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Subject: Ideal World War Two RN
earlm    5/4/2008 3:13:32 PM
With hindsight what should the RN have done to be the best force possible for WW2? 1. Obtain better AA fire control from US. 2. Obtain US carrier based aircraft through lend lease. 3. Introduce a dual purpose 4.5-5" gun. (US 5"/38?) 4. Scrap the R class. 5. Save money on KGV and arm them with R class turrets with higher elevation. 6. Modernize Hood 7. Modernize Repulse
 
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Herald12345       5/4/2008 4:26:49 PM

With hindsight what should the RN have done to be the best force possible for WW2?

1. Obtain better AA fire control from US.
2. Obtain US carrier based aircraft through lend lease.
3. Introduce a dual purpose 4.5-5" gun. (US 5"/38?)
4. Scrap the R class.
5. Save money on KGV and arm them with R class turrets with higher elevation.
6. Modernize Hood
7. Modernize Repulse

Built decent fleet and ASW carriers, more cruisers, destroyers-and escorts -many more escorts as early as possible.

Suggested classes

Improved Illustrious
Something liken a properly built Archer or the US Bogue class
Londons or Kents
Leanders
Didos
Southhamptoms
Tribals
Battles
Flowers

Improvements in AAA? Convert to the 4.5 DP as early as possible,  Scrap the poppoms and go directly to the Borfors. The Oerlikons were a morale weapon. Bofors were better for the damage and actual splashing of planes. Other obvious things-go to a remote director system as early as possible. VT and RP fusing of course.

Develop a decent carrier fighter/strike plane. Everyone screwed up on this aspect of naval warfare. The only aircraft early that the RN had that was even decent besides the swordfish was the Fairy Fulmar  underpowered as it was. Rwedesign as the Firefly and get it into service earlier.

As for the ASW aspect, there was little the RN eventually did, that was wrong-just build it sooner and more of it.

Restrict battleship work to modernizing the fast warships on hand. Those would be the Queen Elizabeths, Reknown, Repulse, and Hood. Strengthen the deck armor against bombs, improve main gun elevation, reboiler to MODERN standards, give more efficient screws, give some thought to crew habitability during modernization, and restructure compartmentalization to further subdivide the bubble. It wouldn't hurt to add torpedo blisters and roll dampers either to the ship classes mentioned. And as always convert to a AAA secondary battery of either 4.5 or 5.25 inch guns and Bofors depending on top-weight and sky arcs.  

Building KGVs was a waste of resources better used  on the U-boats and surface raiders. That means aircraft carriers instead.

Herald    
 




 
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larryjcr       5/5/2008 1:42:04 AM



With hindsight what should the RN have done to be the best force possible for WW2?



1. Obtain better AA fire control from US.

2. Obtain US carrier based aircraft through lend lease.

3. Introduce a dual purpose 4.5-5" gun. (US 5"/38?)

4. Scrap the R class.

5. Save money on KGV and arm them with R class turrets with higher elevation.

6. Modernize Hood

7. Modernize Repulse




Built decent fleet and ASW carriers, more cruisers, destroyers-and escorts -many more escorts as early as possible.

Suggested classes

Improved Illustrious
Something liken a properly built Archer or the US Bogue class
Londons or Kents
Leanders
Didos
Southhamptoms
Tribals
Battles
Flowers

Improvements in AAA? Convert to the 4.5 DP as early as possible,  Scrap the poppoms and go directly to the Borfors. The Oerlikons were a morale weapon. Bofors were better for the damage and actual splashing of planes. Other obvious things-go to a remote director system as early as possible. VT and RP fusing of course.

Develop a decent carrier fighter/strike plane. Everyone screwed up on this aspect of naval warfare. The only aircraft early that the RN had that was even decent besides the swordfish was the Fairy Fulmar  underpowered as it was. Rwedesign as the Firefly and get it into service earlier.

As for the ASW aspect, there was little the RN eventually did, that was wrong-just build it sooner and more of it.

