/c to fuel exhaustion than to combat action.  Neither he nor Leslie, in their reports, said anything about any communication between them prior to the attack, and, in any rate, it is obvious they the had to have sighted the Japanese fleet just about simultaniously.  Leslie didn't need homing help from McClusky, he found them target at the same time McClusky did, and McClusky had no opportunity to home anyone else in anyway.

 

McClusky actually screwed up his attack.  He was only recently made CAG after commanding VF6 and was not yet fully up on dive bomber doctrine.  Dick Best expected him to follow doctrine and lead the leading squadron, VS6 to attack the second, near by carrier.  Best set himself up to lead VB6 against the closer ship.  When  McClusky dived on the nearer ship, Best had to divert to the second target and reposition himself.  All of VS6 followed McClusky, along with nearly all of VB6.  Best ended up with only his own two wingmen following him.  As a result, 30 a/c attacke KAGA, and only three attacked AKAGI.  KAGA was hit by at least five bombs and near missed by at least another five. 

AKAGI  was directly hit by ONLY ONE bomb. 

I will give you a pass on this due to the fact that the second hit has been in the literature so long.  You really should read SHATTERED SWORD.  The direct his struck at the rear edge of the midships a/c elevator, went off in the well, disabled the fireproof curtain at the rear end of the wel

Herald:

You seem to be obsessed with twisting time to try and make a point.

Please try and follow.

 

Nimitz deliberately chose Fletcher as the carrier commander afloat for the active threatre at the time, the SOPAC, not Spruance.

 

Spurance became Chief of Staff for CinCPac, a job he was slated for before Midway.  The Fifth Fleet command came well over a YEAR LATER, where Spruance and Mitscher replaced Pownell, who had failed his 'try out' for the part.  It was not anything Nimitz had planned for him in June of 1942.  With US forces in the Cental Pacific growing and Pownell proving unsuitable, and with more complex operations planned, Spruance was given the planning and supervision of the fleet, and Mitscher got command of the fighting force.  As of June, 1942, Nimitz had had very little direct contact with Spruance and had picked him for Chief of Staff on his reputation.  Fifteen months later, when he was looking for someone to oversee Fifth Fleet, that had changed.

 

Fletcher's staff from YORKTOWN transferred to ASTORIA with him.  That was not a consideration in his decision to leave Spruance in command rather than going aboard HORNET at the end of 4 June.

 

Halsey was not sent to SOPAC to do the 'details of the fighting'.  He was sent in as theatre commander to replace Ghormley who had lost everyone's confidence.  Halsey didn't really want Ghormely's job.  He'd rather have had Fletcher's, not just because he wanted to be in command of carriers at sea again, but also because Ghormley was a long time personal friend, and he didn't like being the agent of the destruction of the man's career.  Fletcher remained in command of carrier forces.

55 km separation is 55,000 meters.
Average cruise for a Wildcat at 4000 meters altitude is about 100 mps. You need nine and a half minutes to cover 30 nautical miles at 191  knots. Since the slower Japanese need the same time OR MORE to get over Yorktown once detected , you will show up at about the same time they do. As happened. Why do you think that Americans SELECTED that  distance of separation? It was the detection range limit damnit!

Note that even with shifting of his flag, Fletcher remain OTC.  His order to Spruance to attack again as soon as possible remained in effect.

 

Crock #4.  Fletcher no longer had a staff and couldn't take command.  Wrong.  Fletcher's staff officers all shifted to ASTORIA with him.  All your ranting based on that chestnut is just hot air.  He was fully installed before a YORKTOWN SBD discovered the location of HIRYU for Spruance, clearly (at least by the standards you've previously used) gives YORKTOWN an 'assist' in the destruction of HIRYU for that alone.

 

As I previously posted, YORKTOWN and ENTERPRISE SBDs, flying from ENTERPRISE destroyed HIRYU by bombing.  I notice that you agree to that, although are careful specifically mentioning that most of the ''combined strike" was YORKTOWN a/c.  As to the HORNET SBDs 'making a run on' HIRYU after they left. so what??  HIRYU  was a done deal, and they didn't bother to drop a bomb on her.  They attacked (and missed) the escort ships.

 

Crock #5.  Nagumo was running for his life.  Again, I'd like to know the source from which you got this delusion.  Try checking something with ship tracks shown in it.  Nagumo did his 'running' EASTWARD towards the US fleet until well after dark, hoping to gain contact for a night action until convinced that they had withdrawn eastward, beyond his reach.  Spruance, showing justifiable caution, had done just exactly that, in his FIRST decision as OTC.

 

If Fletcher spent the day 'sitting in a chair' then so did Spruance.  The plan was by Nimitz with input from Fletcher, Spruance and Noyes.  The morning attack was ordered by Fletcher as per the Nimitz plan.  The TF16 strike was planned (?) by Browning, okayed by Spruance and executed reasonably well by McClusky and poorly by Ring.  The TF17 strike was planned perfectly by Arnold, okayed by Fletcher and executed perfectly by Leslie.  The search for HIRYU was orderd by Fletcher while Spruance was 'sitting in his chair'.  The second attack was ordered by Fletcher and delayed by decision of Spruance.  The second attack was planned by Browning (at least reasonably well), okayed by Spruance and executed well by Gallaher and eventually by Stebbins. 

 

Sitting in a chair is what flag officers mostly do (army as well as navy -- unless you're Geo. Patten and decide to go out and direct traffic at an intersection).  If Fletcher was guilty of 'sitting in a chair' at Midway, so was Spruance.  The fact that YORKTOWN was lost and that ENTERPRISE and HORNET weren't was just the luck of the draw, according to Spruance himself.  The two real differences were that Fletcher had more knowledge and experience than Spruance in June of '42, and, as senior officer and OTC, the chair he sat in was just a little bit taller.