"How do you ignore fighters which are considerably faster than you are..." You made the observation, and I agreed, that the Argentines did send fighter sorties at high altitude. I made the comment that if they did not attack, they were irrelevant to the SHAR CAP mission, and could be ignored, which they were. "Threat" Of course they were a threat. At that stage of the conflict a trawler full of fishermen was a threat. But they could do little to affect the outcome...otherwise they would have done. Q.E.D. "Speed" Why your obsession with speed in air combat maneuvering? Energy matters, but speed is a function of making the other guy fight in your envelope on your terms. Again, the Mirage didn't seem to want to mix it with SHAR intheir realm; so they didn't. If they had done, who knows?

"I've read a British paratrooper who saw Argentine pilots saying 'they were very brave boys'" Well good for you. Nothing like having infantry as expert witnesses to an air campaign. The Agrentines as every pilot in every air force, knew to pull up at the IP and didn't. It is not a question of adolescent standards of gallantry, it is a matter of achieving some success. Anti-air fire is dangerous but few were downed by ground fire over the islands and most got home just fine. As I said, brave, but not brave enough. P.S. I'll talk about my war record, but lets hear yours first.

"You made the observation, and I agreed, that the Argentines did send fighter sorties at high altitude. I made the comment that if they did not attack, they were irrelevant to the SHAR CAP mission, and could be ignored, which they were." The SHAR sorties did not ignore the Mirage patrols. The did in fact remain alert to the possibility that the Mirages would attack and would have been stupid not to do so. I also think that the Argentinean high command was stupid for not ordering the pilots to press home attacks when they had the numbers advantage and suspect this was because they were psyched out by the shooting down of the first two, early in the war. "Of course they were a threat. At that stage of the conflict a trawler full of fishermen was a threat. But they could do little to affect the outcome...otherwise they would have done. Q.E.D." That is complete BS. The British didn't arm their GR-1's with Sidewinders and train the pilots in dogfighting, to tackle fishing trawlers. They obviously thought the Mirages were a legitimate threat and that they would take losses, or they wouldn't have taken this precaution. "Why your obsession with speed in air combat maneuvering? Energy matters, but speed is a function of making the other guy fight in your envelope on your terms. Again, the Mirage didn't seem to want to mix it with SHAR intheir realm; so they didn't. If they had done, who knows." I know very well that speed is not the be-all and end-all in ACM. It is however an advantage, as it allows a pilot some flexibility to pick where and from when they attack. Combined with their superior numbers, at least the British thought there was a serious risk of the Mirages setting up for a series of high-speed passes, from different directions, on the Harriers. This would have been a very difficult tactic to counter, but apparently the Argies training and tactical awareness, which are ultimately a problem with their leaders, let them down on this occasion. By the way, these two passages from your post contradict each other, "But they could do little to affect the outcome...otherwise they would have done. Q.E.D." and, "Again, the Mirage didn't seem to want to mix it with SHAR intheir realm; so they didn't. If they had done, who knows." So are you saying they could or couldn't make a difference? For god sake make up your mind.

"Anti-air fire is dangerous but few were downed by ground fire over the islands and most got home just fine." This is from your initial post, "(f) 102 Argentine aircraft were lost. Of the 64 lost in combat, 11 were SAS, 20 ground fire, 7 air attack and 25 air combat, giving fixed avaition (Sea Harrier/Harrier) 50% of the kills." 20 aircraft lost to ground fire is not a "few". It constituted about 30% of the British combat kills, so indicates that the Argies were taking a serious risk from AAA and SAM's, in attacking the British navy. "As I said, brave, but not brave enough." Another one of your lines, "They were ducking the fire. Still think they were brave?" Sounds to me like you have changed your mind from them not being brave, to not being brave enough. More BS to save a desperate argument? "Nothing like having infantry as expert witnesses to an air campaign" The British paratrooper is only one person who described the Argentinian airforce as brave. That said, courage is courage whether it involved jumping out of a plane into a firefight or flying through one. "It is not a question of adolescent standards of gallantry, it is a matter of achieving some success." I don't think a third-world airforce/naval air- arm sinking half a dozen ships of the second or third most powerful navy in the world at that time, could be regarded as anything but successful. Had that effort been combined with a decent effort by the Argentine army and navy, and Falkland island childern might be learning Spanish as a first language in school. In any case, achieving success is influenced by a variety of factors, quite apart from courage. Training, leadership and equipment all has a part to play and if any one of these is lacking, it can result in a loss, irrespective of how brave the people doing the fighting are. "P.S. I'll talk about my war record, but lets hear yours first." Having served in times of peace, I don't have a war record and have never claimed to. However, I am also not the one unilaterally declaring a group of airmen whose actions are widely regarded as very brave as less than so. I have never read anything about the Falklands campaign(and I've read a lot of informed commentry), that has suggested that the Argentinian attack pilots were anything but brave and I am happy to defer to those peoples opinions. By contrast, all you can do is quote a pilot who declared the Argies tactics "basic", then somehow extrapolate that this was intended as a slur on their courage. So, you can lay your tales of gallentry on me now if you want to. However, given your apparent willingness to change your story to suit yourself, as evidenced throughout this thread, I'll be taking it with a grain of salt. I'd also note that the returned servicemen that I have met, give credit where credit is due, even to the enemy and would regard it as low-brow to do otherwise. The fact that you don't do this raises more suspicions in my mind.

