SecDef Gates recommends halting F-22 and POTUS Helo production

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Herald12345 Warpig reply 4/24/2009 5:17:57 PM

I'd rather we just quit wasting money, equipment, and personnel on such an unnecessary mission, and spend it fighting the war instead.

I wasn't aware that air defense over the United States was an unnecessary mission, thanks for clarifying that. Can we please just stop protecting the US and send all our forces to Iraq and Afghanistan so they may sleep well at night.

No problem, glad that now you know it. It was obvious to me that the possibility of anyone hijacking an airliner and flying into a target in the U.S. anytime on or after 9/12 dropped to basically unmeasurable right around 0900 on 9/11--and it's certainly now many orders of magnitude less than it was before 9/11... when it at least appeared to be extremely unlikely. Frankly, I question the analytical abilities of anyone who thinks otherwise--at least for about the next 10-20 years or so, until we start to become lax again due to no recent threat activities. In any event, the continental U.S. air defense mission is certainly more than adequately met through use of a few of the F-15s we already have for that mission.

Note the underlined, Warpig.

How is our southern border doing?

Why did I raise that question?

15 November 2008

The TSA and Airport Security: A Dismal Failure

The Things He Carried
By Jeffrey Goldberg / November 2008

Airport security in America is a sham—?security theater? designed to make travelers feel better and catch stupid terrorists. Smart ones can get through security with fake boarding passes and all manner of prohibited items—as our correspondent did with ease.

If I were a terrorist, and I?m not, but if I were a terrorist—a frosty, tough-like-Chuck-Norris terrorist, say a C-title jihadist with Hezbollah or, more likely, a donkey-work operative with the Judean People?s Front—I would not do what I did in the bathroom of the Minneapolis?St. Paul International Airport, which was to place myself in front of a sink in open view of the male American flying public and ostentatiously rip up a sheaf of counterfeit boarding passes that had been created for me by a frenetic and acerbic security expert named Bruce Schneier. He had made these boarding passes in his sophisticated underground forgery works, which consists of a Sony Vaio laptop and an HP LaserJet printer, in order to prove that the Transportation Security Administration, which is meant to protect American aviation from al-Qaeda, represents an egregious waste of tax dollars, dollars that could otherwise be used to catch terrorists before they arrive at the Minneapolis?St. Paul International Airport, by which time it is, generally speaking, too late.

I could have ripped up these counterfeit boarding passes in the privacy of a toilet stall, but I chose not to, partly because this was the renowned Senator Larry Craig Memorial Wide-Stance Bathroom, and since the commencement of the Global War on Terror this particular bathroom has been patrolled by security officials trying to protect it from gay sex, and partly because I wanted to see whether my fellow passengers would report me to the TSA for acting suspiciously in a public bathroom. No one did, thus thwarting, yet again, my plans to get arrested, or at least be the recipient of a thorough sweating by the FBI, for dubious behavior in a large American airport. Suspicious that the measures put in place after the attacks of September 11 to prevent further such attacks are almost entirely for show—security theater is the term of art—I have for some time now been testing, in modest ways, their effectiveness. Because the TSA?s security regimen seems to be mainly thing-based—most of its 44,500 airport officers are assigned to truffle through carry-on bags for things like guns, bombs, three-ounce tubes of anthrax, Crest toothpaste, nail clippers, Snapple, and so on—I focused my efforts on bringing bad things through security in many different airports, primarily my home airport, Washington?s Reagan National, the one situated approximately 17 feet from the Pentagon, but also in Los Angeles, New York, Miami, Chicago, and at the Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport (which is where I came closest to arousing at least a modest level of suspicion, receiving a symbolic pat-down—all frisks that avoid the sensitive regions are by definition symbolic—and one question about the presence of a Leatherman Multi-Tool in my pocket; said Leatherman was confiscated and is now, I hope, living with the loving family of a TSA employee). And because I have a fair amount of experience reporting on terrorists, and because terrorist groups produce large quantities of branded knickknacks, I?ve amassed an inspiring collection of al-Qaeda T-shirts, Islamic Jihad flags, Hezbollah videotapes, and inflatable Yasir Arafat dolls (really). All these things I?ve carried with me through airports across the country. I?ve also carried, at various times: pocketknives, matches from hotels in Beirut and Peshawar, dust masks, lengths of rope, cigarette lighters, nail clippers, eight-ounce tubes of toothpaste (in my front pocket), bottles of Fiji Water (which is foreign), and, of course, box cutters. I was selected for secondary screening four times—out of dozens of passages through security checkpoints—during this extended experiment. At one screening, I was relieved of a pair of nail clippers; during another, a can of shaving cream.

