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Subject: Why 183 Raptors is NOT enough.
Herald12345    6/28/2009 2:53:01 PM
Study results follows in next post. Herald
 
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DarthAmerica    @ReactivE    7/2/2009 3:22:01 PM
RE: My disagreement. Disagree may be too strong a word. Rather, I don't understand the economic aspect well enough to make an opinion yet.

Regards
-DA 
 
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Herald12345    I am not moving the goal posts.   7/2/2009 3:42:44 PM




We signed the Washington and London naval treaties which contained clauses about unrestricted submarine warfare.




















I am amused when amateurs  invoke TREATIES as if a scrap of paper would matter after Andersen becomes a smoking hole.in Guam. 






 



I also remind you that there are treaties to which we are signatories that prohibit ASSASSINATION in war. 



 






 



By International Law, that is a WARCRIME. Are we at war with Pakistan?



 



Herald






 






 






 

You should now define how that "smoking hole" got there in Guam, because I think you are now moving the target of the discussion.  I think DA and I have both made it clear that taking out the dam is on a rough equivalency with something like a nuclear strike, and thus is disproportionate in the context of a conventional-only fight.  If the Chinese make Andersen into a smoking hole using nukes, then you've changed that scenario and now we're talking about something very different to most people at least.  If the Chinese make Andersen into a smoking hole using conventional weapons, well, then I just have to stop right there as they barely have the capability to do that and much less chance than that of actually succeeding at doing that.



 


The PRC bandits have to attack Andersen or they can't even mount a credible blackmail of the RoCs. Its the one US base that is within heavy bomber range of their assembly areas and rocket bombardment sites. Even with Tomahawks we can mount an unacceptable (to them) deterrent.
 
Andersen has to go. Guaranteed opening move.  Therefore smoking hole.
 
Herald
 
 
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Herald12345    Butt out clown.   7/2/2009 3:46:20 PM

I jump in just for a moment .

 

Striking the Chinese Dam will lead to 2 things :

-1) a medium to massive Chinese Nuclear retaliation on US soil (within hours)


-2) the loss of all possible US allies


 

Herald is out of his mind , his idea is going to get millions of Americans dead .

China is NOT affraid of a nuclear conflict with the USA gentlemen , keep that closely in mind .


 

Cheers .


I talk with adults (and one wanttobe) here. Stick to your usual BS and leave us alone.
 
Herald
 
 
 
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Reactive       7/2/2009 4:03:12 PM

Interesting positions ReactivE. While I do disagree with you about China's options for diversifying their investments, I also think you have a very interesting viewpoint with regard to China's ability to handle internal security. It seems that in the West we have a tendency to overestimate how much like us people in other countries want to be. Sure, they wear our denim, listen to pop music and surf the Internet. But there are still profound cultural differences. One of those differences is obviously tolerance for hardship. While I don't see the PRC as an evil and oppressive regime, they are certainly more authoritarian than anything we would be used to. I think there's a time and any authoritarian form of government history where significant portions of the population will rise up in protest for some reason. In modern times, with regard to China, that was the Tian an men Square massacre. The Chinese government demonstrated that it can successfully put down very large-scale uprising, endure internal and external pressures and survive international sanctions. So I'm inclined to agree that we may be underestimating the ability of the Chinese to handle the misfortunes of war with regard to internal security. Military and security issues are my expertise so I feel more comfortable discussing this aspect of your post that I do the economic references. I'll have to do some research and get back to you with regard to China's options on investments in our ability to do business elsewhere. However, I strongly suspect China would suffer far worse than the United States. The particularly astute observation you made is in reference to the United States presidency. Because we do have a very short four-year election cycle, first-term presidents are particularly susceptible to economic pressures. That is a vulnerability we would be well advised to consider given our form of government.




-DA 
 Thanks for your thoughts, I do understand where you're coming from.
 
To what extent China dumping the dollar would have on your economy affects day to day life is uncertain, but it will mean massive strain and massive cuts on spending. We're (both the UK and US) "maxed out" in terms of borrowing, and in any case, further borrowing will actually compound the problem. 
 
Probably major shortages of energy, huge lay-offs, inflation, military spending, which is necessarily massive during wartime is one of the surest areas to be "hit", given the choice, I do wonder what any incumbent would choose. It becomes a choice between huge domestic problems in almost every area imaginable, or accepting the loss of an ally that was under the illusion it would be defended.
 
The domestic public position is important, many would favour intervention, but if that did mean the massive "hit" on personal wealth and public services that the media would be predicting (alongside stock markets losing value as fear stuck in) would probably lead to a huge amount of resistence to military intervention. 
 
