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Subject: Why 183 Raptors is NOT enough.
Herald12345    6/28/2009 2:53:01 PM
Study results follows in next post.

Herald
 
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Herald12345       6/30/2009 1:26:15 PM

Herald,


I must admit to being somewhat confused as to the direction of this thread.  The title indicates that it is another attempt to demonstrate the need for more F-22s.  The study and even your posts have had little to do with that issue.  Instead, it deals with the basing and logistical issues that the Air Force would have to deal with in a confrontation with China over Taiwan. 

 
It does, but you are not looking at the kill mechanism in place to remove the PLAAF  as a finctioning element of the PRC bandit order of battle.
 
At various points you seem to be saying (and I agree) that Kadena is too exposed to various Chinese attacks to base the F-22 at.  That leaves Guam as the only major airbase available (assuming that Japan is neutral).  Using the Studies sortie rates, the entire currently planned F-22 inventory could only generate a 6 ship continuous CAP over Taiwan.  Using those same ratios if the additional 60 F-22s are purchased that you have advocated on other threads, then that CAP level could be raised to?.8.  The issue isn?t the number of platforms in service, it?s the basing availability and the support required to get them to the front.  If the US had 1000 F-22s in its inventory, but was still only able to use the Guam bases then the number available for the CAP would not be much different than it is with only 183.  There just isn?t enough room at Anderson field for many more fighters. 
 
Rebuttal: 
 
 
We fight from there.

The primary service in any defense of Taiwan is going to be the Navy.  The carriers are more mobile, harder to find and better protected (if more fragile) than any fixed airbase.   The biggest threats to any invasion force (outside the Taiwanese forces) are US submarines.  I would like to think that seeing the force ratios the Air Forces?s strategy would not be based on a passive Defensive CAP, but instead focus on escorted attack missions and offensive fighter sweeps, where they could concentrate their numbers ad pick and chose their fights.
 
And so the USAF would, but we still have to fight over our airfields in the beginning to clear the skies for peeling their onion.. 

By the way I want to thank you for the opportunity to SHOW why the numbers of F-22s shuttled forward into battle are not restricted by capacity at Kadena and Andersen. Those are just waypoints to the forward bases.

To the army truck driver. 
-you don't know geography.
-you don't know air power.
-you don't know logistics.
 
In fact you don't know squat. This was an elaborate Herald Trap to get you to commit yourself to an ultimate exercise in nonsense to demonstrate how ignorant you really are.
 
To WP: 
 
Sorry about this, but you see I do know the study's weaknesses and STRENGTHS.  The PRCs only have 1000 or so TBMs. The Red Horse battalions shouold be able to repair the RoCAF damage airfield damage once we fly them in. To hold the air space though, we need F-22 topcover for that week whule we repair and fly in. At least 40-80 aircraft from the EASTERN RoCAF air bases+ the defenders we need at Guam and Kadena. That is 120.aircraft.  Add the war reserve for surprise losses and you get 243 MINIMUM.
 
I thought about this problem a LONG time.
 
We also need that ten hour bomber, after the SSGNs shoot their wads, bit that is a different aspect of this same problem.
 
Herald
 
 
 
.     
 
 

 
 
 
Quote    Reply

DarthAmerica       6/30/2009 4:10:20 PM

To WP: 

Sorry about this, but you see I do know the study's weaknesses and STRENGTHS.  The PRCs only have 1000 or so TBMs. The Red Horse battalions shouold be able to repair the RoCAF damage airfield damage once we fly them in. To hold the air space though, we need F-22 topcover for that week whule we repair and fly in. At least 40-80 aircraft from the EASTERN RoCAF air bases+ the defenders we need at Guam and Kadena. That is 120.aircraft.  Add the war reserve for surprise losses and you get 243 MINIMUM.

I thought about this problem a LONG time.

We also need that ten hour bomber, after the SSGNs shoot their wads, bit that is a different aspect of this same problem.

Herald


 

   You also need to think about the fact that this isn't going to be a mission flown exclusively by F-22's. 243 is not a minimum. Its the your preference. I've seen and read studies that show a successful defense of Taiwanese airspace by augmenting the RoCAF with under ~200 legacy AMRAAM capable USAF and USN fighters and the lowest numbers were well under 100 at 72!

