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Subject: Why 183 Raptors is NOT enough.
Herald12345    6/28/2009 2:53:01 PM
Study results follows in next post.

Herald
 
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DarthAmerica       7/2/2009 4:04:16 PM


The PRC bandits have to attack Andersen or they can't even mount a credible blackmail of the RoCs. Its the one US base that is within heavy bomber range of their assembly areas and rocket bombardment sites. Even with Tomahawks we can mount an unacceptable (to them) deterrent.

Andersen has to go. Guaranteed opening move.  Therefore smoking hole.


Herald


 
OKAY, so are you or are you not saying the PRC will nuke Anderson. If not, your suggestion of attacking "crackjing" Three Gorges was wrong. If so, then we can use our own nuclear weapons and this discussion is moot. Either way you need to simply admit that you didn't fully understand the implications of an attack on 3 Gorges, you've been shown the legal and military consequences and move on. Otherwise you are simply further demonstrating that you don't understand this subject as well as you think you do.

Also, Anderson is not a Guarantee. The PRC has several military options it could choose from and some of them are designed to limit the possibility of US involvement.

-DA 
 
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warpig       7/2/2009 4:10:39 PM




You should now define how that "smoking hole" got there in Guam, because I think you are now moving the target of the discussion.  I think DA and I have both made it clear that taking out the dam is on a rough equivalency with something like a nuclear strike, and thus is disproportionate in the context of a conventional-only fight.  If the Chinese make Andersen into a smoking hole using nukes, then you've changed that scenario and now we're talking about something very different to most people at least.  If the Chinese make Andersen into a smoking hole using conventional weapons, well, then I just have to stop right there as they barely have the capability to do that and much less chance than that of actually succeeding at doing that.



The PRC bandits have to attack Andersen or they can't even mount a credible blackmail of the RoCs. Its the one US base that is within heavy bomber range of their assembly areas and rocket bombardment sites. Even with Tomahawks we can mount an unacceptable (to them) deterrent.


Andersen has to go. Guaranteed opening move.  Therefore smoking hole.



Okay, I think I understand that background to your point.  However, what you still left ambiguous to my mind, that is, what I am still not able to figure out from your additional comments, is just how the Chinese do this?  Once again, if they do it by nuking Andersen, fine, I agree they have the capability to do so and at that point the gloves come off in terms of our response.  However, then yes you have moved the goalposts.  If, as you say, you have not moved them, and therefore you only mean the Chinese use non-WMD, then I have a problem with accepting that conclusion to that scenario.  I agree Andersen is very important, but I don't see how China can reasonably hope to do much of anything to it in a non-WMD-only scenario.
 
 
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Reactive       7/2/2009 4:13:01 PM

Interesting positions ReactivE. While I do disagree with you about China's options for diversifying their investments, I also think you have a very interesting viewpoint with regard to China's ability to handle internal security. It seems that in the West we have a tendency to overestimate how much like us people in other countries want to be. Sure, they wear our denim, listen to pop music and surf the Internet. But there are still profound cultural differences. One of those differences is obviously tolerance for hardship. While I don't see the PRC as an evil and oppressive regime, they are certainly more authoritarian than anything we would be used to. I think there's a time and any authoritarian form of government history where significant portions of the population will rise up in protest for some reason. In modern times, with regard to China, that was the Tian an men Square massacre. The Chinese government demonstrated that it can successfully put down very large-scale uprising, endure internal and external pressures and survive international sanctions. So I'm inclined to agree that we may be underestimating the ability of the Chinese to handle the misfortunes of war with regard to internal security. Military and security issues are my expertise so I feel more comfortable discussing this aspect of your post that I do the economic references. I'll have to do some research and get back to you with regard to China's options on investments in our ability to do business elsewhere. However, I strongly suspect China would suffer far worse than the United States. The particularly astute observation you made is in reference to the United States presidency. Because we do have a very short four-year election cycle, first-term presidents are particularly susceptible to economic pressures. That is a vulnerability we would be well advised to consider given our form of government.




-DA 
 Thanks for your thoughts, I do understand where you're coming from.
 
To what extent China dumping the dollar would have on your economy affects day to day life is uncertain, but it will mean massive strain and massive cuts on spending. We're (both the UK and US) "maxed out" in terms of borrowing, and in any case, further borrowing will actually compound the problem. 
 
Probably major shortages of energy, huge lay-offs, inflation, military spending, which is necessarily massive during wartime is one of the surest areas to be "hit", given the choice, I do wonder what any incumbent would choose. It becomes a choice between huge domestic problems in almost every area imaginable, or accepting the loss of an ally that was under the illusion it would be defended.
 
The domestic public position is important, many would favour intervention, but if that did mean the massive "hit" on personal wealth and public services that the media would be predicting (alongside stock markets losing value as fear stuck in) would probably lead to a huge amount of resistence to military intervention. 
 
You are right in that the net effects would be huge for China too, but the lead-time for those effects would be several years in the making, China can manage its internal economy and has a lot of room to soften the blow for a sustained period. It can't replace the US as a trading partner, but it can delay the effects (and manage the percieved effects) for a far longer period.
 
This is why I think it is highly unlikely that either side is looking forward to the prospect of a war over Taiwan, it simply is massively costly for both parties.
 
Economics (however boring) do have a part to play in what wars we will find ourselves involved in, just as much as military capabilities do, and that the trade/debt links between countries function as a mutual deterent. The reality is that both sides are capable of significantly disrupting the lifestyle of the other without having to even fight.
 
And you very accurately noted that the chinese populace can tolerate more, yes, and they're used to it, and when they're fed up they have no mechanism by which they can make their voices heard. In contrast; if a war REALLY affected the lifestyle of a large proportion of the population by means of severe economic depression, then you would find a lot of opposition, and that, in itself, should be regarded as part of the fundamental equation when making a decision about which side wins; it might not be the side that feels it has, as you say, more to lose.
 
