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Subject: UNMANNED NUCLEAR BOMBER
DarthAmerica    6/3/2009 1:10:05 PM
Unmanned and nuclear Is America ready for a UAV bomber? BY ADAM B. LOWTHER In the wake of the August 2007 incident in which six air-launched cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads were mistakenly flown from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., and the August 2006 incident ? acknowledged in March 2008 ? that saw top-secret nuclear fuses mistakenly shipped to Taiwan as battery packs for UH-1 Huey helicopters, Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley. Gates also formed a task force to study nuclear weapons management, which led to former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger?s publication of the ?Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management: The Air Force Nuclear Mission.? The report, along with other recent Pentagon publications, played a role in the creation of Global Strike Command ? a major command dedicated to the nuclear mission. The mistakes had a positive outcome in that they led to the leadership?s re-examination of the entire nuclear enterprise, which served to stimulate a renaissance of thought on nuclear deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy. As part of that renaissance, this article examines the delivery systems upon which the nuclear arsenal relies, with a focus on nuclear-capable bombers. One issue the Schlesinger report and others like it do not discuss is the possible development of a nuclear-dedicated unmanned combat aerial vehicle (ND-UCAV) as a replacement for nuclear-capable bombers. Yet the Air Force should seriously consider replacing its nuclear-capable bombers with a ND-UCAV based on the X-47B UCAV demonstrator, which the Navy began funding in 2007. While Navy requirements focus on carrier-based ISR operations, the Air Force could take advantage of the more than $800 million previously invested in the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program and the $635 million currently dedicated to X-47B development and rapidly develop a ND-UVAC capable of penetrating defended air space with a small nuclear weapons payload. To understand why the ND-UCAV is an attractive option for the future, a brief look at the current condition of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and bomber legs of the nuclear triad illustrates the serious need for modernization. Three points highlight the threat to their continued credibility. First, today?s entire Air Force bomber fleet of B-52Hs, B1-Bs and B-2s, not just nuclear-capable bombers, is 90 percent smaller than it was at its peak in 1959, when Strategic Air Command (SAC) consisted of 1,366 B-47s and 488 B-52s. Placed within a proper context, the dramatic reduction in the bomber fleet diminishes a very visible and psychologically significant element of a credible deterrent that cannot be achieved with unseen ballistic-missile submarines or ICBMs. Of the current bombers in service, all three airframes are aging and in need of costly repair and upgrades. With the entire fleet of 67 B1-Bs dedicated to conventional operations, as well as a majority of the remaining 62 B-52Hs and 20 B-2s primarily dedicated to conventional operations, the nuclear bomber fleet has dwindled to a record low. Second, down from a 1969 peak of 1,054, the nation?s 450 remaining ICBMs are in a similar condition and, like the bomber fleet, aging rapidly even as they undergo periodic maintenance and upgrades through a number of life extension programs. Additionally, designed in the mid-1960s and fielded between the late 1960s and early 1970s, the nation?s Minuteman IIIs are housed in underground silos, which are in need of replacement. Silo replacement is cost-prohibitive and may lead to further reductions in ICBM numbers or, as some internal debate suggests, movement of Minuteman IIIs above ground. Third, with planning for the Next-Generation Bomber (NGB) still in its early stages within the Pentagon, the current fleet of B-52Hs will be approaching 60 before the NGB is expected to enter service in about 2018. The high development costs, underwhelming performance and high maintenance costs of the B1-B are a primary reason the B-52H remained in service after a smaller-than-expected number of B1-Bs were procured. A second attempt at replacing the B-52H led to the B-2, which cost $44 billion to develop and build 21 aircraft, making the B-2 the most expensive aircraft ever built. Even if the NGB can be developed for half the cost of the B-2, each aircraft will cost taxpayers more than $1 billion. In a constrained fiscal budget, procuring an expensive weapons system may prove to be a difficult proposition. Thus, there may be an opportunity to replace an aging bomber fleet with an advanced weapons system that is affordable ? $150 million per aircraft ? and capable of providing a credible air breathing nuclear deterrent. The ND-UCAV can meet the nation?s 21st century nuclear deterrence requi
 
