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Subject: UNMANNED NUCLEAR BOMBER
DarthAmerica    6/3/2009 1:10:05 PM
Unmanned and nuclear Is America ready for a UAV bomber? BY ADAM B. LOWTHER In the wake of the August 2007 incident in which six air-launched cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads were mistakenly flown from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., and the August 2006 incident ? acknowledged in March 2008 ? that saw top-secret nuclear fuses mistakenly shipped to Taiwan as battery packs for UH-1 Huey helicopters, Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley. Gates also formed a task force to study nuclear weapons management, which led to former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger?s publication of the ?Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management: The Air Force Nuclear Mission.? The report, along with other recent Pentagon publications, played a role in the creation of Global Strike Command ? a major command dedicated to the nuclear mission. The mistakes had a positive outcome in that they led to the leadership?s re-examination of the entire nuclear enterprise, which served to stimulate a renaissance of thought on nuclear deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy. As part of that renaissance, this article examines the delivery systems upon which the nuclear arsenal relies, with a focus on nuclear-capable bombers. One issue the Schlesinger report and others like it do not discuss is the possible development of a nuclear-dedicated unmanned combat aerial vehicle (ND-UCAV) as a replacement for nuclear-capable bombers. Yet the Air Force should seriously consider replacing its nuclear-capable bombers with a ND-UCAV based on the X-47B UCAV demonstrator, which the Navy began funding in 2007. While Navy requirements focus on carrier-based ISR operations, the Air Force could take advantage of the more than $800 million previously invested in the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program and the $635 million currently dedicated to X-47B development and rapidly develop a ND-UVAC capable of penetrating defended air space with a small nuclear weapons payload. To understand why the ND-UCAV is an attractive option for the future, a brief look at the current condition of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and bomber legs of the nuclear triad illustrates the serious need for modernization. Three points highlight the threat to their continued credibility. First, today?s entire Air Force bomber fleet of B-52Hs, B1-Bs and B-2s, not just nuclear-capable bombers, is 90 percent smaller than it was at its peak in 1959, when Strategic Air Command (SAC) consisted of 1,366 B-47s and 488 B-52s. Placed within a proper context, the dramatic reduction in the bomber fleet diminishes a very visible and psychologically significant element of a credible deterrent that cannot be achieved with unseen ballistic-missile submarines or ICBMs. Of the current bombers in service, all three airframes are aging and in need of costly repair and upgrades. With the entire fleet of 67 B1-Bs dedicated to conventional operations, as well as a majority of the remaining 62 B-52Hs and 20 B-2s primarily dedicated to conventional operations, the nuclear bomber fleet has dwindled to a record low. Second, down from a 1969 peak of 1,054, the nation?s 450 remaining ICBMs are in a similar condition and, like the bomber fleet, aging rapidly even as they undergo periodic maintenance and upgrades through a number of life extension programs. Additionally, designed in the mid-1960s and fielded between the late 1960s and early 1970s, the nation?s Minuteman IIIs are housed in underground silos, which are in need of replacement. Silo replacement is cost-prohibitive and may lead to further reductions in ICBM numbers or, as some internal debate suggests, movement of Minuteman IIIs above ground. Third, with planning for the Next-Generation Bomber (NGB) still in its early stages within the Pentagon, the current fleet of B-52Hs will be approaching 60 before the NGB is expected to enter service in about 2018. The high development costs, underwhelming performance and high maintenance costs of the B1-B are a primary reason the B-52H remained in service after a smaller-than-expected number of B1-Bs were procured. A second attempt at replacing the B-52H led to the B-2, which cost $44 billion to develop and build 21 aircraft, making the B-2 the most expensive aircraft ever built. Even if the NGB can be developed for half the cost of the B-2, each aircraft will cost taxpayers more than $1 billion. In a constrained fiscal budget, procuring an expensive weapons system may prove to be a difficult proposition. Thus, there may be an opportunity to replace an aging bomber fleet with an advanced weapons system that is affordable ? $150 million per aircraft ? and capable of providing a credible air breathing nuclear deterrent. The ND-UCAV can meet the nation?s 21st century nuclear deterrence requi
 
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DarthAmerica       6/6/2009 12:58:34 PM

Well, one person here thinks an ALCM with a range of 1500miles fired from a manned bomber on a one way mission is somehow equivalent to a nuclear armed UCAS. We didn't launch ALCMs and SRAMs and other nuclear armed cruise missiles except to test them. We don't launch a cruise missile as a show of force or in a response to an increase in DEFCON. We weren't worried about recalling a cruise missile that is what its bomber launch platform was for. 


