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Subject: Why 183 Raptors is NOT enough.
Herald12345    6/28/2009 2:53:01 PM
Study results follows in next post. Herald
 
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Herald12345    RAND study.   6/28/2009 2:55:43 PM
 
Guess who saw that study prepared? Gates among others.
 
Herald 
 
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RockyMTNClimber    Check the link Herald.   6/28/2009 3:29:23 PM

Online Library of Selected Images:
-- EVENTS -- World War II in the Pacific --

Pearl Harbor Raid, 7 December 1941 --
Overview and Special Image Selection.............
 
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Herald12345    CRAP!   6/28/2009 3:37:45 PM
 
Sorry. I was checking something about the Pearl Harbor Raid and used the wrong URL here.
 
I make mistakes.
 
Herald

 
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Herald12345    CRAP!   6/28/2009 3:46:50 PM
One more attempt.........RAND Study...
 
The keys are not just numbers of F-22s, though, its TANKERS and runways. Even with SCRAMDARTS its going to be tough to get on station time and the needed A2G kills without a large fighter CAP to defend the bombers and supporting tanker force.
 
Gates truly is an idiot.
 
Herald
 
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warpig       6/28/2009 3:51:50 PM


 

Sorry. I was checking something about the Pearl Harbor Raid and used the wrong URL here.

 

I make mistakes.

 

Herald






 
 
Typos are meaningless; no one worries about them except morons and Internet grammarnazis.  However, I'd have to say you really did make a mistake in this post, and that is bothering to cite this piece-of-crap advocacy paper "study."  I'm sure we went over some of the shortcomings of this thing here on SP when it surfaced last year as part of yet another lame attempt to smear the F-35 as not being an outstanding air-to-air fighter.  I absolutely do agree in general, however, that in a Taiwan scenario about the biggest challenge to at least USAF participation will be logistic (especially basing), and to USN participation will be the combined threat to our carriers of ASBMs, ASCMs, and subs.  Neither of which is insurmountable nor catastrophic to a long war, but might be exploitable enough for the PRCs to reach some sort of limited objective, or even possibly achieve a rapid collapse of the ROC defenses, early enough to then cry for the UN to step in before we can crush them.
 
 
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Herald12345    WP reply.   6/28/2009 4:21:03 PM







 



Sorry. I was checking something about the Pearl Harbor Raid and used the wrong URL here.



 



I make mistakes.



 



Herald
















 

 

Typos are meaningless; no one worries about them except morons and Internet grammarnazis.  However, I'd have to say you really did make a mistake in this post, and that is bothering to cite this piece-of-crap advocacy paper "study."  I'm sure we went over some of the shortcomings of this thing here on SP when it surfaced last year as part of yet another lame attempt to smear the F-35 as not being an outstanding air-to-air fighter.  I absolutely do agree in general, however, that in a Taiwan scenario about the biggest challenge to at least USAF participation will be logistic (especially basing), and to USN participation will be the combined threat to our carriers of ASBMs, ASCMs, and subs.  Neither of which is insurmountable nor catastrophic to a long war, but might be exploitable enough for the PRCs to reach some sort of limited objective, or even possibly achieve a rapid collapse of the ROC defenses, early enough to then cry for the UN to step in before we can crush them.

 

You are not reading that RAND study right; nor looking at what I look which is the basing, CAP endurance, and tanker support problem which us ACCURATE..
 
 From LOCKMART:
 
 
"The reports (about the F-35 H) are completely false and misleading and have absolutely no basis in fact," Maj. Gen. Davis said. "The August 2008 Pacific Vision Wargame that has been referenced recently in the media did not even address air-to-air combat effectiveness. The F-35 is required to be able to effectively defeat current and projected air-to-air threats. All available information, at the highest classification, indicates that F-35 is effectively meeting these aggressive operational challenges."

The Pacific Vision Wargame was a table-top exercise designed to assess basing and force-structure vulnerabilities, and did not include air-to-air combat exercises or any comparisons of different aircraft platforms.