 
 
 
Just a note to add, looking at some data on Chinese energy generation.
 
Total capacity in 2004 was 440 gigawatts (this is likely to be closer to 500 currently, by 2020 it should be 1TW.
 
Total Three Gorges Dam generating potential (when additional turbines are added) 22.5 gigawatts.
 
So this would be a 5% or so decrease, which as Herald says, is significant for industry, my personal guess would be that they would implement wide-sweeping cuts in domestic supply in affected regions and channel all available energy supplies to industry/military as needed. Probably significant but not (in my opinion) decisive.
 
ReactivE
 
 
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Herald12345    Got it in one!   7/2/2009 4:19:41 PM
Whilst a strike on the Three-Gorges dam is possible in a full-scale strategic conflict it is hard to imagine it being an option ont the table in anything other than total-war. The humanitarian disaster that would unfold would lead to huge ramifications - Herald is correct in the sense that China is heavily reliant on this 22GW installation for power, irrigation, water supply, but wrong (in my opinion) about the scale of effect it would have on the chinese warfighting capability, China is actually one of the few nations that has the ability to RAPIDLY add surplus generation capacity to its grid - the oft-cited "three coal fired powerstations a week" is somewhat overstating the situation but 22GW isn't actually a significant percentage of the domestic energy consumption.
 
Not true. Check where the coal mines are!
 
 
There is a problem for China when the Yangtze flooding occurs!
 
Historically, even in the 20th century they have dealt with several natural disasters that have had death tolls in the millions. It is not to say that its effects would not be catastrophic, but the crisis would primarily be humanitarian, rather than military - for a nation that treats its entire population as a never-ending resource, it would be stirring the hornets nest.
 
The current Chinese population in URBAN areas has not seen this kind of disater in a generation. Their manufacturing is where?
 
 

 
Having been across China I think that we often forget the degree to which the population is disinterested in foreign policy, it is a nation that, at least at the societal level, is introspective in the extreme, most people are far more interested in emulating  newfound capitalist ambition and improving their respective domestic prospects.
 
Hence why I distinguish between the PRC bandits and the Chinese people.
 
In other words, a major infrastructural attack on a project that is both a major symbol of aspiration and achievement (somewhat like the great wall in many eyes), and an essential resource for the development of the region (hubei, and obviously Shanghai). It would turn the chinese population towards nationalism, would be regarded as a war crime without parallel. Given that China IS developing at pace, it would lead to an entire generation of 1+billion people having a hatred of the US that would exceed that seen in the muslim world.
 
Maybe. But that posit only hold if we attack FIRST. Once the PRC aggression is established there cannot be any illusions even among the Chinese that all bets are off.
 
Suitable only for use when the alternative is nuclear, it would be counterproductive in the extreme. I think we have to remember that the Chinese population is broadly pro-western, they are nationalistic on demand, when prompted to be so for publicity, but fundamentally admire the values and ideals of the west, just as we should (if we have any sense) admire many of the values they hold dear. When you look at the relative freedoms that people enjoy in the cities relative to 20 years ago it is to be hoped that the new, ambitious, outspoken middle class will have more impact on policy at the national level, until that point, the last thing we would ever want to do, in any conflict, would be to reverse course, accrue the combined hatred and resentment of a nation that is, at some point (40 years?), going to have technological parity with the west, believe it.
 
Disagree. They are CHINESE.
 
BW, China isn't afraid of a full scale strategic nuclear war? 
 
China has a relatively small nuclear stockpile, estimates are often conservative but it certainly doesn't have the capability that many people ignorantly assume it to.
 
Its a self defense force at the intercontinental level. At the IRBM level it approaches OFFENSE.

In other words, it would come out far worse for China than the US by an order of magnitude (assuming no russian involvement).
 
I can guarantee that if it goes nuclear, we have enough to destroy that nation state. 
 
When you look at the value of current chinese reserves of USD, you can see that china already has its own "nuclear" option, the effect of which would lead to a price crash never before seen, I think the biggest single factor in averting conflict between the US and PRC is the level of economic reliance that exists between the two countries.
 
Dollars mean nothing in war. We were technically bankrupt in 1943 (as was Germany, Japan, and Britain) and and yet we still all fought a world war to conclusion. The measure is PRODUCTION capacity. Future generations have to foot the future bills. The PRCs don't have the capital reserves the emergency production capacity (it takes three years to build an electric plant-even a coal fired one-in a war that will last six months?)  
 
In other words, china has the ability to virtually bankrupt the US economy, they know it, we know it, it's a far more potent potential "strike" than hitting the three-gorges.
 
No demand, no supply. 25% of China's factories are now IDLE. Who hurts here? Not the PRC bbandits:  the Chinese people.
 
Herald
 
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Herald12345       7/2/2009 4:33:36 PM









You should now define how that "smoking hole" got there in Guam, because I think you are now moving the target of the discussion.  I think DA and I have both made it clear that taking out the dam is on a rough equivalency with something like a nuclear strike, and thus is disproportionate in the context of a conventional-only fight.  If the Chinese make Andersen into a smoking hole using nukes, then you've changed that scenario and now we're talking about something very different to most people at least.  If the Chinese make Andersen into a smoking hole using conventional weapons, well, then I just have to stop right there as they barely have the capability to do that and much less chance than that of actually succeeding at doing that.








The PRC bandits have to attack Andersen or they can't even mount a credible blackmail of the RoCs. Its the one US base that is within heavy bomber range of their assembly areas and rocket bombardment sites. Even with Tomahawks we can mount an unacceptable (to them) deterrent.






