The AA-8 would probably not engage fighters from the front, but a su-25 can be maneuvered much more safetly at 100 fts and at lower speeds. If the Eagle could not destroy them, with sidewinders first, it will have to climb a few more hundreds feets to take advantage over the Frogfoots, and will have to forget about the SAMs for a minute.  flying at that altitude is already more dangerous than soviet missiles.

 

Even a Strike Eagle would not naneuver at 100 fts, if I´m not wrong their lowest combat altitude is around 300 or 400 fts. That is one reason why they build specialized aircrafts.

This link about the Indian Airforce indicated that the early AA-8's were tail chase (it was deployed in 1975) but the later ones were all aspect. I'm not sure when the later models were deployed but it would be safe to assume that ground attack squadrons would get them last so an SU-25 in 1980 would probably have the earlier models.

However, you have to remember that the combined closing speed of these aircraft would be in the order of 1000mph. You would expect a maximum sighting range of about 2 miles nearly front on at low level, less depending on how close the Eagle was to the ridgeline when the SU-25 popped out. That would give it a maximum of 8 seconds after spotting to aircraft to identify it as a threat which would be more challenging nearly front on, decide what course of action to take and undertake the required actions to engage. By the time that happenned I would expect that they aircraft would be within gun range and approaching if not in the minumum range for the Sidewinder.

At that height and speed, any dogfight is going to have more casualties from controlled flight into terrain than air to air shots.

 

 

I'd suspect both sides would blow right through each other,

 

Ian

 

 

Thanks for the link!

I guess this situation will depend more on the pilot´s skills. 

I don´t konw how the Eagles fire control system could calculate firing solutions for the cannon without radar, if it can´t do that the combat diferences between both types of aircrafts would be even smaller in that scenario. 

Thanks Gents, heres my thoughts.

 

Senty, I doubt that the Eagles would be transiting a Western European battlefield at high altitude unless they were escorted by weasals and offensive jammers. Their maximum altitude is within that of an SA-2 even when they have full tanks and can use burners. In this scenario the tanks are quite empty and they would have to transit at a lower altitude and at subsonic speed. Doing so in that environment would be suicidal as they would be in range of both SA-2's and SA-3's (possibly
SA-5's too, I don't know if they were deployed in Western Europe though). That is not mentioning that they would have to climb to that altitude after the fight with the Migs, during which time they would be even more vulnerable.

 

I have read accounts of how Cold War fighter sweeps were to be conducted at low altitude. It wasn't just because of the SAM's, but because it range of detection with the fighters radar looking up while reducing that of the enemy looking down. The Israelis set up low level fighter traps doing this over the Bekea and so did the Iraqis during the Iran/Iraq war. It does put the fighter in range of smallarms, small bore autocannon and shoulder launched SAM's but those are a less deadly threat than a SAM when travelling at high altitude. I've been on a gun position that has been buzzed at low leve by F-111's during peacetime and believe me you don't get a lot of warning to raise your rifle when they travel at that altitude and speed. During wartime with the safety limits removed and the aircraft travelling lower and faster, you would have even less.

 

I don't know the exact time that the SU-25 entered Frontal Aviation service but I know that production started in 1978. It is reasonable to assume that if the Soviets didn't have it in service already in 1980 that it would be rushed in in the case of a war. That leaves us with the possibility of a hapless F-15 pilot not knowing its capabilities and trying to engage it, finding out that it is a tougher cookie than he expected. Apart from the manouverability and the big cannon, the big factor that would be in its favour is that its armour would mean that the F-15 pilot would basically have to get a Sidewinder up the tailpipe to ensure destroying it. I agree that should the F-15 pilot know this that he would be better to bug out, though I'd say that he'd be better off to change course away fromt the US rather than trying to fly by otherwise he risks a near head on shot with cannon followed by the SU-25 turning and putting an AA-8 up his tailpipe before he can get away (remember, no afterburner).

 

The best odds that the F-15s would have if they did decide to engage would be to use the fact that they are fighter pilots with superior tactical training to the SU-25's attack pilots and try something like splitting, hooking around behind and then fooling the SU's into showing their tailpipes by using a scissors manouver. I agree however that the whole thing would pose a risk of somebody flying into a tree or a power pylon.