 
Other important facts:
  • External weapon clearance is part of the current F-35 test program.
  • The government has already proven that no other aircraft can survive against the 5th generation stealth that only the F-22 and the F-35 possess; it is impossible to add this stealth to fourth-generation fighters.
  • The F-35's data collection, integration and information sharing capabilities will transform the battlespace of the future and will redefine the close air support mission. The F-35 is specifically designed to take advantage of lessons learned from the F-117 stealth aircraft. Unlike the F-117, the ability to share tactically important information is built into the F-35, along with stealth.
  • F-35 is developing, testing, and fielding mature software years ahead of legacy programs, further reducing development risk. The F-35's advanced software,  already flying on two test aircraft with remarkable stability, is demonstrating the advantages of developing highly-common, tri-variant aircraft.  The software developed  span the entire aircraft and support systems including the aircraft itself, logistics systems, flight and maintenance trainers, maintenance information system and flight-test instrumentation.  
  • Rather than relying exclusively on flight testing, the F-35 is retiring development risk through the most co
 
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gf0012-aust       6/28/2009 5:02:48 PM
The problem with that Rand report is that the loony tunes from APA, Spey, Wheeler, Riccioni, Palmer, Goon, Kopp, Chris eyc... have deliberately misrepresented in their own idealogical quest.

FMD, from the "Australian end" Goon, Kopp, Plamer, Jensens et-al were all quoting it on blogs and web sites as "proof of life" for their own idealogical sprays when  they didn't even know the difference between Falconview and Brawler, :)

 
















 







Sorry. I was checking something about the Pearl Harbor Raid and used the wrong URL here.







 







I make mistakes.







 







Herald




































 



 



Typos are meaningless; no one worries about them except morons and Internet grammarnazis.  However, I'd have to say you really did make a mistake in this post, and that is bothering to cite this piece-of-crap advocacy paper "study."  I'm sure we went over some of the shortcomings of this thing here on SP when it surfaced last year as part of yet another lame attempt to smear the F-35 as not being an outstanding air-to-air fighter.  I absolutely do agree in general, however, that in a Taiwan scenario about the biggest challenge to at least USAF participation will be logistic (especially basing), and to USN participation will be the combined threat to our carriers of ASBMs, ASCMs, and subs.  Neither of which is insurmountable nor catastrophic to a long war, but might be exploitable enough for the PRCs to reach some sort of limited objective, or even possibly achieve a rapid collapse of the ROC defenses, early enough to then cry for the UN to step in before we can crush them.



 




You are not reading that RAND study right; nor looking at what I look which is the basing, CAP endurance, and tanker support problem which us ACCURATE..

 


 From LOCKMART:

 


 

"The reports (about the F-35 H) are completely false and misleading and have absolutely no basis in fact," Maj. Gen. Davis said. "The August 2008 Pacific Vision Wargame that has been referenced recently in the media did not even address air-to-air combat effectiveness. The F-35 is required to be able to effectively defeat current and projected air-to-air threats. All available information, at the highest classification, indicates that F-35 is effectively meeting these aggressive operational challenges."

The Pacific Vision Wargame was a table-top exercise designed to assess basing and force-structure vulnerabilities, and did not include air-to-air combat exercises or any comparisons of different aircraft platforms.
 
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Reactive       6/28/2009 5:52:55 PM
When engineeers plan levees they, like most structural engineers design a tolerance for the "worst possible" outcome, a "hundred-year event", an extreme-low pressure system with a spring tide + hurricane force wind. This is because a logical assumption of a levee is that it should be able to keep out the sea, that the sea, as a somewhat predictable entity can be "defeated" by planning for the worst-case scenarios.
 
The same is true with military planning, we base our strategic decisions on "worst possible" outcomes, yet we also have a temptation to look at "likely" outcomes, for example, within a 20 year window. The current widespread conclusion that future wars and warfare will likely involve smaller conflagrations, terrorism, insurgencies, drug wars, etc is leading a lot of politicians to conclude that our military requirements should generally be tailored to "what we usually do", rather than "what we may have to be able to do in exceptional circumstances". 
 
This seems to be the thinking behind Gates' decisionmaking, it's always tempting to use "likelihoods" rather than "exceptional events" because that enables us to cut funding. The consequences are similar to the failure of a levee, but with the added problem of "reduced deterence" increasing the chances of a major conflict.
 
The US should clearly be aiming for air dominance even in exceptionally unusual circumstances, perhaps where there are numerous theatres of conflict, perhaps even a world-war. This is partly because the increased technology lead times compared to WWII mean that the units that are going to be required in the most extreme instance can not be thrown together in the same fashion that was possible with prop planes and merlin engines. 
 
It's somewhat akin to hedging your bets, if you have a reasonable assumption you'll never need a military unit, you can save vast sums by never fielding it in widespread abundance, in the same sense that you can also save money on concrete and foundations if you are building a series of sea-defences, but surely for a functional thing like a military, we should always, within the bounds of our means, address the outcomes that happen once or twice a century.
 
