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Subject: Why 183 Raptors is NOT enough.
Herald12345    6/28/2009 2:53:01 PM
Study results follows in next post. Herald
 
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Herald12345    Like the rest of your rants    7/1/2009 1:10:02 AM








As for the army truck driver......



 


Just because I KNOW how hard a blackmail operation is does not mean you do. The Seoul blackmail gambit has been the primary military factor in the RoKs not bowling over the  DPRKS on the Korean peninsula . WHAT THE HELL DO YOU THINK THE SECOND ARTILLERY IS; AS REGARDS TAIWAN?



 



Blackmail.



 

By the way, the study you cited was 1987, was wrong then,  and was before the Clintons gave away steller nav-aod corrected inertial and GPS guidance to the Bandits   











WRONG. You aren't fooling anybody with your little tough guy act. You started a thread based on a flawed analysis that does nothing to support your claim. You don't have the skill sets or experience to discuss this with people who actually understand how wars are fought and it's why YOU STARTED OFF WRONG.




When you want to debate this by the numbers and on point then let me know. Otherwise this along with your other examples of error like your suggestion that merchants should have missiles and machine guns are ineffective on water solidify you don't know what you are talking about.




-DA 












This is just the baseless and meaningless assertions with no numbers and facts to back it up again.If your typing was read by volume, it would be hysterical shouting ranted out by a child. Where are your numbers and where is your logic, child? 

In my shop: we call that all mouth and no results . We would send you out to calm down after one of us chewed ypu put for incompetence, then the adults (us) would fix the problem you couldn't solve with your tantrum. 
 
Sheesh, talk about unprofessional. When I lose my temper and chew someone out, I tell him exactly how he screwed up.
 
Like here when you try to bring upm rockets about which you know nothing. and machine gins about which I begin to think all you genuinely kno0w is how you pull the trigger and clean. You certainly don't know the forst thing about stabilization issues or BALLISTICS.
 
I think the more you post your rants, and assertions, the more childlike and less credible you become. You really need to sit back and let the aduhylts debate this amateur. This is clearly out of your league.
 
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warpig       7/1/2009 1:23:00 AM

As far as the PRC is concerned that would be the USA invading sovern PRC territory. Of course thats THEIR interpretation but the kind of escalation that would represent is frightening. Also, not even counting the PLAAF, the force protection issues associated with basing from the RoC would be a nightmare. Especially when the USN can provide mobile basing and aircraft via carriers to deal with this.

All of this aside though, how is China going to do any of this considering the other huge vulnerabilities they have with regard to keeping their SLOC open even to support forces in Taiwan and that they cannot lift enough men and materials to the RoC to have a realistic chance of a successful invasion in the first place? I agree the PRC military capability is significantly improved but they are not ready for something of this magnitude and wont be for a long time. 

I find it interesting that people cavalierly suggest the PRC will just walk right into Taiwan in a week or so when we know from our own experience that an operation like this against a determined foe never goes as planned and is absolutely exhaustive especially when you are being forced to confront Taiwan's natural maritime barrier. An operation as complicated as an air and amphibious assault against a modern defense with good situational awareness is about the most difficult operation imaginable. There are just so many things that could go wrong for them that it's hard to believe they would even make the attempt in the first place. And it's unfathomable that if they did things would flow smoothly and unimpeded by RoC or external defenses on some predetermined timeline.


 
First, I think your point about Chinese reaction to U.S. forces on Taiwan is interesting.  I don't know enough to judge it, but I suspect it certainly might factor into the overall political limitations that would surely be in effect holding us back from thoroughly trashing China.
 
Second, I concur completely with GF 's observations.
 
Finally, while I will stress that I am very confident that if we are allowed to decide for ourselves when the war is over, and don't quit too soon, then there is no way China can take and hold Taiwan, and I agree that their amphibious assault capability to get AFVs and heavy equipment (arty, etc.) ashore is indeed relatively limited,... but it is potentially more than commonly believed.  For one thing, there are many dozens/couple hundred smallish landing craft capable of taking an AFV or two across the strait that are not typically acknowledged in open source OBs.  Of course, mobilizing them may likely give us some indications and warning of an impending operation, so their use has a potential down-side for them.  Furthermore, while I realize a mass of riflemen without any heavier support, other than what they can carry, are prime candidates for becoming automatic cannon fodder, still, there's no doubt that China could send vast swarms of riflemen ashore if they chose to, and that's not nothing.  If America stayed out of it, I'm not confident at all that Taiwan could stop even an invasion geared to succeed as rapidly as possible--and obviously a theoretical long term war that somehow only involves China and Taiwan and is fought without time limits until one side is vanquished can only end with final Chinese victory.
 