During one secondary inspection, at O?Hare International Airport in Chicago, I was wearing under my shirt a spectacular, only-in-America device called a ?Beerbelly,? a neoprene sling that holds a polyurethane bladder and drinking tube. The Beerbelly, designed originally to sneak alcohol—up to 80 ounces—into football games, can quite obviously be used to sneak up to 80 ounces of liquid through airport security. (The company that manufactures the Beerbelly also makes something called a ?Winerack,? a bra that holds up to 25 ounces of booze and is recommended, according to the company?s Web site, for PTA meetings.) My Beerbelly, which fit comfortably over my beer belly, contained two cans? worth of Bud Light at the time of the inspection. It went undetected. The eight-ounce bottle of water in my carry-on bag, however, was seized by the federal government.

On another occasion, at LaGuardia, in New York, the transportation-security officer in charge of my secondary screening emptied my carry-on bag of nearly everything it contained, including a yellow, three-foot-by-four-foot Hezbollah flag, purchased at a Hezbollah gift shop in south Lebanon. The flag features, as its charming main image, an upraised fist clutching an AK-47 automatic rifle. Atop the rifle is a line of Arabic writing that reads Then surely the party of God are they who will be triumphant. The officer took the flag and spread it out on the inspection table. She finished her inspection, gave me back my flag, and told me I could go. I said, ?That?s a Hezbollah flag.? She said, ?Uh-huh.? Not ?Uh-huh, I?ve been trained to recognize the symbols of anti-American terror groups, but after careful inspection of your physical person, your behavior, and your last name, I?ve come to the conclusion that you are not a Bekaa Valley?trained threat to the United States commercial aviation system,? but ?Uh-huh, I?m going on break, why are you talking to me??

In Minneapolis, I littered my carry-on with many of my prohibited items, and also an Osama bin Laden, Hero of Islam T-shirt, which often gets a rise out of people who see it. This day, however, would feature a different sort of experiment, designed to prove not only that the TSA often cannot find anything on you or in your carry-on, but that it has no actual idea who you are, despite the government?s effort to build a comprehensive ?no-fly? list. A no-fly list would be a good idea if it worked; Bruce Schneier?s homemade boarding passes were about to prove that it doesn?t. Schneier is the TSA?s most relentless, and effective, critic; the TSA director, Kip Hawley, told me he respects Schneier?s opinions, though Schneier quite clearly makes his life miserable.

?The whole system is designed to catch stupid terrorists,? Schneier told me. A smart terrorist, he says, won?t try to bring a knife aboard a plane, as I had been doing; he?ll make his own, in the airplane bathroom. Schneier told me the recipe: ?Get some steel epoxy glue at a hardware store. It comes in two tubes, one with steel dust and then a hardener. You make the mold by folding a piece of cardboard in two, and then you mix the two tubes together. You can use a metal spoon for the handle. It hardens in 15 minutes.?

As we stood at an airport Starbucks, Schneier spread before me a batch of fabricated boarding passes for Northwest Airlines flight 1714, scheduled to depart at 2:20 p.m. and arrive at Reagan National at 5:47 p.m. He had taken the liberty of upgrading us to first class, and had even granted me ?Platinum/Elite Plus? status, which was gracious of him. This status would allow us to skip the ranks of hoi-polloi flyers and join the expedited line, which is my preference, because those knotty, teeming security lines are the most dangerous places in airports: terrorists could paralyze U.S. aviation merely by detonating a bomb at any security checkpoint, all of which are, of course, entirely unsecured. (I once asked Michael Chertoff, the secretary of Homeland Security, about this. ?We actually ultimately do have a vision of trying to move the security checkpoint away from the gate, deeper into the airport itself, but there?s always going to be some place that people congregate. So if you?re asking me, is there any way to protect against a person taking a bomb into a crowded location and blowing it up, the answer is no.?)

Schneier and I walked to the security checkpoint. ?Counterterrorism in the airport is a show designed to make people feel better,? he said. ?Only two things have made flying safer: the reinforcement of cockpit doors, and the fact that passengers know now to resist hijackers.? This assumes, of course, that al-Qaeda will target airplanes for hijacking, or target aviation at all. ?We defend against what the terrorists did last week,? Schneier said. He believes that the country would be just as safe as it is today if airport security were rolled back to pre-9/11 levels. ?Spend the rest of your money on intelligence, investigations, and emergency response.?

