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Subject: Why 183 Raptors is NOT enough.
Herald12345    6/28/2009 2:53:01 PM
Study results follows in next post.

Herald
 
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Herald12345    RAND study.   6/28/2009 2:55:43 PM
 
Guess who saw that study prepared? Gates among others.
 
Herald 
 
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RockyMTNClimber    Check the link Herald.   6/28/2009 3:29:23 PM

Online Library of Selected Images:
-- EVENTS -- World War II in the Pacific --

Pearl Harbor Raid, 7 December 1941 --
Overview and Special Image Selection.............
 
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Herald12345    CRAP!   6/28/2009 3:37:45 PM
 
Sorry. I was checking something about the Pearl Harbor Raid and used the wrong URL here.
 
I make mistakes.
 
Herald

 
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Herald12345    CRAP!   6/28/2009 3:46:50 PM
One more attempt.........RAND Study
 
The keys are not just numbers of F-22s, though, its TANKERS and runways. Even with SCRAMDARTS its going to be tough to get on station time and the needed A2G kills without a large fighter CAP to defend the bombers and supporting tanker force.
 
Gates truly is an idiot.
 
Herald
 
Quote    Reply

warpig       6/28/2009 3:51:50 PM


 

Sorry. I was checking something about the Pearl Harbor Raid and used the wrong URL here.

 

I make mistakes.

 

Herald






 
 
Typos are meaningless; no one worries about them except morons and Internet grammarnazis.  However, I'd have to say you really did make a mistake in this post, and that is bothering to cite this piece-of-crap advocacy paper "study."  I'm sure we went over some of the shortcomings of this thing here on SP when it surfaced last year as part of yet another lame attempt to smear the F-35 as not being an outstanding air-to-air fighter.  I absolutely do agree in general, however, that in a Taiwan scenario about the biggest challenge to at least USAF participation will be logistic (especially basing), and to USN participation will be the combined threat to our carriers of ASBMs, ASCMs, and subs.  Neither of which is insurmountable nor catastrophic to a long war, but might be exploitable enough for the PRCs to reach some sort of limited objective, or even possibly achieve a rapid collapse of the ROC defenses, early enough to then cry for the UN to step in before we can crush them.
 
 
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Herald12345    WP reply.   6/28/2009 4:21:03 PM







 



Sorry. I was checking something about the Pearl Harbor Raid and used the wrong URL here.



 



I make mistakes.



 



Herald
















 

 

Typos are meaningless; no one worries about them except morons and Internet grammarnazis.  However, I'd have to say you really did make a mistake in this post, and that is bothering to cite this piece-of-crap advocacy paper "study."  I'm sure we went over some of the shortcomings of this thing here on SP when it surfaced last year as part of yet another lame attempt to smear the F-35 as not being an outstanding air-to-air fighter.  I absolutely do agree in general, however, that in a Taiwan scenario about the biggest challenge to at least USAF participation will be logistic (especially basing), and to USN participation will be the combined threat to our carriers of ASBMs, ASCMs, and subs.  Neither of which is insurmountable nor catastrophic to a long war, but might be exploitable enough for the PRCs to reach some sort of limited objective, or even possibly achieve a rapid collapse of the ROC defenses, early enough to then cry for the UN to step in before we can crush them.

 

You are not reading that RAND study right; nor looking at what I look which is the basing, CAP endurance, and tanker support problem which us ACCURATE..
 
 From LOCKMART:
 
 
"The reports (about the F-35 H) are completely false and misleading and have absolutely no basis in fact," Maj. Gen. Davis said. "The August 2008 Pacific Vision Wargame that has been referenced recently in the media did not even address air-to-air combat effectiveness. The F-35 is required to be able to effectively defeat current and projected air-to-air threats. All available information, at the highest classification, indicates that F-35 is effectively meeting these aggressive operational challenges."

The Pacific Vision Wargame was a table-top exercise designed to assess basing and force-structure vulnerabilities, and did not include air-to-air combat exercises or any comparisons of different aircraft platforms.