IMHO it is not representative to make any judgement on minimum numbers of F-22's without first considering what the PRC is capable of doing and then taking a look at what the RoC and any allies it may have will do. Clearly though this isn't going to require 243 F-22's and even if we had that number or more getting them into the fight would only make marginal differences at best.

-DA 


 




 


 





 

 

 
Quote    Reply

warpig       6/30/2009 4:37:27 PM




It does, but you are not looking at the kill mechanism in place to remove the PLAAF  as a finctioning element of the PRC bandit order of battle.

Rebuttal: 





We fight from there.


And so the USAF would, but we still have to fight over our airfields in the beginning to clear the skies for peeling their onion.. 



By the way I want to thank you for the opportunity to SHOW why the numbers of F-22s shuttled forward into battle are not restricted by capacity at Kadena and Andersen. Those are just waypoints to the forward bases.


Sorry about this, but you see I do know the study's weaknesses and STRENGTHS.  The PRCs only have 1000 or so TBMs. The Red Horse battalions shouold be able to repair the RoCAF damage airfield damage once we fly them in. To hold the air space though, we need F-22 topcover for that week whule we repair and fly in. At least 40-80 aircraft from the EASTERN RoCAF air bases+ the defenders we need at Guam and Kadena. That is 120.aircraft.  Add the war reserve for surprise losses and you get 243 MINIMUM. 


I was going to elaborate on my opinion earlier, but I didn't have the time.  As far as I'm concerned, we should not get involved in defending Taiwan unless we are going to keep fighting a major air and sea campaign for at least a couple weeks, and are going to completely disregard any efforts by the PRCs to end it quickly via diplomatic intervention if they are able to gain an early success on Taiwan before we can arrive in force.  As a corrolary, I think we also should not bother to defend Taiwan unless we are going to take advantage of the PRC's stupidity in actually giving us an excuse to open up on them, and go ahead with the whole can of whomp-ass on every aircraft and ship that dares to leave China's 12-mile limit at a minimum, plus as much of the higher-value aircraft and ships that stay anywhere within the whole Eastern War Zone (which essentially means the Guangzhou, Nanjing, and Jinan MRs) as see fit to destroy.  In other words, we take this opportunity to reduce their military projection capabilities to 1980s levels.
 
Given that, even I am leery of this idea of basing on Taiwan proper.  I realize your timing is the second week (plus) of the war, with the projection that China has essentially expended its airbase attack capabilities.  I remain dubious of the idea they will deplete themselves that far such that we could then open up their two major eastern airbases for our use... and keep them open.  I decried their ability to shut down Kadena for long, and for good reason in my opinion--while their ability to affect Andersen is definitely much less than even Kadena.  However, their ability to interfere with air operations on TAF airfields is at least a thousand times greater.  Not only do they have at least 1000 SRBMs that can reach all of Taiwan (rather than only a few dozen MRBMs that can reach Kadena), as you noted, but they also have land attack cruise missiles, and probably more importantly long range rocket launchers, for which they very possibly have/will have guided munitions as well.  Their biggest MRLs certainly can reach from any territory they manage to occupy on Taiwan or the Pescadores, and the largest can even make it from China itself.  And then there's the very real presence of the PLAAF, with a much greater capability to bomb Taiwan bases than they ever could hope for regarding bombing Kadena.  Finally there's the possibility of the PLA having something to say about us flying out of some or all of those Taiwanese airfields at all.
 
I guess I am not arguing that we couldn't fly from Taiwan, just that I am not convinced we could do it from the first week on.  I think it might take more time than that before we want to risk basing that close.  Of course, then there's the political realities of this idea, as opposed to the theoretical military possibility, which I'm sure will make it a non-starter in the real world.  Still, a guy can dream....
 
 

 
 
Quote    Reply

DarthAmerica    Warpig Reply    6/30/2009 4:54:56 PM


I guess I am not arguing that we couldn't fly from Taiwan, just that I am not convinced we could do it from the first week on.  I think it might take more time than that before we want to risk basing that close.  Of course, then there's the political realities of this idea, as opposed to the theoretical military possibility, which I'm sure will make it a non-starter in the real world.  Still, a guy can dream....

