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Subject:
UNMANNED NUCLEAR BOMBER
DarthAmerica
6/3/2009 1:10:05 PM
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| Unmanned and nuclear
Is America ready for a UAV bomber?
BY ADAM B. LOWTHER
In the wake of the August 2007 incident in which six air-launched cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads were mistakenly flown from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., and the August 2006 incident ? acknowledged in March 2008 ? that saw top-secret nuclear fuses mistakenly shipped to Taiwan as battery packs for UH-1 Huey helicopters, Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley. Gates also formed a task force to study nuclear weapons management, which led to former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger?s publication of the ?Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management: The Air Force Nuclear Mission.? The report, along with other recent Pentagon publications, played a role in the creation of Global Strike Command ? a major command dedicated to the nuclear mission.
The mistakes had a positive outcome in that they led to the leadership?s re-examination of the entire nuclear enterprise, which served to stimulate a renaissance of thought on nuclear deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy. As part of that renaissance, this article examines the delivery systems upon which the nuclear arsenal relies, with a focus on nuclear-capable bombers.
One issue the Schlesinger report and others like it do not discuss is the possible development of a nuclear-dedicated unmanned combat aerial vehicle (ND-UCAV) as a replacement for nuclear-capable bombers. Yet the Air Force should seriously consider replacing its nuclear-capable bombers with a ND-UCAV based on the X-47B UCAV demonstrator, which the Navy began funding in 2007. While Navy requirements focus on carrier-based ISR operations, the Air Force could take advantage of the more than $800 million previously invested in the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program and the $635 million currently dedicated to X-47B development and rapidly develop a ND-UVAC capable of penetrating defended air space with a small nuclear weapons payload.
To understand why the ND-UCAV is an attractive option for the future, a brief look at the current condition of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and bomber legs of the nuclear triad illustrates the serious need for modernization. Three points highlight the threat to their continued credibility.
First, today?s entire Air Force bomber fleet of B-52Hs, B1-Bs and B-2s, not just nuclear-capable bombers, is 90 percent smaller than it was at its peak in 1959, when Strategic Air Command (SAC) consisted of 1,366 B-47s and 488 B-52s. Placed within a proper context, the dramatic reduction in the bomber fleet diminishes a very visible and psychologically significant element of a credible deterrent that cannot be achieved with unseen ballistic-missile submarines or ICBMs. Of the current bombers in service, all three airframes are aging and in need of costly repair and upgrades. With the entire fleet of 67 B1-Bs dedicated to conventional operations, as well as a majority of the remaining 62 B-52Hs and 20 B-2s primarily dedicated to conventional operations, the nuclear bomber fleet has dwindled to a record low.
Second, down from a 1969 peak of 1,054, the nation?s 450 remaining ICBMs are in a similar condition and, like the bomber fleet, aging rapidly even as they undergo periodic maintenance and upgrades through a number of life extension programs. Additionally, designed in the mid-1960s and fielded between the late 1960s and early 1970s, the nation?s Minuteman IIIs are housed in underground silos, which are in need of replacement. Silo replacement is cost-prohibitive and may lead to further reductions in ICBM numbers or, as some internal debate suggests, movement of Minuteman IIIs above ground.
Third, with planning for the Next-Generation Bomber (NGB) still in its early stages within the Pentagon, the current fleet of B-52Hs will be approaching 60 before the NGB is expected to enter service in about 2018. The high development costs, underwhelming performance and high maintenance costs of the B1-B are a primary reason the B-52H remained in service after a smaller-than-expected number of B1-Bs were procured. A second attempt at replacing the B-52H led to the B-2, which cost $44 billion to develop and build 21 aircraft, making the B-2 the most expensive aircraft ever built. Even if the NGB can be developed for half the cost of the B-2, each aircraft will cost taxpayers more than $1 billion. In a constrained fiscal budget, procuring an expensive weapons system may prove to be a difficult proposition. Thus, there may be an opportunity to replace an aging bomber fleet with an advanced weapons system that is affordable ? $150 million per aircraft ? and capable of providing a credible air breathing nuclear deterrent. The ND-UCAV can meet the nation?s 21st century nuclear deterrence requi |
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