 
Other important facts:
  • External weapon clearance is part of the current F-35 test program.
  • The government has already proven that no other aircraft can survive against the 5th generation stealth that only the F-22 and the F-35 possess; it is impossible to add this stealth to fourth-generation fighters.
  • The F-35's data collection, integration and information sharing capabilities will transform the battlespace of the future and will redefine the close air support mission. The F-35 is specifically designed to take advantage of lessons learned from the F-117 stealth aircraft. Unlike the F-117, the ability to share tactically important information is built into the F-35, along with stealth.
  • F-35 is developing, testing, and fielding mature software years ahead of legacy programs, further reducing development risk. The F-35's advanced software,  already flying on two test aircraft with remarkable stability, is demonstrating the advantages of developing highly-common, tri-variant aircraft.  The software developed  span the entire aircraft and support systems including the aircraft itself, logistics systems, flight and maintenance trainers, maintenance information system and flight-test instrumentation.  
  • Rather than relying exclusively on flight testing, the F-35 is retiring development risk through the most comprehensive laboratories, sensor test beds, and integrated full-fusion flying test bed ever created for an aircraft program.  Representing only 25% of our verification plans, still the F-35's flight test program is comparable in hours to the combined flight test programs of the three primary U.S. aircraft it will replace.
  • The F-35 is one aircraft program designed to replace many different types of aircraft around the world - F-16, F/A-18, F-117, A-10, AV-8B, Sea Harrier, GR.7, F-111 and Tornado  - flown by 14 air forces.
  • In addition to 19 developmental test aircraft, the F-35 is producing 20 fully instrumented, production-configured operational test aircraft. No program in history has employed this many test vehicles.
 The SP criticism of this report was leveled at the false Sparky conclusions that fanboy nitwits drew. The criticism did not address these issies; that being  basing vulnerabiluty, CAP time on station, tanker support, or the sheer numeric odds we face in battle. THAT was for what I culled the report, and that is for what I looked.

What the report sought to address, it addressed.
 
Herald
 
 
 
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gf0012-aust       6/28/2009 5:02:48 PM
The problem with that Rand report is that the loony tunes from APA, Spey, Wheeler, Riccioni, Palmer, Goon, Kopp, Chris eyc... have deliberately misrepresented in their own idealogical quest.

FMD, from the "Australian end" Goon, Kopp, Plamer, Jensens et-al were all quoting it on blogs and web sites as "proof of life" for their own idealogical sprays when  they didn't even know the difference between Falconview and Brawler, :)

 
















 







Sorry. I was checking something about the Pearl Harbor Raid and used the wrong URL here.







 







I make mistakes.







 







Herald




































 



 



Typos are meaningless; no one worries about them except morons and Internet grammarnazis.  However, I'd have to say you really did make a mistake in this post, and that is bothering to cite this piece-of-crap advocacy paper "study."  I'm sure we went over some of the shortcomings of this thing here on SP when it surfaced last year as part of yet another lame attempt to smear the F-35 as not being an outstanding air-to-air fighter.  I absolutely do agree in general, however, that in a Taiwan scenario about the biggest challenge to at least USAF participation will be logistic (especially basing), and to USN participation will be the combined threat to our carriers of ASBMs, ASCMs, and subs.  Neither of which is insurmountable nor catastrophic to a long war, but might be exploitable enough for the PRCs to reach some sort of limited objective, or even possibly achieve a rapid collapse of the ROC defenses, early enough to then cry for the UN to step in before we can crush them.



 




You are not reading that RAND study right; nor looking at what I look which is the basing, CAP endurance, and tanker support problem which us ACCURATE..

 


 From LOCKMART:

 


 

"The reports (about the F-35 H) are completely false and misleading and have absolutely no basis in fact," Maj. Gen. Davis said. "The August 2008 Pacific Vision Wargame that has been referenced recently in the media did not even address air-to-air combat effectiveness. The F-35 is required to be able to effectively defeat current and projected air-to-air threats. All available information, at the highest classification, indicates that F-35 is effectively meeting these aggressive operational challenges."

The Pacific Vision Wargame was a table-top exercise designed to assess basing and force-structure vulnerabilities, and did not include air-to-air combat exercises or any comparisons of different aircraft platforms.





 

Other important facts:




  • External weapon clearance is part of the current F-35 test program.



  • The government has already proven that no other aircraft can survive against the 5th generation stealth that only the F-22 and the F-35 possess; it is impossible to add this stealth to fourth-generation fighters.



  • The F-35's data collection, integration and information sharing capabilities will transform the battlespace of the future and will redefine the close air support mission. The F-35 is specifically designed to take advantage of lessons learned from the F-117 stealth aircraft. Unlike the F-117, the ability to share tactically important information is built into the F-35, along with stealth.



  • F-35 is developing, testing, and fielding mature software years ahead of legacy programs, further reducing development risk. The F-35's advanced software,  already flying on two test aircraft with remarkable stability, is demonstrating the advantages of developing highly-common, tri-variant aircraft.  The software developed  span the entire aircraft and support systems including the aircraft itself, logistics systems, flight and maintenance trainers, maintenance information system and flight-test instrumentation.  



