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Subject: India to limit missile program to aid US nuclear deal
Softwar    6/18/2007 12:43:16 PM
http://in.news.yahoo.com/070618/210/6h403.html Report: India to limit missile program to aid US nuclear deal Monday June 18, 07:35 PM India will limit its ballistic missile program to medium-range rockets in a bid to seal a nuclear cooperation deal with the United States, news reports said Monday. India has decided not to develop missiles with a range over 5,000 kilometers (3,100 miles) as a goodwill gesture toward the U.S., the CNN-IBN news channel reported, citing unidentified government officials. The Indian Foreign Ministry and the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi declined to comment on the report. The proposed nuclear deal, seen as the cornerstone of an emerging partnership between the two countries, has been stalled in recent months. One of the biggest sticking points has been American reluctance to allow India to reprocess spent atomic fuel because of fears it would spark a nuclear arms race in Asia by allowing India to use extra nuclear fuel which the deal would provide to free up its domestic uranium for weapons. Reprocessing fuel is a key step in making weapons-grade nuclear material. The report said the move to limit missile range was intended to reassure the U.S. of India's peaceful intentions. In April, India successfully test-fired the Agni 3, a new missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads across much of Asia and the Middle East. India's current missiles are mostly intended for confronting neighboring archrival Pakistan. However, the Agni 3, India's longest-range missile, is designed to reach 3,000 kilometers (1,900 miles) _ putting China's major cities well into range, as well as targets deep in the Middle East. The nuclear deal, agreed to by the two countries' leaders in July 2005, would let the U.S. provide nuclear fuel and know-how to India in exchange for safeguards and U.N. inspections at India's 14 civilian nuclear plants. Eight military plants would remain off-limits.
 
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Herald1234    Reply to various idiots.    6/27/2007 3:03:55 AM
Agni, I had a brain fart.. Happy fools?
 
 
[quoting on warheads] from the link;
 
Warhead Options
India's nuclear warhead options are still relatively limited, though quite perfectly adequate. Since the first Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974 (PoK-I), India adopted the recessed deterrence posture initially consisting of fission weapons (~15 KT yield) followed by boosted fission weapons of 200 KT yield, suitable for the Agni-TD/TTB. The PoK-II 1998 'Shakti' series of nuclear tests in Pokhran were reportedly done to validate multiple weapon designs, of 1995 vintage. Interestingly the 200 KT boosted fission design of 1980 was not tested in PoK-II, ostensibly having long given way to a lighter and more efficient S1 design. It is interesting to note that India has access to large quantities[135] of Tritium - produced at an extremely low cost - which lends flexibility to Indian weapon design options, an option that is not available or viable to prior nuclear weapon states.  Weapon Fission Fuel Yield (KT) Weight (kg) Note
1 
High yield, thermonuclear (Plutonium [Pu], Deuterium & Tritium)[136] 
Pu
(Weapon Grade) 200 - 300 250[137] 
• Shakti-I test at Pokharan-II (PoK-II)
• Boosted fission primary of ~20KT
• Plutonium based boosted primary stage. Li-D secondary
• Fusion Spark Plug material (Pu or U235) unknown
2 
Medium yield, fusion boosted fission 
Pu
(Weapon Grade) 50 < 200 
• In inventory small size medium yield weapon
3 
Medium yield, fusion boosted fission 
Pu
(Weapon Grade) 15 - 20 100[137a] 
• Primary stage of Shakti-1 test at PoK-II
• Standard medium yield weapon
4 
Medium yield, pure fission 
Pu
(Weapon Grade) 15[138] 170 - 200 
• Shakti-2 test at PoK-II
• This was tested from a weapon stockpile. Almost certainly superseded by a fusion boosted fission version, described above (item 3).
5 
Low yield, sub-KT 
Pu (Weapon Grade) 0.1 to 1 < 200 (est.) 
• Battlefield Weapon
6 
Low yield, sub-KT[139] 
Pu or U233 (Reactor Grade)[140] 0.3 to 1 < 200 (est.) 
• Reactor Grade Pu or U233
 