Schneier and I joined the line with our ersatz boarding passes. ?Technically we could get arrested for this,? he said, but we judged the risk to be acceptable. We handed our boarding passes and IDs to the security officer, who inspected our driver?s licenses through a loupe, one of those magnifying-glass devices jewelers use for minute examinations of fine detail. This was the moment of maximum peril, not because the boarding passes were flawed, but because the TSA now trains its officers in the science of behavior detection. The SPOT program—?Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques?—was based in part on the work of a psychologist who believes that involuntary facial-muscle movements, including the most fleeting ?micro-expressions,? can betray lying or criminality. The training program for behavior-detection officers is one week long. Our facial muscles did not cooperate with the SPOT program, apparently, because the officer chicken-scratched onto our boarding passes what might have been his signature, or the number 4, or the letter y. We took our shoes off and placed our laptops in bins. Schneier took from his bag a 12-ounce container labeled ?saline solution.?

The author's forged boarding pass — complete with Platinum/Elite Plus status and magical TSA-approval squiggle — got him through security.

?It?s allowed,? he said. Medical supplies, such as saline solution for contact-lens cleaning, don?t fall under the TSA?s three-ounce rule.

?What?s allowed?? I asked. ?Saline solution, or bottles labeled saline solution??

?Bottles labeled saline solution. They won?t check what?s in it, trust me.?

They did not check. As we gathered our belongings, Schneier held up the bottle and said to the nearest security officer, ?This is okay, right?? ?Yep,? the officer said. ?Just have to put it in the tray.?

?Maybe if you lit it on fire, he?d pay attention,? I said, risking arrest for making a joke at airport security. (Later, Schneier would carry two bottles labeled saline solution—24 ounces in total—through security. An officer asked him why he needed two bottles. ?Two eyes,? he said. He was allowed to keep the bottles.)

We were in the clear. But what did we prove?

?We proved that the ID triangle is hopeless,? Schneier said.

The ID triangle: before a passenger boards a commercial flight, he interacts with his airline or the government three times—when he purchases his ticket; when he passes through airport security; and finally at the gate, when he presents his boarding pass to an airline agent. It is at the first point of contact, when the ticket is purchased, that a passenger?s name is checked against the government?s no-fly list. It is not checked again, and for this reason, Schneier argued, the process is merely another form of security theater.

?The goal is to make sure that this ID triangle represents one person,? he explained. ?Here?s how you get around it. Let?s assume you?re a terrorist and you believe your name is on the watch list.? It?s easy for a terrorist to check whether the government has cottoned on to his existence, Schneier said; he simply has to submit his name online to the new, privately run CLEAR program, which is meant to fast-pass approved travelers through security. If the terrorist is rejected, then he knows he?s on the watch list.

To slip through the only check against the no-fly list, the terrorist uses a stolen credit card to buy a ticket under a fake name. ?Then you print a fake boarding pass with your real name on it and go to the airport. You give your real ID, and the fake boarding pass with your real name on it, to security. They?re checking the documents against each other. They?re not checking your name against the no-fly list—that was done on the airline?s computers. Once you?re through security, you rip up the fake boarding pass, and use the real boarding pass that has the name from the stolen credit card. Then you board the plane, because they?re not checking your name against your ID at boarding.?

What if you don?t know how to steal a credit card?

?Then you?re a stupid terrorist and the government will catch you,? he said.

What if you don?t know how to download a PDF of an actual boarding pass and alter it on a home computer?

?Then you?re a stupid terrorist and the government will catch you.?

I couldn?t believe that what Schneier was saying was true—in the national debate over the no-fly list, it is seldom, if ever, mentioned that the no-fly list doesn?t work. ?It?s true,? he said. ?The gap blows the whole system out of the water.?

This called for a visit to TSA headquarters. The headquarters is located in Pentagon City, just outside Washington. Kip Hawley, the man who runs the agency, is a bluff, amiable fellow who is capable of making a TSA joke. ?Do you want three ounces of water?? he asked me.

I raised the subject of the ID triangle, hoping to get a cogent explanation. This is what Hawley said: ?The TDC?—that?s ?ticket document checker?—?will make a notation on your ticket and that?s something that will follow you all the way through? to the gate.