 
As far as the PRC is concerned that would be the USA invading sovern PRC territory. Of course thats THEIR interpretation but the kind of escalation that would represent is frightening. Also, not even counting the PLAAF, the force protection issues associated with basing from the RoC would be a nightmare. Especially when the USN can provide mobile basing and aircraft via carriers to deal with this.

All of this aside though, how is China going to do any of this considering the other huge vulnerabilities they have with regard to keeping their SLOC open even to support forces in Taiwan and that they cannot lift enough men and materials to the RoC to have a realistic chance of a successful invasion in the first place? I agree the PRC military capability is significantly improved but they are not ready for something of this magnitude and wont be for a long time. 

I find it interesting that people cavalierly suggest the PRC will just walk right into Taiwan in a week or so when we know from our own experience that an operation like this against a determined foe never goes as planned and is absolutely exhaustive especially when you are being forced to confront Taiwan's natural maritime barrier. An operation as complicated as an air and amphibious assault against a modern defense with good situational awareness is about the most difficult operation imaginable. There are just so many things that could go wrong for them that it's hard to believe they would even make the attempt in the first place. And it's unfathomable that if they did things would flow smoothly and unimpeded by RoC or external defenses on some predetermined timeline.

-DA 

 




 


 
Quote    Reply

Bluewings12       6/30/2009 6:29:24 PM
Just a question :
are the USA building the 180 something F-22s to protect the homeland and do some missions abroad or to stop China to invade Taiwan ?
 
Cheers .
 
Quote    Reply

gf0012-aust       6/30/2009 6:37:40 PM
I find it interesting that people cavalierly suggest the PRC will just walk right into Taiwan in a week or so when we know from our own experience that an operation like this against a determined foe never goes as planned and is absolutely exhaustive especially when you are being forced to confront Taiwan's natural maritime barrier. An operation as complicated as an air and amphibious assault against a modern defense with good situational awareness is about the most difficult operation imaginable. There are just so many things that could go wrong for them that it's hard to believe they would even make the attempt in the first place. And it's unfathomable that if they did things would flow smoothly and unimpeded by RoC or external defenses on some predetermined timeline.


The issue of taking taiwan revolves around what political construct is in play.
eg, if china wants to keep infrastructure, minimise scorched earth responses, and have a relatively benign population to contend with - then the military option will not take such a kinetic response.
if china wants to send a statement about absolute power, they're more than able to barrage the western part of taiwan with land based ballistic conventionals.  they could demolish the west side, and within days the taiwanese economy would be imploding and the politicians would be under pressure to negotiate - that would however leave china with a latently hostile civlian population, a buggered economy (and they want Taiwanese industrial and research capability), and world oprobrium
what china cannot afford to do is slip into a protracted war - so overwhelming force, albeit military or political needs to have an impact within a week - before the US can get sufficient persistent volume and response (and political will) in place.
 
IMO if its a kinetic option, it will be short, violent and brutal - and it won't expand into a full theatre event.




 







 
Quote    Reply

Herald12345    WP reply.   6/30/2009 8:13:40 PM









It does, but you are not looking at the kill mechanism in place to remove the PLAAF  as a finctioning element of the PRC bandit order of battle.



Rebuttal: 











We fight from there.






And so the USAF would, but we still have to fight over our airfields in the beginning to clear the skies for peeling their onion.. 









By the way I want to thank you for the opportunity to SHOW why the numbers of F-22s shuttled forward into battle are not restricted by capacity at Kadena and Andersen. Those are just waypoints to the forward bases.





Sorry about this, but you see I do know the study's weaknesses and STRENGTHS.  The PRCs only have 1000 or so TBMs. The Red Horse battalions shouold be able to repair the RoCAF damage airfield damage once we fly them in. To hold the air space though, we need F-22 topcover for that week whule we repair and fly in. At least 40-80 aircraft from the EASTERN RoCAF air bases+ the defenders we need at Guam and Kadena. That is 120.aircraft.  Add the war reserve for surprise losses and you get 243 MINIMUM. 






