I agree with Sentinel that the Eagle drivers would not engage for a number of reasons.  Hard deck limitations during training would prevent the accumulation of much experience at fighting at such a low altitude and a reluctance to do so. The Americans would likely have been briefed about the low speed maneuvoring abilities of the Frogfoot. 

 

If the Eagles did choose to engage,  they would use their superior climbing ability to attack from a position of advantage from a higher altitude.  Given the fuel state in your scenario, not having the ability to use mil/afterburner power to achieve a quick climb would go against that decision.  Then there is the threat from SAMs.  I say live to fight another day.

AGA, I disagree.  The USAF ingressed/egressed at medium to high altitudes during the First Gulf War and suffered relatively low casualties as a result; the RAF tried Central European tactics of low levels and were torn up by flak before they moved also to medium altitude.  The SA-2 was out of date by 1973; the Israelis had little trouble with them.  It was the SA-6/ZSU combination that hurt them--at low level--which was why they only conducted low-level ACM when the SAM threat in the Bekaa had been entirely neutralized.  Both the SA-3 and SA-5 are designed to stop slow bombers, not fast fighters.  In any case, F-15 pilots would much rather take their chances against SAMs, which their RWR can pick up and missiles that can be evaded, rather than get nailed by a ZPU over open gun sights or the random odd angry shot from a Soviet line doggie with an AK-47.

 

F-15 pilots would have by 1980 gotten in some training with the A-10, so they would know better than try to fight Su-25s down in the weeds where the Frogfoot has all the advantages.  If they have some Sparrows left, they might try to lock one or two up and fire from altitude, but otherwise, they'd mosey on home to refuel and tell stories about the hapless MiG-21 pilots at the O-Club.

 

Sentenial,

 

Regarding SU-25's versus F-15's. I agree that disengageing and trying to hit them with a Sparrow, or indeed just letting them go, might have been the best bet in this scenario. It would really depend on the available intelligence on the SU-25 at the time (I'm not convinced that there would have been much) and the judgement of the F-15 flight commander, remembering that he would only have maybe 10 seconds to decide what to do.

 

Regarding low versus high level transit you are incorrect on a number of counts.

 

You cannot readily equate the situation in the first Gulf War, or the Bekaa or Vietnam for that matter with what would have occurred in Western Europe. In each of those situations the enemy adopted a defensive posture and thus the US and Israeli forces had all the time they needed to pull their SAM defences apart before conducting strike missions and to ensure that their strike packages were escorted by Weasals and close in jammers. In those situations I agree that it didn't make sense to transit at low altitude and risk being engaged by gunfire or short range SAMS/MANPADS.

 

Western Europe would have closer to the situation in the early part of the Yom Kippur war, where the enemy was adopting an offensive posture. In this situation the priority was hit the enemy ground forces before they over ran strategically vital areas of territory (e.g. the Sinai or the West German airbases), so the respective airforces had to be thrown at them irrespective of an active SAM threat. In such a situtation aircraft had better odds at low level and risk the gun/short range SAM fire than they did operating at medium to high level and offering a clear target for the enemy's SAMS.

 

When refering to the example of the RAF Tornados that were lost it is important to note that they were lost in the vicinity of the Iraqi airfields that they were attacking with JP-223's, not in transit. There is a world of difference between operating at low level over a heavily defended target where the AA crews are expecting an attack than there would have been for an aircraft returning at low level over a battlefield from a fight coming from the opposite direction to that which the AAA crews are expecting it to come from. Even if the crews and individual soldiers that you are talking about did see the F-15's coming they would be unlikely to have time to identify them and react against when they are operating at those speeds and altitude.

 

Furthermore, your statement "It was the SA-6/ZSU combination that hurt them--at low level--which was why they only conducted low-level ACM when the SAM threat in the Bekaa had been entirely neutralized" doesn't make sense. The entire thrust of your arguement is that it would have been more dangerous to operate at low level because of the risk of fire from everything down to individual soldiers. Why would the Isrealis in the Bekaa neutralise the SAM threat which held them at risk at medium to high altitudes, only to start operating at low level where AAA, SA-7's and AK-47's could have gotten them?

You are incorrect about the SA-3 being an anti-bomber missile. It was in fact a two stage tactical missile which was more agile than the SA-2, which hit heaps of fighters in its time. The SA-3 would have posed a greater risk still. You are correct that SA-5 (and the SA-4, both of which the East Germans deployed) were medium to high altitude anti-bomber missiles. However, they both had huge warheads (300 to 500 lb HE).

 

F-15's transiting at high altitude and at subsonic speeds over say 50 miles of enemy territory in Europe would have been subject to enemy missile fire for at least five minutes and the Warsaw Pact forces would have fired dozens of missiles at them, just like they did to Gary Powers U-2. The F-15 pilots might be able to dodge a few missiles but it would just be a matter of time before they would miss one or before they ran out of fuel for manouvering,  and a missile would connect. Without afterburners while they were climbing over enemy territory, they would be vulnerable even to SA-6's and SA-8's (if the latter was in service by that stage).