The primary warhead for the Agni family would be a 200-300 Kt fusion weapon based on the Shakti-1 (Pokhran-II) test in 1998. The weapons yield is adjustable from 45-300Kt by changing the amount and quality of tertiary fuel. Yield of 45-200Kt range using  natural Uranium and 45-300Kt range using moderately enriched fuel (U235 or Pu).
The fusion weapon based on the S-1 design reportedly weighs less than 450 Kg, however other sources indicate a mass of between 300 to 200 Kg[137A]. The 45kT S1 device reportedly weighed 450 kg and used an inert mantle to ensure third stage did not generate any yield[141]. It has also emerged that by 1982, the BARC/DRDO team had produced a design for a (pure) fission device that weighed between 170 and 200 kg for a yield of 15 KT - a huge change from the 1000 kg monster tested in 1974[142]. This would mean that a missile warhead based on this 1982 vintage design would weigh some 250 - 350 kg.  On the eve of Agni-III D1 test flight on 12 April 2007, Union Minister of State for Defence MM Pallam Raju confirmed that "the strategic payload of the missile is between 100 kg to 250 kg"[142a]. One can conservatively deduce that the 250 kg mentioned by the minister corresponded to Indian Thermo-nuclear weapon, and 100Kg correspond to either 20Kt medium yield boosted fission weapon because low yield sub-KT weapon are tactical & not considered as strategic weapons. Therefore, when considering the range and payload parameters of the Agni and Prithvi missiles, these figures must be borne in mind.
 
Next time you write, Myth, you better present the data to back up your claims, you liar.
 
Youn might also admit your MANY lies.
 
When I pull a boner, I correct for the record, idiot. I got the name of the missile wrong but the numbers operating characteristics and dates are correct for the missile I describe
 
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Herald1234    HtJ analysis.   6/27/2007 3:15:03 AM

Did u know that China also has a deal with US to limit nukes--REALLY. We helped your economy in exchange, thats an old deal. Why do you think China doesn't have 1000s of nukes. Besides India lakes some carbon fibre technology for ICBM which US put a ban on for all export. INdia cannot make a military ICBM beyond its Satellite launchers which can easily be destroyed by US due to fueling time etc. Besides INdia cannot afford ICBM deployment.


1. The PRCs don't have them because they cannot build them.
2. India has French and Israeli rocketeers helping them. There is very little that India doesn't know about building rockets these days. Infrastructure and industrial base is a little problem, but once India builds the giant autoclaves[she already has the SRB mills] you can pack that lie you wrote away, too, HtJ.
 
Face it, if ISRAEL can build SRB booster casings inhouse, so can India. 
 
Stick to mopping.
 
Herald
 
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mithradates       6/27/2007 12:21:24 PM
 
 
h!tp://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/

Testing

After 24 years without testing India resumed nuclear testing with a series of nuclear explosions known as "Operation Shatki." Prime Minister Vajpayee authorized the tests on April 8, 1998, two days after the Ghauri missile test-firing in Pakistan.

On May 11, 1998, India tested three devices at the Pokhran underground testing site, followed by two more tests on May 13, 1998. The nuclear tests carried out at 3:45 pm on May 11th were claimed by the Indian government to be a simultaneous detonation of three different devices - a fission device with a yield of about 12 kilotons (KT), a thermonuclear device with a yield of about 43 KT, and a sub-kiloton device. The two tests carried out at 12:21 pm on May 13th were also detonated simultaneously with reported yields in the range of 0.2 to 0.6 KT.

However, there is some controversy about these claims. Based on seismic data, U.S. government sources and independent experts estimated the yield of the so-called thermonuclear test in the range of 12-25 kilotons, as opposed to the 43-60 kiloton yield claimed by India. This lower yield raised skepticism about India's claims to have detonated a thermonuclear device.

Observers initially suggested that the test could have been a boosted fission device, rather than a true multi-stage thermonuclear device. By late 1998 analysts at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory had concluded that the India had attempted to detonate a thermonuclear device, but that the second stage of the two-stage bomb failed to ignite as planned.

