False, I remember what I read last year right enough, and I recalled the same concepts you looked at, which is why I am in general agreement with the only couple of reasonably valid overall takeaways that are addressed poorly through loose analysis by the report, and said above, "I absolutely do agree in general, however, that in a Taiwan scenario about the biggest challenge to at least USAF participation will be logistic (especially basing),...."

 

A couple of the points I seem to recall from reading it last year include that while Kadena AB is more vulnerable than Andersen AFB through sheer proximity, it is by no means even likely that China can shut it down and keep it shut down long enough to accomplish their objectives.  Of course we need tankers, and scores of them, to fight over and around Taiwan, since the nearest couple bases are many hundreds of miles away.  Their idea of an air engagement over Taiwan is fatally flawed.

 

It's a darn shame we don't have a couple hundred new tankers in the pipeline, and it sure would be nice to still have Clark AB.

Small portion of an interview conducted by Defense Today with Lt. General David A Deptula.

 

"Ten AEFs provide the framework to achieve sufficient expeditionary aerospace forces to sustain rotational base requirements and personnel tempos to meet the dual requirements of our security strategy. With respect to the F-22, the key to Air Force expeditionary force structure is to ensure those ten AEFs are each structured, equipped, and EQUAL in capability and capacity for the variety of missions that the F-22 will be called upon to conduct-and ISR in denied areas may well be what we most value the F-22 for in the future. The fact that it can negate adversary anti-access capabilities, and can operate in denied airspace unconstrained, means we can make use of its ISR capabilities that otherwise would not be available without enormous cost in alternate means. From this perspective, the expense argument in regards to this airframe loses steam pretty quickly. It is the focus on capabilities that is important."

 

Given an optimistic mission capable rate of 70%, it appears it would take 240 combat coded Raptors to complete 10AEFs. Whatever final number for testing, training, and attrition allows this is what the AF should be buying.

 

Weather exploit one....

 

Weather exploit two. Pearl Har... 

 

 

 

Thanks, I know what a DF-21 is.  Yup, a wave of them could shut down Kadena for several hours at least.

 

All they need is a week, assuming the Taiwanese cave in (in which case, who cares, let them suffer the consequences if they can't find the balls to keep fighting) and assuming we won't keep fighting after China has gained a substantial hold over Taiwan (in which case we should bother fighting at all since we can't get there in massive force before then no matter what we do, short of spending tens of billions of dollars specifically just to keep Taiwan free).

 

Its just means we have to do it 27 times. And we have to use a cutout.because of the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missule Treaty.

 

 

One factor the Rand study highlights is that war is a dynamic process where quite often some or even most of one's assumptions turn out to be wrong and often fatally wrong.

 

The assumption that 183 F-22s, meaning around 140 combat coded, provides enough redundant capability, given unknown attrition, aircraft usage rates, enemy direct, enemy indirect, and other myriad other factors is not supportable.  When one does not have enough of something to maintain a useful reserve then in military terms one simply does not have enough.

 

It's not prudent to bet the future of 300 million free people on the ability of 183 F-22 to not suffer undue attrition, not be overused reducing life cycle (as if the military has enough of every other capability), not be afflicted by any serious fatigue or design problem lowering life cycle, not to fight an enemy that might seek to target them on the ground via various conventional and non conventional means, and not to fight an a dynamic enemy with any capabilities air to air that might lessen our dominance.  Not to mention a hundred other possible factors.

 

Somehow the nation requires thousands of F-35s and only 183 F-22s because Gates does not feel that mid term there is a high probability of the US having to fight a near peer competitor?

 

New flash WWII began with a surprise attack.  Korea was a total surprise. Vietnam was not the war the US was preparing for the decade prior.  The fighting in the 1973 Arab Israeli war came as huge shock to the world in terms of capabilities and led to everyone seriously upgrading military doctrine, planning, and TO&E.  The US was not prepared to rescue it's citizens in the 1970s and failed when it attempted to do so.  The US was not prepared to deploy troops to Lebanon in the early 1980s and got hundreds killed.  The US was not prepared to invade the small nation of Grenada and doing so exposed myriad problems.  The US was not prepared for a couple UH-60s getting shot down by a native force it the 1993.  The attack on the US in 2001 was another surprise attack.  The US was not prepared for the aftermath of invading Iraq.

 

It's a tad beyond obvious that you don't always get to pick your enemy and he gets a large say in it's outcome and the interaction of both parties is not exactly predictable.  War is a dynamic process.  The US has a bad history of preparing to re-fight the last war and not being prepared for the next.  History constantly repeats itself.

 

Your assertion is no good any more.

 

Herald