Restrict battleship work to modernizing the fast warships on hand. Those would be the Queen Elizabeths, Reknown, Repulse, and Hood. Strengthen the deck armor against bombs, improve main gun elevation, reboiler to MODERN standards, give more efficient screws, give some thought to crew habitability during modernization, and restructure compartmentalization to further subdivide the bubble. It wouldn't hurt to add torpedo blisters and roll dampers either to the ship classes mentioned. And as always convert to a AAA secondary battery of either 4.5 or 5.25 inch guns and Bofors depending on top-weight and sky arcs.  

Building KGVs was a waste of resources better used  on the U-boats and surface raiders. That means aircraft carriers instead.

Herald    
 





Agree on all.  The Fulmar was really a non-starter as a fighter.  It was one of the bad results of RAF control of carrier a/c developement prior to the mid-1930s.  When the RN finally got control back they had no one knowledgable on a/c with enough rank to influence decision making, hence the idea that a naval fighter needed a navigator on board.  Better to go with the Sea Hurricain until the Grumman F4F was available as a fighter, stick to the Skua as primary strike a/c until a developement of the Battle/Fulmar layout could be developed (Firefly), stick to the Swordfish as torpedo a/c until the TBFs were available.  The Albacore wasn't enough improvement on the Swordfish to be worth the effort and the Barracuda wasn't worth the effort to develope. 
 
Build improved ARK ROYALs instead of the ILLUSTRIOUS class.  The armored flight deck was nice to have, but it wasn't worths a fifty per cent reduction in a/c capacity.  Again this was based on RN belief that a/c carriers were just a scouting element and fighter protection for the BBs, rather than a striking force in their own right.
Of course, all of this is totally based on hindsight, so it's nothing but an intellectual exercise.  The Japanese were the only ones who took the idea of a carrier striking force seriously.  The USN talked about it as a theory, but made no actual effort to develope the idea in practice until the sudden demonstration of the OBBs vulnerability to air attack forced dependence on carrier based Task Forces.  The Royal Navy seems to have barely considered the possibiltiy, hence the design of a 23000 ton carrier class with a capacity of 36 a/c, but plenty of armor to provide protection against the gunfire of enemy surface ships.
 
Above all, the RNs assumption that the convoy system alone would provide to total answer to a German submarine campaign, even with only a handful of escorts available was a very, very dangerous error.  Assumption is the moth
 
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Herald12345       5/5/2008 4:27:48 PM



Agree on all.  The Fulmar was really a non-starter as a fighter.  It was one of the bad results of RAF control of carrier a/c development prior to the mid-1930s.  When the RN finally got control back they had no one knowledgeable on a/c with enough rank to influence decision making, hence the idea that a naval fighter needed a navigator on board.  Better to go with the Sea Hurricane until the Grumman F4F was available as a fighter, stick to the Skua as primary strike a/c until a development of the Battle/Fulmar layout could be developed (Firefly), stick to the Swordfish as torpedo a/c until the TBFs were available.  The Albacore wasn't enough improvement on the Swordfish to be worth the effort and the Barracuda wasn't worth the effort to develop.

You have to start somewhere.  The problem with the Fulmar was that it was grossly underpowered with a rather weak aeroshell.  RN funds were limited so I regard the suggestion to stick with the Swordfish for torpedo work and introduce the Sea Hurricane as sound until the Firefly was ready. The RN had a good air-dropped torpedo and a tough little bird in the Swordfish; so you could get away with it, the Swordfish, flying against crap German and Japanese naval AAA for your torpedo work as long as you didn't have Zekes to bother you. The Firefly gives you the longer ranged strike fighter suitable for the yoyos you are likely to meet over the ocean in the European theater, which are mainly Italian Machis, Savoias, some junk German Junkers, the occasional brave Heinkel and the Dornier or two along with the pesky Arados. German air-dropped torpedoes were almost as bad as American ones, so your big carrier heartburn would be SM 79 Sparrowhawks with their SI 400/536 torpedoes or the Japanese Kates with the Type 91 torpedo. The Firefly or the Sea Hurricane should handle both threats easily. The Wildcat did, and it wasn't that great a fighter.    

Build improved ARK ROYALs instead of the ILLUSTRIOUS class.  The armored flight deck was nice to have, but it wasn't worths a fifty per cent reduction in a/c capacity.  Again this was based on RN belief that a/c carriers were just a scouting element and fighter protection for the BBs, rather than a striking force in their own right.

