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Subject: UNMANNED NUCLEAR BOMBER
DarthAmerica    6/3/2009 1:10:05 PM
Unmanned and nuclear Is America ready for a UAV bomber? BY ADAM B. LOWTHER In the wake of the August 2007 incident in which six air-launched cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads were mistakenly flown from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., and the August 2006 incident ? acknowledged in March 2008 ? that saw top-secret nuclear fuses mistakenly shipped to Taiwan as battery packs for UH-1 Huey helicopters, Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley. Gates also formed a task force to study nuclear weapons management, which led to former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger?s publication of the ?Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management: The Air Force Nuclear Mission.? The report, along with other recent Pentagon publications, played a role in the creation of Global Strike Command ? a major command dedicated to the nuclear mission. The mistakes had a positive outcome in that they led to the leadership?s re-examination of the entire nuclear enterprise, which served to stimulate a renaissance of thought on nuclear deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy. As part of that renaissance, this article examines the delivery systems upon which the nuclear arsenal relies, with a focus on nuclear-capable bombers. One issue the Schlesinger report and others like it do not discuss is the possible development of a nuclear-dedicated unmanned combat aerial vehicle (ND-UCAV) as a replacement for nuclear-capable bombers. Yet the Air Force should seriously consider replacing its nuclear-capable bombers with a ND-UCAV based on the X-47B UCAV demonstrator, which the Navy began funding in 2007. While Navy requirements focus on carrier-based ISR operations, the Air Force could take advantage of the more than $800 million previously invested in the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program and the $635 million currently dedicated to X-47B development and rapidly develop a ND-UVAC capable of penetrating defended air space with a small nuclear weapons payload. To understand why the ND-UCAV is an attractive option for the future, a brief look at the current condition of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and bomber legs of the nuclear triad illustrates the serious need for modernization. Three points highlight the threat to their continued credibility. First, today?s entire Air Force bomber fleet of B-52Hs, B1-Bs and B-2s, not just nuclear-capable bombers, is 90 percent smaller than it was at its peak in 1959, when Strategic Air Command (SAC) consisted of 1,366 B-47s and 488 B-52s. Placed within a proper context, the dramatic reduction in the bomber fleet diminishes a very visible and psychologically significant element of a credible deterrent that cannot be achieved with unseen ballistic-missile submarines or ICBMs. Of the current bombers in service, all three airframes are aging and in need of costly repair and upgrades. With the entire fleet of 67 B1-Bs dedicated to conventional operations, as well as a majority of the remaining 62 B-52Hs and 20 B-2s primarily dedicated to conventional operations, the nuclear bomber fleet has dwindled to a record low. Second, down from a 1969 peak of 1,054, the nation?s 450 remaining ICBMs are in a similar condition and, like the bomber fleet, aging rapidly even as they undergo periodic maintenance and upgrades through a number of life extension programs. Additionally, designed in the mid-1960s and fielded between the late 1960s and early 1970s, the nation?s Minuteman IIIs are housed in underground silos, which are in need of replacement. Silo replacement is cost-prohibitive and may lead to further reductions in ICBM numbers or, as some internal debate suggests, movement of Minuteman IIIs above ground. Third, with planning for the Next-Generation Bomber (NGB) still in its early stages within the Pentagon, the current fleet of B-52Hs will be approaching 60 before the NGB is expected to enter service in about 2018. The high development costs, underwhelming performance and high maintenance costs of the B1-B are a primary reason the B-52H remained in service after a smaller-than-expected number of B1-Bs were procured. A second attempt at replacing the B-52H led to the B-2, which cost $44 billion to develop and build 21 aircraft, making the B-2 the most expensive aircraft ever built. Even if the NGB can be developed for half the cost of the B-2, each aircraft will cost taxpayers more than $1 billion. In a constrained fiscal budget, procuring an expensive weapons system may prove to be a difficult proposition. Thus, there may be an opportunity to replace an aging bomber fleet with an advanced weapons system that is affordable ? $150 million per aircraft ? and capable of providing a credible air breathing nuclear deterrent. The ND-UCAV can meet the nation?s 21st century nuclear deterrence requi
 
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benellim4       6/5/2009 6:28:25 PM
Sure we could hang nukes off a UCAS. That doesn't mean we would have the positive control required of a nuclear weapon.
 
