Thomas, At first you had mentioned visual identification, as in by the MANPADs operators. Regarding visual observers, yes, they are a big part of most lower-tech country's air defense networks. A pair of eyes and ears are some of the best anti-stealth sensors out there. Many countries have multiple networks covering their coastlines, borders, and often a line or two in depth behind the front. Iraq had hundreds of visob posts along its borders and back in a ring around Baghdad. Typically each network reports to the sector operations center for that sector. Visob indications can give tip-offs and possibly some amplifying information for identifying the intruder. It's commonly believed that a visob tip alerted the Iranian defenses to the American hostage rescue raid in 1980. Yes, MANPADs are more effective with cueing data. Once again, that's where C2 comes in. That's why the first target set considered for an air campaign is the enemy's IADS and striking its critical nodes. Displacedjim

Displacedjim: We are getting into sync now! You point about command and control is certainly valid. Today, the picture of the air-defence situation from any sensor can be digitised and integrated with the pictures of other sensors. The information in an air-defence overview is very small indeed. One thing you know with certainty is: Your air-defence nodes will be hit, thus prepare for it. 20 years ago it meant: If you lose central command, carry on the best you can with what you've got: Your own part of the picture. Today with multiple channels of communication, you can establish a new control center in seconds, even with simple voice-telling. This should mean almost seemless continuity, as when one center falls out an other take over immediately. This can continue even to the extend of a fighter pilot suddenly has the responsability for the command and control, because he has the complete air-defence picture at his scope, if he needs it. It could be a truck on the ground as well. This should mean a very low degree of vulnerability of the Air-defence SYSTEM.

Thomas, Yes, it is possible for communications to be distributed and flow across multi-redundant paths these days. This makes that aspect of the air defense network far more difficult to attack phyically (but consider the increased possibility to insinuate damaging, false, or misleading information into it--not as easy to do as dropping a bomb on a DMPI, but more elegant). However, more robust communication by itself does not necessarily improve command and control. In fact, too much information can be its own danger. Just feeding a jillion radar plots to everyone isn't going to ensure that the right aggressor aircraft are engaged. Someone still needs to be in command, making decisions about which tracks are the highest priority threats and which weapon systems should engage which tracks. Overall, you're right, there's greater possibility than before to construct an IADS that degrades gracefully and can still function somewhat as command layers are peeled off/blown up. However, I think to be successful this requires a certain overarching mindset in the air defense force, the military, and the country in question. Frankly, there's probably not a whole lot of countries whose leadership is all that comfortable with the idea of giving their underlings such autonomy or capability for leadership! Furthermore, their military and national cultures often aren't condusive to fostering such a spirit of emergent leadership where everyone has a take-charge type of attitude. For one thing, that officer corps might just use their improved communications to "take-charge" their current government out of a job! :-) Displacedjim

You hit the nail right on the head!!!! 1. It is the filtering process that is the difficult one!!!! That is why NCO's are in charge of that task. You are talking to an old NCO of that type. Warning has been much underrated in comparison to Control. That is probably why so many tends to regard radar as the ultimate solution - it is part of a solution. Secondly The communication possibilities leavwe centralistic imformationcontrolling regiemes at a disadvantage. This is not only the case in the air, but also on the ground and at sea.

That's why I react the way I do to posts regarding stealth and the recently emerging technologies like passive detection and bistatic detection. Some people seem to think this improved capability to detect stealth aircraft means the end to stealth's advantage. I suspect those people don't understand the whole kill chain and that only one link needs to be missing from the detect-track-identify-decide-engage-destroy chain for the stealth aircraft to escape. Ideas like using a country's cell phone network as a bistatic radar only improves the "detect" link in that chain, but does nothing for the other links--and the F-117 flies merrily on to bomb its target. An IADS is a synergistic combination of multiple air defense assets, and what brings them all together is the C2 equipment, networks, and processes. Without them, their air defense is just a bunch of independent parts that know nothing of each other's existence. Displacedjim

As I wrote somewhere else: "Air Defence is all about getting your act together." This makes the higher level of abstraction relevant, it is more about people than bang. Tell You a story: We had a Luftmeldekorps doing its duty during the cold war, when we got a new colonel around say 1982: He was a mean bastard; but the volunteers loved him: Tell us what to do, and we'll deliver - and they/we did. A pleasure discussing with You, displacedjim