Disagree. The Ark Royal was poorly designed to resist torpedo and underwater shock damage. Except for Midway, where the Japanese scuttled burned out hulks , they couldn't tow  home, the chief  cause of carrier  death during WW II, was below the waterline torpedo hits that sank the carrier. Most of the Japanese carriers not scuttled as bombed hulks were torpedo kills either by US submarine or torpedo bomber. The obverse was also true. Most British carriers lost were torpedo kills. The Illustrious had a better bubble and was more shock resistant than Ark Royal. She was also cheaper and quicker to build. More RN carriers in a hurry was essential. Improved Illustrious carriers  bulged , blistered and with proper attention paid to deck hardstand and hanger height would make a fifty-sixty  plane capacity carrier possible on 25,000 tonnes displacement . The Japanese competed with carriers of that size range.

Of course, all of this is totally based on hindsight, so it's nothing but an intellectual exercise.  The Japanese were the only ones who took the idea of a carrier striking force seriously.  The USN talked about it as a theory, but made no actual effort to develop the idea in practice until the sudden demonstration of the OBBs vulnerability to air attack forced dependence on carrier based Task Forces.  The Royal Navy seems to have barely considered the possibility, hence the design of a 23000 ton carrier class with a capacity of 36 a/c, but plenty of armor to provide protection against the gunfire of enemy surface ships.

 If the Japanese knew what they were doing, how do you explain Midway [Nagumo]? That was flatout  a textbook example of how to use carriers WRONG. Santa Cruz, Eastern Solomons and the Turkey Shoot [not Ozawa's fault, Kurita didn't follow orders as he didn't at Leyte Gulf, either]  weren't such sterling performances for the IJNAF though I triple damn Halsey for his own ineptitude in some of those actions that cost us so many US flattops.

Above all, the RNs assumption that the convoy system alone would provide to total answer to a German submarine campaign, even with only a handful of escor
 
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larryjcr       5/6/2008 1:24:09 AM







Agree on all.  The Fulmar was really a non-starter as a fighter.  It was one of the bad results of RAF control of carrier a/c development prior to the mid-1930s.  When the RN finally got control back they had no one knowledgeable on a/c with enough rank to influence decision making, hence the idea that a naval fighter needed a navigator on board.  Better to go with the Sea Hurricane until the Grumman F4F was available as a fighter, stick to the Skua as primary strike a/c until a development of the Battle/Fulmar layout could be developed (Firefly), stick to the Swordfish as torpedo a/c until the TBFs were available.  The Albacore wasn't enough improvement on the Swordfish to be worth the effort and the Barracuda wasn't worth the effort to develop.

You have to start somewhere.  The problem with the Fulmar was that it was grossly underpowered with a rather weak aeroshell.  RN funds were limited so I regard the suggestion to stick with the Swordfish for torpedo work and introduce the Sea Hurricane as sound until the Firefly was ready. The RN had a good air-dropped torpedo and a tough little bird in the Swordfish; so you could get away with it, the Swordfish, flying against crap German and Japanese naval AAA for your torpedo work as long as you didn't have Zekes to bother you. The Firefly gives you the longer ranged strike fighter suitable for the yoyos you are likely to meet over the ocean in the European theater, which are mainly Italian Machis, Savoias, some junk German Junkers, the occasional brave Heinkel and the Dornier or two along with the pesky Arados. German air-dropped torpedoes were almost as bad as American ones, so your big carrier heartburn would be SM 79 Sparrowhawks with their SI 400/536 torpedoes or the Japanese Kates with the Type 91 torpedo. The Firefly or the Sea Hurricane should handle both threats easily. The Wildcat did, and it wasn't that great a fighter.    



Build improved ARK ROYALs instead of the ILLUSTRIOUS class.  The armored flight deck was nice to have, but it wasn't worths a fifty per cent reduction in a/c capacity.  Again this was based on RN belief that a/c carriers were just a scouting element and fighter protection for the BBs, rather than a striking force in their own right.

