Unfortunately the above plan (1) Leaves the Navy without a true stealth aircraft for its carriers. If you want to create a real financial scream try suggesting adapting the F-22 for carrier duty. (2) Loses the flexability of new V/STOL aircraft and (3) Undercuts our international F-35 partners.

 

1) The Super Hornet and Growler are perfectly capable until stealthy UCAVs join the fleet.

 

2) There is no point in acquiring a new V/STOL aircraft.   The Marines should buy Super Hornets.  LHA/D/A(R)s are not strike carriers, and the Marines wind up operating their Harriers from fixed runways the vast majority of the time.

 

3) Our international F-35 partners are all balking at the costs of the project and could very well bail out on us.  Every one of the JSF partners has reduced or delayed its commitments to buy airframes, and we wind up bearing the resulting costs.  At some point, we have to decide to stop and live with the sunk costs.  And for those countries just as with the US, there are also cheaper alternatives: F-15ES, advanced F-16s, F/A-18s for the UK CVFs, etc.

Da,

Even the Sec of Def cannot pull planes out of thin air ok. The numbers I stated are not *my* opinion. Those are the officially published numbers by LM and the US Gov to date. And by anyones standards, they are extremely optimisitc. Anyone with an open mind could and should expect those numbers to slip to some extent. Certainly NOT go up, and go up by the required amount Gates is leading people to believe in order to arrive at his 513 number. For him (GATES) to come out and make such a statement is either one of two things. Either he has no clue what is acutually going on with the JSF program, or he is intentionally misleading the American public.

 

Thank you but I am fully aware of the proposed production schedule of the F35. More so then you it appears. The 230/yr is not scheduled to take effect until 2015 and like I said, anyone being realistic can certainly expect that to slip to some degree. The only thing in question is how much. At any rate, Gates cannot simply say we are gonna get X amount of planes and then they magically appear. In the time frame he stated, the US cannot get 513 planes and that's just a simple fact of life. As far as the 230/yr goes, the US is only slated to get 130 of those as well DA. Of those 130 it is split between the USN and USAF ( looks like after 2015 it will be about a 65/35% split in favor of the USAF) so it still leaves the USAF short of planes.

 

I got a feeling I already know what his alternative is going to be. Something like this. After further review I have determined that we do not actually need the earlier stated numbers due to advances in (fill in the blank) and procurement on the F35 will be cut to (fill in the blank). Gates is like reading an old book you've read a dozen times and already know the outcome. It's obvious to anyone with open eyes and anyone who is free to actually critizize him, which you are NOT, where he is taking this nations national defense.

 

Beazz

 

 Source is Newsweek, but it is pertinent.

 

Will Gates Nomination Revive Old Scandals?

Nov. 8, 2006 - By choosing Robert Gates as his new Defense secretary, President George W. Bush is once again turning to a trusted warhorse from his father?s administration. But the Gates nomination also could remind the new Democratic Congress about controversies from the George H.W. Bush era as well.

Gates was investigated during the late 1980s and 1990s by independent counsel Lawrence Walsh over whether Gates had told the truth about the Iran-contra affair, which occurred during his tenure as deputy to Ronald Reagan?s CIA director, William Casey. Questions about Gates's knowledge of secret arms sales to Iran—and the diversion of proceeds to support the Nicaraguan contras—caused Gates to withdraw his nomination to succeed Casey as CIA director in 1987.

Gates was again nominated by President George H.W. Bush to be CIA chief in 1991, setting off an intense and spirited confirmation hearing in which charges and countercharges about Iran-contra flared anew. Gates also was publicly accused by former CIA subordinates of slanting intelligence about the Soviet threat—a criticism that evokes an eerie parallel to accusations hurled against the current Bush administration over its handling of pre-war intelligence about Iraq?s weapons of mass destruction and alleged ties to Al Qaeda.