STRAWMAN

 

 A nuclear armed UCAS would have to be launched more often and fly greater distances than a cruise missile. If we lost an ALCM over uncontrolled territory that would have been the least of our worries. More important would have been the nuclear weapons exploding all across the planet. If we have a UCAS lost, which is more likely to happen than with a manned bomber then we have a major incident like that over Georgia or the Med.
 
 
All incorrect. A UCAS would not need the training flight hours manned platforms do. A UCAS would be able to loiter for days or weeks in the timeframe we are discussion. And it is not more likely that to have losses than a manned platform. That's a myth.

 

One person here thinks that dropping two A-bombs on a country that had none, bombs that burst at 1850ft is the same thing as nuclear war. One person here thinks that two bombs, dropped from B-29s, which had little sensor ability some 64 years ago thinks that gave us "tons of data."

LOL more spin. Unless you think WW II wasn't a war and you also think the bombs were not nuclear than you are simply no longer credible now as you are overtly denying the truth. Also, if you think we don't have "tons of data" on nuclear weapons effects then that's on you. I know and have proved we do. I wasn't referring to B-29's which is another strawman. Mutual exchange of weapons isn't necessary to have a nuclear war. If I nuke you, and the blow forces your surrender or destruction, and you can't fight back after, it's still a nuke war Benellim4. It only takes one gun to have a gunfight.

-DA
 


 
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Herald12345    More blah blah fromn a novice.   6/6/2009 3:44:43 PM
Howe do you assert positive control over the weapon?
 
I know this is going to be a good load of brown steaming goo. because it goes to the heart of telemetry and the design of an artilect. These are subjects about which the poster is clueless. 

So how do you assert positive control over the nuclear weapon?
 
 
Hint: Electronic hive minds are NOT HUMAN. 
 
Applicability: The stupid robot is out to kill a target class. What class? What are the rejectors? What is the default recall? (Remember you will have a live BOMB coming back with your UAS upon RTB default with no sure way to disarm except via remote. Are you SURE?)
 
The better question should be, given that reality of just how things actually work is; "are you insane?"
 
Herald

 
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DarthAmerica       6/6/2009 5:11:43 PM

Howe do you assert positive control over the weapon?

I know this is going to be a good load of brown steaming goo. because it goes to the heart of telemetry and the design of an artilect. These are subjects about which the poster is clueless. 


So how do you assert positive control over the nuclear weapon?



Hint: Electronic hive minds are NOT HUMAN. 

Applicability: The stupid robot is out to kill a target class. What class? What are the rejectors? What is the default recall? (Remember you will have a live BOMB coming back with your UAS upon RTB default with no sure way to disarm except via remote. Are you SURE?)

The better question should be, given that reality of just how things actually work is; "are you insane?" 
Herald


 
 

Again, more null content from you. Oh, and I'm not the one with an insanity. What's insane is that you continue to  troll threads trying to start flamewars and arguments. Get back to me when you figure out what SAC is and it's history BEFORE you want to discuss nuclear weapons. Thus far you are the only "poster" do demonstrate cluelessness...

breaka    Disbanding SAC    6/6/2009 3:31:33 AM

Herald,

If you are going to call people idiots, you may want to get your facts right. SAC was disbanded under the Bush I administration in 1992, not by Clinton.  It was part of Gen McPeak's sweeping reorg in response to the end of the Cold War, big drawdowns, and the expeditionary combat experience that blurred the line between tactical and strategic forces in a conventional war.  I'm not a McPeak fan, but if you want to throw political spears he can be held against both side - appointed by Bush I, backed Dole's presidential run in '96 and GWB in '00, but also served under Clinton, backed Dean and then Kerry, and was Obama's military advisor and committe co-chairman.

BTW, the Yom Kippur War was 1973, not 1972.  This was in the middle of the Watergate scandal and there are some claims that Nixon wasn't involved with the DEFCON decison at all, rather the NSC decided and issued statements in his name.