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Herald12345    And in the end.....   6/5/2009 6:51:52 PM
It comes down to positive control. If you use a robot bomb carrier, it will be a weapon bus, EXPENDABLE used as a total war weapon only in extremis, with no recall design, and only on a ONE WAY trip. 
 
That is why this idea of a UCAV bomber for nuclear weapon delivery is insane as are its proponents. 
 
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gf0012-aust       6/5/2009 8:06:18 PM
The way it stands now we have about 6 to 9 years before either of us can prove conclusively to each other one way or the other.

My "grief" is that there seemed to be an optimism that the technology existed now - and that UAV's could step into the manned roles for a multitude of missions which currently require intelligence for critical decision making.
9 years is closer to the point of where AI might be deployable in discretionary prosecution roles such as nuke delivery in complex batlespace.  5 years no.  I say that with a degree of confidence because having sat through a direct DARPA/AustGov presentation on AI concepts that the US is working on with Aust for hive management and complex systems.  At this point in time, Aust does lead in the development of AI for swarms and hive management - and the US has freely acknowledged that.
Outside of whatever AI advances are made in the next half generation, the capability still needs to fit in with doctrine, and with legal requirements.  The US understandably has some significant concerns about the legal implications of prosecuting kill/destroy events without direct manned intervention in the decision/prosecution loop.
Even with multiple redundancy, everytime you send up a UAV with a nuke weapon, and within striking range, you have in effect committed to a failsafe scenario.

multiple redundancy does fail (witness afghanistan) 
reach back does fail (witness iraq, afghanistan) 
fallback to the last waypoint does fail (iraq, witness afghanistan) 
over ride does fail (witness afghanistan) 
self destruction does fail (witness afghanistan) 

and we're then left with the engineers paradox:
the more complex the system, the greater the cost
the more safety built in - the greater the cost 
the greater the cost, he greater the chance that the principle stakeholder will reject it

technology is always about meeting multiple hurdles
functionality (the engineers vision after discussing it with the user community - and thats not always on the same page)
relevance (the user community) 
legals - self evident
doctrine - relevance of and applicability
flow on effect to the force.  or for want of a better, a force majeur impact
 
 
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JFKY    Darth   6/5/2009 8:52:05 PM
Comm's fails...Having read Robert's Ridge all I can say is that in a very permissive electronic environment, the Taliban functionally being in the Stone Age, satellite communication failed SEVERAL times...due to overloaded circuits or due to electronic jamming being conducted by the Allied Forces (the book makes no conclusions).
 
So in Afghanistan, in the face of NO electronic opposition or interference units lost the ability to communicate...at the most inopportune times.  All I can say is that you have far more faith in electronic communications, under extreme pressure, than I do.
 
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breaka    Disbanding SAC    6/6/2009 3:31:33 AM

Herald,

If you are going to call people idiots, you may want to get your facts right. SAC was disbanded under the Bush I administration in 1992, not by Clinton.  It was part of Gen McPeak's sweeping reorg in response to the end of the Cold War, big drawdowns, and the expeditionary combat experience that blurred the line between tactical and strategic forces in a conventional war.  I'm not a McPeak fan, but if you want to throw political spears he can be held against both side - appointed by Bush I, backed Dole's presidential run in '96 and GWB in '00, but also served under Clinton, backed Dean and then Kerry, and was Obama's military advisor and committe co-chairman.

BTW, the Yom Kippur War was 1973, not 1972.  This was in the middle of the Watergate scandal and there are some claims that Nixon wasn't involved with the DEFCON decison at all, rather the NSC decided and issued statements in his name.

 
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Herald12345    Stand corrected.   6/6/2009 7:32:13 AM

Herald,


If you are going to call people idiots, you may want to get your facts right. SAC was disbanded under the Bush I administration in 1992, not by Clinton.  It was part of Gen McPeak's sweeping reorg in response to the end of the Cold War, big drawdowns, and the expeditionary combat experience that blurred the line between tactical and strategic forces in a conventional war.  I'm not a McPeak fan, but if you want to throw political spears he can be held against both side - appointed by Bush I, backed Dole's presidential run in '96 and GWB in '00, but also served under Clinton, backed Dean and then Kerry, and was Obama's military advisor and committee co-chairman.


BTW, the Yom Kippur War was 1973, not 1972.  This was in the middle of the Watergate scandal and there are some claims that Nixon wasn't involved with the DEFCON decison at all, rather the NSC decided and issued statements in his name.