 
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warpig       7/1/2009 1:33:37 AM
Herald,  I have to admire your bold vision for taking the fight to the enemy.  I'm still not sure it's not too reckless, and I'm quite dubious that such risky forward basing would be allowed politically for fear of suffering politically (or even militarily) unacceptable losses, but it certainly presents the potential for rapidly smashing the PLA.
 
 
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Herald12345    Like the rest of your rants    7/1/2009 1:34:37 AM


Herald,




I must admit to being somewhat confused as to the direction of this thread.  The title indicates that it is another attempt to demonstrate the need for more F-22s.  The study and even your posts have had little to do with that issue.  Instead, it deals with the basing and logistical issues that the Air Force would have to deal with in a confrontation with China over Taiwan


 

It does, but you are not looking at the kill mechanism in place to remove the PLAAF  as a finctioning element of the PRC bandit order of battle.


 

At various points you seem to be saying (and I agree) that Kadena is too exposed to various Chinese attacks to base the F-22 at.  That leaves Guam as the only major airbase available (assuming that Japan is neutral).  Using the Studies sortie rates, the entire currently planned F-22 inventory could only generate a 6 ship continuous CAP over Taiwan.  Using those same ratios if the additional 60 F-22s are purchased that you have advocated on other threads, then that CAP level could be raised to?.8.  The issue isn?t the number of platforms in service, it?s the basing availability and the support required to get them to the front.  If the US had 1000 F-22s in its inventory, but was still only able to use the Guam bases then the number available for the CAP would not be much different than it is with only 183.  There just isn?t enough room at Anderson field for many more fighters. 

 

Rebuttal: 

 


 

We fight from there.





The primary service in any defense of Taiwan is going to be the Navy.  The carriers are more mobile, harder to find and better protected (if more fragile) than any fixed airbase.   The biggest threats to any invasion force (outside the Taiwanese forces) are US submarines.  I would like to think that seeing the force ratios the Air Forces?s strategy would not be based on a passive Defensive CAP, but instead focus on escorted attack missions and offensive fighter sweeps, where they could concentrate their numbers ad pick and chose their fights.

 

And so the USAF would, but we still have to fight over our airfields in the beginning to clear the skies for peeling their onion.. 





By the way I want to thank you for the opportunity to SHOW why the numbers of F-22s shuttled forward into battle are not restricted by capacity at Kadena and Andersen. Those are just waypoints to the forward bases.

                                                                                                                                                          &n
 
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LB    Combined Arms   7/1/2009 1:36:38 AM
What total rubbish.  To say "do not have to operate" is to just about say nothing.  In any case the library at the Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, is called the Combined Arms Research Library.  The Command and General Staff College is one of 11 major organizations at Ft Leavenworth under the United States Army Combined Arms Center.  The US Army seems a tad focused upon modern warfare being combined arms warfare. 
 
Combined arms did not go away with the end of the Cold War nor is it relegated to "conventional" warfare.  Combined arms is the gravity that holds warfare together.  An infantry centric tactical or operational level force does not eliminate the central focus of combined arms- to include not just the infantry but any armor, recon, artillery, AT, AA, combat engineers, helicopters, and possible close air support.
 
Combined arms has existed since the dawn of warfare and those who ignore this do so at their peril.  Infantry in the US Army always operate as part of a combined arms force.  This is operational art 101.  While it might not be that apparent at plat or company level this is the basic reality of warfare.
 
You're not the first infantry fanboy, nor hundredth for that matter, I've heard this single arm of service is dominant line from and I've heard it from O6s who never left the branch in their career and general officers; however, you are the first to propose the notion that combined arms is "Cold War" or "conventional" thinking.  One might be forgiven for a bit of hubris or hyperbole regarding the infantry during a counter insurgency but denying the basic parameters of warfare is a bit over the top even for me. 
 