Andersen has to go. Guaranteed opening move.  Therefore smoking hole.









Okay, I think I understand that background to your point.  However, what you still left ambiguous to my mind, that is, what I am still not able to figure out from your additional comments, is just how the Chinese do this?  Once again, if they do it by nuking Andersen, fine, I agree they have the capability to do so and at that point the gloves come off in terms of our response.  However, then yes you have moved the goalposts.  If, as you say, you have not moved them, and therefore you only mean the Chinese use non-WMD, then I have a problem with accepting that conclusion to that scenario.  I agree Andersen is very important, but I don't see how China can reasonably hope to do much of anything to it in a non-WMD-only scenario.


 


Destroy parked aircraft, the tank farm, the bomb dump, scatter mines, and KILL people. Hit the power house, and knock out the base radars. I don't think they can handle runway fracturing with a cruise missile strike, but they sure can degrade soft structure including hitting the barracks and base housing. The key to knocking out an airbase is to kill people, fuel, bombs, and  AIRCRAFT. Runways and shelters are not that critical as the people and aircraft are.
 
Herald
 
   
 
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warpig       7/2/2009 4:41:11 PM




Okay, I think I understand that background to your point.  However, what you still left ambiguous to my mind, that is, what I am still not able to figure out from your additional comments, is just how the Chinese do this?  Once again, if they do it by nuking Andersen, fine, I agree they have the capability to do so and at that point the gloves come off in terms of our response.  However, then yes you have moved the goalposts.  If, as you say, you have not moved them, and therefore you only mean the Chinese use non-WMD, then I have a problem with accepting that conclusion to that scenario.  I agree Andersen is very important, but I don't see how China can reasonably hope to do much of anything to it in a non-WMD-only scenario.



Destroy parked aircraft, the tank farm, the bomb dump, scatter mines, and KILL people. Hit the power house, and knock out the base radars. I don't think they can handle runway fracturing with a cruise missile strike, but they sure can degrade soft structure including hitting the barracks and base housing. The key to knocking out an airbase is to kill people, fuel, bombs, and  AIRCRAFT. Runways and shelters are not that critical as the people and aircraft are.

 
I understand the critical nodes of an airbase, the basics of weaponeering and munitions effectiveness, and where to place the DMPIs.  I mean that the Chinese can't accomplish this with their current nor even their future force structure.
 
There is a disconnect between what the Chinese want/need to do to Andersen on one hand, and what in reality they can actually accomplish on the other hand.  Ain't gonna happen.

 
 
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Reactive       7/2/2009 4:43:53 PM



I would essentially agree with the first point below as roughly 70% of China's population is still rural.  Then there is the deep well spring of nationalism that can be tapped in a time of war especially if the Chinese mainland is attacked in defence of Taiwan.  Having said that, my opinion is that at the present time the PRC is primarily focused on continued economic development in an effort to quell internal dissent and to meet the aspirations of the migrating peasantry from the countryside into the urban centers.  Taiwan is no doubt front and center in the thoughts of the Communist Party but in the short term, military action will likely only be precipitated by a unilateral declaration of Taiwanese independence or a more radical militaristic turn to the right in the party leadership.  


 

The notion that PRC USD currency holdings can be used as leverage has some merit but given the trillions of US treasuries China currently holds a deliberate attempt to devalue the USD has some blowback.  One would also expect that in the event of hostilities, the US would withhold interest payments on any Chinese held treasuries and a reneging of repayment of them when they mature.  I would have to assume that this is factored into any deliberate consideration of hostilities notwithstanding the two factors at the end of the previous paragraph.  At the present time, the US and China are engaged in an economic embrace that both are willing to continue, but the PRC has the luxury of time and patience on its side. 


 

I watched a recent documentary that claimed a significant portion of the government's budget is spent distributing the wealth to a broad swath of the party.  The insinuation being that loyalty and acquiesence is being bought and that the party is not a simple monolith but one with differing opinions and voices.  Consideration for the continuation of this gravy train would hopefully factor into any consideration for foreign misadventure. 




 
 
Very interesting thoughts - the ruling party itself paradoxically votes for high office positions, quite an irony, and, as you say the fact that there are differing voices in the chinese communist party is testament to the fact that the "system" is opening up somewhat - the young, affluent city-dwelling middle class feel confident enough to protest on the streets about proposed Maglev expansion in Shanghai, things are changing, slowly, and will hopefully continue to do so. Police "independantly" investogate allegations of corruption, and when suspects are caught (or hung out to dry) sentences can be severe, or even terminal.
 
It does point to a country that is working its way into the modern world, it's not going to be a revolution, but a gradual easing of information, in combination with an affluent, informed middle class who are able to exert influence without prompting fears of revolution or "dissent".
 
As you also say, the US has numerous economic mechanisms to hit back at China, undoubtably for both sides it ends up being more costly through indirect economic effects than the military action itself, as you say, the chinese Govt is unlikely to want to needlessly upset the system, risk turning back decades of growth for the sake of an Island, the more likely situation is that "talks" will continue for the next 30 years, and that nothing will really change, China (as well as the more well publicised missiles) spends a lot of money sending PR initiatives into Taiwan, they are moving (publically at least) more towards a "softly softly" approach, dialogue, diplomacy, handshakes etc.
 
The bottom line is that war would really really suck for everyone, it wouldn't really be a question of who won but who lost less, because from the very outset of any conflict, the prospect for both economies in the medium term would be bleak.
 
I think the points you make re: chinese attitude are well observed, I don't think there's many countries where you could adopt a "one child approach" and have the vast majority of people observe it, not necessarily because of the consequences, but because it is ordained in law and custom.
 
So, more F22's?
 