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Herald12345    Look up a Tennessee compant named AGT, and ssomething called a plasma flow actuator.   6/7/2009 11:55:56 PM

Sentiments at some level shared and not merely respected.  About those lost sophisticated assets:  please post the circumstances here.  We deserve a look, and appeals to hidden knowledge do not hold sway here, apparently.


v^2




Herald
 
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DarthAmerica       6/8/2009 1:30:47 AM

every US nuke released is managed by not only tech validation trees for redundancy, but also by multiple manned validation.

even under SAC both operators were to ignore conflicting voice commands once they hit failsafe perimeters.

the russians went to a a similar model after the cuban crisis (where the 5 sub commanders were given the authority to release their nuke torpedo if they determined it was necessary).  after the soviets experienced 2-3 rogue command events they tightened it up even further.  An AI managed asset or preprogrammed open/closed logic set on a UAV does not allow the same degree of control.


GF,

It's possible to code just about any command set. Not only that, it's possible to debug and then install patches in real time. This is something that's done everyday. With a UAV you can code MORE control and it's reliable. I think people are resisting simple because of the presence of nuclear weapons. But saying UAV and Nuke in the Abstract doesn't really put things in the proper context. These platforms can be made and operated safely. 

-DA 
 
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gf0012-aust       6/8/2009 2:42:29 AM

GF,

It's possible to code just about any command set. Not only that, it's possible to debug and then install patches in real time. This is something that's done everyday. With a UAV you can code MORE control and it's reliable. I think people are resisting simple because of the presence of nuclear weapons. But saying UAV and Nuke in the Abstract doesn't really put things in the proper context. These platforms can be made and operated safely. 

-DA 


I spent some 10 years in IT System Security management as the senior geek.  Some of that was in the 2nd largest non military network in the southern hemisphere.  I also was responsible for the system security for 4 Federal Ministers in our parliament.  This is separate to my current role (which you are aware of)

There is  a vast difference in conducting roll outs,  patches, version and change control in non critical house keeping systems compared to that conducted for lethal output or weapons systems software solutions.  The sub system is trialed in absentia, then in a clean room, then in a closed clean system and then against all other applications it interacts with before it even sees the light of user day.  (esp dealing with any crap that comes out of microsoft)

In my current job, part of that role means that I manage how and what the vendor tries to pass off as a gold release.  Nothing gets deployed within a day - especially if its a combat system.  My US counterparts have the same focussed view.  Nothing gets into a live system unless it meets control criteria.

 
 





 
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LB    Rubbish   6/8/2009 2:48:06 AM
Many people cite actual facts not merely assertions much less your presenting your unsupported assertions as facts.
 
What is the current loss rate per 100,000 for the Predator?  According to the USAF it's over 30.  That is an order of magnitude greater than the average USAF combat aircraft.  This is neither a "very weak case" nor all I have.
 
You stated a future UCAV will be as or more reliable than manned aircraft.  This is fiction.  There are no trends that support your fictional claim and in fact they clearly show your claim as fictional.
 
If you wish to present your "trends" or "even official statements" to prove your assertion as anything other than complete rubbish than please do so.
 
Frankly your amateurish presentation of unsupported assertion as fact and then following this with allusions that there are indeed facts to support you is beyond tiresome.  Either support your fantastic claims with evidence or stop posting your fictional ideas as facts.
 
 
Every one is asserting something. While I can show trends and even official statements such as the one that opened this post to state this is possible you cannot show that it isn't. You and a few others for whatever reason are uncomfortable with the idea of it and that is the basis of your argument. The only very weak case you can make is that early UAVs have crashed a lot. That's really all you have.







-DA 

 
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DarthAmerica       6/8/2009 8:50:18 PM

GF,

It's possible to code just about any command set. Not only that, it's possible to debug and then install patches in real time. This is something that's done everyday. With a UAV you can code MORE control and it's reliable. I think people are resisting simple because of the presence of nuclear weapons. But saying UAV and Nuke in the Abstract doesn't really put things in the proper context. These platforms can be made and operated safely. 