After months of partisan wrangling and debate, Gates was confirmed as CIA director in November 1991 and served in that capacity until the end of the first President Bush?s term in January 1993. He later served as interim dean of the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and, after that, as president of Texas A&M, where both the school of government and the Bush library are located. After Congress passed "intelligence reform" legislation in 2004 creating the post of a national intelligence director to coordinate the activities of feuding intelligence agencies, the White House approached Gates to see if he wanted to become the first new intelligence czar. But on that occasion, Gates turned George W. Bush down.

Bush today praised Gates as a ?steady, solid leader who can help make the necessary adjustments in our approach to the current challenges.? And indeed some former associates describe Gates as a savvy and seasoned bureaucratic veteran who is almost certain to establish a more co-operative relationship with the uniformed services and other agencies.

But some of Gates's old critics—who not coincidentally have also been critics of the current Bush administration?s Iraq policy—maintain he is not necessarily the best candidate for the job of correcting a war policy that is seriously off course.

When he heard today about Gates's nomination, ?I nearly choked on my sandwich,? said Mel Goodman, a former Soviet analyst at the CIA who testified against Gates?s nomination to be CIA director in 1991. ?This is not a guy who?s ever been accused of speaking truth to power. If you?re looking for somebody who?s going to change Iraq policy, he?s hardly the guy to do it. The only policy he?s going to consider is what is acceptable to the White House.?

During his 1991 testimony, Goodman testified that Gates, as deputy CIA director, consistently politicized intelligence-community reports about Iran, Nicaragua and Afghanistan in order to cater to the hard-line anti-Soviet policies of the Reagan White House. Gates?s role as deputy CIA director ?was to corrupt the process and the ethics of intelligence on all of these issues.? When Goodman protested his actions, Gates ?went off like a Roman candle,? Goodman said today. ?It was the same kind of manufacturing of intelligence? in the run-up to the Iraq war, Goodman said.

Congressional records and transcripts extensively document the debate over Gates's credentials and record in the Bush and Reagan administrations. In one case, Democrats accused Gates of helping to push an allegedly contentious report about the Soviet Union's influence in Iran.

One of the most controversial intelligence issues concerning Gates, as CIA No. 2, involved an investigation into contentious allegations that the Soviet Union played a role in the 1981 shooting, by a Turkish extremist, of Pope John Paul II. According to Senate transcripts, the CIA prepared a memo outlining the case for Soviet complicity in the attack on the pope and in a cover letter forwarding the document to Reagan. Gates allegedly stated that the intelligence review upon which the memo was based was comprehensive. However, a CIA internal review later denounced the memo as being skewed, and Gates himself later admitted the document had been based on thin evidence. "The charges [against Gates] of politicization, intimidation and demoralization of analysts, particularly in the Soviet field, are compelling. After all, even Mr. Gates has expressed worries about politicization," commented the late Sen. Brock Adams, a Washington Democrat, during the Senate floor debate that eventually led to Gates's confirmation as George H.W. Bush's CIA director.

A report produced by Lawrence Walsh, the independent counsel appointed to conduct a criminal investigation of the Iran-contra affair, criticized Gates for possible lack of candor related to what he knew about the Reagan-era scandal. According to the report, Gates consistently testified that he first learned in October 1986 that money from the sales of arms to Iran may have been diverted to anticommunist contra forces in Central America. Other evidence, however, suggested that Gates got a report on the affair from a senior CIA official several months earlier. Walsh eventually decided that there was not enough evidence to warrant the filing of any criminal case against Gates. "In the end, although Gates's actions suggested an officer who was more interested in shielding his institution from criticism and in shifting the blame to the NSC [National Security Council] than in finding out the truth, there was insufficient evidence to charge Gates with a criminal endeavor to obstruct congressional investigations," Walsh wrote in his report.

Confirmation hearings on Gates's nomination to become Defense secretary will be held by the Senate Armed Services Committee, which will be chaired by Michigan Sen. Carl Levin if Democrats do take control of the Senate. One of the Democrats' best-informed members on military and foreign-policy issues, Levin is also a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee and has been in the forefront of efforts by both committees to investigate allegations that policymakers in the current Bush administration "cherry picked" intelligence reporting and pressured analysts to highlight information supporting White House policies toward Iraq.