The other factor is individual pilot skill and training.  Would a a late 70s era SU-25 ground pounder pilot have received extensive ACM training or practiced much AtoA? 

Probably just basic acm when they were doing their advanced flight training I'd imagine, versus post-Vietnam advanced ACM with aggressors for the F-15's. I'd say that is probably going to be a major factor though the advantages of low speed manouverabilty and armour that the SU-25's would enjoy in this scenario would equalise sthe odds somewhat. Its really easy to see an F-15 pilot trying to manouvering his aircraft into a position for a Sidewinder shot only to find himself in cannon range, firing on the SU-25 with multiple hits but little effect due to armour then being forced to overshoot when it rolls into a turn and those big wings slow it right down to a speed where the F-15 can't manouver. At altitude a good F-15 pilot might be able to compensate with a manouver in the vertical like a yo-yo but at this altitude that would be a very dangerous thing to try.

The other factor is individual pilot skill and training.  Would a a late 70s era SU-25 ground pounder pilot have received extensive ACM training or practiced much AtoA? 

Probably just basic acm when they were doing their advanced flight training I'd imagine, versus post-Vietnam advanced ACM with aggressors for the F-15's. I'd say that is probably going to be a major factor though the advantages of low speed manouverabilty and armour that the SU-25's would enjoy in this scenario would equalise sthe odds somewhat. Its really easy to see an F-15 pilot trying to manouvering his aircraft into a position for a Sidewinder shot only to find himself in cannon range, firing on the SU-25 with multiple hits but little effect due to armour then being forced to overshoot when it rolls into a turn and those big wings slow it right down to a speed where the F-15 can't manouver. At altitude a good F-15 pilot might be able to compensate with a manouver in the vertical like a yo-yo but at this altitude that would be a very dangerous thing to try.

I agree with Sentinel that the Eagle drivers would not engage for a number of reasons.  Hard deck limitations during training would prevent the accumulation of much experience at fighting at such a low altitude and a reluctance to do so. The Americans would likely have been briefed about the low speed maneuvoring abilities of the Frogfoot. 

 

If the Eagles did choose to engage,  they would use their superior climbing ability to attack from a position of advantage from a higher altitude.  Given the fuel state in your scenario, not having the ability to use mil/afterburner power to achieve a quick climb would go against that decision.  Then there is the threat from SAMs.  I say live to fight another day.

AGA, I disagree.  The USAF ingressed/egressed at medium to high altitudes during the First Gulf War and suffered relatively low casualties as a result; the RAF tried Central European tactics of low levels and were torn up by flak before they moved also to medium altitude.  The SA-2 was out of date by 1973; the Israelis had little trouble with them.  It was the SA-6/ZSU combination that hurt them--at low level--which was why they only conducted low-level ACM when the SAM threat in the Bekaa had been entirely neutralized.  Both the SA-3 and SA-5 are designed to stop slow bombers, not fast fighters.  In any case, F-15 pilots would much rather take their chances against SAMs, which their RWR can pick up and missiles that can be evaded, rather than get nailed by a ZPU over open gun sights or the random odd angry shot from a Soviet line doggie with an AK-47.

 

F-15 pilots would have by 1980 gotten in some training with the A-10, so they would know better than try to fight Su-25s down in the weeds where the Frogfoot has all the advantages.  If they have some Sparrows left, they might try to lock one or two up and fire from altitude, but otherwise, they'd mosey on home to refuel and tell stories about the hapless MiG-21 pilots at the O-Club.

 

Sentenial,

 

Regarding SU-25's versus F-15's. I agree that disengageing and trying to hit them with a Sparrow, or indeed just letting them go, might have been the best bet in this scenario. It would really depend on the available intelligence on the SU-25 at the time (I'm not convinced that there would have been much) and the judgement of the F-15 flight commander, remembering that he would only have maybe 10 seconds to decide what to do.

 

Regarding low versus high level transit you are incorrect on a number of counts.

 

You cannot readily equate the situation in the first Gulf War, or the Bekaa or Vietnam for that matter with what would have occurred in Western Europe. In each of those situations the enemy adopted a defensive posture and thus the US and Israeli forces had all the time they needed to pull their SAM defences apart before conducting strike missions and to ensure that their strike packages were escorted by Weasals and close in jammers. In those situations I agree that it didn't make sense to transit at low altitude and risk being engaged by gunfire or short range SAMS/MANPADS.