  • Rather than relying exclusively on flight testing, the F-35 is retiring development risk through the most comprehensive laboratories, sensor test beds, and integrated full-fusion flying test bed ever created for an aircraft program.  Representing only 25% of our verification plans, still the F-35's flight test program is comparable in hours to the combined flight test programs of the three primary U.S. aircraft it will replace.



  • The F-35 is one aircraft program designed to replace many different types of aircraft around the world - F-16, F/A-18, F-117, A-10, AV-8B, Sea Harrier, GR.7, F-111 and Tornado  - flown by 14 air forces.



  • In addition to 19 developmental test aircraft, the F-35 is producing 20 fully instrumented, production-configured operational test aircraft. No program in history has employed this many test vehicles.



 The SP criticism of this report was leveled at the false Sparky conclusions that fanboy nitwits drew. The criticism did not address these issies; that being  basing vulnerabiluty, CAP time on station, tanker support, or the sheer numeric odds we face in battle. THAT was for what I culled the report, and that is for what I looked.




What the report sought to address, it addressed.


 

Herald


 



 
 
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Reactive       6/28/2009 5:52:55 PM
When engineeers plan levees they, like most structural engineers design a tolerance for the "worst possible" outcome, a "hundred-year event", an extreme-low pressure system with a spring tide + hurricane force wind. This is because a logical assumption of a levee is that it should be able to keep out the sea, that the sea, as a somewhat predictable entity can be "defeated" by planning for the worst-case scenarios.
 
The same is true with military planning, we base our strategic decisions on "worst possible" outcomes, yet we also have a temptation to look at "likely" outcomes, for example, within a 20 year window. The current widespread conclusion that future wars and warfare will likely involve smaller conflagrations, terrorism, insurgencies, drug wars, etc is leading a lot of politicians to conclude that our military requirements should generally be tailored to "what we usually do", rather than "what we may have to be able to do in exceptional circumstances". 
 
This seems to be the thinking behind Gates' decisionmaking, it's always tempting to use "likelihoods" rather than "exceptional events" because that enables us to cut funding. The consequences are similar to the failure of a levee, but with the added problem of "reduced deterence" increasing the chances of a major conflict.
 
The US should clearly be aiming for air dominance even in exceptionally unusual circumstances, perhaps where there are numerous theatres of conflict, perhaps even a world-war. This is partly because the increased technology lead times compared to WWII mean that the units that are going to be required in the most extreme instance can not be thrown together in the same fashion that was possible with prop planes and merlin engines. 
 
It's somewhat akin to hedging your bets, if you have a reasonable assumption you'll never need a military unit, you can save vast sums by never fielding it in widespread abundance, in the same sense that you can also save money on concrete and foundations if you are building a series of sea-defences, but surely for a functional thing like a military, we should always, within the bounds of our means, address the outcomes that happen once or twice a century.
 
It's a shame to see such thinking, it cost a lot of countries dearly in WWII, to see a plane like the F22 become a rarely-fielded, small-user-base unit means that it will never have the same sort of lifespan as the teen series jets, it will become increasingly attractive in future decades to remove support and supply chains for a bird that will be at the periphery, rather than, as it should be, the core of US air power.
 
Quote    Reply

Reactive       6/28/2009 6:14:11 PM
When engineeers plan levees they, like most structural engineers design a tolerance for the "worst possible" outcome, a "hundred-year event", an extreme-low pressure system with a spring tide + hurricane force wind. This is because a logical assumption of a levee is that it should be able to keep out the sea, that the sea, as a somewhat predictable entity can be "defeated" by planning for the worst-case scenarios.
 
The same is true with military planning, we base our strategic decisions on "worst possible" outcomes, yet we also have a temptation to look at "likely" outcomes, for example, within a 20 year window. The current widespread conclusion that future wars and warfare will likely involve smaller conflagrations, terrorism, insurgencies, drug wars, etc is leading a lot of politicians to conclude that our military requirements should generally be tailored to "what we usually do", rather than "what we may have to be able to do in exceptional circumstances". 
 
This seems to be the thinking behind Gates' decisionmaking, it's always tempting to use "likelihoods" rather than "exceptional events" because that enables us to cut funding. The consequences are similar to the failure of a levee, but with the added problem of "reduced deterence" increasing the chances of a major conflict.
 