Disagree. The Ark Royal was poorly designed to resist torpedo and underwater shock damage. Except for Midway, where the Japanese scuttled burned out hulks , they couldn't tow  home, the chief  cause of carrier  death during WW II, was below the waterline torpedo hits that sank the carrier. Most of the Japanese carriers not scuttled as bombed hulks were torpedo kills either by US submarine or torpedo bomber. The obverse was also true. Most British carriers lost were torpedo kills. The Illustrious had a better bubble and was more shock resistant than Ark Royal. She was also cheaper and quicker to build. More RN carriers in a hurry was essential. Improved Illustrious carriers  bulged , blistered and with proper attention paid to deck hardstand and hanger height would make a fifty-sixty  plane capacity carrier possible on 25,000 tonnes displacement . The Japanese competed with carriers of that size range.



Of course, all of this is totally based on hindsight, so it's nothing but an intellectual exercise.  The Japanese were the only ones who took the idea of a carrier striking force seriously.  The USN talked about it as a theory, but made no actual effort to develop the idea in practice until the sudden demonstration of the OBBs vulnerability to air attack forced dependence on carrier based Task Forces.  The Royal Navy seems to have barely considered the possibility, hence the design of a 23000 ton carrier class with a capacity of 36 a/c, but plenty of armor to provide protection against the gunfire of enemy surface ships.



 If the Japanese knew what they were doing, how do you explain Midway [Nagumo]? That was flatout  a textbook example of how to use carriers WRONG. Santa Cruz, Eastern Solomons and the Turkey Shoot
 
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larryjcr    Doctrine   5/6/2008 1:54:10 AM
The Japanese carrier doctrine was MUCH better than the USN.  They were operating up to six carriers as a group while the USN hadn't even attempted to practice with more than one in a group.  The aviation element wanted to use carriers as a striking force, but had nothing but theories (some of them badly wrong) about how to do it. 
 
At Midway, it wasn't doctrine that failed the Japanese, it was overconfidence, the assumption that they were going to win, and that the Americans would react when, and in the way that was expected of them.  Midway had been called a great victory against the odds.  True.  But it wasn't the number of ships or a/c that was the primary disadvantage the USN had to deal with.  The Japanese strategy and planning, along with the results of the Battle of the Coral Sea, had negated their advantage of numbers.  The long odds that the USN had to surmount was its own lack of an effective operational doctrine for either operating carriers together, or for operating air groups together.  Only YORKTOWN, managed to put a strike of more than two squadrons together and execute effectively.
 
The Japanese started the war with a very effective weapon that their enemies couldn't match for quality, but they made major mistakes in applying it, starting with sending only one division of carriers to the Coral Sea.  They allowed their force to be defeated in detail, thanks to a great deal of determination, and, at Midway, an unbelievable amount of sheer luck.   
 
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larryjcr    Classes   5/6/2008 2:18:22 AM
I think that the RN made the right decision in concentrating on the SOUTHAMPTON class over the 8" gun classes or the smaller LEANDERs.  Until about mid-1943 when radar fire control forced increased spacing of salvoes, the large 6" gun ships were more effective surface fighters than the 8" gun types of the same tonnage.  The LEANDERs were useful for patrolling distant oceans in peacetime (which is what they were built for) but no match for the larger modern cruisers in any sort of fleet operation.  The DIDOs were a very good investment for their size and filled very important functions.  They were about as good as the LEANDERs in general service, and much more effective as air defense units.
 
The Tribal class certainly gave very good service, but they were very expensive to build.  The smaller four and six gun classes were a better investment, in view of the RNs shortage of escort types generally.  They were better ASW units than the Tribals and could be built more quickly.  It was something (anything) like the Flowers and the HUNTs that were needed really desperately.  At least the RN started building new destroyers years before the USN did.
 
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Herald12345       5/6/2008 3:29:19 AM




It always comes back to money doesn't it.  The point of this is what should they have done differently.

You cannot avoid money, time, tech tree, resource base, manufacturing capability, manpower,, and WILL.  As much as  I would like tyo change the parameters of history raduically I stay within the seams of what is possible. Simple crucial little things that pay HUGE dividends IF the right decisions [within the knowledge and capabilities of the time are made.