You are right in that the net effects would be huge for China too, but the lead-time for those effects would be several years in the making, China can manage its internal economy and has a lot of room to soften the blow for a sustained period. It can't replace the US as a trading partner, but it can delay the effects (and manage the percieved effects) for a far longer period.
 
This is why I think it is highly unlikely that either side is looking forward to the prospect of a war over Taiwan, it simply is massively costly for both parties.
 
Economics (however boring) do have a part to play in what wars we will find ourselves involved in, just as much as military capabilities do, and that the trade/debt links between countries function as a mutual deterent. The reality is that both sides are capable of significantly disrupting the lifestyle of the other without having to even fight.
 
And you very accurately noted that the chinese populace can tolerate more, yes, and they're used to it, and when they're fed up they have no mechanism by which they can make their voices heard. In contrast; if a war REALLY affected the lifestyle of a large proportion of the population by means of severe economic depression, then you would find a lot of opposition, and that, in itself, should be regarded as part of the fundamental equation when making a decision about which side wins; it might not be the side that feels it has, as you say, more to lose.
 
 
 
 
 
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sinoflex    Reactive Points   7/2/2009 4:04:14 PM
I would essentially agree with the first point below as roughly 70% of China's population is still rural.  Then there is the deep well spring of nationalism that can be tapped in a time of war especially if the Chinese mainland is attacked in defence of Taiwan.  Having said that, my opinion is that at the present time the PRC is primarily focused on continued economic development in an effort to quell internal dissent and to meet the aspirations of the migrating peasantry from the countryside into the urban centers.  Taiwan is no doubt front and center in the thoughts of the Communist Party but in the short term, military action will likely only be precipitated by a unilateral declaration of Taiwanese independence or a more radical militaristic turn to the right in the party leadership.  
 
The notion that PRC USD currency holdings can be used as leverage has some merit but given the trillions of US treasuries China currently holds a deliberate attempt to devalue the USD has some blowback.  One would also expect that in the event of hostilities, the US would withhold interest payments on any Chinese held treasuries and a reneging of repayment of them when they mature.  I would have to assume that this is factored into any deliberate consideration of hostilities notwithstanding the two factors at the end of the previous paragraph.  At the present time, the US and China are engaged in an economic embrace that both are willing to continue, but the PRC has the luxury of time and patience on its side. 
 
I watched a recent documentary that claimed a significant portion of the government's budget is spent distributing the wealth to a broad swath of the party.  The insinuation being that loyalty and acquiesence is being bought and that the party is not a simple monolith but one with differing opinions and voices.  Consideration for the continuation of this gravy train would hopefully factor into any consideration for foreign misadventure. 
 
 
Basically it boils down to the fact that china is able to absorb economic shock more than the US, whether it ends up with millions starving, being forced to work, or simply being unemployed and living hand-to-mouth. There have been tens of millions (yes millions) of job losses in china, but because so many of the factory workers are from the rural poor, they have simply gone back (in many cases at least) to living a subsistence life until work prospects improve again, this is not an option we have in similar situations, in that our mechanism for coping is state-benefits, a further economic drain that "has to come from somewhere".
 
There is a very good reason to hold trillions of USD in currency, it's a fail-safe, the effects of which will make any us president very wary of getting involved in a conflict with Taiwan, as you say, the short-term effects would be catastrophic for the day-to-day running of public life.
 
 
 
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DarthAmerica       7/2/2009 4:04:16 PM


The PRC bandits have to attack Andersen or they can't even mount a credible blackmail of the RoCs. Its the one US base that is within heavy bomber range of their assembly areas and rocket bombardment sites. Even with Tomahawks we can mount an unacceptable (to them) deterrent.

Andersen has to go. Guaranteed opening move.  Therefore smoking hole.


Herald


 
OKAY, so are you or are you not saying the PRC will nuke Anderson. If not, your suggestion of attacking "crackjing" Three Gorges was wrong. If so, then we can use our own nuclear weapons and this discussion is moot. Either way you need to simply admit that you didn't fully understand the implications of an attack on 3 Gorges, you've been shown the legal and military consequences and move on. Otherwise you are simply further demonstrating that you don't understand this subject as well as you think you do.

Also, Anderson is not a Guarantee. The PRC has several military options it could choose from and some of them are designed to limit the possibility of US involvement.

-DA 
 
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warpig       7/2/2009 4:10:39 PM




You should now define how that "smoking hole" got there in Guam, because I think you are now moving the target of the discussion.  I think DA and I have both made it clear that taking out the dam is on a rough equivalency with something like a nuclear strike, and thus is disproportionate in the context of a conventional-only fight.  If the Chinese make Andersen into a smoking hole using nukes, then you've changed that scenario and now we're talking about something very different to most people at least.  If the Chinese make Andersen into a smoking hole using conventional weapons, well, then I just have to stop right there as they barely have the capability to do that and much less chance than that of actually succeeding at doing that.