-DA 

I spent some 10 years in IT System Security management as the senior geek.  Some of that was in the 2nd largest non military network in the southern hemisphere.  I also was responsible for the system security for 4 Federal Ministers in our parliament.  This is separate to my current role (which you are aware of)

There is  a vast difference in conducting roll outs,  patches, version and change control in non critical house keeping systems compared to that conducted for lethal output or weapons systems software solutions.  The sub system is trialed in absentia, then in a clean room, then in a closed clean system and then against all other applications it interacts with before it even sees the light of user day.  (esp dealing with any crap that comes out of microsoft)

In my current job, part of that role means that I manage how and what the vendor tries to pass off as a gold release.  Nothing gets deployed within a day - especially if its a combat system.  My US counterparts have the same focussed view.  Nothing gets into a live system unless it meets control criteria.

GF,


I am currently senior geek responsible for managing several programs that have a dependency on SATCOM in order to function. I know without any question that it is a matter of trivia to quickly release and put patches over the air in order to patch bugs or upgrade middleware/software. This is dependent on urgency. If designed properly, there is no reason this doesn't work. And it's one of the first things that gets validated in the earlier phases of development. If seen and even initiated downloads of code released the same day to deal with critical issues in the field. I know of several different ways this can be done on an unmanned platform during flight and not cause any danger of accidental discharge or crash. So if you are suggesting this is not possible then I respectfully disagree.


-DA

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Herald12345    Not buying any of that.   6/8/2009 9:22:07 PM









GF,




It's possible to code just about any command set. Not only that, it's possible to debug and then install patches in real time. This is something that's done everyday. With a UAV you can code MORE control and it's reliable. I think people are resisting simple because of the presence of nuclear weapons. But saying UAV and Nuke in the Abstract doesn't really put things in the proper context. These platforms can be made and operated safely. 




-DA 






I spent some 10 years in IT System Security management as the senior geek.  Some of that was in the 2nd largest non military network in the southern hemisphere.  I also was responsible for the system security for 4 Federal Ministers in our parliament.  This is separate to my current role (which you are aware of)





There is  a vast difference in conducting roll outs,  patches, version and change control in non critical house keeping systems compared to that conducted for lethal output or weapons systems software solutions.  The sub system is trialed in absentia, then in a clean room, then in a closed clean system and then against all other applications it interacts with before it even sees the light of user day.  (esp dealing with any crap that comes out of microsoft)




In my current job, part of that role means that I manage how and what the vendor tries to pass off as a gold release.  Nothing gets deployed within a day - especially if its a combat system.  My US counterparts have the same focussed view.  Nothing gets into a live system unless it meets control criteria.









GF,





I am currently senior geek responsible for managing several programs that have a dependency on SATCOM in order to function. I know without any question that it is a matter of trivia to quickly release and put patches over the air in order to patch bugs or upgrade middleware/software. This is dependent on urgency. If designed properly, there is no reason this doesn't work. And it's one of the first things that gets validated in the earlier phases of development. If seen and even initiated downloads of code released the same day to deal with critical issues in the field. I know of several different ways this can be done on an unmanned platform during flight and not cause any danger of accidental discharge or crash. So

 
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gf0012-aust       6/8/2009 10:01:24 PM
It's possible to code just about any command set. Not only that, it's possible to debug and then install patches in real time. This is something that's done everyday. With a UAV you can code MORE control and it's reliable. I think people are resisting simple because of the presence of nuclear weapons. But saying UAV and Nuke in the Abstract doesn't really put things in the proper context. These platforms can be made and operated safely. 

-DA 


we're going to have to disagree then.