?But all they do is write a little squiggly mark on the boarding pass,? I said.

?You think you might be able to forge that?? he asked me.

?My handwriting is terrible, but don?t you think someone can forge it?? I asked.

?Well, uh, maybe. Maybe not,? he said.

Aha! I thought. He?s hiding something from me.

?Are you telling me that I don?t know about something that?s going on?? I asked.

?We?re well aware of the scenario you describe. Bruce has been talking about it for two years,? he said, referring to Schneier?s efforts to publicize the gaps in the ID triangle.

?Isn?t it a basic flaw, that you?re checking the no-fly list at the point of purchase, not at the airport??

He leaned back in his chair.

?What do you do about vulnerabilities?? he asked, rhetorically. ?All the time you hear reports and people saying, ?There?s a vulnerability.? Well, duh. There are vulnerabilities everywhere, in everything. The question is not ?Is there a vulnerability?? It?s ?What are you doing about it???

Well, what are you doing about it?

?There are vulnerabilities where you have limited ways to address it directly. So you have to put other layers around it, other things that will catch them when that vulnerability is breached. This is a universal problem. Somebody will identify a very small thing and drill down and say, ?I found a vulnerability.??

In other words, the TSA has no immediate plans to check passengers against the no-fly list at the moment before they board their flight. (Hawley said that boarding passes will eventually be encrypted so the TSA can follow their progress from printer to gate.) Nor does it plan to screen airport employees when they show up for work each day. Pilots—or people dressed as pilots—are screened, as the public knows, but that?s because they enter the airport through the front door. The employees who drive fuel trucks, and make french fries at McDonald?s, and clean airplane bathrooms (to the extent that they?re cleaned anymore) do not pass through magnetometers when they enter the airport, and their possessions are not searched. To me this always seemed to be, well, another ?vulnerability.?

?Do you know what you have on the inside of an airport?? Hawley asked me. ?You have all the military traveling, you have guns, chemicals, jet fuel. So the idea that we would spend a whole lot of resources putting a perimeter around that, running every worker, 50,000 people, every day, through security—why in the heck would you do that? Because all they have to do is walk through clean and then have someone throw something over a fence.?

I asked about the depth of background screening for airport employees. He said, noncommittally, ?It goes reasonably deep.?

So there are, in other words, two classes of people in airports: those whose shoes are inspected for explosives, and those whose aren?t. How, I asked, do you explain that to the public in a way that makes sense?

?Social networks,? he answered. ?It?s a very tuned-in workforce. You?re never alone when you?re on or around a plane. ?What is that guy spending all that time in the cockpit for?? All airport employees know what normal is.? Hawley did say that TSA employees conduct random ID checks and magnetometer screenings, but he did not say how frequently.

I suppose I?ve seen too many movies, but, really? Social networks? Behavior detection? The TSA budget is almost $7 billion. That money would be better spent on the penetration of al-Qaeda social networks.

As I stood in the bathroom, ripping up boarding passes, waiting for the social network of male bathroom users to report my suspicious behavior, I decided to make myself as nervous as possible. I would try to pass through security with no ID, a fake boarding pass, and an Osama bin Laden T-shirt under my coat. I splashed water on my face to mimic sweat, put on a coat (it was a summer day), hid my driver?s license, and approached security with a bogus boarding pass that Schneier had made for me. I told the document checker at security that I had lost my identification but was hoping I would still be able to make my flight. He said I?d have to speak to a supervisor. The supervisor arrived; he looked smart, unfortunately. I was starting to get genuinely nervous, which I hoped would generate incriminating micro-expressions. ?I can?t find my driver?s license,? I said. I showed him my fake boarding pass. ?I need to get to Washington quickly,? I added. He asked me if I had any other identification. I showed him a credit card with my name on it, a library card, and a health-insurance card. ?Nothing else?? he asked.

?No,? I said.

?You should really travel with a second picture ID, you know.?

?Yes, sir,? I said.

?All right, you can go,? he said, pointing me to the X-ray line. ?But let this be a lesson for you.?

Jeffrey Goldberg, an Atlantic national correspondent and the author of Prisoners: A Story of Friendship and Terror (2007), blogs at jeffreygoldberg.theatlantic.com.

