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Subject: Current Carrier design is obsolete & can be easily sunk.
HYPOCENTER    9/28/2007 3:16:22 PM
Guys, here is an eye-opening article on the threats facing the US Navy – it concludes that, with the proliferation of advanced anti-ship missiles and torpedoes, the super carrier has been compromised to such a degree that they simply are no longer viable. Furthermore, the author states a bold prediction: “If the U.S. Navy keeps building gigantic surface aircraft carriers and daring people to sink them, odds are, eventually, someone will take us up on it and do just that. My personal prediction is that this will happen within the next 10-20 years. Within 10-20 years, one of our aircraft carriers will get sent to the bottom by enemy missiles or torpedos (or both)--or possibly even UAVs/UAS. This scenario could even happen within the next five years.” Summary of key judgments: -“….the latest ship-killing unmanned weapon systems like supercavitating torpedoes and supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles being produced and/or developed by other countries that can probably sink the CVN-21, even if it is protected by its own highly-advanced, highly-lethal systems like fighter aircraft (primarily F/A-18s), ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare i.e. "sub-hunting") aircraft, the Raytheon Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS), Aegis-radar-equipped and highly-weaponized cruisers and destroyers, submarines, etc. That's not to mention unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) a.k.a. unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) being produced and developed by other countries that can also potentially wreak a lot of havoc and destruction on surface ships. And, at the end of the day, that's what the CVN-21 will be, a large, hulking, incredibly expensive (albeit very sexy) surface ship.” -Proliferation of such high-tech anti-ship missiles limits where carrier’s can safely or reasonably operate (thus limiting their effectiveness), “In the tactical shooting a.k.a. defensive shooting world, there's an old saying: "Action beats reaction." In other words, the actor always has the time advantage over the reactor. Time is the reactor's enemy, which means it will be our ships' enemy, if any of the now multiple countries who have supersonic anti-ship missiles and high-speed supercavitating torpedoes decide to launch them on us. Make no mistake, the first ships they'll launch against will be our aircraft carriers, and they'll probably launch a large number of these missiles at one time.” -“Let's give the U.S. Navy the benefit of the doubt, and say that it can stop 90% of the enemy missiles and/or torpedos streaking towards the carrier(s). The result's going to be the same. Understand that if just one of these missiles or torpedos hits the carrier, it's probably done. Even if it doesn't sink, it will most likely be taken out of operation. So, in effect, no more carrier. Let's say it takes two hits to destroy the carrier. All the enemy will have to do is fire at least 20 missiles at once, get its two hits on the carrier, and no more carrier. What if the enemy launches 20 missiles and 20 torpedos at the carrier at the same time? Get the picture? 20 anti-ship missiles and 20 torpedos might read like a big investment, but it's nowhere near the investement of a $5-$13.7 billion aircraft carrier. Not even close.” - Current defense systems are not enough, “I know what you're thinking. You're thinking "So what?" Even if the Iranians get one of those super-duper missiles, the U.S. Navy's got SeaRAM, which can defeat those nasty Mach 2.5 (approx.) anti-ship missiles. The SeaRAM Anti-Ship Missile Defense System can defeat it. It's our salvation. Well, not so fast. Ya' see, that little theory depends on two things: 1) that the enemy missile threat will be detected in time and SeaRAM will have a 100% kill rate, and 2) the 11-missile RAM launcher won't run out of missiles before the enemy does.” -Bottom line, if we get into any kind of serious beef with ANY country that has a decent arsenal of these weapons, our aircraft carriers will most likely be destroyed and sunk within minutes. They're just too big, too slow, and too visible to survive, even with all their onboard and offboard networked defenses. The fact is that high-speed, sophisticated precision anti-ship weapons technology is cheaper and can therefore outpace our ability to protect our big, slow carriers. In the end, war is a financial transaction. Russian helicopters cost a lot more to produce, field and replace than Stinger missiles, and U.S. Aircraft carriers cost A LOT more to produce, field and replace than even the most sophisticated anti-ship weapons. H*tp://www.defensereview.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1048
 
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gf0012-aust       9/30/2007 9:47:57 PM

What if you had a dedicated decoy? Is this a practical idea?
 
during the cold war, one poor sucker (usually a DDE or DDG) was usually the lamb. - ie the electronic bait ship.
nowadays there are other seduction and deception systems in play.

 
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scotty       9/30/2007 10:49:37 PM
The article is correct in the respect that a missile would damage a carrier. However the author disregards a couple of basic points.
First a carrier is an extension of power. while it is near it is the proverbial
"knife at your throat" Able to strike at your country basically at will. It's main power is in the threat of power.You will never inspire awe with a ship killing missile.
Secondly if you do attack an aircraft carrier then you've got a war. Then the whole military comes at you with more carriers, bombs,missiles etc. In that case its like you shot me with a BB gun so I shoot back with an uzi.
 