If he holds on to his slim election-night lead and is sworn in as the final member of a new Democratic majority in the Senate, Virginia's Jim Webb may also ultimately have an interesting take to offer on the Gates nomination. Webb, a highly decorated war hero, was secretary of the Navy during the Reagan administration and, before that, had attended the U.S. Naval Academy with Oliver North, the Marine colonel who was at the center of the Iran-contra scandal. Webb publicly criticized North years ago when the former colonel ran unsuccessfully for the Virginia Senate seat that Webb himself is now on the verge of capturing.

A Capitol Hill official familiar with the views of Senate Democrats said, however, that while Democrats like Levin are expected to grill Gates thoroughly about his past record—including the Iran-contra affair and allegations of politicization—Democrats at this stage are not necessarily gunning to shoot down the Gates nomination. The official said that while Democrats were aware of allegations, which they themselves publicized, that Gates had skewed intelligence or misstated his knowledge of the Iran-contra affair, the view among some Democrats is that once Gates finally became CIA chief under the first President Bush, he turned out to be "one of the better [CIA directors] we've ever had." The official added: "Generally his reputation as CIA director is very positive."

Bill Harlow, a spokesman for former CIA director George Tenet who worked with Gates at the National Security Council during the previous Bush administration, described Gates as "extremely smart, dedicated, hardworking and experienced." He added: "I'm sure he will be a unifying figure at the Pentagon."

Correction: An earlier version of this report incorrectly stated that Gates had served as director of the George Bush Library at Texas A&M.

URL:Will Gates Nomination Revive Old Scandals?

Nov. 8, 2006 - By choosing Robert Gates as his new Defense secretary, President George W. Bush is once again turning to a trusted warhorse from his father?s administration. But the Gates nomination also could remind the new Democratic Congress about controversies from the George H.W. Bush era as well.

Gates was investigated during the late 1980s and 1990s by independent counsel Lawrence Walsh over whether Gates had told the truth about the Iran-contra affair, which occurred during his tenure as deputy to Ronald Reagan?s CIA director, William Casey. Questions about Gates's knowledge of secret arms sales to Iran—and the diversion of proceeds to support the Nicaraguan contras—caused Gates to withdraw his nomination to succeed Casey as CIA director in 1987.

Gates was again nominated by President George H.W. Bush to be CIA chief in 1991, setting off an intense and spirited confirmation hearing in which charges and countercharges about Iran-contra flared anew. Gates also was publicly accused by former CIA subordinates of slanting intelligence about the Soviet threat—a criticism that evokes an eerie parallel to accusations hurled against the current Bush administration over its handling of pre-war intelligence about Iraq?s weapons of mass destruction and alleged ties to Al Qaeda.

After months of partisan wrangling and debate, Gates was confirmed as CIA director in November 1991 and served in that capacity until the end of the first President Bush?s term in January 1993. He later served as interim dean of the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and, after that, as president of Texas A&M, where both the school of government and the Bush library are located. After Congress passed "intelligence reform" legislation in 2004 creating the post of a national intelligence director to coordinate the activities of feuding intelligence agencies, the White House approached Gates to see if he wanted to become the first new intelligence czar. But on that occasion, Gates turned George W. Bush down.

Bush today praised Gates as a ?steady, solid leader who can help make the necessary adjustments in our approach to the current challenges.? And indeed some former associates describe Gates as a savvy and seasoned bureaucratic veteran who is almost certain to establish a more co-operative relationship with the uniformed services and other agencies.

But some of Gates's old critics—who not coincidentally have also been critics of the current Bush administration?s Iraq policy—maintain he is not necessarily the best candidate for the job of correcting a war policy that is seriously off course.