Source / Atlantic

But, hey, the TSA is right on top of this:

TSA?s Take on the Atlantic Article

Bruce Schneier and others have raised a number of good issues about TSA?s role in aviation security but veer off course when our work is described as ?security theater.? Some examples from a recent article in the Atlantic magazine are worth examining and I would put them in three categories as they represent three different layers of security: 1) items carried through checkpoints on the body; 2) watch-lists and boarding passes; and 3) behavior detection. The comments about TSA not hassling the reporter for carrying a Hezbollah flag or AQ T-shirt are more in the entertainment category along with the thought of splashing water on your face to simulate sweating as a demonstration that behavior detection doesn?t work.

Items carried on the person, be they a ?beer belly? or concealed objects in very private areas, are why we are buying over 100 whole body imagers in upcoming months and will deploy more over time. In the meantime, we use hand-held devices that detect hydrogen peroxide and other explosives compounds as well as targeted pat-downs that require private screening.

Watch-lists and identity checks are important and effective security measures. We identify dozens of terrorist-related individuals a week and stop No-Flys regularly with our watch-list process. Dozens more people with security concerns are identified through finding altered or forged documents, including boarding passes. Using stolen credit cards and false documents as a way to get around watch-lists makes the point that forcing terrorists to use increasingly risky tactics has its own security value. Boarding pass scanners and encryption are being tested in eight airports now and more will be coming.

Behavior detection works and we have 2,000 trained officers at airports today. They alert us to people who may pose a threat but who may also have items that could elude other layers of physical security.

The bigger point is that there are vulnerabilities everywhere and we use multiple layers of different security measures to protect us all from instances where one vulnerability can be exploited. The standard for TSA is not perfection, but material reduction of risk.

Clever terrorists can use innovative ways to exploit vulnerabilities. But don?t forget that most bombers are not, in fact, clever. Living bomb-makers are usually clever, but the person agreeing to carry it may not be super smart. Even if ?all? we do is stop dumb terrorists, we are reducing risk.

Stopping the ?James Bond? terrorist is truly a team effort and I whole-heartedly agree that the best way to stop those attacks is with intelligence and law enforcement working together. Anyone who knows would tell you that TSA is, in fact, an intelligence-driven operation, working daily with our colleagues throughout the counter-terrorism community in that common effort.

Kip Hawley (10.21.2008)

Source / TSA: Evolution of Security

.....................................Do you see where FALSE assumptions lead?

Herald.

Quote Reply

Nichevo 4/24/2009 5:36:23 PM

At the $150 million F-22 to $100 million F-35 prices its hard to argue with reducing the the 2500 F-35 buy by 90 for 60 additional F-22s given the F-22 capabilities vis-a-vis the F-35. We know the F-22 price is $150 million we don't know the F-35 price will be $100 million. This week's AW&ST ( 4/20 ) reports the Dutch are unwilling to commit to the F-35 because the US can not or will not give them a firm price.

The only concern I see - minus say 100 of 'em ordered now, are we gonna run out of F-35s and lose a war or an air battle or miss a shot at Osama? I think not. The money is all funny anyway, front-load it or back-load it or do whatever the blivet factory in Washington does best, so the shortfall will never even occur in 2024 or whenever it's 'planned.' But if Herald is right, cutting 1/3 of the program raises unit cost 10-15%. It might be less for a smaller and as I say prob. nonexistent reduction.

And as the numbers rise for F-22, unit cost is said to go down to maybe $120MM? While F-35 seems to be porking up from planned $50MM to closer to $80-100MM without my help. (

This is another kind of "risk." F-35 overruns could easily wipe out any possible F-22 savings and in this climate there would only be cuts to F-35 to fix it. Maybe enough to kill it entirely as has happened to other programs. That's why F-35 program risk is non-negligible. If the F-22 is $120MM for the next batch and F-35 is $100MM which looks better? Maybe a block N+1 F-22 with all the best transferable bits from JSF - avionics, IRST, HMS, etc.

Range concerns for F-22: VLO CFTs, I think we are programmed to expect that miracle now. Hell, where's Stealth Sidewinder let alone VLO-RAAM?

I am confused also on the drone. Herald was that you eating crow? What Avenger? I thought that was the Pred-C? (I was wrong about the Williams I guess. Looked like a big stealthy ALCM dvlpt to me. )

Why is the F-23 thought better for capacity as a light/med bomber? Physically larger weap bays?