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Arbalest       10/1/2007 1:17:13 AM

David Crane’s article makes a number of interesting points; a submersible aircraft carrier, the return of the S-3B, and "All ships (surface and submarine) should be as small and fast as possible, and be capable of carrying, launching, and recovering 2-12 F-35s . . ." being some of the more interesting ones.

"Do-ability" seems to be a problem in some cases, though.

 

He has some valid points: ships are vulnerable to attack (no surprise), a larger number of smaller carriers minimizes the amount of force degradation should one be damaged or sunk, submarines are quite formidable and lethal.

But he misses a couple of basic points: he seems to assume that "vulnerability" is a binary term, and carriers are essentially a mobile friendly airfield.

"Vulnerability" is a rarely binary term; the CSS Virginia was invulnerable to every ship afloat, but only for 1 day.  The appearance of the USS Monitor changed that.

All modern warships are vulnerable, to some degree, to existing weapons.  The Argentines learned that letting their ships take hits from an 84mm Carl Gustav was a poor choice.  Mr. Crane’s suggestion of a navalized A-10 has much merit; one very long burst (perhaps 500 rds) from the 30mm (and maybe some napalm), scattered amidships, should wreck just about any ship displacing 20,000 tons or less.  The various anti-ship missiles he mentions are even more lethal.

But in each case, the weapon has to get close enough to hit the target.

Regrettably, Mr. Crane doesn’t do much analysis of hitting a ship; for conventional weapons, no hit, no kill.

How vulnerable is a CBG?  Yes, the Iranians got close to a carrier, but they might have stayed in Iranian airspace the whole time (easily possible in the Strait of Hormuz), and the probability of shooting seemed small.  A small achievement.

Mr. Crane seems to miss the point that, unlike gunfire, missiles are subject to spoofing and other countermeasures.  500 missiles might seem to be sufficient to sink an entire CBG, but if 90% are spoofed (450), the next 90% are intercepted with missiles (45), this leaves 5 missiles to be defeated by guns.  But this is more of a technology game than a ship design game.

Torpedoes are lethal, but are slow (compared to missiles), and also subject to countermeasures.  Various anti-torpedo schemes have been presented over the last few decades.  Using a shipboard multi-barrel mortar to fire a pattern of charges in front of an incoming torpedo is one scheme; the pressure wave from the detonations are designed to detonate or damage the torpedo. Not high tech, but not hard to do; yet challenging for the torpedo to survive.

Mr. Crane seems to have an agenda, and he needs to have the CBG appear to be more vulnerable than it is.  One day the CBG concept will be obsolete, much like a battleship line, but that day is not today, or anytime soon.

 

Carriers are essentially a mobile friendly airfield. Larger carriers, that can carry more types of aircraft, and more of each type, are more valuable than smaller ones.  For a given mission, where are the trade-off points?

The carriers deployed by the British in the Falklands were just sufficient, given the actual situation.  The Argentine carrier 25 de Mayo might have swung things the other way; alternatively, one Nimitz-class carrier might have ended the situation sooner.

This suggests that Mr. Crane is wrong, specifically many years premature, in his thinking concerning carrier size.  But the ability to place a very large friendly airfield on the doorstep of a "problem child" is likely to always be valuable, and Mr. Crane says as much.

It may be that the CVN-21 really is too costly; certainly the prospect of quickly replacing one is undesirable.  But the force projection size and ability of one Nimitz-class carrier suggests that finding a way to protect such a carrier is the best solution for the foreseeable future.
 
 
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Darth Squirrel       10/2/2007 8:50:59 PM
USN's glaring problem is ASW - they've gotten way out of practice, and at the same time the name of the game has totally changed.  During and right after the Cold War the most important detection methods were passive.  Now there are AIP diesels out there that you just cannot hear - and suddenly active detection has become the imperative.  Enemy provacateurs in the environmental movement are stiffling USN capabilities via legal challenges in American courts.  It reminds me of old Soviet tactics in Western Europe.
 
There IS a vulnerability to torpedos in the hull design of the modern USN CVN, and torpedos have a surprising amount of explosive power, but it seems doubtful that a single torp could sink a CVN even with a critical hit.  The USN probably has a good idea itself, seeing as how they sunk the USS America a few years ago to find out just how vulnerable carriers were to various weapons.
 
 
I lol'd at Hearld's assessment of the article's author.  Herald is correct, this man is no more an expert on anti-ship weapons than is Katie Couric, and the article sounds like something one would hear on the evening news.  CERTAINTY:  There exists no conventional-warhead anti-ship missile that can sink a Nimitz-class in one hit - not even an AS-4.  The very idea is laughable.  Next!
 
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gf0012-aust       10/2/2007 9:16:31 PM


There IS a vulnerability to torpedos in the hull design of the modern USN CVN, and torpedos have a surprising amount of explosive power, but it seems doubtful that a single torp could sink a CVN even with a critical hit.  The USN probably has a good idea itself, seeing as how they sunk the USS America a few years ago to find out just how vulnerable carriers were to various weapons.