I'm not talking about vanilla updates to a benign asset doing convoy surveillance or one thats sending back happy snaps to that an analyst can recognise vegetation patterns or count goats.  I'm talking about a weapons platform that is fitted out with a WMD capability

I'd suggest to you that any unform that allowed a field upgrade to an operational system geared to deliver a nuke, and without putting it through clean room tests would end up as a procotology test case for every senior officer and suit in his decision chain.  And at the end of it, a number of people would suffer from career limiting if not suspension/termination moves.

There is no way in hades, that any responsible program manager is going to allow a field upgrade into an operational weapons systems without going through sanity and cleanliness testing  (and a UAS carting WMD most certainly would be) 

eg, some russian military frequencies are now in civilian contested bandwidth - you can imagine the fallout from someones video transfer frequency triggering off a weapons release in a russian weapons set that just happens to lie in one of the waypoint paths and which hasn't been identified by other INT elements - and it does happen.  Intel is never perfect.  Systems are never perfect - and allowing weapons delivery capability upgrades into a contested environment without undertaking properly authorised sign off will just end up hurting more than the geek.

It's why we have checks and balances. Sure you can do a field software update in an emergency - but you sure as heck are not going to find an enthusiastic queue of people signing up to take responsibility when it goes pear shaped.

The last signature in that software release would be someone who's rectum would be capable of abluting water melon sized  scats after the investigation team finsihed their job.

 



I spent some 10 years in IT System Security management as
 
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gf0012-aust    oops, sorry about prev stuff up.   6/8/2009 10:06:10 PM
I am currently senior geek responsible for managing several programs that have a dependency on SATCOM in order to function. I know without any question that it is a matter of trivia to quickly release and put patches over the air in order to patch bugs or upgrade middleware/software. This is dependent on urgency. If designed properly, there is no reason this doesn't work. And it's one of the first things that gets validated in the earlier phases of development. If seen and even initiated downloads of code released the same day to deal with critical issues in the field. I know of several different ways this can be done on an unmanned platform during flight and not cause any danger of accidental discharge or crash. So if you are suggesting this is not possible then I respectfully disagree.


-DA




we're going to have to disagree then.

I'm not talking about vanilla updates to a benign asset doing convoy surveillance or one thats sending back happy snaps to that an analyst can recognise vegetation patterns or count goats.  I'm talking about a weapons platform that is fitted out with a WMD capability

I'd suggest to you that any unform that allowed a field upgrade to an operational system geared to deliver a nuke, and without putting it through clean room tests would end up as a procotology test case for every senior officer and suit in his decision chain.  And at the end of it, a number of people would suffer from career limiting if not suspension/termination moves.

There is no way in hades, that any responsible program manager is going to allow a field upgrade into an operational weapons systems without going through sanity and cleanliness testing  (and a UAS carting WMD most certainly would be) 

eg, some russian military frequencies are now in civilian contested bandwidth - you can imagine the fallout from someones video transfer frequency triggering off a weapons release in a russian weapons set that just happens to lie in one of the waypoint paths and which hasn't been identified by other INT elements - and it does happen.  Intel is never perfect.  Systems are never perfect - and allowing weapons delivery capability upgrades into a contested environment without undertaking properly authorised sign off will just end up hurting more than the geek.

It's why we have checks and balances. Sure you can do a field software update in an emergency - but you sure as heck are not going to find an enthusiastic queue of people signing up to take responsibility when it goes pear shaped.

The last signature in that software release would be someone who's rectum would be capable of abl
 
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DarthAmerica       6/8/2009 10:12:15 PM
GF,

Then I'm not sure we are disagreeing. Because I was clear that it's a matter or urgency which implies that the situation is crucial enough to justify the action. Also, with regard to personal experience, we run sanity checks and testing. Both live and on emulation equipment to verify the fixes. This process is carefully orchestrated by the PM and senior managers to ensure that the code is verified as much as time permits prior to fielding. And then its just temporary fix until full regression procedures can produce more thoroughly verified code. In this case, you would just be trying to recover from a mission critical failure in the code in order to recover the platform for further fixes/testing. Look at several of the G-Hawk mishaps where the aircraft were recovered and then later software patches were applied to the fleet.

-DA 
 
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