 

Western Europe would have closer to the situation in the early part of the Yom Kippur war, where the enemy was adopting an offensive posture. In this situation the priority was hit the enemy ground forces before they over ran strategically vital areas of territory (e.g. the Sinai or the West German airbases), so the respective airforces had to be thrown at them irrespective of an active SAM threat. In such a situtation aircraft had better odds at low level and risk the gun/short range SAM fire than they did operating at medium to high level and offering a clear target for the enemy's SAMS.

 

When refering to the example of the RAF Tornados that were lost it is important to note that they were lost in the vicinity of the Iraqi airfields that they were attacking with JP-223's, not in transit. There is a world of difference between operating at low level over a heavily defended target where the AA crews are expecting an attack than there would have been for an aircraft returning at low level over a battlefield from a fight coming from the opposite direction to that which the AAA crews are expecting it to come from. Even if the crews and individual soldiers that you are talking about did see the F-15's coming they would be unlikely to have time to identify them and react against when they are operating at those speeds and altitude.

 

Furthermore, your statement "It was the SA-6/ZSU combination that hurt them--at low level--which was why they only conducted low-level ACM when the SAM threat in the Bekaa had been entirely neutralized" doesn't make sense. The entire thrust of your arguement is that it would have been more dangerous to operate at low level because of the risk of fire from everything down to individual soldiers. Why would the Isrealis in the Bekaa neutralise the SAM threat which held them at risk at medium to high altitudes, only to start operating at low level where AAA, SA-7's and AK-47's could have gotten them?

You are incorrect about the SA-3 being an anti-bomber missile. It was in fact a two stage tactical missile which was more agile than the SA-2, which hit heaps of fighters in its time. The SA-3 would have posed a greater risk still. You are correct that SA-5 (and the SA-4, both of which the East Germans deployed) were medium to high altitude anti-bomber missiles. However, they both had huge warheads (300 to 500 lb HE).

 

F-15's transiting at high altitude and at subsonic speeds over say 50 miles of enemy territory in Europe would have been subject to enemy missile fire for at least five minutes and the Warsaw Pact forces would have fired dozens of missiles at them, just like they did to Gary Powers U-2. The F-15 pilots might be able to dodge a few missiles but it would just be a matter of time before they would miss one or before they ran out of fuel for manouvering,  and a missile would connect. Without afterburners while they were climbing over enemy territory, they would be vulnerable even to SA-6's and SA-8's (if the latter was in service by that stage).

 

High level transit would frankly just have been a suicidal proposition in Western Europ as the entire battlefield would have been under SAM coverage, unlike in the wars that the US has fought over larger areas where it has generally just been the target areas that have been covered. Low level transit would have been a much lower risk, which is why in fact those tactics were practiced for Western Europe.

Sure, AGA, I'll just ignore everything F-15 pilots have told me about not getting in the mud.

 

The USAF has used medium-high altitude ingress and egress because the low level tactics got pilots shot down in the thousands and killed during Vietnam.  The RAF and Bill Gunston always disdained the USAF and predicted they wouldn't survive at low level--but over Iraq, as I stated, the RAF took the bulk of its losses at low level.  Matter of fact, one of the reasons why the USAF was so sour over the A-10 prior to Desert Storm was because it was thought it would never survive at low level over Central Europe.

 

You are right about the SA-3--you got me there.  But note one other thing: it was designed for use at low level.

 

The F-15s would not be heading home at low level if they wanted to live.  And they wouldn't engage Su-25s down in the mud unless they wanted to get shot down.  End of story.

I don't know whether or not you really have spoken to F-15 pilots about this and frankly you can believe what you want on the subject, its no skin off my nose. What I would say is that if indeed that was their tactical thinking at the time then they might well have been wrong about it being the best way to fight the Western European fight. It wouldn't be the first time an armed force had gotten its tactical doctrine wrong for a type of conflict that it had never previously been involved in and the USAF is no exception.

BTW, the SA-3's operational ceiling was just shy of 60,000 feet and the F-15's with burner was 65,000 feet, so it would be a lot lower without. It would have been well within the SA-3's capability to hit it at high altitude.