The last thing China would do, even with economic consequences is start a war it looked likely on paper to lose, the F22 provides the answer to that question, if it is marginal it has less of a deterent effect.  It is worth having more in order to provide every military analyst in China with enough data to see that the USAF is utterly dominant during any potential conflict, that way, they'll never seriously consider putting it to the acid test.
 
 
 
 
Quote    Reply

DarthAmerica       7/2/2009 5:12:17 PM

So, more F22's?


 

The last thing China would do, even with economic consequences is start a war it looked likely on paper to lose, the F22 provides the answer to that question, if it is marginal it has less of a deterent effect.  It is worth having more in order to provide every military analyst in China with enough data to see that the USAF is utterly dominant during any potential conflict, that way, they'll never seriously consider putting it to the acid test.


 The answer? In my opinion, that's far to platform specific logic. If success is ultimately dependent on numbers of raptors, then we are in trouble. Basing for land-based fighters is far too limited and vulnerable in the area of operation. Few in number, in range of Chinese strike assets and vulnerable to political considerations. The Chinese being able to convince one regional partner not to participate would have disproportionate effects on operations. Rather than the raptor, the true answer is in balance. In this case, it is the United States Navy aircraft carriers and submarines that the Chinese really fear. Those are the types of weapons systems the Chinese cannot locked out of the region or reliably hold at risk. In fact, a lot of Chinese military modernization has been geared toward countering these threats to their interest. Raptors forced to fight under these conditions are a far easier thing to deal with than carriers or submarines. And don't forget long ranged strike assets as well.

-DA 

 


 


 
Quote    Reply

Reactive       7/2/2009 6:59:04 PM

Whilst a strike on the Three-Gorges dam is possible in a full-scale strategic conflict it is hard to imagine it being an option ont the table in anything other than total-war. The humanitarian disaster that would unfold would lead to huge ramifications - Herald is correct in the sense that China is heavily reliant on this 22GW installation for power, irrigation, water supply, but wrong (in my opinion) about the scale of effect it would have on the chinese warfighting capability, China is actually one of the few nations that has the ability to RAPIDLY add surplus generation capacity to its grid - the oft-cited "three coal fired powerstations a week" is somewhat overstating the situation but 22GW isn't actually a significant percentage of the domestic energy consumption.



 



Not true. Check where the coal mines are!

Coal mines within the total river basin do not necessarily equate to coal mines that would be destroyed by a breach of the dam. The coal mines would have been almost exclusively cut before the dam construction started, in which case they would have had to compete with flooding. Consider many factors behind flooding, a major one being extant water saturation levels in floodplain. The yangtze river is seasonal, the flooding only occurs during peak-flow conditions, i.e. if the dam were to breach it would not be the equivalent volume of water released downstream as would have been the case in a wet-season flood (where ground downriver is already saturated).
 
Given this is the case the Chinese would (if destruction of the dam was judged a possibility) launch an operation (given they have the choice in this conflict) during the dry season where the lake behind the dam is routinely drained to prepare for the wet season.  Assuming a breach of the dam there would clearly be huge implications for certain industrial areas nearer the dam , but it would not be a major flood for the vast majority of the river basin. Assuming it was in the dry season the river channel itself is big enough to absorb a huge amount of the volume of water stored in the lake.
 
If you look at the testimonials from construction workers on the project about reinforcing bars not being used, concrete being incorrectly mixed (too wet), as well as the fact that the dam is now strewn with deep hairline cracks, I think you will find that sooner or later the dam does fail, provided that doesn't happen during peak flow in the wet season, its effect will not be as vast as might be imagined. There has also been unusual high-level criticism of the construction, impact, usefulness of the dam, I don't think you'll find they have placed new critical infrastructure in harms way because everyone knows or fears that this is a disaster waiting to happen.
 
Bottom line, it would be a huge torrent of water rushing downriver, but whose total volume was far less than that experienced in "basin-wide" floods regularly experienced by all mines and industry downriver.
 
 
 

 

 



There is a problem for China when the Yangtze flooding occurs!

With respect, you are highlighting mines in the river basin, not representative of the regions that would be expected to flood,  consider that ALL coal mines in the floodplane had to contend with the full fury of the seasonal floods until very recently. It would be possible to calculate the extent of the flood with detailed topographic data, but again, in normal conditions it would be primarily a human catastrophy rather than an infrastructural one.

 

Historically, even in the 20th century they have dealt with several natural disasters that have had death tolls in the millions. It is not to say that its effects would not be catastrophic, but the crisis would primarily be humanitarian, rather than military - for a nation that treats its entire population as a never-ending resource, it would be stirring the hornets nest.

 

The current Chinese population in URBAN areas has not seen this kind of disater in a generation. Their manufacturing is where?
 
 A lot of them have, because most of the people in chinese urban areas are economic migrants from poor rural areas, the urban middle-classes would get in line, I don't think shanghai would be adversely affected, again, as long as the breach didn't happen during a sustained low in the wet-season.
 

 




 

Having been across China I think that we often forget the degree to which the population is disinterested in foreign policy, it is a nation that, at least at the societal level, is introspective in the extreme, most people are far more interested in emulating  newfound capitalist ambition and improving their respective domestic prospects.

 

Hence why I distinguish between the PRC bandits and the Chinese people.

Yep, the chinese people themselves have my fullest admiration.
 

In other words, a major infrastructural attack on a project that is both a major symbol of aspiration and achievement (somewhat like the great wall in many eyes), and an essential resource for the development of the region (hubei, and obviously Shanghai). It would turn the chinese population towards nationalism, would be regarded as a war crime without parallel. Given that China IS developing at pace, it would lead to an entire generation of 1+billion people having a hatred of the US that would exceed that seen in the muslim world.