The US should clearly be aiming for air dominance even in exceptionally unusual circumstances, perhaps where there are numerous theatres of conflict, perhaps even a world-war. This is partly because the increased technology lead times compared to WWII mean that the units that are going to be required in the most extreme instance can not be thrown together in the same fashion that was possible with prop planes and merlin engines. 
 
It's somewhat akin to hedging your bets, if you have a reasonable assumption you'll never need a military unit, you can save vast sums by never fielding it in widespread abundance, in the same sense that you can also save money on concrete and foundations if you are building a series of sea-defences, but surely for a functional thing like a military, we should always, within the bounds of our means, address the outcomes that happen once or twice a century.
 
It's a shame to see such thinking, it cost a lot of countries dearly in WWII, to see a plane like the F22 become a rarely-fielded, small-user-base unit means that it will never have the same sort of lifespan as the teen series jets, it will become increasingly attractive in future decades to remove support and supply chains for a bird that will be at the periphery, rather than, as it should be, the core of US air power.
 
Quote    Reply

Reactive       6/28/2009 6:18:38 PM
When engineeers plan levees they, like most structural engineers design a tolerance for the "worst possible" outcome, a "hundred-year event", an extreme-low pressure system with a spring tide + hurricane force wind. This is because a logical assumption of a levee is that it should be able to keep out the sea, that the sea, as a somewhat predictable entity can be "defeated" by planning for the worst-case scenarios.
 
The same is true with military planning, we base our strategic decisions on "worst possible" outcomes, yet we also have a temptation to look at "likely" outcomes, for example, within a 20 year window. The current widespread conclusion that future wars and warfare will likely involve smaller conflagrations, terrorism, insurgencies, drug wars, etc is leading a lot of politicians to conclude that our military requirements should generally be tailored to "what we usually do", rather than "what we may have to be able to do in exceptional circumstances". 
 
This seems to be the thinking behind Gates' decisionmaking, it's always tempting to use "likelihoods" rather than "exceptional events" because that enables us to cut funding. The consequences are similar to the failure of a levee, but with the added problem of "reduced deterence" increasing the chances of a major conflict.
 
The US should clearly be aiming for air dominance even in exceptionally unusual circumstances, perhaps where there are numerous theatres of conflict, perhaps even a world-war. This is partly because the increased technology lead times compared to WWII mean that the units that are going to be required in the most extreme instance can not be thrown together in the same fashion that was possible with prop planes and merlin engines. 
 
It's somewhat akin to hedging your bets, if you have a reasonable assumption you'll never need a military unit, you can save vast sums by never fielding it in widespread abundance, in the same sense that you can also save money on concrete and foundations if you are building a series of sea-defences, but surely for a functional thing like a military, we should always, within the bounds of our means, address the outcomes that happen once or twice a century.
 
It's a shame to see such thinking, it cost a lot of countries dearly in WWII, to see a plane like the F22 become a rarely-fielded, small-user-base unit means that it will never have the same sort of lifespan as the teen series jets, it will become increasingly attractive in future decades to remove support and supply chains for a bird that will be at the periphery, rather than, as it should be, the core of US air power.
 
Quote    Reply

warpig       6/28/2009 7:04:07 PM

 
You are not reading that RAND study right; nor looking at what I look which is the basing, CAP endurance, and tanker support problem which us ACCURATE..


 The SP criticism of this report was leveled at the false Sparky conclusions that fanboy nitwits drew. The criticism did not address these issies; that being  basing vulnerabiluty, CAP time on station, tanker support, or the sheer numeric odds we face in battle. THAT was for what I culled the report, and that is for what I looked.


What the report sought to address, it addressed.


False, I remember what I read last year right enough, and I recalled the same concepts you looked at, which is why I am in general agreement with the only couple of reasonably valid overall takeaways that are addressed poorly through loose analysis by the report, and said above, "I absolutely do agree in general, however, that in a Taiwan scenario about the biggest challenge to at least USAF participation will be logistic (especially basing),...."
 
A couple of the points I seem to recall from reading it last year include that while Kadena AB is more vulnerable than Andersen AFB through sheer proximity, it is by no means even likely that China can shut it down and keep it shut down long enough to accomplish their objectives.  Of course we need tankers, and scores of them, to fight over and around Taiwan, since the nearest couple bases are many hundreds of miles away.  Their idea of an air engagement over Taiwan is fatally flawed.
 
It's a darn shame we don't have a couple hundred new tankers in the pipeline, and it sure would be nice to still have Clark AB.
 