Opinion:
 
1 June 1992, was the date that idiiocy occured. Half a year. 1973 Arab Israel1 war. One year off, again, wrong on fact again. You backed DEAN? .Get a mental health checkup. My memory may require I look at possible onset of Alzheimers, but supporting Dean indicates McPeak has galloping insanity. As for Obama, current data track indicates he made a third hige error in judgement.. . 
 
Ascerbic comment::
 
The Russians ran a bluff in 1973. Factpod claimed: Nixon was drunk.on the 11 October when the British PM Ed Heath tried to talk to him about the crisis, sole source climing being Kissinger, which indicates to me that that  maniac, Kissinger, was running around mismanaging US foreign policy during the crisis solely by his own arrogant accounts. By the 23, that double dealing double crosser had convinced himself and the panicked Russians (Schlessinger pushed for the Defcon 3 over K's objection and Nixon agreed) to put through that cease fire. The thought of Kissinger trying to play general and decide when to declare "victory" should have chilled the blood of any sane man. That miscalculating egomaniac never could read a crisis right oir negotiate a viable agreement. That is why I suggest strongly that  it was actually Nixoin who sobered up and dealt with Brezhnev as he explicitly told Kissinger he would do in a memorandum of instruction he sent to that hubris driven Secretary of State on the 19th October.
 
Now as to the Clinton administration being packed full of idiots..........
 
 
Herald
.   
 
 
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JFKY    Herald,   6/6/2009 8:46:28 AM
read for comprehension...MCPEAK backed Dean and then Kerry...we have no idea who Breaka backed.....
 
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Herald12345    Take own advice, JRKY.   6/6/2009 9:13:07 AM

read for comprehension...MCPEAK backed Dean and then Kerry...we have no idea who Breaka backed.....
 
Well then.....Breaka, who did YOU support? Problem solved.   
 
Brainfart does not excuse me, though many's the time you've done the same when you misquoted me.
 
Herald
 
 
 
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DarthAmerica       6/6/2009 12:39:15 PM

Comm's fails...Having read Robert's Ridge all I can say is that in a very permissive electronic environment, the Taliban functionally being in the Stone Age, satellite communication failed SEVERAL times...due to overloaded circuits or due to electronic jamming being conducted by the Allied Forces (the book makes no conclusions).

So in Afghanistan, in the face of NO electronic opposition or interference units lost the ability to communicate...at the most inopportune times.  All I can say is that you have far more faith in electronic communications, under extreme pressure, than I do.

 
JFKY,

I do have faith with it because it's something I've worked with and on everyday. That doesn't mean to suggest that your concerns are no valid. Just that as an engineer we can design redundancies and create ways to mitigate the chances of failure. That's why I wrote to GF that if we wanted, we could deploy a Unmanned Nuclear Bomber this year with existing technologies. It would be quick and crude but it could be done if we absolutely wanted it. Give 5-9 years though and the technologies would be mature enough to be competitive with manned platforms and certainly exceed the performance. Again that doesn't mean that institutional resistance wouldn't still be an obstacle.

With regard to failure. Again, remember, even the B-2 and Raptor go down. And like the electronic conditions over Afghanistan, it doesn't have to be due to enemy activity. No one can legitimately say there is no chance of failure. But I can say that with proper test and development it is possible to make the system as reliable as manned aircraft. It just takes time. A good program to look at would be Global Hawk. It's a prototype that was rushed to war due to urgent needs. It has the AI capability to deal with loss of coms and in 30,000 plus hours of flight has had very few losses considering that it was a prototype, maintenance and operator proficiency wasn't mature ect. 

-DA 

 
-DA 
 
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DarthAmerica       6/6/2009 12:46:50 PM

Sure we could hang nukes off a UCAS. That doesn't mean we would have the positive control required of a nuclear weapon.

Spin. I mentioned that if we rushed something it would be crude but still doable. Also, our control of the nuclear payload would be no less secure than a nuclear tipped CM. Why a nuke on a CM isn't even an issue on a one way trip but somehow it you put it one a platform that can be recalled all the way up to the release point is the million dollar question. Let me break that down.

AGM-89B is fired, on the way to the target, it can crash, be intercepted, fail to explode and cannot be reused or recalled.

ND-UCAS takes off and has all of the above characteristics of a CM. Additionally, it can be recalled. It can loiter on station until needed and if designed to do so, can even fight back in the EW and physical domain.

Its a gain.

-DA 

-DA 
 
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