You say carriers were  killed by torpedoes EXCEPT THE ONES BURNED OUT.  Actually, fire was the most serious killer.  Of the US fleet carriers, only one, WASP (which was always considered weakly built) was sunk by below waterline torpedo damage.  YORKTOWN had already taken serious damage from fires resulting from both bombs and torpedoes before the sub finished her off.  LEXINGTON, HORNET and PRINCETON were all lost to fires.  SARATOGA took and survived repeated torpedo hits.  LEXINGTON survived at least two torpedoes and was operating at 25 knots before the fires got to the avgas.  The changes in damage control doctrine that resulted from her loss were major reasons that so many USN carrier survived extensive damage later in the war.  FRANKLIN came close to being lost to fire, while INTREPID was torpedoed, but never in danger of loss from it.  The fires started later in the war when she was hit by a pair of kamikaze's were much more serious.

Yorktown went to the bottom sent there by Japanese torpedoes. Hornet went to the bottom, sent there by Japanese torpedoes . Lexington was scuttled  by US TORPEDOES. Gambier Bay went down by gunfire and St Lo went down as result of Kamikaze attack. Princeton sank from a bomb[my error CREF below}, but every other US carrier so far mentioned  sunk was TORPEDOED to send her to the bottom save those  I specified were gunfire or bomb victims.

Langley: US torpedoes, scuttled.
Lexington: US torpedoes scuttled.
Yorktown: Japanese torpedoes ripped her open and she sank.
Wasp: went down after hit by Japanese torpedoes.
Hornet: went down from US and Japanese torpedoes [14 altogether]
Princeton:  US torpedoes  scuttled.

In  point of fact you really don't know what you are talking about again.

Source citation.
     
Of the Japanese fleet carriers, fire got HIRYU, SORYU, AKAGI, KAGA, RYUJO and TAIHO (which handled the torp. hit fine, before the avgas explosion).  Torpedoes got SHOKAKU, UNRYU and SHINANO.  SHOHO and ZUIKAKU both took enough bombs and torpedoes that either could have sunk them.  In the case of SHOHO there's a question of how many of the torpedoes that hit her actually went off.  It's pretty clear that the fires from the bombs were more than adequate to kill her.  HIYO was probably lost primarily to torpedoes, CHITOSE was killed by bomb hits and fires.  CHIYODA was finished off by destroyer torpedoes and cruiser gunfire after being crippled by bombs.  ZUIHO was crippled by bombs and fire, although, again, torpedoes and more bombs were used to finish her off.  When shock effect from torpedoes sank a ship it was by starting a fire that damage control failed to deal with.  Note that HIYO was the only IJN CV actually lost to air launched torpedoes, the rest all came from subs.

Taiho didn't handle the torpedo hit fine at all since it was that hit that knocked out her firemains and also screwed up her avgas piping and storage that spread the fumes throughout the ship. That nitwit damage control officer just helped us out further by turning on the ventilators to clear out the fumes which was making it impossible for his DC parties to work in the bilges to patch the hole where she was flooding. Aerosol bomb. Somebody  either sparked or lit off and  scratch one flattop Cause.......TORPEDO. By the way, you forgot the SHINANO. that was also a righteous torpedo kill.

Akagi: scuttled by Japanese destroyer torpedoes.
Hiryu: scuttled
 
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Herald12345       5/6/2008 4:02:56 AM

The Japanese carrier doctrine was MUCH better than the USN.  They were operating up to six carriers as a group while the USN hadn't even attempted to practice with more than one in a group.  The aviation element wanted to use carriers as a striking force, but had nothing but theories (some of them badly wrong) about how to do it.