 

High level transit would frankly just have been a suicidal proposition in Western Europ as the entire battlefield would have been under SAM coverage, unlike in the wars that the US has fought over larger areas where it has generally just been the target areas that have been covered. Low level transit would have been a much lower risk, which is why in fact those tactics were practiced for Western Europe.

Sure, AGA, I'll just ignore everything F-15 pilots have told me about not getting in the mud.

 

The USAF has used medium-high altitude ingress and egress because the low level tactics got pilots shot down in the thousands and killed during Vietnam.  The RAF and Bill Gunston always disdained the USAF and predicted they wouldn't survive at low level--but over Iraq, as I stated, the RAF took the bulk of its losses at low level.  Matter of fact, one of the reasons why the USAF was so sour over the A-10 prior to Desert Storm was because it was thought it would never survive at low level over Central Europe.

 

You are right about the SA-3--you got me there.  But note one other thing: it was designed for use at low level.

 

The F-15s would not be heading home at low level if they wanted to live.  And they wouldn't engage Su-25s down in the mud unless they wanted to get shot down.  End of story.

I don't know whether or not you really have spoken to F-15 pilots about this and frankly you can believe what you want on the subject, its no skin off my nose. What I would say is that if indeed that was their tactical thinking at the time then they might well have been wrong about it being the best way to fight the Western European fight. It wouldn't be the first time an armed force had gotten its tactical doctrine wrong for a type of conflict that it had never previously been involved in and the USAF is no exception.

BTW, the SA-3's operational ceiling was just shy of 60,000 feet and the F-15's with burner was 65,000 feet, so it would be a lot lower without. It would have been well within the SA-3's capability to hit it at high altitude.

AGA, in that situation you disengage. Also, at high altitude and FLYING AWAY from the SAMs/Fighters, the Eagles should be relatively safe. Not to mention the benefit of better fuel economy due to pushing through less dense air. If the Eagles had to engage or maneuver, they could also trade altitude for speed. AGA, one thing you have to take into account is that missiles fired from the ground have to climb to altitude and "catch" the Eagles after they expend their fuel. This means that as the Eagles are flying away, the ability of the SAMs to achieve a high PK is decreasing FAST. Also, in a full war scenario, the Soviet SAM operators are not just going to deplete their weapons on targets that are not high PK or an immediate threat. If it were me, based on what you said, if climb to altitude, and use the INTSUM data to thread the needle back to base or a tanker. Forget the Frogfoots. 

Oh and don't forget about electronic fratricide working in the Eagles favor as well. 

-DA 

DA, I've already agreed that as long as the Eagle knew about the Frogfoot's capabilities they probably would have engaged (unless they were stupid). As for the Eagles flying away from the SAM's, if they are on a fighter sweep in enemy territory in Western Europe that isn't going to be the case, as the place was so densely defended that they would have passed a lot of SAM sites on the way in. The SAM operators would have had plenty of time to get a leading shot at the Eagles, making a high altitude transit across that sort of distance suicidal.

This paper is from the Government Audit Office and details the Gulf Air War in 1991. It includes a number of key points relevant to this conversation.

 

1. The Brits weren't the only ones to operate at low-level early in the war, the Americans did for the first three days as well but stopped when the Iraqi IAD had been dismantled.

2. The number of kills from all causes and radar guided SAM's was the highest in the early part of the war, before the IAD's was destroyed and medium to high altitude tactics were adopted. Its seems that the radar guided SAM's were forcing the Coalition aircraft to operate at low altitude and they were then subject to SA-7 and AAA fire. One would expect that in a 1980 Central European conflict that this would have persisted much longer, as the Warsaw Pact had far greater redundancy in their SAM defences compared to the Iraqis but the allies only had limited numbers of SEAD aircraft (the USAF had

1 active wing of F-4G's in Europe and 2 at home and the Germans/Brits didn't have the Tornado and associated weapons yet) and the weapons to deal with them were not as advanced at that time (no HARM or F-117's). Note that the paper indicates that if that rate of attrition had continued then the coalition would have lost three times as many aircraft.

 

3. Medium to high altitude delivery's reduced the accuracy of the American's weapons delivery, even in the good weather of Iraq and at a time when guided weapons had proliferated from what was available in 1980. You can imagine that the poorer weather in Germany would have necessitated low-level operations.

link

AGA, as usual I find that you're not interested in an argument unless other posters agree with you.  You want the F-15s in the mud fighting the Su-25s on the Frogfoot's home ground--therefore, that's what it will be.

 

In that case, since we're dealing with utter idiots behind the sticks of the F-15s, my guess is that some Frogfoot jock becomes the first Shturmovik ace since 1945.  Happy?

 

As ever im expecting to be proven wrong but here goes;

 

1) Re gulf  I have to agree with AGA

 

The results for the RAF are skewed the switch to mid altitude coincided with the destruction of the Iraqi air defence system (hence the ability to switch to med altitude)  and the end of attacks on large obvoius and heavilly defended targets ie airfields.

With that its hard to extrapolate which was more significant to the loss rate.

 

2) On topic

 

It was my understanding that the strike air craft stayed low with fighter cover and weasel support clearing egress lanes (quite possibly blasting a clear path) enabling them to sit at medium altitude .

 

i suspect they would avoid each other