When he heard today about Gates's nomination, ?I nearly choked on my sandwich,? said Mel Goodman, a former Soviet analyst at the CIA who testified against Gates?s nomination to be CIA director in 1991. ?This is not a guy who?s ever been accused of speaking truth to power. If you?re looking for somebody who?s going to change Iraq policy, he?s hardly the guy to do it. The only policy he?s going to consider is what is acceptable to the White House.?

During his 1991 testimony, Goodman testified that Gates, as deputy CIA director, consistently politicized intelligence-community reports about Iran, Nicaragua and Afghanistan in order to cater to the hard-line anti-Soviet policies of the Reagan White House. Gates?s role as deputy CIA director ?was to corrupt the process and the ethics of intelligence on all of these issues.? When Goodman protested his actions, Gates ?went off like a Roman candle,? Goodman said today. ?It was the same kind of manufacturing of intelligence? in the run-up to the Iraq war, Goodman said.

Congressional records and transcripts extensively document the debate over Gates's credentials and record in the Bush and Reagan administrations. In one case, Democrats accused Gates of helping to push an allegedly contentious report about the Soviet Union's influence in Iran.

One of the most controversial intelligence issues concerning Gates, as CIA No. 2, involved an investigation into contentious allegations that the Soviet Union played a role in the 1981 shooting, by a Turkish extremist, of Pope John Paul II. According to Senate transcripts, the CIA prepared a memo outlining the case for Soviet complicity in the attack on the pope and in a cover letter forwarding the document to Reagan. Gates allegedly stated that the intelligence review upon which the memo was based was comprehensive. However, a CIA internal review later denounced the memo as being skewed, and Gates himself later admitted the document had been based on thin evidence. "The charges [against Gates] of politicization, intimidation and demoralization of analysts, particularly in the Soviet field, are compelling. After all, even Mr. Gates has expressed worries about politicization," commented the late Sen. Brock Adams, a Washington Democrat, during the Senate floor debate that eventually led to Gates's confirmation as George H.W. Bush's CIA director.

A report produced by Lawrence Walsh, the independent counsel appointed to conduct a criminal investigation of the Iran-contra affair, criticized Gates for possible lack of candor related to what he knew about the Reagan-era scandal. According to the report, Gates consistently testified that he first learned in October 1986 that money from the sales of arms to Iran may have been diverted to anticommunist contra forces in Central America. Other evidence, however, suggested that Gates got a report on the affair from a senior CIA official several months earlier. Walsh eventually decided that there was not enough evidence to warrant the filing of any criminal case against Gates. "In the end, although Gates's actions suggested an officer who was more interested in shielding his institution from criticism and in shifting the blame to the NSC [National Security Council] than in finding out the truth, there was insufficient evidence to charge Gates with a criminal endeavor to obstruct congressional investigations," Walsh wrote in his report.

Confirmation hearings on Gates's nomination to become Defense secretary will be held by the Senate Armed Services Committee, which will be chaired by Michigan Sen. Carl Levin if Democrats do take control of the Senate. One of the Democrats' best-informed members on military and foreign-policy issues, Levin is also a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee and has been in the forefront of efforts by both committees to investigate allegations that policymakers in the current Bush administration "cherry picked" intelligence reporting and pressured analysts to highlight information supporting White House policies toward Iraq.

If he holds on to his slim election-night lead and is sworn in as the final member of a new Democratic majority in the Senate, Virginia's Jim Webb may also ultimately have an interesting take to offer on the Gates nomination. Webb, a highly decorated war hero, was secretary of the Navy during the Reagan administration and, before that, had attended the U.S. Naval Academy with Oliver North, the Marine colonel who was at the center of the Iran-contra scandal. Webb publicly criticized North years ago when the former colonel ran unsuccessfully for the Virginia Senate seat that Webb himself is now on the verge of capturing.