I note your raised emotions but I'm afraid it doesn't change the facts. Frankly I don't know why I bother but here goes:- 1. Before any military operation officers conduct what is called "enemy appreciation" which includes "threat reduction". In this case the Mirage were a threat, but only if they escortd attackers or engaged the CAPS; they did neither so the SHAR did not need to engage them - "ignore them" is correct - while concentrating on their beach protection mission. Similarly, the Exocet threat was "reduced" to the refuelled range of the Etendards and the land-based pocket south of Stanley. The trawler in question was called the "Narwhal" , an intelligence gatherer, and was fired on by SHAR cannon, boarded by SBS and later sank. 2. Pilots are responsible individually for planning an attack - reviewing intelligence, aerial photos, selecting weapons, routes in/out, time on target. Pilots, not "high command". The air force trained very extensively with Naval Esc. 2 and their navy, even specifically practicing against Argentine Type 42 destroyers and learning the recognize radar signatures, etc. They were not half-trained, merely inexperienced in ship attack. The naval pilots noted in training that the air force pilots tended to fly too high on approach (they corrected this) and then pull up too high after passing the target rather than at the IP. This low then climb was ineffective and dangerous; the required low-high-low was rarely mastered; as one naval abiator commented, "the air force din't seem to understand that facing fire before the target (to release) was a lot safer than taking fire after you pull away". What I referred to as "ducking the fire", to which you take exception. You can put this down to poor training if you like, but they were all qualified attack pilots trained to hit point targets. 3. The Argentine losses to ground-fire include two "own goals" and at least one Pucara. The balance mostly crashed into the sea on the way home - a nasty way to go with no hope of rescue. But, please note these 17 aircraft were 1/10 of the 170 sorties between May 21 and May 25 and 1/20 of some 300 sorties flown in total. What is telling is that these sorties consistently, more than any other air campaign ever recorded, droped weapons which failed to detonate; why? Because they had not armed, because they were released too low. You can argue that against the limited success, the attacks were wasteful, or do you think they should get "points" for low flying? The annals of air combat are full of desperate, determined action. The Doolittle raid of 1942 taking off in land bombers from aircraft carriers knew that the must bomb Tokyo and then crash land "somewhere" in China. The marine aviators at Midway knew that they must fight despite their obsolete Buffaloes; none survived. You are probably familiar with the Dambusters; virtually the entire squadron lost, but BOTH dams destroyed. It is the same in infantry warfare; at D-Day casualties were below the 10% expected; BUT the first wave suffered 95% casualties. If any Argentine pilot had said, we MUST destroy one major amphibian (Fearless, Intrepid, Canberra one of the 5 LSL's) regardless of cost, it might have been different. But no one did; the attacks were not pressed home with "ruthless bravery" to use Chuck Horner's description of the RAF in GW1. I am not retracting anything and regret your missing some of the nuances of my points. Against the standards of other air campaigns and mindful of all the unarmed bombs, I simply repeat what I have said: brave, but not brave enough.