4. Incorrect. The US Navy had correctly come to the conclusion that it took remarkably few aircraft to wreck a carrier. Thus the USN doctrine, early in the war, like the Japanese doctrine: emphasized, find first, attack first and cripple the enemy flight deck. as a mode of defense The USN wargamed fighter defense and found the US naval fighters of the day FAILED. AAA wasn't good enough, either, to mass fires to stop either dive bombers or torpedo planes. The only USN defense that worked as late as 1942 was carrier dispersal and strike them first, so that a single enemy attack didn't catch everybody in the same strike sortie. At Coral Sea it helped. At Midway it was the DIFFERENCE. So as to contemporary US carrier tactics, you don't know what the hell you are talking about.  Only an effective AAA curtain, sheer numbers, and a strong fighter element with a competent GCI vector director  could guarantee defensive carrier group tactics would work.  Nobody had that until 1944. Until then the US dispersal defense of 1942 worked as long as a competent admiral handled it properly. Incidentally, that wasn't Fletcher.

At Midway, it wasn't doctrine that failed the Japanese, it was overconfidence, the assumption that they were going to win, and that the Americans would react when, and in the way that was expected of them.  Midway had been called a great victory against the odds.  True.  But it wasn't the number of ships or a/c that was the primary disadvantage the USN had to deal with.  The Japanese strategy and planning, along with the results of the Battle of the Coral Sea, had negated their advantage of numbers.  The long odds that the USN had to surmount was its own lack of an effective operational doctrine for either operating carriers together, or for operating air groups together.  Only YORKTOWN, managed to put a strike of more than two squadrons together and execute effectively.

5. Again with that BS. You do know that I discredited you on that previous Fletcher, Spruance  thread by citing the actual Midway Action Reports that showed the Enterprise got three carriers one shared with Hornet , and the Yorktown shared one with Enterprise? When are you going to stick to the FACTS? Aren't you tired of being beaten up?  I mean come  on! What was that strike on the Kurita SAG  or the strike Enterprise put over Akaga and Soryu?
 
The Japanese started the war with a very effective weapon that their enemies couldn't match for quality, but they made major mistakes in applying it, starting with sending only one division of carriers to the Coral Sea.  They allowed their force to be defeated in detail, thanks to a great deal of determination, and, at Midway, an unbelievable amount of sheer luck.  

6. Bullshit. Good intelligence and good planning produced solid results. [Nimitz and Spruance] To say otherwise flies in both the official records of the  USN and the IJN  as we have it recorded today.

a. The Japanese had no fighter director system whatsoever. The US was working on the rudiments of such in Fleet problem XVIII.
b. The USN had a carrier DOCTRINE based on their limitations as they understood it from wargaming into 1941. They used said  doctrine until 1943 against the Japanese. Despite bunglers like Halsey, it apparently worked well enough, so that even mediocre American admirals [Fletcher] could fight the Japanese outnumbered to a draw.

Wrong on 4, 5, and 6.  
Herald

 
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Herald12345       5/6/2008 4:33:07 AM

I think that the RN made the right decision in concentrating on the SOUTHAMPTON class over the 8" gun classes or the smaller LEANDERs.  Until about mid-1943 when radar fire control forced increased spacing of salvoes, the large 6" gun ships were more effective surface fighters than the 8" gun types of the same tonnage.  The LEANDERs were useful for patrolling distant oceans in peacetime (which is what they were built for) but no match for the larger modern cruisers in any sort of fleet operation.  The DIDOs were a very good investment for their size and filled very important functions.  They were about as good as the LEANDERs in general service, and much more effective as air defense units.

7. For a navy that was short of fleet trains but which had a global base system in the light of the aircraft technology of the day. the small patrol cruiser that could function as a convoy escort against surface raiders and U-boats makes senseThe main threat to Britain as seen was NOT Japan. it was Germany.  This correct build program decision proved out during the Battle of the River Plate, where two Leanders and a York class heavy cruiser put an end to Graf Spee.

8. Leanders were much cheaper than Didos, which were properly very expensive AAA defense ships, to be used in company with scarce  British carriers;  sort of like the Atlantas were supposed to be used with US carriers to provide a AAA screen and bodyguard ship.

The Tribal class certainly gave very good service, but they were very expensive to build.  The smaller four and six gun classes were a better investment, in view of the RNs shortage of escort types generally.  They were better ASW units than the Tribals and could be built more quickly.  It was something (anything) like the Flowers and the HUNTs that were needed really desperately.  At least the RN started building new destroyers years before the USN did.