As an aside the most infantry centric force in the history of warfare is the USMC where every marine is considered a rifleman.  The Corp worships the rifleman and is entirely constructed to support the rifle plat, company, and battalion.  There is not a lot of structure in the ground forces that even allows anything but an infantry centric force.  The USMC is infantry heaven as the religion is the worship of the infantry.  Combined arms is drilled into it's commanders and this is reflected in training, doctrine and organization.  To deny the primacy and central importance of combined arms in warfare is to be kind not a supportable position.
 
In any case much of the Combined Arms Research Library is online.  Feel free to cite supporting evidence for your notion.  My world view does not include as factual the idea that combined arms is not relevant at times nor that air superiority is not the primary factor that enables the rest of the US military to wage war.  It might not seem that way when the other guy hasn't an air force but gravity still works even when you are comfortably sitting down.
 
 
 









You'll excuse me for the mistaken belief that the importance of the infantry was somewhat terrain dependent and that the infantry operated as part of a combined arms team.  You'll further excuse my incorrect notion that 11M10s exist to speed the tanks forward to cite DePuy.



Infantry do not have to operate as a part of a combined arms force. You are stuck on conventional Cold War "western" paradigms. 



 
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mustang22       7/1/2009 12:20:01 PM
Assuming unopposed use of Kadena and Andersen, what is the maximum number of F-22's that could be in the air simultaneously in a first day of war scenario in the Strait? This is also assuming full maintenance and tanker support. What would the maximum sortie rate be and how does the Rand study come up with only 6 aircraft for CAP?
 
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DarthAmerica    LB reply   7/1/2009 2:06:19 PM
You are clearly not understanding what I'm telling you. I'm telling you what actual war is like and not these theories from the internet. This is first person infantry experience so if you think it's in anyway "fanboy" then nothing I say is going to change your mind. We will just have to agree to disagree.


-DA 
 
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Herald12345    Says the guy who relies on air recon for land routes and movements.   7/1/2009 2:44:37 PM

You are clearly not understanding what I'm telling you. I'm telling you what actual war is like and not these theories from the internet. This is first person infantry experience so if you think it's in anyway "fanboy" then nothing I say is going to change your mind. We will just have to agree to disagree.







-DA 


Missed the POINT again, "rocket expert".. 
 
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DarthAmerica    warpig Reply    7/1/2009 3:35:10 PM

First, I think your point about Chinese reaction to U.S. forces on Taiwan is interesting.  I don't know enough to judge it, but I suspect it certainly might factor into the overall political limitations that would surely be in effect holding us back from thoroughly trashing China.

 
Of course. And it isn't just political. Simple economics makes such a conflict extremely unlikely where the USA and PRC fight. I think the most realistic worse case is the PRC imposing some sort of limited bombardment against the RoC using BM's which limit the scope of the conflict to just PRC vs RoC. Once they start shooting at US and Allied militaries and territory the price goes well beyond what a rational PRC leadership would consider worth it. Having said that, a US admin would be equally interested in containing such a conflict as well. Just like the Cold War where the USA and USSR picked proxies to fight rather than endure the hardships of a direct fight.

We could provide CAP and even strike against PLAAF and PLAN units directly engaged in the fight. We might even conduct limited SEAD against some of their longer ranged IADs. But physically bombing the PRC proper and putting US forces on Taiwan and having them actively engage PRC forces? Just the same, PRC forces bombing Japanese and US territory? Something like that could get wildly out of hand and even go nuclear. I think the politics will greatly limit some of the more "aggressive" strategies being suggested here. That was certainly the case in the war I was involved in and the risk to US interest were not nearly this great.

Not saying we should not prepare for all cases. Just that the more extreme suggestions are less likely. 

-DA 
 
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DarthAmerica    Herald Reply    7/1/2009 3:38:12 PM

Missed the POINT again, "rocket expert".. 

No, and you would be well advised to shut up and listen. Of course you wont since you choose to comment on things you have no experience with but just the same. You have no idea whatsoever what I relied on or how we did what we did.


-DA 
 
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