 
We can add that the other list of things you were wrong about such as when you said Missiles for Merchants was the better option compared to firearms right before PMC used Glock 17 and Navies choose Sniper Weapons and Capture with Small Arms...lol 


-DA 

 
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Herald12345    Didn't understand the paper at all did you, poster?    6/6/2009 5:33:00 PM




Howe do you assert positive control over the weapon?



I know this is going to be a good load of brown steaming goo. because it goes to the heart of telemetry and the design of an artilect. These are subjects about which the poster is clueless. 






So how do you assert positive control over the nuclear weapon?









Hint: Electronic hive minds are NOT HUMAN. 




Applicability: The stupid robot is out to kill a target class. What class? What are the rejectors? What is the default recall? (Remember you will have a live BOMB coming back with your UAS upon RTB default with no sure way to disarm except via remote. Are you SURE?)




The better question should be, given that reality of just how things actually work is; "are you insane?" 

Herald






 

 



Again, more null content from you. Oh, and I'm not the one with an insanity. What's insane is that you continue to  troll threads trying to start flamewars and arguments. Get back to me when you figure out what SAC is and it's history BEFORE you want to discuss nuclear weapons. Thus far you are the only "poster" do demonstrate cluelessness...















breaka    Disbanding SAC    6/6/2009 3:31:33 AM


Herald,


If you are going to call people idiots, you may want to get your facts right. SAC was disbanded under the Bush I administration in 1992, not by Clinton.  It was part of Gen McPeak's sweeping reorg in response to the end of the Cold War, big drawdowns, and the expeditionary combat experience that blurred the line between tactical and strategic forces in a conventional war.  I'm not a McPeak fan, but if you want to throw political spears he can be held against both side - appointed by Bush I, backed Dole's presidential run in '96 and GWB in '00, but also served under Clinton, backed Dean and then Kerry, and was Obama's military advisor and committe co-chairman.


BTW, the Yom Kippur War was 1973, not 1972.  This was in the middle of the Watergate scandal and there are some claims that Nixon wasn't involved with the DEFCON decison at all, rather the NSC decided and issued statements in his name.




 

We can add that the other list of things you were wrong about such as when you said Missiles for Merchants was the better option compared to firearms right before PMC used Glock 17 and Navies choose Sniper Weapons and Capture with Small Arms...lol 







-DA 





Getting a date wrong is not as DEADLY as not understanding process and outcome.&
 
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VelocityVector    Request for Info   6/6/2009 5:51:38 PM

Thank you for posting that link, Herald, this is a valuable contribution to the thread.  What I also will appreciate is a comparable analysis that examines how performance by human beings, given the same assumptions, would address the scenarios under consideration, with analyses focused on time to decision.  It very well may be the case that machine logic will yield better practical results than human beings can, given what is presented in the paper.  Can you steer me please?

v^2

 
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DarthAmerica       6/6/2009 6:45:57 PM

How do you mauntain positive weapon control again?

Answer that quesation for a robot and you've substantially made your case. But you can't, because unlike you I do know what you have to do. I even told you.  You missed it completely. 

And some wonder why I get irritated.

Herald



No, you didn't tell me. I know. There are many ways to safeguard the weapons. However, so long as you  post vitriol and fail to control your irritation, I'm not going to waste time dealing with your post.  You will just have to come to your own conclusions about what I know or don't know and I'm fine to let you do just that.

A more relevant response to the trivia of how to maintain positive control would be to ask how humans do it...

The Air Force continued handing out disciplinary actions in response to the six nuclear warheads mistakenly flown on a B-52 Stratofortress bomber from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., on Aug. 30. The squadron commander in charge of Minot?s munitions crews was relieved of all duties pending the investigation.

 

It seems that humans can cause manned platforms to make mistakes too. Hmm. AGM-129, how do we maintain positive control of those? Case closed. Being unmanned has nothing to do with it. It's about designing sufficient safety measures into the system and properly following them. The only difference between this and what Herald asked is that the humans are sitting a ~20ft away in a cockpit from weapons they still can't physically manipulate in flight and that have to be communicated with via data bus. In essence they have to TRUST that when the data displayed says that the weapons are safed, that it is true.

-DA 
 

   


 





 

 
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gf0012-aust       6/6/2009 7:01:27 PM

What I also will appreciate is a comparable analysis that examines how performance by human beings, given the same assumptions, would address the scenarios under consideration, with analyses focused on time to decision.  