Quote Reply

DarthAmerica 4/24/2009 5:37:41 PM

Warpig is not making any false assumptions. The chance that anyone will use a captured airliner to attack the USA is extremely low and it is a problem that has solutions rooted in security on the ground and it is not a problem for fighters. First of all, just the mere act of capturing a plane is going to be a national tradgedy because the crew and passengers will crash it rather than be flown into something. That will stil lbe a few hundred deaths. Second, if the airliner is shot down over populated areas, the damage potential is huge. Putting armed air marshals in the planes would be a much better solution and cheaper.

I do think cruise missiles are a legitimate threat. But that is a threat we can address with AESA equipped F-15s. Since we are keeping these F-15s until the 2020's. Its logical to upgrade them to better facilitate missile defense. The F-35 coming next decade will also have significant CM defense capability via its sensors and it will have the numbers to provide decent area coverage.

My point isn't that F-22's aren't good for this. It certainly is. My point is that we already have these capabilites without the F-22 so this is not a "sky is falling" issue. Its a matter of picking which of several options to use with the F-22 being only one.

-DA

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mustang22 4/24/2009 5:38:35 PM

Herald they just don't get it.

Argue every valid point until we are blue in the face, all that matters is fighting pirates and insurgencies and starting up the JSF line so we don't hurt our allies' feelings when in all reality most will be more pissed off in the long run because they can only afford to buy 20 of them at 4x the cost originally proposed. Good luck with that.

Quote Reply

DarthAmerica 4/24/2009 5:41:29 PM

And as the numbers rise for F-22, unit cost is said to go down to maybe $120MM? While F-35 seems to be porking up from planned $50MM to closer to $80-100MM without my help. (

Range concerns for F-22: VLO CFTs, I think we are programmed to expect that miracle now. Hell, where's Stealth Sidewinder let alone VLO-RAAM?

I am confused also on the drone. Herald was that you eating crow? What Avenger? I thought that was the Pred-C? (I was wrong about the Williams I guess. Looked like a big stealthy ALCM dvlpt to me. )

Why is the F-23 thought better for capacity as a light/med bomber? Physically larger weap bays?

Nichevo,

The last thing we want to do is increase the cost of the F-35 by up to 15% in this economic climate. The USA might be able to afford it, but many other nations cannot. Besides it would be a bad investment when we know the USAF does not have a requirement for more F-22's. What would be the justification?

-DA

Quote Reply

DarthAmerica 4/24/2009 5:47:33 PM

Herald they just don't get it.

No, we get it. Unlike some others we just don't see the issue as the only option or else. The SecDef and USAF have made it public that we don't have a requirement for more than 187. What is unclear about that?

*ttp://thinkprogress.org/2009/04/06/gates-ends-f22-production/

-DA

Quote Reply

Herald12345 4/24/2009 5:48:33 PM

Not relevant.

Math errors and faulty logic. 300 deaths versus 3000 is the tradeoff.

Cruise missiles are very difficult targets to engage even with super-cruise fighters and the world's best chase missiles. Eagles never would have a chance at all when it comes to the CONUS perimeter defense. NOT ENOUGH TIME. So you might as well be ready to accept the prospect for successful cruise missile launches and attacks until we introduce scram-darts and a standing CAP.

Its called physics.

Herald

Quote Reply

mustang22 4/24/2009 5:53:04 PM

-DA

Can an AESA equipped F-15 engage cruise missiles sitting on its landing gear, we better hope so if the fleet is grounded anytime within the next 15 years? Again the reason for the extra 60 Raptors because this is a very real possibility but go ahead and remain in denial.

Quote Reply

Herald12345 Shrug........, 4/24/2009 6:01:37 PM

Herald they just don't get it.

Its called science and what's possible, Mustang. The politicians (Gates) have looked at the future and they are taking a huge unjustified risk. We ran that risk in the 1960s when we thought that manned bomber attack receded as a viable option against us and we dismantled our air defense coverage. When ICBMs were a guaranteed kill, it made some sense. But now we are on the threshold of stopping ballistic missiles, so now we're back to the air-breather threat.

There was this:

Air Defense gap 6.

I just pointed out that the air-breather threat, even as a 9-11 repeat was viable. From Jamaica to Miami is just two hours. Hijack enroute as you enter into Miami final ATC approach and CRASH. Response time you have could be as little as ten minutes.

Shrug. I'm not happy about pointing these things out.

Herald

Quote Reply

DarthAmerica 4/24/2009 6:07:22 PM

Math errors and faulty logic. 300 deaths versus 3000 is the tradeoff.

Its called physics.