I was going to elaborate on my opinion earlier, but I didn't have the time.  As far as I'm concerned, we should not get involved in defending Taiwan unless we are going to keep fighting a major air and sea campaign for at least a couple weeks, and are going to completely disregard any efforts by the PRCs to end it quickly via diplomatic intervention if they are able to gain an early success on Taiwan before we can arrive in force.  As a corollary, I think we also should not bother to defend Taiwan unless we are going to take advantage of the PRC's stupidity in actually giving us an excuse to open up on them, and go ahead with the whole can of whomp-ass on every aircraft and ship that dares to leave China's 12-mile limit at a minimum, plus as much of the higher-value aircraft and ships that stay anywhere within the whole Eastern War Zone (which essentially means the Guangzhou, Nanjing, and Jinan MRs) as see fit to destroy.  In other words, we take this opportunity to reduce their military projection capabilities to 1980s levels.

 I prefer ZERO followed by an Iraqu style occupatiuon, but U'll take what I can get..

Given that, even I am leery of this idea of basing on Taiwan proper.  I realize your timing is the second week (plus) of the war, with the projection that China has essentially expended its airbase attack capabilities.  I remain dubious of the idea they will deplete themselves that far such that we could then open up their two major eastern airbases for our use... and keep them open.  I decried their ability to shut down Kadena for long, and for good reason in my opinion--while their ability to affect Andersen is definitely much less than even Kadena.  However, their ability to interfere with air operations on TAF airfields is at least a thousand times greater.  Not only do they have at least 1000 SRBMs that can reach all of Taiwan (rather than only a few dozen MRBMs that can reach Kadena), as you noted, but they also have land attack cruise missiles, and probably more importantly long range rocket launchers, for which they very possibly have/will have guided munitions as well.  Their biggest MRLs certainly can reach from any territory they manage to occupy on Taiwan or the Pescadores, and the largest can even make it from China itself.  And then there's the very real presence of the PLAAF, with a much greater capability to bomb Taiwan bases than they ever could hope for regarding bombing Kadena.  Finally there's the possibility of the PLA having something to say about us flying out of some or all of those Taiwanese airfields at all.

This is assuming they can fight in the air. They have to have a fighter CAP OVER OWN BASES to do that. You  essentially concede we have to fight for air superiority and whittle them down along the Jinian to Guangzhou arc. You realize this of course? They could have 10,000 MRLS missiles for all I care and they cannot stop us once we have airtbase presence and start piunding theirs . . IF WE HAVE CONTROL OF THE AIR , rockets travel both directions and ours are better.
 
I guess I am not arguing that we couldn't fly from Taiwan, just that I am not convinced we could do it from the first week on.  I think it might take more time than that before we want to risk basing that close.  Of course, then there's the political realities of this idea, as opposed to the theoretical military possibility, which I'm sure will make it a non-starter in the real world.  Still, a guy can dream....

Its the only realistic way once the shooting starts.And we hammer their airbases with our air lainched cruise missiles . We have to operate from the RoK and Taiwan forward to kill the PLAAF in the follow up, or the PRC bandits win. You know this.

As for the army truck driver......
 
Just because I KNOW how hard a blackmail operation is does not mean you do. The Seoul blackmail gambit has been the primary military factor in the RoKs not bowling over the  DPRKS on the Korean peninsula . WHAT THE HELL DO YOU THINK THE SECOND ARTILLERY IS; AS REGARDS TAIWAN?
 
Blackmail.
 

 
By the way, the study you cited was 1987, was wrong then,  and was before the Clintons gave away steller nav-aod corrected inertial and GPS guidance to the Bandits   

 
Quote    Reply

DarthAmerica       6/30/2009 8:45:49 PM


As for the army truck driver......

 
Just because I KNOW how hard a blackmail operation is does not mean you do. The Seoul blackmail gambit has been the primary military factor in the RoKs not bowling over the  DPRKS on the Korean peninsula . WHAT THE HELL DO YOU THINK THE SECOND ARTILLERY IS; AS REGARDS TAIWAN?

 

Blackmail.

 
By the way, the study you cited was 1987, was wrong then,  and was before the Clintons gave away steller nav-aod corrected inertial and GPS guidance to the Bandits   




WRONG. You aren't fooling anybody with your little tough guy act. You started a thread based on a flawed analysis that does nothing to support your claim. You don't have the skill sets or experience to discuss this with people who actually understand how wars are fought and it's why YOU STARTED OFF WRONG.

When you want to debate this by the numbers and on point then let me know. Otherwise this along with your other examples of error like your suggestion that merchants should have missiles and machine guns are ineffective on water solidify you don't know what you are talking about.