Positive control, by rote means direct intervention in the process/prosecution loop.  NONE of the claims made by vendors to date shows any capability to exerxise positive control because the entire raft of solutions demonstrated to a number of countries in the field have failed.  ie, the oft claimed redundancy of systems will fail.

The AI is not sophisticated enough for any combat ready event to demonstrate positive control capability.  Hence why the chinese would have a fondness for US project development techniques as they've been getting free technology everytime a UAV goes into a "broken arrow" equivalent flight profile.

Every UAV that carries a weapon at this point in time reflects failsafe conditions.  Thats why the US is still losing UAV's and their mission packs/weapons sets in afghanistan and this is in benight electronic emission space.  Its a completely electronically uncontested, unmolested  battlespace.

getting long range recovery teams, special forces, or offering rewards for asset recovery is not evidence of platform/systems maturity.  need is over-riding capability boundaries.
 
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DarthAmerica    gf0012 reply   6/6/2009 7:18:37 PM
GF,

Men do it too. It's called pilot error. Or even defection where entire aircraft have been hand delivered.  Not only that but you are making invalid comparisons by stating the GWOT examples. None of those aircraft are designed with the kinds of redundancies and safeguards that would go into a nuclear capable delivery system. Not only that, a lot of the UAV's that have been lost were rushed into the field as prototypes with accompanying teams of contractors from the manufacturers to keep them running. I know from direct contact with these people why the early history is what it is. If you notice, reliability has been dramatically improving right along with flight hours. There is no reason why positive control would be an issue. I also cannot stress enough, AI is more than capable of dealing with the contingencies.

-DA 
 
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gf0012-aust       6/6/2009 8:02:31 PM

GF,

Men do it too. It's called pilot error. Or even defection where entire aircraft have been hand delivered.  Not only that but you are making invalid comparisons by stating the GWOT examples. None of those aircraft are designed with the kinds of redundancies and safeguards that would go into a nuclear capable delivery system. Not only that, a lot of the UAV's that have been lost were rushed into the field as prototypes with accompanying teams of contractors from the manufacturers to keep them running. I know from direct contact with these people why the early history is what it is. If you notice, reliability has been dramatically improving right along with flight hours. There is no reason why positive control would be an issue. I also cannot stress enough, AI is more than capable of dealing with the contingencies.
No, Im reinforcing the last 2 years,  I haven't touched the GW experience in UAS because its a prev UAV generation.
I'm talking here and now - and within the last 3 months as a recent example.

We know exactly what problems are happening because we deal with it in real everyday operational terms.  We know the grief that the US is going through because we know who's on first.   
 
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DarthAmerica       6/6/2009 8:38:45 PM


GF,

Men do it too. It's called pilot error. Or even defection where entire aircraft have been hand delivered.  Not only that but you are making invalid comparisons by stating the GWOT examples. None of those aircraft are designed with the kinds of redundancies and safeguards that would go into a nuclear capable delivery system. Not only that, a lot of the UAV's that have been lost were rushed into the field as prototypes with accompanying teams of contractors from the manufacturers to keep them running. I know from direct contact with these people why the early history is what it is. If you notice, reliability has been dramatically improving right along with flight hours. There is no reason why positive control would be an issue. I also cannot stress enough, AI is more than capable of dealing with the contingencies.

No, Im reinforcing the last 2 years,  I haven't touched the GW experience in UAS because its a prev UAV generation.

I'm talking here and now - and within the last 3 months as a recent example.

We know exactly what problems are happening because we deal with it in real everyday operational terms.  We know the grief that the US is going through because we know who's on first.   

The GWOT is still in progress(WELL DEPENDING ON WHAT THEY CALL IT NOW...LOL).  And I'm also talking current systems. I'm not sure we actually disagree. I'm saying that yes, we could slap something together now if we wanted to. It would be crude, but it would work(capable of successful payload delivery/handling) if we are willing to accept the limitations and risk. I'm also saying that institutional resistance to the idea of a nuclear UAV would probably be a problem though. Fast forward 5 to 9 years and assume a program started to build the nuclear UCAV was initiated today. It would be very much within the realm of possible to have a technologically mature platform capable of doing this duty at least as reliably as a manned platform in any environment.

-DA 
 
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