Simple logical positivism, but simplified:- "couldn't ergo didn't, QED" "didn't ergo didn't" Any other argument is redundant. P.S. References to the Almighty should be capitalized. P.P.S. Cool under fire is a more admirable quality.

"I note your raised emotions but I'm afraid it doesn't change the facts." In this case facts according to Worchester have been very fuzzy facts indeed. In any case, yes my emotions are raised, if that is the way you want to put it. I prefer to say that you have succeeded in pissing me off. Why? Because as a matter of honour, those in the military give credit where credit is due, even to an enemy who deserves such recognition. You are breaking that code through your continual distortions and misrepresentations. To make it worse, you appear to be doing so purely out of stubborn pride. Its just a shame, because most of what you right on these boards is well considered, fair and worth reading. 1. Your whole first response misses the point. The whole premise of my argument about the Mirages, as distinct from that about the attack fighters, was that they could have successfully engaged the Harriers, but did not choose to. My suspicion is that they lacked the tactical skills to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of the SHAR force and use their own advantages against them. It was noted by a SHAR pilot that they had not NATO style air to air training, which was undoubtedly a factor leading to their intimidation out of seeking effective engagement. Also, I note again, for the last time, that I never spoke of escorting the strike fighters, a scenario that you keep raising for some reason. I in fact suggested they could have performed offensive air superiority missions, prior to the bombing. In the context of a tactically aware Mirage force(the context of my comments), it would be impossible to "ignore" them. 2. Well if they were inexperienced in ship attack, don't you think that would count for something? If the airforce pilots had ess experience than the naval pilots had, of course they were going to be less successful. The same can be said for the fact that they didn't have the right bombs for the job. As such, none of this has anything to do with lack of bravery. In fact, as opposed to your logic, the airforce pilots would have had to have been braver than the navy ones to achieve the same results. 3. "Because they had not armed, because they were released too low." Nope, because they had the wrong bombs for the job. Why do you think that the Argentine navy, the maritime attack experts, bought Snakeyes? Because they were right for the job. It wasn't the airforce pilots fault that they weren't properly equipped. That gets back to their leaders. As for the WW2 efforts, that was a completely different era. No Western country would accept those types of losses nowdays, least of all over a dinky little archepelego, inhabited by sheep farmers. So, if you want to say that the Argies are not as brave as the Dambusters were, then I agree, but I'd love you to show me a modern airforce that is. "If any Argentine pilot had said, we MUST destroy one major amphibian (Fearless, Intrepid, Canberra one of the 5 LSL's) regardless of cost, it might have been different." Thats assuming the pilots could tell a frigate from an amphib at 50 feet and 600mph. Given that even the maritime strike trained naval aviators didn't manage this, I'm picking that it was simply impossible under the circumstances. "I simply repeat what I have said: brave, but not brave enough." Of course without acknowledging that this wasn't what you said when you started the thread. Just one of many points ignored, because you know they are right.

"References to the Almighty should be capitalized." I wasn't refering to your Almighty. I was talking about that generic god who inhabits the English language, thanks to that language's long association with the Christian faith.

"Fuzzy" facts oxymoron. I have produced lists of data (facts), identified their sources (which are reliable) and made the obvious conclusions which are also very similar to those held by Lami Doso, the Argentine air force commander - the absence of a committed effort at the target. Meanwhile your response has been to speculate about "what if" - which is an interesting exercise - but, not receiving an affirnmtive response, you decide to take offense under some mythic code of "military courtesy". P.S. The Argentine air force did use the British 1000 pound retard bomb; as used by the RN Fleet Air Arm...for shipping attacks.

"dinky little archipelago inhabited by sheep farmers" May 25th 1982 was the 200th anniversary of Argentina's independence from Spain - why their aircraft carrier was called Veinticinco de Mayo (25th May) - and why the air campaign was so intense 22-25 May. Las Malvinas were Galtieri's gift to the nation. It's kind of like US pilots losing a battle on July 4th 1976; what's the equivalent in Australia? "no western country would accept these losses...show me a modern air force that is.." RAF in GW1; lost 3 aircraft out of 30 GR3A sorties in 24 hours, achieved the objective and it wasn't even St George's Day. Suspect you'll find your own aviators would do the same to protect your land. The shame is Argentine AF took losses but never had a major success except Bluff Cove, unlike their Navy.