-DA 




 
Quote    Reply

ex98C_ver2       6/30/2009 11:36:03 PM

Herald,


I must admit to being somewhat confused as to the direction of this thread.  The title indicates that it is another attempt to demonstrate the need for more F-22s.  The study and even your posts have had little to do with that issue.  Instead, it deals with the basing and logistical issues that the Air Force would have to deal with in a confrontation with China over Taiwan

 
It does, but you are not looking at the kill mechanism in place to remove the PLAAF  as a finctioning element of the PRC bandit order of battle.
 
At various points you seem to be saying (and I agree) that Kadena is too exposed to various Chinese attacks to base the F-22 at.  That leaves Guam as the only major airbase available (assuming that Japan is neutral).  Using the Studies sortie rates, the entire currently planned F-22 inventory could only generate a 6 ship continuous CAP over Taiwan.  Using those same ratios if the additional 60 F-22s are purchased that you have advocated on other threads, then that CAP level could be raised to?.8.  The issue isn?t the number of platforms in service, it?s the basing availability and the support required to get them to the front.  If the US had 1000 F-22s in its inventory, but was still only able to use the Guam bases then the number available for the CAP would not be much different than it is with only 183.  There just isn?t enough room at Anderson field for many more fighters. 
 
Rebuttal: 
 
 
We fight from there.

The primary service in any defense of Taiwan is going to be the Navy.  The carriers are more mobile, harder to find and better protected (if more fragile) than any fixed airbase.   The biggest threats to any invasion force (outside the Taiwanese forces) are US submarines.  I would like to think that seeing the force ratios the Air Forces?s strategy would not be based on a passive Defensive CAP, but instead focus on escorted attack missions and offensive fighter sweeps, where they could concentrate their numbers ad pick and chose their fights.
 
And so the USAF would, but we still have to fight over our airfields in the beginning to clear the skies for peeling their onion.. 

By the way I want to thank you for the opportunity to SHOW why the numbers of F-22s shuttled forward into battle are not restricted by capacity at Kadena and Andersen. Those are just waypoints to the forward bases.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 

Interesting idea Herald, but I have to agree with Warpig that it is not a basing strategy that I would employ.  It seems to me that any units posted there would be in as much danger, if not more, than if they were based out of Kadena.  When did you anticipate placing them on the island?  During the building of tensions and the massing of forces?  Assuming that we had the time and China gave us the luxury of building up our forces unopposed they would still be at the mercy of inadequate shelter and bases closed for periods by Missiles, air strikes, artillery and sabotage.  In my opinion it would be too big a risk that they would be caught on the ground.  The only place the F-22 should be risked is in the air, that?s were it dominance shines. 

 

I don't think you are advocating trying to establish them on Taiwan during the height of the combat, that would be almost suicide.  Assuming that Taiwan holds out for the first week or two and the Chinese assault is blunted, it might then be possible to move forces onto the island.   I would submit that if this was the case, the better choice would be to place F-35s and ASEA f-15s on the island.  The F-15s would be good enough to bleed whatever the Chinese had left and this would leave the Raptors available for higher priority missions.

 

While the Red Horse units are well trained at airfield repair getting them to the island poses logistical difficulties with something like 1500 tons of vehicles and equipment per unit, it would be inadvisable to try and deploy it under fire.  As for before hostilities start I don?t think China is going to sit idly by when the hundreds of transports flights needed to establish and support the fighters and engineers on the island are flown.  They would attack before we could be fully set.

 

It seems to me that it comes down to a difference in philosophy.  You seem to be advocating a close in heads up fight, strength on strength, believing that we would win the day.  I believe in staying back bleeding them little by little until they give up or are weakened enough for the death blow.  While I believe in our overall superiority I believe much of the advantage would be negated if they are allowed to choose where to fight

 
Quote    Reply

warpig       7/1/2009 12:47:38 AM

Just a question :

are the USA building the 180 something F-22s to protect the homeland and do some missions abroad or to stop China to invade Taiwan ?

 

Cheers .




 
 
Yes.
 
And many other missions as well.
 
That's the beauty of airpower:  Flexibility.
 
