Can't we achieve the same thing with 2 Cruise Missiles?  I mean they're drones too, and we don't have to develop new ones...

 

An Unmanned but man-in-the-loop UCAV for the nuclear mission is a non-starter.  Once the nuclear war starts we're going to lose the satellite communications that will make it work and therefore it won't work, right?

 

So it will have to be an unmanned, pre-programmed drone, kind of like the ALCM or SLCM so rather than fund a multi-billion dollar follow-on to ALCM or SLCM....let's just build a few more ALCM or SLCM.

 

Seriously, no sarcasm, no irony I'd be interested in Herald's "take" on this as he SEEMS to have a grasp of the technical in's and out's of aviation and electronics....I don't see an UCAV for the Nuclear Delivery mission.

JFKY,

The difference between a UCAV and CM is that the UCAV can RTB after an abort. You can put a nuclear UCAV up for days potentially and maybe longer in a time of tension. Imagine a CVN putting a bunch of these on station within a few hours or less of potential targets for a long time. It would be very survivable and difficult to stop. Because it's a discrete weapon, it would cause the kind of alarm a CM launch would. Also, SATCOM is very robust and not as vulnerable as some suggest. Hardening and securing the COMMS is definitely expensive. But not so vulnerable as to be useless. At the strategic level our space assets are anti-jam, LPI and have extensive nuclear hardening in addition to being rapidly replaceble in some cases. This is some of the DoD/USG most sensitive information and is not like the commercial birds we bounce signals off of out of convenience in order to use more BW. 

Not saying the enemy wont try and even have some success. But it is definitely a contest all by itself and we are not unprepared.

 

"it would cause the kind of alarm a CM launch would" should read "it wouldn't cause the kind of alarm a CM launch would".

Regards

-DA

 

Nuclear Deterrence has NOTHING to do with striking first, and in fact, requires a robust response...IF the PRC, Russia, Iran, or Botswana strike first, using EMP and discrete attacks on satellite control points, the ND-UCAV loses it's satellite communications.  And hence LO or not, it doesn't "go" anywhere....

 

It's why LORAN or TACAN or any external guidance system was taboo for SAC systems, as a primary guidance system, because in the event of war, and Soviet first strike these external systems would most likely die, rendering the deterrent force inoperable.

 

A man-in-the-loop UCAV is just such a system...the man is not there and if the communication is gone, the system is not there...

 

So again, wouldn't it just be cheaper AND MORE EFFECTIVE to use SLCM and ALCM?  Any way, a CM is pretty LO, certainly capable of penetrating the PRC and most Russian targets, wouldn't you say?

 

Bottom-line: you want an UNMANNED Nuclear Delivery System, an ICBM, a CM with DSMC and TerCom, or an SLBM are the way to go, as they require nothing imported from the outside to accomplish their mission(s).  You want a man to be there to deliver "The Bomb" the man has to be ON the platform, not separated from the platform tele-operating it.  Again your mileage may vary.

That's like saying that SSBN's are not a valid concept because they are out of contact sometimes. There are many ways to ensure reliable communications with the UCAV and they can be as simple as carrying out preprogramed attacks on specific targets in the event of certain input or lack thereof. There are also classified communications architectures that deal with things like this. The DoD isn't just hoping that somehow they can talk to their man or machines in the event of catastrophic attack. Man in the loop is desirable I agree bust certainly not necessary.

-DA 

you miss the point...a CVN or an SSBN have a man making the decision to launch or not, but the CM, or Trident are UNMANNED,,,they do NOT have a man-in-the-loop....the ND-UCAV, as it appears, in this article, will be "flown" to the target by a man-in-the-loop lose that satcom capacity; lose the delivery system.

 

Lose satcom with a CVN and the system can compensate, lose satcom and the SSBN can launch, or could....

 

again the systems you have posited, still operate without outside input once launched....

 

An unmanned CONVENTIONAL bomber is fine...there won't be nuclear weapons "popping off"; there won't be EMP or plasma in the upper atmosphere or damage to the satellites or control stations....but nuclear conflict is a order of magnitude much more violent and destructive!

 

To me, right now, this thing reads like that silly space bomber/Marine Transport plane that SCCOMarine dragged in...a neat idea in search of a problem to solve.

would oppose this idea....it involves an outside input for successful delivery of the nuclear weapon.  Just like SAC would oppose GPS for B-52's or warheads...it requires an outside signal, that may not or may not be present due to nuclear combat, to arrive on target.

 

Outside input is nice in peacetime navigation, but it could never be expected to provide support for actual war missions...stellar navigation, ballistic information, radar navigation (bombers), even looking out the window and seeing where you were....but never TACAN or GPS or LORAN or any other aids to navigation.

JFKY,

It's already doing that. I'll put it to you like this. There are no technological barriers to making this work and much of what's necessary is already operationally fielded.  There may be an institutional resistance but we are over the tech hurdles. The AI, stealth technology, EW/COMs capability, hardening, redundancies and weapons security issues are solved and could easily be integrated. Again, this is no different fundamentally from putting a warhead on a CM except you can reuse the delivery mechanism. BWT, there is no more SAC. Those duties are now handled by US Strategic Command.

-DA