I can tell you unequivocably that one ADCAP sized torpedo - even a golden BB will not sink a CVN.
 
The SINKEX and HULKEX data is pretty compelling - but there is no way that this data will end up being discussed on the net.

 
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blacksmith       10/12/2007 8:12:43 AM




I can tell you unequivocably that one ADCAP sized torpedo - even a golden BB will not sink a CVN.

 

The SINKEX and HULKEX data is pretty compelling - but there is no way that this data will end up being discussed on the net.


You just discussed it.

 
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tianjinrob       10/12/2007 11:38:22 AM
No, he didn't. Don't be a ferking troll.
 
TJrob
 
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WarNerd       10/13/2007 12:49:24 PM

USN's glaring problem is ASW - they've gotten way out of practice, and at the same time the name of the game has totally changed.  During and right after the Cold War the most important detection methods were passive.  Now there are AIP diesels out there that you just cannot hear - and suddenly active detection has become the imperative.  Enemy provacateurs in the environmental movement are stiffling USN capabilities via legal challenges in American courts.  It reminds me of old Soviet tactics in Western Europe.

Continuous active sonar search is only a stopgap, what you really need is better processing of the passive information to spot the "hole" in the background noise that is the sub.  Think of it as trying to spot a black balloon on a moonless night, you can only see it when it passes in front of a star.
 
Given that this was already becoming an issue before the breakup of the Soviet Union, and that the USN is not going ballistic over the training range issue, I suspect that there have already been developments in this area.

 

That said, if you insist on operating in a location (deep enough to hide and shallow enough to sit on the bottom) and manner (congested waters or political constraints to a limited maneuver area, so you end up driving over a waiting sub) that gives too many advantages to the sub you should expect to lose.

 
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Herald1234       10/13/2007 12:57:02 PM



USN's glaring problem is ASW - they've gotten way out of practice, and at the same time the name of the game has totally changed.  During and right after the Cold War the most important detection methods were passive.  Now there are AIP diesels out there that you just cannot hear - and suddenly active detection has become the imperative.  Enemy provacateurs in the environmental movement are stiffling USN capabilities via legal challenges in American courts.  It reminds me of old Soviet tactics in Western Europe.


Continuous active sonar search is only a stopgap, what you really need is better processing of the passive information to spot the "hole" in the background noise that is the sub.  Think of it as trying to spot a black balloon on a moonless night, you can only see it when it passes in front of a star.

 

Given that this was already becoming an issue before the breakup of the Soviet Union, and that the USN is not going ballistic over the training range issue, I suspect that there have already been developments in this area.

 


That said, if you insist on operating in a location (deep enough to hide and shallow enough to sit on the bottom) and manner (congested waters or political constraints to a limited maneuver area, so you end up driving over a waiting sub) that gives too many advantages to the sub you should expect to lose.


So send a network of madly pinging robots into that shallow water and then when you find acoustic occultation, drop a bomb on the shadow you find.

Herald

 
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Shirrush    However,...   10/13/2007 2:24:11 PM
...There's a point.
A carrier is symbol of US power, and as such it is The Most Desirable Target for a determined foe. Hard to sink? True. One doesn't need to sink the carrier to achieve sweet victory: it's full of sailors, remember USS Cole? It is conceivably very difficult to get close enough to a CBG at sea and on wartime alert to be able to shoot at it, let alone score significant hits. The nature of the enemy and its assymetrical approach also must be considered.

Yes, the carriers are vulnerable.
Consider a first-day-of-the war Pear Harbor-styled scenario. Let us assume the carrier is at the entrance of a very busy waterway such as the Suez or the Panama canal. It just has performed a much-publicized port visit with one of the US allies in the vicinity, so EVERYBODY knows where it is, and where it's going.
Consider an innocent-looking, suitably rusty and Panamean-flagged tanker or container ship, in which a multiple AShM launcher, or worse, multiple torpedo tubes have been concealed. Consider that this ship is lined up less than five miles behind the carrier in the queue to the canal. The result: 100+ dead sailors, a couple thousands hurt to varying degrees, and a critically crippled capital ship. You-know whom gloats mightily and distribute confectioneries outside certain non-Buddhist religious buildings...

Consider, if you wish, a sudden outbreak of a war with Iran. The fleet is anchored at Bahrain, and on a peacetime footing, in full view of the IRGC forward observers. All of a sudden, supersonic AShM's and long-range torps are tearing in. The Iranian cost is less than 150 miles away, and two Iranian airbases are within a 200 miles radius. If I'm not mistaken, the enemy doesn't need to sail or to fly very far from its own turf to bring its weapons within range of Manama, so there won't be much time to respond once the attack is detected, and ships will get hit.




 
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