Quote    Reply

mustang22       6/28/2009 10:21:35 PM
Small portion of an interview conducted by Defense Today with Lt. General David A Deptula.
 
"Ten AEFs provide the framework to achieve sufficient expeditionary aerospace forces to sustain rotational base requirements and personnel tempos to meet the dual requirements of our security strategy. With respect to the F-22, the key to Air Force expeditionary force structure is to ensure those ten AEFs are each structured, equipped, and EQUAL in capability and capacity for the variety of missions that the F-22 will be called upon to conduct-and ISR in denied areas may well be what we most value the F-22 for in the future. The fact that it can negate adversary anti-access capabilities, and can operate in denied airspace unconstrained, means we can make use of its ISR capabilities that otherwise would not be available without enormous cost in alternate means. From this perspective, the expense argument in regards to this airframe loses steam pretty quickly. It is the focus on capabilities that is important."

 
Given an optimistic mission capable rate of 70%, it appears it would take 240 combat coded Raptors to complete 10AEFs. Whatever final number for testing, training, and attrition allows this is what the AF should be buying.
 
Quote    Reply

Herald12345       6/28/2009 11:23:14 PM




 

You are not reading that RAND study right; nor looking at what I look which is the basing, CAP endurance, and tanker support problem which us ACCURATE..

 The SP criticism of this report was leveled at the false Sparky conclusions that fanboy nitwits drew. The criticism did not address these issies; that being  basing vulnerabiluty, CAP time on station, tanker support, or the sheer numeric odds we face in battle. THAT was for what I culled the report, and that is for what I looked.

What the report sought to address, it addressed.









False, I remember what I read last year right enough, and I recalled the same concepts you looked at, which is why I am in general agreement with the only couple of reasonably valid overall takeaways that are addressed poorly through loose analysis by the report, and said above, "I absolutely do agree in general, however, that in a Taiwan scenario about the biggest challenge to at least USAF participation will be logistic (especially basing),...."

A couple of the points I seem to recall from reading it last year include that while Kadena AB is more vulnerable than Andersen AFB through sheer proximity, it is by no means even likely that China can shut it down and keep it shut down long enough to accomplish their objectives.  Of course we need tankers, and scores of them, to fight over and around Taiwan, since the nearest couple bases are many hundreds of miles away.  Their idea of an air engagement over Taiwan is fatally flawed.

It's a darn shame we don't have a couple hundred new tankers in the pipeline, and it sure would be nice to still have Clark AB.


 
 
 
 
 
 
Here is an eye brow raiser. How much energy arrives when a 500 kilogram Mach 10 lump arrives?
 
2,722,500,000  joules.
 
Apply that to am airbase. That is equivalent to dropping a 600 kilogram explosive-fueled conventional bomb. Never mind the shock wave of the impact that travels through the ground and the air. Don't need explosives to reach that equivalence, either, just a nice DF-21 missile RV filled with a steel lump. .None of that rods from god BS either. This is straight up physics that will leave a hole at least ten meters deep and 30 meters across where it hits. What a pattern barrage is to a PRC bandit targeteer is nothing more than meteor swarm to me. CEP of 200 meters is good enough to wreck Kadena. How many missiles? 10 or 20 followed up by submarine cruise missile attack?
 
 
Not enough yet. But close. Let's see what happens in the next five years.
 
All they need is a week.
 
Herald 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quote    Reply

warpig       6/29/2009 1:20:07 AM


This is straight up physics that will leave a hole at least ten meters deep and 30 meters across where it hits. What a pattern barrage is to a PRC bandit targeteer is nothing more than meteor swarm to me. CEP of 200 meters is good enough to wreck Kadena. How many missiles? 10 or 20 followed up by submarine cruise missile attack?

 
Not enough yet. But close. Let's see what happens in the next five years.


All they need is a week.



 
 
Thanks, I know what a DF-21 is.  Yup, a wave of them could shut down Kadena for several hours at least.
 
All they need is a week, assuming the Taiwanese cave in (in which case, who cares, let them suffer the consequences if they can't find the balls to keep fighting) and assuming we won't keep fighting after China has gained a substantial hold over Taiwan (in which case we should bother fighting at all since we can't get there in massive force before then no matter what we do, short of spending tens of billions of dollars specifically just to keep Taiwan free).

 
 
Quote    Reply

Herald12345    What they can do, we can do.   6/29/2009 1:40:36 AM
Its just means we have to do it 27 times. And we have to use a cutout.because of the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missule Treaty.
 
 
 
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