A Capitol Hill official familiar with the views of Senate Democrats said, however, that while Democrats like Levin are expected to grill Gates thoroughly about his past record—including the Iran-contra affair and allegations of politicization—Democrats at this stage are not necessarily gunning to shoot down the Gates nomination. The official said that while Democrats were aware of allegations, which they themselves publicized, that Gates had skewed intelligence or misstated his knowledge of the Iran-contra affair, the view among some Democrats is that once Gates finally became CIA chief under the first President Bush, he turned out to be "one of the better [CIA directors] we've ever had." The official added: "Generally his reputation as CIA director is very positive."

Bill Harlow, a spokesman for former CIA director George Tenet who worked with Gates at the National Security Council during the previous Bush administration, described Gates as "extremely smart, dedicated, hardworking and experienced." He added: "I'm sure he will be a unifying figure at the Pentagon."

Correction: An earlier version of this report incorrectly stated that Gates had served as director of the George Bush Library at Texas A&M.

URL: CONTACT POINT: MSNBC

:

The highlighted sections are the important ones. You cannot rely on Gates to be anything, but what he is.

 

Gates is an apparatchik.

 

Herald

 

 

 

Darth's UAV problem is that he does not seem to know how or when to use them. The "no fly zones" over Bosnia and Iraq burned up thousands of hours of airframe life and was not a mission that could have been done with a Predator drone (or any other drone today). It was a pure air to air mission that soaked up 2 full F15C airwings during the 90's. Every morning the Iraqi Airforce would drive their migs at the no fly zone border and the US F15c's would respond. We had a standing BARCAP mission 24-7 for about a decade in Iraq and to a lesser degree in Bosnia (hey darth, google it!). On top of that there were standing HARM patrols to keep Iraqi SAMs pinned down.

None of this can be done by a UCAV today. Since he is unaware of those missions and their effect upon the USAFs overall mission it is safe to say he isn't qualified to discuss the USAF air superiority requirements moving forward. His argument is first political and second ego-manic. Whenever he meets someone who obviously has a clue, Phaid for instance, he retreats behind a thin veil of "I'm a veteran" and declares himself the smartest guy in the room where any who disagree are "biased". What a boob!

 

 

When he learns history and context of these conversations he might be able to think critically on the subjects. For now he is a troll.

 

Check Six

 

Rocky

It's also my gut reaction that the posters who are suggesting that F-35 be scrapped are somewhat less than sincere in their stated position F-35 could, in fact, actually be cancelled.  End run attempt, nothing more, but good game ;>)

v^2

 

I am one hundred percent sincere.  In and of itself I am not a "F-35 basher", but the program is too risky given the current economic climate.  It forces us to give up too much in the near term and may never deliver at all in the long term. 

 

I stand by my predictions.  Every single completely-new defense acquisition program in the last 10 years has spiraled out of control and wound up canceled or curtailed, and the F-35 looks well on its way to the same fate.  If the choice is between purchasing systems whose development is complete and which are known to meet our current and future needs, versus scrapping them all for a program whose success is far from assured... it isn't any choice at all.

Softwar,

It's sad that you and Herald are incapable of having a debate based on facts rather than your politics. The fact is that neither of you are capable of making your case and are showing a complete misunderstanding of the subject matter altogether. Softwar, your reference to CID is simply laughable and indicative of how little you really understand. Neither of you are worth a single keystroke outside of you local fanclubs on this website. Again, I challenge you on facts. When you are actually capable of responding in kind and learn how to share an opinion without insulting your audience, then you will start to appreciate the benefit of a forum. Grow up. Try to be like Warpig, Phaid or GF. I'm sure both have different opinions compared to mine, but neither of them are diving into the realm of personal insults as both of you two are. Bluewings is absolutely right that some of you behave like clowns in the face of peers. Consider that. Especially Herald. You would think getting pimp slapped of the boards would have humbled him. Warpig was right. 

-DA 

 

 

 

Phaid, my opinion is that we have enough air to air capable platforms to deal with any likely scenarios and that the need for them will decrease as conflicts continue to be more biased towards rogue states and non-state actors. I disagree about not mature enough for primary strike though. I agree that some work has to be done with regard to CAS however.

Appeal to the crowd and character assassination its called when the shouter has no facts to rebut the plain stated case on its merits.