The PRC bandits have to attack Andersen or they can't even mount a credible blackmail of the RoCs. Its the one US base that is within heavy bomber range of their assembly areas and rocket bombardment sites. Even with Tomahawks we can mount an unacceptable (to them) deterrent.


Andersen has to go. Guaranteed opening move.  Therefore smoking hole.



Okay, I think I understand that background to your point.  However, what you still left ambiguous to my mind, that is, what I am still not able to figure out from your additional comments, is just how the Chinese do this?  Once again, if they do it by nuking Andersen, fine, I agree they have the capability to do so and at that point the gloves come off in terms of our response.  However, then yes you have moved the goalposts.  If, as you say, you have not moved them, and therefore you only mean the Chinese use non-WMD, then I have a problem with accepting that conclusion to that scenario.  I agree Andersen is very important, but I don't see how China can reasonably hope to do much of anything to it in a non-WMD-only scenario.
 
 
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Reactive       7/2/2009 4:13:01 PM

Interesting positions ReactivE. While I do disagree with you about China's options for diversifying their investments, I also think you have a very interesting viewpoint with regard to China's ability to handle internal security. It seems that in the West we have a tendency to overestimate how much like us people in other countries want to be. Sure, they wear our denim, listen to pop music and surf the Internet. But there are still profound cultural differences. One of those differences is obviously tolerance for hardship. While I don't see the PRC as an evil and oppressive regime, they are certainly more authoritarian than anything we would be used to. I think there's a time and any authoritarian form of government history where significant portions of the population will rise up in protest for some reason. In modern times, with regard to China, that was the Tian an men Square massacre. The Chinese government demonstrated that it can successfully put down very large-scale uprising, endure internal and external pressures and survive international sanctions. So I'm inclined to agree that we may be underestimating the ability of the Chinese to handle the misfortunes of war with regard to internal security. Military and security issues are my expertise so I feel more comfortable discussing this aspect of your post that I do the economic references. I'll have to do some research and get back to you with regard to China's options on investments in our ability to do business elsewhere. However, I strongly suspect China would suffer far worse than the United States. The particularly astute observation you made is in reference to the United States presidency. Because we do have a very short four-year election cycle, first-term presidents are particularly susceptible to economic pressures. That is a vulnerability we would be well advised to consider given our form of government.




-DA 
 Thanks for your thoughts, I do understand where you're coming from.
 
To what extent China dumping the dollar would have on your economy affects day to day life is uncertain, but it will mean massive strain and massive cuts on spending. We're (both the UK and US) "maxed out" in terms of borrowing, and in any case, further borrowing will actually compound the problem. 
 
Probably major shortages of energy, huge lay-offs, inflation, military spending, which is necessarily massive during wartime is one of the surest areas to be "hit", given the choice, I do wonder what any incumbent would choose. It becomes a choice between huge domestic problems in almost every area imaginable, or accepting the loss of an ally that was under the illusion it would be defended.
 
The domestic public position is important, many would favour intervention, but if that did mean the massive "hit" on personal wealth and public services that the media would be predicting (alongside stock markets losing value as fear stuck in) would probably lead to a huge amount of resistence to military intervention. 
 
You are right in that the net effects would be huge for China too, but the lead-time for those effects would be several years in the making, China can manage its internal economy and has a lot of room to soften the blow for a sustained period. It can't replace the US as a trading partner, but it can delay the effects (and manage the percieved effects) for a far longer period.
 
This is why I think it is highly unlikely that either side is looking forward to the prospect of a war over Taiwan, it simply is massively costly for both parties.
 
Economics (however boring) do have a part to play in what wars we will find ourselves involved in, just as much as military capabilities do, and that the trade/debt links between countries function as a mutual deterent. The reality is that both sides are capable of significantly disrupting the lifestyle of the other without having to even fight.
 
And you very accurately noted that the chinese populace can tolerate more, yes, and they're used to it, and when they're fed up they have no mechanism by which they can make their voices heard. In contrast; if a war REALLY affected the lifestyle of a large proportion of the population by means of severe economic depression, then you would find a lot of opposition, and that, in itself, should be regarded as part of the fundamental equation when making a decision about which side wins; it might not be the side that feels it has, as you say, more to lose.
 
 
 
 
 
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Herald12345    Got it in one!   7/2/2009 4:19:41 PM
Whilst a strike on the Three-Gorges dam is possible in a full-scale strategic conflict it is hard to imagine it being an option ont the table in anything other than total-war. The humanitarian disaster that would unfold would lead to huge ramifications - Herald is correct in the sense that China is heavily reliant on this 22GW installation for power, irrigation, water supply, but wrong (in my opinion) about the scale of effect it would have on the chinese warfighting capability, China is actually one of the few nations that has the ability to RAPIDLY add surplus generation capacity to its grid - the oft-cited "three coal fired powerstations a week" is somewhat overstating the situation but 22GW isn't actually a significant percentage of the domestic energy consumption.
 
