Well, they definitely have been testing a conventional submunition warhead.  The evidence can be seen on Google Earth.  I certainly am concerned about it, both for attacking airbases and also against aircraft carriers.

One good point of that briefing is it points out that there are bases in Japan that don't always get mentined, and even far north Misawa is actually closer to Taiwan than Guam is.  It's true that there are no major bases in the Ryukyus closer than Okinawa is (although there is at least one small airstrip on an island quite close toTaiwan that I think the Japanese have been looking at improving), but actually considering the large number of SRBMs and LACMs that really could reach them, I'm not sure I'd really want to put many large fixed-wing aircraft there anyway.

 

would be to use the SCRAMDART aerial solution at their IRBM ranges to clobber their air bases before we float forward to clobber their TBM sites and naval assets. I think our carriers will survive anything ballistic the PRCs throw because of dodge, EW and our SAM defense. Our few land bases are frankly goners unless the PRCs honor Japanese and US sovereignity which they won't. The big question is whether we can fight close in aftertwards. You are right that their air bases can be repaired quickly, but then I want to kill aircraft and aircrew. We have to do that in the air. So air battle over Taiwan is a given at some point; since we want to kill their PILOTS and AIRCRAFT where their ejected pilots drown; or we capture them. Its also where they cannot recover damaged aircraft and we can.

Herald

 

There is not a long list of wars or battles won when the enemy has air superiority.  The US Army has actually had trouble when either the enemy had air superiority or was able to seriously contest the battle space.  The notion that air superiority is not the pre-req and enabling condition for everything else is interesting and perhaps what the Arab nations thought in 1967 but it in fact was an incorrect notion.

In any case it's clear where you are finally coming from.  The most important mission belongs to the infantry are your words.

You'll excuse me for the mistaken belief that the importance of the infantry was somewhat terrain dependent and that the infantry operated as part of a combined arms team.  You'll further excuse my incorrect notion that 11M10s exist to speed the tanks forward to cite DePuy.

 

In any case you tell the Iraqi army in 1991 that "Air power is not the most important mission" or the British in 1940 or for the Germans over Germany in 1944.  Tell the IJA and IJN SNLF troops starving on dozens of islands that air power is more important.  Tell it to the IJN in all it's major battles.  Tell Syria in 1982.  Tell Argentina in 1981.

 

Armies operate, and especially the American Army, at the end of a long logistical chain.  The central importance of air power in protecting that chain from air attack, submarine and surface ship attack is not a matter of debate.  Air power is the force multiplier that allows the infantry, among the other arms, to operate.  The USA needs to be prepared to fight more than a counter insurgency or minor conflict with enemies with little or no air power.

 

When the enemy has air superiority it becomes a tad difficult, among myriad other factors, to win the information war.

 

That you believe air power is not the central and overarching factor in modern warfare is with all due respect akin to being a member of the flat earth society.

 

 

The biggest threats to any invasion force (outside the Taiwanese forces) are US submarines.

welcome back :)

re the above, to whit, it's the firepower and capability of the SSGN's that are one of their nightmares.... 

No one said America doesn't need to be prepared. But no matter what the conflict its still up to having enough 19 year olds with guns to settle the issue. Air Power is an enabler and makes it easier, but it isn't a must have. 

No, I'm a person who knows first hand what I'm talking about. Air Power helps, its a force multiplier, it can reach deep and even cause some to surrender, but it is still ultimately a support role to the real central factor which is having the men to go in and take advantage of the situation. Air Power helps to prepare a battlefield, Infantry control it.

-DA

Herald,

 

I must admit to being somewhat confused as to the direction of this thread.  The title indicates that it is another attempt to demonstrate the need for more F-22s.  The study and even your posts have had little to do with that issue.  Instead, it deals with the basing and logistical issues that the Air Force would have to deal with in a confrontation with China over Taiwan. 

At various points you seem to be saying (and I agree) that Kadena is too exposed to various Chinese attacks to base the F-22 at.  That leaves Guam as the only major airbase available (assuming that Japan is neutral).  Using the Studies sortie rates, the entire currently planned F-22 inventory could only generate a 6 ship continuous CAP over Taiwan.  Using those same ratios if the additional 60 F-22s are purchased that you have advocated on other threads, then that CAP level could be raised to?.8.  The issue isn?t the number of platforms in service, it?s the basing availability and the support required to get them to the front.  If the US had 1000 F-22s in its inventory, but was still only able to use the Guam bases then the number available for the CAP would not be much different than it is with only 183.  There just isn?t enough room at Anderson field for many more fighters. 

The primary service in any defense of Taiwan is going to be the Navy.  The carriers are more mobile, harder to find and better protected (if more fragile) than any fixed airbase.   The biggest threats to any invasion force (outside the Taiwanese forces) are US submarines.  I would like to think that seeing the force ratios the Air Forces?s strategy would not be based on a passive Defensive CAP, but instead focus on escorted attack missions and offensive fighter sweeps, where they could concentrate their numbers ad pick and chose their fights.

This is the very reason why I always call the PRCs are coming crowd on the F-22 numbers. This is also why I advocate a longer ranged persistent unmanned platform designed specifically with the geography of the pacific in mind. This is why I also supported the SSGN decision. The big gigantic white elephant in the room is that we don't have enough access to the RoC AO to get the land based fighters we do have in there in sufficient numbers and safely conduct operations. It's a huge error to suggest that buying 60 more Raptors somehow changes the calculous. Sure, it helps with regard to over all USAF numbers over the life of the F-22 fleet. But it isn't going to fundamentally alter things in this scenario. Nevermind the fact that the RoC AO poses significant logistical and C4ISR challenges to the PRC as well that even without our involvement they are not prepared to deal with. Their issues do not improve faster than we will be adding to our own capabilities. They could try it, but it would be a huge disaster for them to do so and one they may never recover from even if they win.

-DA 

Thats a false assertion. I can cite many wars and battle like this where one side had absolute air dominance and the winning side didn't. Hell WE ARE IN A WAR LIKE THAT TODAY. Air Superiority is certainly valuable but it is not a "pre-req." 

Are you suggesting that we are losing a particular war at this time?

 

You see, this is the major reason people fail to understand war. It's been US policy to shape Iraqi policy since 1991 including regime change. Air Power could no do that sufficiently. It took having the ground component to go in there and physically take and occupy the terrain to settle that issue. This isn't all about infantry. This is about fundamentals of war. Our Air Power is a luxury. You need to understand that. Senior Officers and NCO's know exactly what I'm talking about. No one is questioning the utility of all aspect of the armed forces. But you can make war without an air force. You cannot make one without infantry. Even if it's just the threat of invasion. Now, this is not the same as an air raid like El Dorado Canyon or random TLAM strike into some hell hole. When nations are assessing capability, in the end they look at the potential for being physically forced into something. You can endure aerial bombardment. You cannot endure men grabbing you and shooting you in the head, throwing you in jail or killing your troops and standing on terrain you occupy. Never forget this concept. All the fancy planes and technology exist to support what goes on on the ground. Is if absolutely necessary? NO. Is it desirable and am I glad we have such luxuries? Hell Yes. But I never forget the overriding principle. I learned it the hard way and paid for it.

-DA