Herald

There are no math, logic or physics errors in my post. Just different ideas. There is a budget and logistic errors with suggesting we use F-22's since we don't have them in enough numbers and there are no requirements to get them. Also, by the time we did, F-35's will be adding to our capability through sheer numbers. 100% fatalities on airliners are at 100% since the FIRST lane was hijacked on 9/11. Either by being crashed into building or by intervention of some kind. The probability of a hijacking over CONUS since 9/11 is miniscule and the chance of a hijacked airliner being flown into a building is even lower considering people know what their only alternatives are.

Cruise missile coverage can be handled by fewer Raptors or more Eagles. We have the Eagles. Either way there will be gaps because cruise missiles pose an insurmountable problem for either method if the goals is complete coverage. Cruise Missiles have to be dealt with offensively and/or by treaty. If a defense is used, manned platforms are woefully inadequate. Cruise missiles are a time critical target and a better way to deal with them to overcome the issue of time would be to use an unmanned persistent networked system that can act like a virtual fence.

-DA

Quote Reply

DarthAmerica 4/24/2009 6:10:44 PM

Can F-22's with a MC or less than ~65%? 60 extra Raptors does not in anyway eliminate the CM defense problem.

-DA

Quote Reply

ArtyEngineer 4/24/2009 6:46:44 PM

There was this:

Air Defense gap 6.

Shrug. I'm not happy about pointing these things out.

Herald

Yeah, airport security on the island of jamaica is an absolute joke!!!!

Quote Reply

mustang22 4/24/2009 6:52:49 PM

Can F-22's with a MC or less than ~65%? 60 extra Raptors does not in anyway eliminate the CM defense problem.

-DA

Why is it you will contradict your own argument just to disagree? 65% is more than likely due to a teething stage and should increase, regardless should a conflict arise and 100 or so are deployed the extra 40 factoring in your 65% gives the extra flexibility against an attack on our soil as it can respond and engage a CM faster and more effectively than any F-15.

Quote Reply

gf0012-aust 4/24/2009 7:07:07 PM

Some of you are aware that my daughter used to be in maritime security (before she decided that getting shot at was not fun!)

her vessels were regularly MG'd and RPG'd. In fact one RPG went through 2 wardrooms and popped some fingers off one of the crewmen who unfortunately were in its flight path. Fortunately it didn't go bang or things could have been worse.

but, their standard procedure was to increase speed or to turn into the attackers at speed. increasing speed (and cruiseliners can get up and go when they have to) increases wash as well as distance. turning into the attacker also does the same and does actually scare the crap out of them.

her last trip included a UK based MPT. it is possible to have weapons on board but the circumstances are unique. (and surely need changing). the crew drill was to stay out of sight and for the MPT to get maximum elevation as well as action a repel boarders routine. You want maximum elevation for a number of reasons. (which I hope are self evident) its also why a helicopter response is also better as they can maximise the elevation advantage when going about their business

on one side of the equation an RPG inherently has greater range than defensive small arms (and it doesn't have to be accurate, it just needs to hit anything) the range advantage can be up to triple that of small arms. the only legal onboard system that can counter that range is an LRAD, outside of that you need to start looking at heavy barrelled weapons - which cannot be legitimately carried. Outside of transit channels (and it is a bloody busy body of water) then small craft can and will come close. Its why at various points, everyone goes on pirate watch to start to mitigate and deflect an opportunity. As we're seeing now, these people are going bluewater - and it's 600-800km offshore- they're sophisticated operrations, so we''re not dealing with opportunists.

As I said before, this is a complex issue, not all pirates are the same, they're not all scraggly teenagers doing the planning, and in some cases, although nobody wants to say it out loud, it also includes members of the political elite or business elite in Somalia running the show.

A kinetic lethal response is only part of the solution.

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Herald12345 4/24/2009 7:07:35 PM

Not correct data.

Can F-22's with a MC or less than ~65%? 60 extra Raptors does not in anyway eliminate the CM defense problem.

The current force is around 70% sortie ready.

The coverage calls for 50 aircraft because you have an estimated non-available of 20% (40 F-22 aircraft is CONUS CAP minimum from four airbases @ Mach 1.5 (500 m/s) at super-cruise chase means 1 hour rundown at 1,800,000 meters or 970 nautical miles. Note that is the radius A2A super-cruise of the bird unrefueled from the runway to IP? These performance figures aren't design accidents you know.

Physics and technology, folks.

Herald

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