Not true. Check where the coal mines are!
 
 
There is a problem for China when the Yangtze flooding occurs!
 
Historically, even in the 20th century they have dealt with several natural disasters that have had death tolls in the millions. It is not to say that its effects would not be catastrophic, but the crisis would primarily be humanitarian, rather than military - for a nation that treats its entire population as a never-ending resource, it would be stirring the hornets nest.
 
The current Chinese population in URBAN areas has not seen this kind of disater in a generation. Their manufacturing is where?
 
 

 
Having been across China I think that we often forget the degree to which the population is disinterested in foreign policy, it is a nation that, at least at the societal level, is introspective in the extreme, most people are far more interested in emulating  newfound capitalist ambition and improving their respective domestic prospects.
 
Hence why I distinguish between the PRC bandits and the Chinese people.
 
In other words, a major infrastructural attack on a project that is both a major symbol of aspiration and achievement (somewhat like the great wall in many eyes), and an essential resource for the development of the region (hubei, and obviously Shanghai). It would turn the chinese population towards nationalism, would be regarded as a war crime without parallel. Given that China IS developing at pace, it would lead to an entire generation of 1+billion people having a hatred of the US that would exceed that seen in the muslim world.
 
Maybe. But that posit only hold if we attack FIRST. Once the PRC aggression is established there cannot be any illusions even among the Chinese that all bets are off.
 
Suitable only for use when the alternative is nuclear, it would be counterproductive in the extreme. I think we have to remember that the Chinese population is broadly pro-western, they are nationalistic on demand, when prompted to be so for publicity, but fundamentally admire the values and ideals of the west, just as we should (if we have any sense) admire many of the values they hold dear. When you look at the relative freedoms that people enjoy in the cities relative to 20 years ago it is to be hoped that the new, ambitious, outspoken middle class will have more impact on policy at the national level, until that point, the last thing we would ever want to do, in any conflict, would be to reverse course, accrue the combined hatred and resentment of a nation that is, at some point (40 years?), going to have technological parity with the west, believe it.
 
Disagree. They are CHINESE.
 
BW, China isn't afraid of a full scale strategic nuclear war? 
 
China has a relatively small nuclear stockpile, estimates are often conservative but it certainly doesn't have the capability that many people ignorantly assume it to.
 
Its a self defense force at the intercontinental level. At the IRBM level it approaches OFFENSE.

In other words, it would come out far worse for China than the US b
 
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Herald12345       7/2/2009 4:33:36 PM









You should now define how that "smoking hole" got there in Guam, because I think you are now moving the target of the discussion.  I think DA and I have both made it clear that taking out the dam is on a rough equivalency with something like a nuclear strike, and thus is disproportionate in the context of a conventional-only fight.  If the Chinese make Andersen into a smoking hole using nukes, then you've changed that scenario and now we're talking about something very different to most people at least.  If the Chinese make Andersen into a smoking hole using conventional weapons, well, then I just have to stop right there as they barely have the capability to do that and much less chance than that of actually succeeding at doing that.








The PRC bandits have to attack Andersen or they can't even mount a credible blackmail of the RoCs. Its the one US base that is within heavy bomber range of their assembly areas and rocket bombardment sites. Even with Tomahawks we can mount an unacceptable (to them) deterrent.






Andersen has to go. Guaranteed opening move.  Therefore smoking hole.









Okay, I think I understand that background to your point.  However, what you still left ambiguous to my mind, that is, what I am still not able to figure out from your additional comments, is just how the Chinese do this?  Once again, if they do it by nuking Andersen, fine, I agree they have the capability to do so and at that point the gloves come off in terms of our response.  However, then yes you have moved the goalposts.  If, as you say, you have not moved them, and therefore you only mean the Chinese use non-WMD, then I have a problem with accepting that conclusion to that scenario.  I agree Andersen is very important, but I don't see how China can reasonably hope to do much of anything to it in a non-WMD-only scenario.


 


Destroy parked aircraft, the tank farm, the bomb dump, scatter mines, and KILL people. Hit the power house, and knock out the base radars. I don't think they can handle runway fracturing with a cruise missile strike, but they sure can degrade soft structure including hitting the barracks and base housing. The key to knocking out an airbase is to kill people, fuel, bombs, and  AIRCRAFT. Runways and shelters are not that critical as the people and aircraft are.
 
Herald
 
   
 
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