 

Maybe. But that posit only hold if we attack FIRST. Once the PRC aggression is established there cannot be any illusions even among the Chinese that all bets are off.

Yes, but wheras we have (in our countries) many differing viewpoints, it will be presented to the chinese people, without exception, as a crime akin to genocide, and used to whip up nationalist fervor and sentiment for generations to come.
 

Suitable only for use when the alternative is nuclear, it would be counterproductive in the extreme. I think we have to remember that the Chinese population is broadly pro-western, they are nationalistic on demand, when prompted to be so for publicity, but fundamentally admire the values and ideals of the west, just as we should (if we have any sense) admire many of the values they hold dear. When you look at the relative freedoms that people enjoy in the cities relative to 20 years ago it is to be hoped that the new, ambitious, outspoken middle class will have more impact on policy at the national level, until that point, the last thing we would ever want to do, in any conflict, would be to reverse course, accrue the combined hatred and resentment of a nation that is, at some point (40 years?), going to have technological parity with the west, believe it.

 

Disagree. They are CHINESE.

Japanese people are ethnically chinese, they benefitted from US assistance after WWII, china has essentially had a few decades of industrialisation, coupled with massive overpopulation, but considering they have gone from pre-industrial to the leading industrial nation on earth, I think you shouldn't assume that the produce from their "very young" manufacturing base is not going to improve. Consider also 10 million hard science graduates per year, millions more in engineering, universities that have far stricter entrance criteria than Oxbridge, and a space program, and I think you will be surprised how people's perceptions of china differ in 40 years time, in much the same way as we don't necessarily base our own expecations of domestic produce on the cotton and steel mills of yesteryear.
 

BW, China isn't afraid of a full scale strategic nuclear war? 

 

China has a relatively small nuclear stockpile, estimates are often conservative but it certainly doesn't have the capability that many people ignorantly assume it to.

 



Its a self defense force at the intercontinental level. At the IRBM level it approaches OFFENSE.

Agreed



In other words, it would come out far worse for China than the US by an order of magnitude (assuming no russian involvement).


 

I can guarantee that if it goes nuclear, we have enough to destroy that nation state. 

And more to spare, the merciful thing is that because their total stockpiles are small full scale devestation wouldn't be on the table, just a pre-emptive strike.
 

When you look at the value of current chinese reserves of USD, you can see that china already has its own "nuclear" option, the effect of which would lead to a price crash never before seen, I think the biggest single factor in averting conflict between the US and PRC is the level of economic reliance that exists between the two countries.

 

Dollars mean nothing in war. We were technically bankrupt in 1943 (as was Germany, Japan, and Britain) and and yet we still all fought a world war to conclusion. The measure is PRODUCTION capacity. Future generations have to foot the future bills. The PRCs don't have the capital reserves the emergency production capacity (it takes three years to build an electric plant-even a coal fired one-in a war that will last six months?)  

They mean a lot in war, they determine whether your population is willing to suffer the personal and immediate consequences of a domestic economic collapse. I'm not saying that the armed forces would simply vanish, but they would become less sustainable to a modern nation. It's not quite the same as WW2 for several reasons, notably the dollar wasn't the world's reserve currency then, we had comparatively cheaper resources in almost every measurable area, as well as a vast underexploited manufacturing base. Re: building new power stations, my point is that they are adding capacity to the extent that new power stations already in process and completed on a weekly basis (as well as the fact the grid has been updated hugely throughout the entire area to be flexible) would take up a lot of the slack. Currently the three gorges produces (based on 1998) only 3 percent of domestic supply, as opposed to 5 percent in 2004...
 

In other words, china has the ability to virtually bankrupt the US economy, they know it, we know it, it's a far more potent potential "strike" than hitting the three-gorges.

 

No demand, no supply. 25% of China's factories are now IDLE. Who hurts here? Not the PRC bbandits:  the Chinese people.

That is the point, 25 percent of manufacturing capability is knocked out, no major unrest, apply that same situation to the US or Europe and think about the consequences, they are more resilient by an order of magnitude.

 

Herald
Regards,
 
ReactivE
 
Quote    Reply

Herald12345    Let's see.    7/2/2009 7:08:49 PM









Okay, I think I understand that background to your point.  However, what you still left ambiguous to my mind, that is, what I am still not able to figure out from your additional comments, is just how the Chinese do this?  Once again, if they do it by nuking Andersen, fine, I agree they have the capability to do so and at that point the gloves come off in terms of our response.  However, then yes you have moved the goalposts.  If, as you say, you have not moved them, and therefore you only mean the Chinese use non-WMD, then I have a problem with accepting that conclusion to that scenario.  I agree Andersen is very important, but I don't see how China can reasonably hope to do much of anything to it in a non-WMD-only scenario.









Destroy parked aircraft, the tank farm, the bomb dump, scatter mines, and KILL people. Hit the power house, and knock out the base radars. I don't think they can handle runway fracturing with a cruise missile strike, but they sure can degrade soft structure including hitting the barracks and base housing. The key to knocking out an airbase is to kill people, fuel, bombs, and  AIRCRAFT. Runways and shelters are not that critical as the people and aircraft are.





 

I understand the critical nodes of an airbase, the basics of weaponeering and munitions effectiveness, and where to place the DMPIs.  I mean that the Chinese can't accomplish this with their current nor even their future force structure.

 

There is a disconnect between what the Chinese want/need to do to Andersen on one hand, and what in reality they can actually accomplish on the other hand.  Ain't gonna happen.



 

Pop up cruise missile attack from a Song is not likely. More likely is a massed Kilo attack. How many CMs to kill Andersen? About 80-100 half unitary and half bomblet.  Follow up bombardment has to be air launched from air breathers.

We have ten years to track this. 
 