 

I do have to correct you on a couple of points, SW. When a properly designed ballistic missile decouples from its ground support cables it is a self contained robot that flies on its internal guidance. Some of them will have guidance updating mid-phase or will read radio-location beacons to correct for drift error as they debus their RVs, but most don't.

 

There is thus no antenna vulnerability to exploit to misdirect such a war rocket. To may knowledge there is no EW way to spoof such a self-contained weapon within the Earth's atmosphere.

 

Guided missiles are another story.

In  addition to other science fiction things we must be careful about when we make assumptions and declare things, we don't exactly burn missiles out of the air as much as we exploit information paths that the enemy builds in his missiles to disable them. We've done this as spoofing for a long time with self protection jammers and other active countermeasures, but now we can build it into the radar which has the power at last to do more than just spoof. We can cook pilots at range, if the enemy aircraft isn't radio opaque for example. 

 

But remember there has to be an exploit path. Mister Faraday is very much still with us.  

Herald

 

 

   

 

No, you misunderstood me. Let me clarify. The No Fly Zones of the 21st Century are not going to be like the No Fly Zones of last decade. This decades no fly zone is over Pakistan, Africa and Iraq looking for Taliban and AQ not SAMs and Migs. ISR and Time Critical Strike against Targets of Opportunity has taken the the lead in this regard. Contrary to some of the errors people have posted here, we are much closer to having UCAV's than people think that are capable of taking over significant portions of the roles we use manned platforms for. Particularly with regard to CAP, SEAD and Strike roles. And this doesn't even consider the roles they will take over that we use some rotor winged assets for now. 

We are past the peak of manned air combat. It's an area that is radically changing. Especially in the air to air domain. WE NEED F-22's. But with the current trend and considering other assets we can bring to bear not in any more numbers than we have already agreed to procure. This is another one of those issues people will come back to 5 years from now and say, WOW how did you know that? The signs are clear if you know what to look for. But it requires a broad look across a range of military and technological disciplines to grasp.  

Now, this is my opinion. It's based on facts and my own military and civil experiences. It ***could*** be wrong. But I don't think so. If you, disagree, say so and let it be. There is no need to get wrapped around the axle calling people trolls because 1 guy you don't know on the internet thinks we don't need more F-22's.

-DA 

 

1) The Super Hornet and Growler are perfectly capable until stealthy UCAVs join the fleet.

 

The question  of course is when the air defense, attack and EW stealthy UCAVs will be available. To quote Rumsfeld you go to war with the militaery you have.

 

2) There is no point in acquiring a new V/STOL aircraft.   The Marines should buy Super Hornets.  LHA/D/A(R)s are not strike carriers, and the Marines wind up operating their Harriers from fixed runways the vast majority of the time.

 

 

3) Our international F-35 partners are all balking at the costs of the project and could very well bail out on us.  Every one of the JSF partners has reduced or delayed its commitments to buy airframes, and we wind up bearing the resulting costs.  At some point, we have to decide to stop and live with the sunk costs.  And for those countries just as with the US, there are also cheaper alternatives: F-15ES, advanced F-16s, F/A-18s for the UK CVFs, etc.

Granted that ballistic missiles do not have antennas to exploit - and the warheads are much more hardened than say an AAM or land attack missile.  However - the F-22 AESA can be used against sensitive electronics  and it is not limited on antenna entry points.  This is especially true of unsheilded or commercial grade products where there are exploits available.  Simple induction of current flow or distortion of the chip memory can result in unpredictable results.  A very good example is the unsheilded computers onboard the former Russian space station which malfunctioned.

 

Of course, generation 1 guidance systems - e.g. clock work mechanical systems - are not vulnerable but much less accurate.

 

The IW aspects of a powerful AESA combined with the CPU even alows for true hacking into networks without antennas using various unsheilded entry points such as nodes and even fiber optic relays.  This is one reason for rad hardened chips in your ballistic missile guidance and warhead assembly.