It's a shame to see such thinking, it cost a lot of countries dearly in WWII, to see a plane like the F22 become a rarely-fielded, small-user-base unit means that it will never have the same sort of lifespan as the teen series jets, it will become increasingly attractive in future decades to remove support and supply chains for a bird that will be at the periphery, rather than, as it should be, the core of US air power.
 
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Reactive       6/28/2009 6:14:11 PM
When engineeers plan levees they, like most structural engineers design a tolerance for the "worst possible" outcome, a "hundred-year event", an extreme-low pressure system with a spring tide + hurricane force wind. This is because a logical assumption of a levee is that it should be able to keep out the sea, that the sea, as a somewhat predictable entity can be "defeated" by planning for the worst-case scenarios.
 
The same is true with military planning, we base our strategic decisions on "worst possible" outcomes, yet we also have a temptation to look at "likely" outcomes, for example, within a 20 year window. The current widespread conclusion that future wars and warfare will likely involve smaller conflagrations, terrorism, insurgencies, drug wars, etc is leading a lot of politicians to conclude that our military requirements should generally be tailored to "what we usually do", rather than "what we may have to be able to do in exceptional circumstances". 
 
This seems to be the thinking behind Gates' decisionmaking, it's always tempting to use "likelihoods" rather than "exceptional events" because that enables us to cut funding. The consequences are similar to the failure of a levee, but with the added problem of "reduced deterence" increasing the chances of a major conflict.
 
The US should clearly be aiming for air dominance even in exceptionally unusual circumstances, perhaps where there are numerous theatres of conflict, perhaps even a world-war. This is partly because the increased technology lead times compared to WWII mean that the units that are going to be required in the most extreme instance can not be thrown together in the same fashion that was possible with prop planes and merlin engines. 
 
It's somewhat akin to hedging your bets, if you have a reasonable assumption you'll never need a military unit, you can save vast sums by never fielding it in widespread abundance, in the same sense that you can also save money on concrete and foundations if you are building a series of sea-defences, but surely for a functional thing like a military, we should always, within the bounds of our means, address the outcomes that happen once or twice a century.
 
It's a shame to see such thinking, it cost a lot of countries dearly in WWII, to see a plane like the F22 become a rarely-fielded, small-user-base unit means that it will never have the same sort of lifespan as the teen series jets, it will become increasingly attractive in future decades to remove support and supply chains for a bird that will be at the periphery, rather than, as it should be, the core of US air power.
 
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Reactive       6/28/2009 6:18:38 PM
When engineeers plan levees they, like most structural engineers design a tolerance for the "worst possible" outcome, a "hundred-year event", an extreme-low pressure system with a spring tide + hurricane force wind. This is because a logical assumption of a levee is that it should be able to keep out the sea, that the sea, as a somewhat predictable entity can be "defeated" by planning for the worst-case scenarios.
 
The same is true with military planning, we base our strategic decisions on "worst possible" outcomes, yet we also have a temptation to look at "likely" outcomes, for example, within a 20 year window. The current widespread conclusion that future wars and warfare will likely involve smaller conflagrations, terrorism, insurgencies, drug wars, etc is leading a lot of politicians to conclude that our military requirements should generally be tailored to "what we usually do", rather than "what we may have to be able to do in exceptional circumstances". 
 
This seems to be the thinking behind Gates' decisionmaking, it's always tempting to use "likelihoods" rather than "exceptional events" because that enables us to cut funding. The consequences are similar to the failure of a levee, but with the added problem of "reduced deterence" increasing the chances of a major conflict.
 
The US should clearly be aiming for air dominance even in exceptionally unusual circumstances, perhaps where there are numerous theatres of conflict, perhaps even a world-war. This is partly because the increased technology lead times compared to WWII mean that the units that are going to be required in the most extreme instance can not be thrown together in the same fashion that was possible with prop planes and merlin engines. 
 
It's somewhat akin to hedging your bets, if you have a reasonable assumption you'll never need a military unit, you can save vast sums by never fielding it in widespread abundance, in the same sense that you can also save money on concrete and foundations if you are building a series of sea-defences, but surely for a functional thing like a military, we should always, within the bounds of our means, address the outcomes that happen once or twice a century.
 
It's a shame to see such thinking, it cost a lot of countries dearly in WWII, to see a plane like the F22 become a rarely-fielded, small-user-base unit means that it will never have the same sort of lifespan as the teen series jets, it will become increasingly attractive in future decades to remove support and supply chains for a bird that will be at the periphery, rather than, as it should be, the core of US air power.
 
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