 
Quote    Reply

Herald12345    Like the rest of your rants    7/1/2009 1:10:02 AM








As for the army truck driver......



 


Just because I KNOW how hard a blackmail operation is does not mean you do. The Seoul blackmail gambit has been the primary military factor in the RoKs not bowling over the  DPRKS on the Korean peninsula . WHAT THE HELL DO YOU THINK THE SECOND ARTILLERY IS; AS REGARDS TAIWAN?



 



Blackmail.



 

By the way, the study you cited was 1987, was wrong then,  and was before the Clintons gave away steller nav-aod corrected inertial and GPS guidance to the Bandits   











WRONG. You aren't fooling anybody with your little tough guy act. You started a thread based on a flawed analysis that does nothing to support your claim. You don't have the skill sets or experience to discuss this with people who actually understand how wars are fought and it's why YOU STARTED OFF WRONG.




When you want to debate this by the numbers and on point then let me know. Otherwise this along with your other examples of error like your suggestion that merchants should have missiles and machine guns are ineffective on water solidify you don't know what you are talking about.




-DA 












This is just the baseless and meaningless assertions with no numbers and facts to back it up again.If your typing was read by volume, it would be hysterical shouting ranted out by a child. Where are your numbers and where is your logic, child? 

In my shop: we call that all mouth and no results . We would send you out to calm down after one of us chewed ypu put for incompetence, then the adults (us) would fix the problem you couldn't solve with your tantrum. 
 
Sheesh, talk about unprofessional. When I lose my temper and chew someone out, I tell him exactly how he screwed up.
 
Like here when you try to bring upm rockets about which you know nothing. and machine gins about which I begin to think all you genuinely kno0w is how you pull the trigger and clean. You certainly don't know the forst thing about stabilization issues or BALLISTICS.
 
I think the more you post your rants, and assertions, the more childlike and less credible you become. You really need to sit back and let the aduhylts debate this amateur. This is clearly out of your league.
 
.
 
 

 
 
  .  
 
 
 
 
Quote    Reply

warpig       7/1/2009 1:23:00 AM

As far as the PRC is concerned that would be the USA invading sovern PRC territory. Of course thats THEIR interpretation but the kind of escalation that would represent is frightening. Also, not even counting the PLAAF, the force protection issues associated with basing from the RoC would be a nightmare. Especially when the USN can provide mobile basing and aircraft via carriers to deal with this.

All of this aside though, how is China going to do any of this considering the other huge vulnerabilities they have with regard to keeping their SLOC open even to support forces in Taiwan and that they cannot lift enough men and materials to the RoC to have a realistic chance of a successful invasion in the first place? I agree the PRC military capability is significantly improved but they are not ready for something of this magnitude and wont be for a long time. 

I find it interesting that people cavalierly suggest the PRC will just walk right into Taiwan in a week or so when we know from our own experience that an operation like this against a determined foe never goes as planned and is absolutely exhaustive especially when you are being forced to confront Taiwan's natural maritime barrier. An operation as complicated as an air and amphibious assault against a modern defense with good situational awareness is about the most difficult operation imaginable. There are just so many things that could go wrong for them that it's hard to believe they would even make the attempt in the first place. And it's unfathomable that if they did things would flow smoothly and unimpeded by RoC or external defenses on some predetermined timeline.


 
First, I think your point about Chinese reaction to U.S. forces on Taiwan is interesting.  I don't know enough to judge it, but I suspect it certainly might factor into the overall political limitations that would surely be in effect holding us back from thoroughly trashing China.
 
Second, I concur completely with GF 's observations.
 
Finally, while I will stress that I am very confident that if we are allowed to decide for ourselves when the war is over, and don't quit too soon, then there is no way China can take and hold Taiwan, and I agree that their amphibious assault capability to get AFVs and heavy equipment (arty, etc.) ashore is indeed relatively limited,... but it is potentially more than commonly believed.  For one thing, there are many dozens/couple hundred smallish landing craft capable of taking an AFV or two across the strait that are not typically acknowledged in open source OBs.  Of course, mobilizing them may likely give us some indications and warning of an impending operation, so their use has a potential down-side for them.  Furthermore, while I realize a mass of riflemen without any heavier support, other than what they can carry, are prime candidates for becoming automatic cannon fodder, still, there's no doubt that China could send vast swarms of riflemen ashore if they chose to, and that's not nothing.  If America stayed out of it, I'm not confident at all that Taiwan could stop even an invasion geared to succeed as rapidly as possible--and obviously a theoretical long term war that somehow only involves China and Taiwan and is fought without time limits until one side is vanquished can only end with final Chinese victory.
 