TEST DEVICE DATE YIELD
claimed		 YIELD
reported
Fission device   18 May 1974 12-15 kiloton 4-6 kiloton
Shakti 1 Thermonuclear device   11 May 1998 43-60 kiloton 12-25 kiloton
Shakti 2 Fission device 11 May 1998 12 kiloton ??
Shakti 3 Low-yield device 11 May 1998 0.2 kiloton low
Shakti 4 Low-yield device 13 May 1998 0.5 kiloton low
Shakti 5 Low-yield device 13 May 1998 0.3 kiloton low

India's Nuclear Arsenal

Though India has not made any official statements about the size of it nuclear arsenal, the NRDC estimates that India has a stockpile of approximately 30-35 nuclear warheads and claims that India is producing additional nuclear materials. Joseph Cirincione at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (3) estimates that India has produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for 50-90 nuclear weapons and a smaller but unknown quantity of weapons-grade uranium. Weapons
 
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YelliChink       6/27/2007 3:09:28 PM
India has the capability to design and build 200kt H-bomb. The only question is whether it is India's interest to do so. I don't know how many weapons of different scales that India has, so I don't comment on that.
 
However, it is the year 1998. People don't build a working nuclear weapon just to show off. Instead, people are building test detonation devices so that they can accurately measure signitures of chain reactions. That's why people build sub-kt devices instead of Mt devices in the old days.
 
For amateur or ignorants, it might be a source to ridicule India. But, the people who have basic knowledge about how things get done, they know what 45kt/0.2kt means.
 
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Herald1234       6/28/2007 1:09:31 AM

India has the capability to design and build 200kt H-bomb. The only question is whether it is India's interest to do so. I don't know how many weapons of different scales that India has, so I don't comment on that.

 

However, it is the year 1998. People don't build a working nuclear weapon just to show off. Instead, people are building test detonation devices so that they can accurately measure signitures of chain reactions. That's why people build sub-kt devices instead of Mt devices in the old days.

 

For amateur or ignorants, it might be a source to ridicule India. But, the people who have basic knowledge about how things get done, they know what 45kt/0.2kt means.


If the PRC had read the part of the data I presented where India publicly admitted that the fission booster tested was an inert package installed into the test trigger device, the PRC would have known this, but even at that assuming his presentation is accurate, he doesn't understand that seismic data can be off by an order of a magnitude, depending on detector delta range and the medium through which the shock wave travelled. You can't declare with absolute certainty what the device yield is unless you have access to local instrumentation to a local event. That's physics. All events are LOCAL.
Just more PRC ignorance at work, I see.
 
Herald  
 
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Herald1234       6/28/2007 2:20:02 AM




India has the capability to design and build 200kt H-bomb. The only question is whether it is India's interest to do so. I don't know how many weapons of different scales that India has, so I don't comment on that.



 



However, it is the year 1998. People don't build a working nuclear weapon just to show off. Instead, people are building test detonation devices so that they can accurately measure signitures of chain reactions. That's why people build sub-kt devices instead of Mt devices in the old days.



 



For amateur or ignorants, it might be a source to ridicule India. But, the people who have basic knowledge about how things get done, they know what 45kt/0.2kt means.




If the PRC had read the part of the data I presented where India publicly admitted that the fission booster tested was an inert package installed into the test trigger device, the PRC would have known this, but even at that assuming his presentation is accurate, he doesn't understand that seismic data can be off by an order of a magnitude, depending on detector delta range and the medium through which the shock wave travelled. You can't declare with absolute certainty what the device yield is unless you have access to local instrumentation to a local event. That's physics. All events are LOCAL.

Just more PRC ignorance at work, I see.

 

Herald  


For follow up, that FAS data is as of 2002;
 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/
Maintained by the Strategic Security Project
Updated Friday, November 8, 2002 2:48:14 PM
 
From Global Security which is more accurate and up to date;
 
 

Nuclear Weapons

India's pursuit of nuclear weapons was first spurred by a 1962 border clash with China and by Beijing's 1964 nuclear test. India made significant progress in refining its weapons design and fabrication capabilities, including reducing the size of weapons and increasing their efficiency and yield through boosted fission using tritium.

At a formal level, Indian officials and strategists denied that India possessed nuclear weapons and refered to India's position as an "options strategy," which essentially meant maintaining the nuclear weapons option and exercising it should regional and international conditions so warrant. In pursuit of this end, India refused to sign the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Indian officials argued that India's refusal to sign the treaty stemmed from its fundamentally discriminatory character; the treaty places restrictions on the nonnuclear weapons states but does little to curb the modernization and expansion of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons states.

India probably began work on a thermonuclear weapon prior to 1980. By 1989 it was publicly known that India was making efforts to isolate and purify the lithium-6 isotope, a key requirement in the production of a thermonuclear device.

India Nuclear Stockpile
 
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