Shrug. You say they can't. I ask you why can't they? All they have to do is build enough Harbins and enough HA-10s
 
 
Sift the WHEAT from the chaff. The new H-6 Ks amd Ms exist.
 
Herald 
 

 
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Reactive       7/2/2009 7:20:40 PM
Please excuse me posting again, but there is something else that occurred to me, in the event that a dam breach presented a risk during a theoretical war, all the PRC would have to do would be to drain the lake behind the hydro dam to near-normal levels, this would fill the downriver area to pre-dam levels, which would still be within the normal river channel size.
 
Consider the amount of resources devoted to the dam-buster missions in WW2, they massively overestimated the amount of wartime impact the missions would have, based on post war testimonials as well as output data from the affected regions, these missions have now been shown to have had a fairly negligible impact on production. This was due to the ability of those in affected regions to quickly restore manufacturing capability.
 
With respect, I think it is a situation, that, even if theoretically of use to the US in a conflict, could easily be mitigated with a bit of foresight by the PRC.
 
ReactivE
 
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Herald12345    Intelligent answer.    7/2/2009 7:27:39 PM




Whilst a strike on the Three-Gorges dam is possible in a full-scale strategic conflict it is hard to imagine it being an option ont the table in anything other than total-war. The humanitarian disaster that would unfold would lead to huge ramifications - Herald is correct in the sense that China is heavily reliant on this 22GW installation for power, irrigation, water supply, but wrong (in my opinion) about the scale of effect it would have on the chinese warfighting capability, China is actually one of the few nations that has the ability to RAPIDLY add surplus generation capacity to its grid - the oft-cited "three coal fired powerstations a week" is somewhat overstating the situation but 22GW isn't actually a significant percentage of the domestic energy consumption.









 









Not true. Check where the coal mines are!




Coal mines within the total river basin do not necessarily equate to coal mines that would be destroyed by a breach of the dam. The coal mines would have been almost exclusively cut before the dam construction started, in which case they would have had to compete with flooding. Consider many factors behind flooding, a major one being extant water saturation levels in floodplain. The yangtze river is seasonal, the flooding only occurs during peak-flow conditions, i.e. if the dam were to breach it would not be the equivalent volume of water released downstream as would have been the case in a wet-season flood (where ground downriver is already saturated).

 

Given this is the case the Chinese would (if destruction of the dam was judged a possibility) launch an operation (given they have the choice in this conflict) during the dry season where the lake behind the dam is routinely drained to prepare for the wet season.  Assuming a breach of the dam there would clearly be huge implications for certain industrial areas nearer the dam , but it would not be a major flood for the vast majority of the river basin. Assuming it was in the dry season the river channel itself is big enough to absorb a huge amount of the volume of water stored in the lake.


 

If you look at the testimonials from construction workers on the project about reinforcing bars not being used, concrete being incorrectly mixed (too wet), as well as the fact that the dam is now strewn with deep hairline cracks, I think you will find that sooner or later the dam does fail, provided that doesn't happen during peak flow in the wet season, its effect will not be as vast as might be imagined. There has also been unusual high-level criticism of the construction, impact, usefulness of the dam, I don't think you'll find they have placed new critical infrastructure in harms way because everyone knows or fears that this is a disaster waiting to happen.


 

Bottom line, it would be a huge torrent of water rushing downriver, but whose total volume was far less than that experienced in "basin-wide" floods regularly experienced by all mines and industry downriver.



 

 

 







 



 









There is a problem for China when the Yangtze flooding occurs!



With respect, you are highlighting mines in the river basin, not representative of the regions that would be expected to flood,  consider that ALL coal mines in the floodplane had to contend with the full fury of the seasonal floods until very recently. It would be possible to calculate the extent of the flood with detailed topographic data, but again, in normal conditions it would be primarily a human catastrophy rather than an infrastructural one.





 



Historically, even in the 20th century they have dealt with several natural disasters that have had death tolls in the millions. It is not to say that its effects would not be catastrophic, but the crisis would primarily be humanitarian, rather than military - for a nation that treats its entire population as a never-ending resource, it would be stirring the hornets nest.



 



The current Chinese population in URBAN areas has not seen this kind of disater in a generation. Their manufacturing is where?

 

 A lot of them have, because most of the people in chinese urban areas are economic migrants from poor rural areas, the urban middle-classes would get in line, I don't think shanghai would be adversely affected, again, as long as the breach didn't happen during a sustained low in the wet-season.


 



 










 



Having been across China I think that we often forget the degree to which the population is disinterested in foreign policy, it is a nation that, at least at the societal level, is introspective in the extreme, most people are far more interested in emulating  newfound capitalist ambition and improving their respective domestic prospects.



 



Hence why I distinguish between the PRC bandits and the Chinese people.



Yep, the chinese people themselves have my fullest admiration.



 



In other words, a major infrastructural attack on a project that is both a major symbol of aspiration and achievement (somewhat like the great wall in many eyes), and an essential resource for the development of the region (hubei, and obviously Shanghai). It would turn the chinese population towards nationalism, would be regarded as a war crime without parallel. Given that China IS developing at pace, it would lead to an entire generation of 1+billion people having a hatred of the US that would exceed that seen in the muslim world.



 



Maybe. But that posit only hold if we attack FIRST. Once the PRC aggression is established there cannot be any illusions even among the Chinese that all bets are off.




Yes, but wheras we have (in our countries) many differing viewpoints, it will be presented to the chinese people, without exception, as a crime akin to genocide, and used to whip up nationalist fervor and sentiment for generations to come.
 