 
Quote    Reply

warpig       7/1/2009 1:33:37 AM
Herald,  I have to admire your bold vision for taking the fight to the enemy.  I'm still not sure it's not too reckless, and I'm quite dubious that such risky forward basing would be allowed politically for fear of suffering politically (or even militarily) unacceptable losses, but it certainly presents the potential for rapidly smashing the PLA.
 
 
Quote    Reply

Herald12345    Like the rest of your rants    7/1/2009 1:34:37 AM


Herald,




I must admit to being somewhat confused as to the direction of this thread.  The title indicates that it is another attempt to demonstrate the need for more F-22s.  The study and even your posts have had little to do with that issue.  Instead, it deals with the basing and logistical issues that the Air Force would have to deal with in a confrontation with China over Taiwan


 

It does, but you are not looking at the kill mechanism in place to remove the PLAAF  as a finctioning element of the PRC bandit order of battle.


 

At various points you seem to be saying (and I agree) that Kadena is too exposed to various Chinese attacks to base the F-22 at.  That leaves Guam as the only major airbase available (assuming that Japan is neutral).  Using the Studies sortie rates, the entire currently planned F-22 inventory could only generate a 6 ship continuous CAP over Taiwan.  Using those same ratios if the additional 60 F-22s are purchased that you have advocated on other threads, then that CAP level could be raised to?.8.  The issue isn?t the number of platforms in service, it?s the basing availability and the support required to get them to the front.  If the US had 1000 F-22s in its inventory, but was still only able to use the Guam bases then the number available for the CAP would not be much different than it is with only 183.  There just isn?t enough room at Anderson field for many more fighters. 

 

Rebuttal: 

 


 

We fight from there.





The primary service in any defense of Taiwan is going to be the Navy.  The carriers are more mobile, harder to find and better protected (if more fragile) than any fixed airbase.   The biggest threats to any invasion force (outside the Taiwanese forces) are US submarines.  I would like to think that seeing the force ratios the Air Forces?s strategy would not be based on a passive Defensive CAP, but instead focus on escorted attack missions and offensive fighter sweeps, where they could concentrate their numbers ad pick and chose their fights.

 

And so the USAF would, but we still have to fight over our airfields in the beginning to clear the skies for peeling their onion.. 





By the way I want to thank you for the opportunity to SHOW why the numbers of F-22s shuttled forward into battle are not restricted by capacity at Kadena and Andersen. Those are just waypoints to the forward bases.

                                                                                                                                                                                         
 


Interesting idea Herald, but I have to agree with Warpig that it is not a basing strategy that I would employ.  It seems to me that any units posted there would be in as much danger, if not more, than if they were based out of Kadena.  When did you anticipate placing them on the island?  During the building of tensions and the massing of forces?  Assuming that we had the time and China gave us the luxury of building up our forces unopposed they would still be at the mercy of inadequate shelter and bases closed for periods by Missiles, air strikes, artillery and sabotage.  In my opinion it would be too big a risk that they would be caught on the ground.  The only place the F-22 should be risked is in the air, that?s were it dominance shines. 


After I subject the enemy airbase infrastructure to a prolonged SCRAMDART bombardment of course. The Mach 10 sligs work better for us going the other way since we can just keep pounding from standoff. The close battle I don't want until; we run them out of SAMS and TBMs.

 
We can fly out of Guam at that stage wuth heavy bombers to do this.
 
Meanwhile, RoC will be pounded by the blackmail artillery. The PRC Bandits have the missiles and artillery for about a week, then they have to try something else. They really don't have that many rockets  I would presume that the RoCs will have the brains to be sending stuff the other way whule this happens. My favorite target of course is Three Gorges DAM as crackjing that lake will set back the PRC bandits a century. The flyin by the USAF will have to be about a week after the missile shooting starts. Presumably the PRC bandits will try for a propaganda landing somewhere.near Taipei. The RoCs will need help to break that up  Heavy bombers as AShM launch platforms again. Gee that Guam gambit looks more and more like a PRC opening move they need doesn't it?     
.   
I don't think you are advocating trying to establish them on Taiwan during the height of the combat, that would be almost suicide.  Assuming that Taiwan holds out for the first week or two and the Chinese assault is blunted, it might then be possible to move forces onto the island.   I would submit that if this was the case, the better choice would be to place F-35s and ASEA f-15s on the island.  The F-15s would be good enough to bleed whatever the Chinese had left and this would leave the Raptors available for higher priority missions.
 
