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Subject:
The General Accounting Office's report on the F35.
RockyMTNClimber
6/20/2009 11:15:34 AM
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Below are a series of quotes plucked from the GAO report.
ht***tp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09303.pdf
From Page 2 (first line after the introduction): "JSF development will cost more and take longer than reported to the Congress last year, and DOD wants to accelerate procurement believing that will more quickly recapitalize tactical air forces. The program office estimates that an additional $2.4 billion is needed for cost overruns on the air system and engine contracts and for a 1-year extension to the development schedule". ............." This would increase total system development costs to $51.8 billion?-a 17 percent increase from the April 2008 estimate?and delay completion of development to October 2016"
Page 3: "Ongoing manufacturing inefficiencies and parts problems have significantly delayed the delivery of needed test aircraft, and the prime contractor has not yet achieved the levels of learning expected, even as the program ramps up production."
Page 5: Under the accelerated procurement plan, DOD may procure 360 aircraft costing an estimated $57 billion before completing development flight testing.
(This sets the price at over $158 million each. The F22 currently costs less than that. Allot less.)
Page 26: Thermal management challenges hamper the ability to conduct
missions in hot and cold environments. The Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation reported that an alternative main engine fuel pump to remedy this problem is under development but will not be available before the low-rate initial production Lot 3, which is likely to affect operational testing. The test team aborted a test sortie because of high fuel temperatures in June.
Page 27: The program must move forward, but given all these challenges,accelerating procurement in a cost-reimbursement contract
environment?where uncertainties in contract performance do not permit
costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixedprice contract?places very significant financial risk on the government.Accelerating plans also does not equate to an ability to deliver to those plans. Because the program?s manufacturing processes are still maturing and flight testing is still in its infancy, incorporating an accelerated production schedule introduces even more risk and uncertainty to the program. Our past work has shown that programs that make production decisions prior to fully proving a system?s design through testing and demonstration of mature manufacturing processes have an increased risk of design and production changes and retrofits of completed aircraft. |
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