Suitable only for use when the alternative is nuclear, it would be counterproductive in the extreme. I think we have to remember that the Chinese population is broadly pro-western, they are nationalistic on demand, when prompted to be so for publicity, but fundamentally admire the values and ideals of the west, just as we should (if we have any sense) admire many of the values they hold dear. When you look at the relative freedoms that people enjoy in the cities relative to 20 years ago it is to be hoped that the new, ambitious, outspoken middle class will have more impact on policy at the national level, until that point, the last thing we would ever want to do, in any conflict, would be to reverse course, accrue the combined hatred and resentment of a nation that is, at some point (40 years?), going to have technological parity with the west, believe it.



 



Disagree. They are CHINESE.






Japanese people are ethnically chinese, they benefitted from US assistance after WWII, china has essentially had a few decades of industrialisation, coupled with massive overpopulation, but considering they have gone from pre-industrial to the leading industrial nation on earth, I think you shouldn't assume that the produce from their "very young" manufacturing base is not going to improve. Consider also 10 million hard science graduates per year, millions more in engineering, universities that have far stricter entrance criteria than Oxbridge, and a space program, and I think you will be surprised how people's perceptions of china differ in 40 years time, in much the same way as we don't necessarily base our own expecations of domestic produce on the cotton and steel mills of yesteryear.

 



BW, China isn't afraid of a full scale strategic nuclear war? 



 



China has a relatively small nuclear stockpile, estimates are often conservative but it certainly doesn't have the capability that many people ignorantly assume it to.



 









Its a self defense force at the intercontinental level. At the IRBM level it approaches OFFENSE.




Agreed










In other words, it would come out far worse for China than the US by an order of magnitude (assuming no russian involvement).






 



I can guarantee that if it goes nuclear, we have enough to destroy that nation state. 




And more to spare, the merciful thing is that because their total stockpiles are small full scale devestation wouldn't be on the table, just a pre-emptive strike.

 



When you look at the value of current chinese reserves of USD, you can see that china already has its own "nuclear" option, the effect of which would lead to a price crash never before seen, I think the biggest single factor in averting conflict between the US and PRC is the level of economic reliance that exists between the two countries.



 



Dollars mean nothing in war. We were technically bankrupt in 1943 (as was Germany, Japan, and Britain) and and yet we still all fought a world war to conclusion. The measure is PRODUCTION capacity. Future generations have to foot the future bills. The PRCs don't have the capital reserves the emergency production capacity (it takes three years to build an electric plant-even a coal fired one-in a war that will last six months?)  




They mean a lot in war, they determine whether your population is willing to suffer the personal and immediate consequences of a domestic economic collapse. I'm not saying that the armed forces would simply vanish, but they would become less sustainable to a modern nation. It's not quite the same as WW2 for several reasons, notably the dollar wasn't the world's reserve currency then, we had comparatively cheaper resources in almost every measurable area, as well as a vast underexploited manufacturing base. Re: building new power stations, my point is that they are adding capacity to the extent that new power stations already in process and completed on a weekly basis (as well as the fact the grid has been updated hugely throughout the entire area to be flexible) would take up a lot of the slack. Currently the three gorges produces (based on 1998) only 3 percent of domestic supply, as opposed to 5 percent in 2004...

 



In other words, china has the ability to virtually bankrupt the US economy, they know it, we know it, it's a far more potent potential "strike" than hitting the three-gorges.



 



No demand, no supply. 25% of China's factories are now IDLE. Who hurts here? Not the PRC bbandits:  the Chinese people.






That is the point, 25 percent of manufacturing capability is knocked out, no major unrest, apply that same situation to the US or Europe and think about the consequences, they are more resilient by an order of magnitude.


 



Herald


Regards,

 

ReactivE


Well answered, I have to be quick.

The imported slave labor class are the ones who live in the slums. They would know hardship, but the yuppie class, the party apparatchiks and the manager class have not. Those are the ones who will fold up and  quit when we put them in the dark and short on food. As I said earlier, the Chinese peasants are TOUGH.
 
The flood plain inundated will drown out not only the mines you see, ruin the rice fields, in the valley, nut also cut the road and rail net. That is soggy and poor soiled ground that needs flooding to replenish it. Two reasons that I regard Three Gorges as a gift to the United States. I love it when a command economy never looks at the disastrous side effects of a mismanaged water table!    
 
The Chinese have to go overseas to get the manganese, copper, zinc, and TITANIUM they need for advanced tech machines they need. They have to go through US to get it. We have direct access to ALL of that.
 
23 GW is significant because it feeds the SHANGHAI industrial district grid. That is a national kill node.
 
The cleave point in China 
 

 
  Is the Huang He. North versus South. Been that way for three thousand uears. An exploit.
 
I'll have more later. Nice to have an intelligent debate about this problem with WP, you, and some others here.
 
Herald. 
 
 
Quote    Reply

gf0012-aust       7/2/2009 7:53:54 PM
With respect, I think it is a situation, that, even if theoretically of use to the US in a conflict, could easily be mitigated with a bit of foresight by the PRC.

Agree in principle.  Chinas water problems are actually more significant than their demand and need for energy solutions to keep pace with their economic needs.  They've been desperately trying to purchase french, american and australian water quality management technologies for years because of the desperate situation they're in (esp north, nth west, west, south western regions).  The sanctity and integrity of their existing water resources is paramount.

eg they have desertification issues encroaching upon Beijing at the rate of 5km per year - within a generation,  Beijing could end up with the desert if not surrounding it, then at least on its doorstep.  Maintaining a water resource for the populace, let alone for maintaining industry, let alone feeding and cooling its energy systems.