Surviving SAM belt TEL hunting, and I want to KILL those PLAAF bastards in the air, not just blunt or precision bomb them into a negotiated peace. I'm after a Chinese People's revolution and liberation.  Remember also that  RoK  and JAPAN have to be covered here as well as Guam  We will be fighting EVERYWHERE when the PRCs try thos stunt..

While the Red Horse units are well trained at airfield repair getting them to the island poses logistical difficulties with something like 1500 tons of vehicles and equipment per unit, it would be inadvisable to try and deploy it under fire.  As for before hostilities start I don?t think China is going to sit idly by when the hundreds of transports flights needed to establish and support the fighters and engineers on the island are flown.  They would attack before we could be fully set.


Have the RoCs preposition dual use equipment as they are doing..


It seems to me that it comes down to a difference in philosophy.  You seem to be advocating a close in heads up fight, strength on strength, believing that we would win the day.  I believe in staying back bleeding them little by little until they give up or are weakened enough for the death blow.  While I believe in our overall superiority I believe much of the advantage would be negated if they are allowed to choose where to fight


I have no illisions. They have to be stopped at the first usland ring.

 
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LB    Combined Arms   7/1/2009 1:36:38 AM
What total rubbish.  To say "do not have to operate" is to just about say nothing.  In any case the library at the Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, is called the Combined Arms Research Library.  The Command and General Staff College is one of 11 major organizations at Ft Leavenworth under the United States Army Combined Arms Center.  The US Army seems a tad focused upon modern warfare being combined arms warfare. 
 
Combined arms did not go away with the end of the Cold War nor is it relegated to "conventional" warfare.  Combined arms is the gravity that holds warfare together.  An infantry centric tactical or operational level force does not eliminate the central focus of combined arms- to include not just the infantry but any armor, recon, artillery, AT, AA, combat engineers, helicopters, and possible close air support.
 
Combined arms has existed since the dawn of warfare and those who ignore this do so at their peril.  Infantry in the US Army always operate as part of a combined arms force.  This is operational art 101.  While it might not be that apparent at plat or company level this is the basic reality of warfare.
 
You're not the first infantry fanboy, nor hundredth for that matter, I've heard this single arm of service is dominant line from and I've heard it from O6s who never left the branch in their career and general officers; however, you are the first to propose the notion that combined arms is "Cold War" or "conventional" thinking.  One might be forgiven for a bit of hubris or hyperbole regarding the infantry during a counter insurgency but denying the basic parameters of warfare is a bit over the top even for me. 
 
As an aside the most infantry centric force in the history of warfare is the USMC where every marine is considered a rifleman.  The Corp worships the rifleman and is entirely constructed to support the rifle plat, company, and battalion.  There is not a lot of structure in the ground forces that even allows anything but an infantry centric force.  The USMC is infantry heaven as the religion is the worship of the infantry.  Combined arms is drilled into it's commanders and this is reflected in training, doctrine and organization.  To deny the primacy and central importance of combined arms in warfare is to be kind not a supportable position.
 
In any case much of the Combined Arms Research Library is online.  Feel free to cite supporting evidence for your notion.  My world view does not include as factual the idea that combined arms is not relevant at times nor that air superiority is not the primary factor that enables the rest of the US military to wage war.  It might not seem that way when the other guy hasn't an air force but gravity still works even when you are comfortably sitting down.
 
 
 









You'll excuse me for the mistaken belief that the importance of the infantry was somewhat terrain dependent and that the infantry operated as part of a combined arms team.  You'll further excuse my incorrect notion that 11M10s exist to speed the tanks forward to cite DePuy.



Infantry do not have to operate as a part of a combined arms force. You are stuck on conventional Cold War "western" paradigms. 



 
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