9. The British needed some large screen destroyers to serve with their capital units that could keep up with the fleet at SPEED and range.

a. The Tribals were it-the equivalent of the US Fletchers, though nowhere as good a AAA ship [though a better ASW escort it turns out].  The Flowers and whatever other corvettes would do until the Germans introduced their electric U-boats, then the British would have to build a class of fast frigates ton pace them.
 

b. The 4 and 6 gun destroyers were too light to stand in a Pacific carrier battle as AAA pickets. Virtually most, of the RN destroyer classes, fell far short of the air defense standards needed, even in the 1940 Mediterranean. The British needed to get that 4.5 DP gun they design bungled to work. The 4 inch x position turret stopgap they tried on many of their midwar refitted destroyer classes wasn't going to do it, in a serious naval war against a first rate naval enemy like Japan.

Wrong on 7, 8, and 9.
Herald

 
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larryjcr       5/8/2008 11:05:21 AM








It always comes back to money doesn't it.  The point of this is what should they have done differently.

You cannot avoid money, time, tech tree, resource base, manufacturing capability, manpower,, and WILL.  As much as  I would like tyo change the parameters of history raduically I stay within the seams of what is possible. Simple crucial little things that pay HUGE dividends IF the right decisions [within the knowledge and capabilities of the time are made.



You say carriers were  killed by torpedoes EXCEPT THE ONES BURNED OUT.  Actually, fire was the most serious killer.  Of the US fleet carriers, only one, WASP (which was always considered weakly built) was sunk by below waterline torpedo damage.  YORKTOWN had already taken serious damage from fires resulting from both bombs and torpedoes before the sub finished her off.  LEXINGTON, HORNET and PRINCETON were all lost to fires.  SARATOGA took and survived repeated torpedo hits.  LEXINGTON survived at least two torpedoes and was operating at 25 knots before the fires got to the avgas.  The changes in damage control doctrine that resulted from her loss were major reasons that so many USN carrier survived extensive damage later in the war.  FRANKLIN came close to being lost to fire, while INTREPID was torpedoed, but never in danger of loss from it.  The fires started later in the war when she was hit by a pair of kamikaze's were much more serious.



Yorktown went to the bottom sent there by Japanese torpedoes. Hornet went to the bottom, sent there by Japanese torpedoes . Lexington was scuttled  by US TORPEDOES. Gambier Bay went down by gunfire and St Lo went down as result of Kamikaze attack. Princeton sank from a bomb[my error CREF below}, but every other US carrier so far mentioned  sunk was TORPEDOED to send her to the bottom save those  I specified were gunfire or bomb victims.

Langley: US torpedoes, scuttled.
Lexington: US torpedoes scuttled.
Yorktown: Japanese torpedoes ripped her open and she sank.
Wasp: went down after hit by Japanese torpedoes.
Hornet: went down from US and Japanese torpedoes [14 altogether]
Princeton:  US torpedoes  scuttled.

In  point of fact you really don't know what you are talking about again.

Source citation.
     

Of the Japanese fleet carriers, fire got HIRYU, SORYU, AKAGI, KAGA, RYUJO and TAIHO (which handled the torp. hit fine, before the avgas explosion).  Torpedoes got SHOKAKU, UNRYU and SHINANO.  SHOHO and ZUIKAKU both took enough bombs and torpedoes that either could have sunk them.  In the case of SHOHO there's a question of how many of the torpedoes that hit her actually went off.  It's pretty clear that the fires from the bombs were more than adequate to kill her.  HIYO was probably lost primarily to torpedoes, CHITOSE was killed by bomb hits and fires.  CHIYODA was finished off by destroyer torpedoes and cruiser gunfire after being crippled by bombs.  ZUIHO was crippled by bombs and fire, although, again, torpedoes and more bombs were used to finish her off.  When shock effect from torpedoes sank a ship it was by starting a fire that damage control failed to deal with.  Note that HIYO was the only IJN CV actually lost to air launched torpedoes, the rest all came from subs.

Taiho didn't handle the torpedo hit fine at all since it was that hit that knocked out her firemains and also screwed up her avgas piping and storage that spread the fumes throughout the ship. That nitwit damage control officer just helped us out further
 
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