Its because of this that I think that any attack on an infrastructure that was not clearly defensible as a military target would trigger a significant response.

of course that assumes that its hit total war and that the gloves have been taken off and the International conventions (eg Berne, Geneva etc...) governing legitimacy of action have been abandoned. :) 

 
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Reactive       7/2/2009 8:49:22 PM
 The answer? In my opinion, that's far to platform specific logic. If success is ultimately dependent on numbers of raptors, then we are in trouble. Basing for land-based fighters is far too limited and vulnerable in the area of operation. Few in number, in range of Chinese strike assets and vulnerable to political considerations. The Chinese being able to convince one regional partner not to participate would have disproportionate effects on operations. Rather than the raptor, the true answer is in balance. In this case, it is the United States Navy aircraft carriers and submarines that the Chinese really fear. Those are the types of weapons systems the Chinese cannot locked out of the region or reliably hold at risk. In fact, a lot of Chinese military modernization has been geared toward countering these threats to their interest. Raptors forced to fight under these conditions are a far easier thing to deal with than carriers or submarines. And don't forget long ranged strike assets as well.
 
I accept your point, and conceed that you are right in that my statement appeared to suggest that the US would be relying on one platform at the expense of the other resources present. I guess a better way of putting it is that, as Herald has pointed out, airbases are vulnerable, the US should therefore have enough Air-superiority-optimised airframes to field in numbers that can absorb losses. I think whilst the F-35 when operational will most likely resemble the F16 in that it will hopefully be a more-than-competent (and stealthy) A2A platform, the F22 can provide an additional layer of coverage, capability, and persistent high-altitude air dominance that would be, even taken without other considerations, an added layer of protection for CBG's that can be rendered out of action if one single Chinese plane gets an uncontested shot at a carrier, any system of air defence has a saturation limit, I'm sure the USN knows what that is, my guess is that the chinese could field a number of aicraft that would severely test it.

 In fact, a lot of Chinese military modernization has been geared toward countering these threats to their interest
 
Agreed, it's been highlighted (and refuted by the PRC) by several DOD reports, I think that the last thing you want to do is to provide them with exactly the threat scenario that they have been training for, undetectable aircraft emerging from regions outside the battle groups with extended range and refueling can achieve persistent early-warning and air dominance that, if not impossible, isn't the primary design objective of the F35.
 
I'm pretty sure that the major point of any military system is that it shouldn't, if possible be produced in quantities that can not absorb the risks associated with being stationed in potentially targetable locations. It makes the weapon a high-value, attrition-sensitive asset when it really should be the primary air-asset. 
 
But I do take your point, the USN is what China fear.
 
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Reactive       7/2/2009 10:06:59 PM
The imported slave labor class are the ones who live in the slums. They would know hardship, but the yuppie class, the party apparatchiks and the manager class have not. Those are the ones who will fold up and  quit when we put them in the dark and short on food. As I said earlier, the Chinese peasants are TOUGH.
 
I think that you are right in that there are a lot of chinese who live a life that is more akin to downtown new yorkers than workers in the rice paddies, I also think that you shouldn't underestimate the ability of the PRC to effectively control the dissent even of the aforementioned when the military gets involved. One thing I observed in China that was telling were road checkpoints where soldiers demonstrated a level of rude, assertive dominance over even quite influential local officials etc, there is a heirachy of respect and, when push comes to shove the PRC do have an amazing level of control over the population, even in the affluent classes, there are huge disparities in what is acceptable, relative to our society, they are born, bred, and treated like a nation of children whose discipline and behaviour is expected at all times to conform to the expectations of the state. I remember hearing "house of the rising sun" recreated in lyric-free honky-tonk, it somewhat reminds me of the society portrayed in "demolition man". Everything is approved, softened, moderated by a huge public sector devoted entirely to the orderly management of society. In wartime, my guess is that the people, even in the cities, would remain more orderly, calm, and obedient than would be likely were the same to happen in our society. (re: New-Orleans, Blackouts on East-Coast, etc)
 
 
The flood plain inundated will drown out not only the mines you see, ruin the rice fields, in the valley, nut also cut the road and rail net. That is soggy and poor soiled ground that needs flooding to replenish it. Two reasons that I regard Three Gorges as a gift to the United States. I love it when a command economy never looks at the disastrous side effects of a mismanaged water table!    

23 GW is significant because it feeds the SHANGHAI industrial district grid. That is a national kill node.
 
I accept that you know what you are talking about with respect to the relative volumes, as I said, I don't personally know the volume of downriver area that would be inundated by a sudden release from the dam. It does rather strike at the heart of the country, and I can of course appreciate that whatever the extent, the sudden release of 25+cubic km of water would have enormous impact, whether or not it would be to the full extent you estimate, it is presumably possible to calculate, and presumably has been at some point, whether it's in the public domain is another matter.
 
 
What I am reaonably confident of is that China could mitigate this in the dry season by lowering the height of the lake even more than does when it flushes in preparation for the wet season. This would remove hydro-capacity but would, in the dry season, restore the downriver area to pre-dam levels and flow volume.
 
DOD Report:
 Taipei political and military leaders have recently suggested acquiring weapon systems
capable of standoff strikes against the Chinese mainland as a cost-effective means of
deterrence. Taiwan?s Air Force already has a latent capability for airstrikes against
China. Leaders have publicly cited the need for ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles.
Since Taipei cannot match Beijing?s ability to field offensive systems, proponents of
strikes against the mainland apparently hope that merely presenting credible threats to
China?s urban population or high- value targets, such as the Three Gorges Dam, will deter
Chinese military coercion.
 
 
maybe it is an achilles heel, it's hard to imagine Taiwan worrying too much about the chinese population when they're being hit by hundreds of thousands of submunitions and associated civilian casualties.
 
 Echo your sentiments re: intelligent discourse, surprised to learn that the DOD has clearly (and publically) mentioned it as a possible target (for taiwan, of course).
 
 
ReactivE
 
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