To AGR From the spring of '41 on, Luftwaffe forces opposite Britain were composed of two JGs, and those at less than full strength as sub units were constantly being sent as reinforcements to other theatures. Until well into '42 the only Spitfires the RAF had outside Fighter Command were a handful on Malta. You figure the odds. Yes, air superiority was achieved during '43-'44 because the Germans were forced to withdraw more and more a/c for use elsewhere. At the same time, combat on the Russian Front, in North Africaa, and especially over Germany itself inflicted losses in a/c and personel that prevented the Luftwaffe from increasing its strength to meet its increasing needs, in spite of radically increased a/c production and expanded pilot training. Over the coast, prior to the arrival of the USAAF, Fighter Command simply lacked the range to force combat on the two partial JGs defending, except at the German's choice. The result was that the Germans could always contest control of the air successful when they did choose, as in the case of the Channel Dash, and the Dieppe Raid. The Spitfires were there, not in heaps standing in hangers, but flying short range day bomber escorts and fighter sweeps, while the Germans inflicted a seriously negative kill/lose ratio on them. Even after the introduction of the MkIX the Germans did low level jabo strikes on England, with a positive k/l ratio for them, until RAF tactics finally began to improve in the spring of '43.

Actually, the Spitfire had a comparatively poor zoom, another downside of the low wing loading, along with acceleration limitations, particularly in the dive. Either the Thunderbolt or Lightning could out-zoom a Spitfire easily, even a MkXIV. Only if the climb continued long for the momentum of the zoom to be lost, did the Spitfire's climbing ability come into play, and in acutal combat that would amount to disengagement. Your comment on turning is exactly correct, and that is the essence of close combat tactics. Get on his tail and follow him until he reverses on you, you shoot him down, or he disengages. The problem is that the longer the combat has lasted, the less chance of actually shooting him down. Those accounts of individual dogfights are great reading, but they were relatively rare, and when they occured, usually ended with successful disengagement by the disadvantaged a/c. Short of a lucky hit, the only way to make a kill is if the pursued pilot makes a mistake, or is trapped into a predictable maneuver that the pursuer can follow. This is why its important to do the engage-disengage-reengage pattern. Its on the intitial engagement, when the target may be looking the wrong way, that you get kills.

Yes, but those changes were progressive developements of what remained the basic MkI airframe. The increased fin and rudder area were as necessary to deal with the increased power as the strengthened engine mounts, just not so quickly recognized. Yes, I know about ther C wing. But notice the extra two cannon were almost never mounted because of the weight and drag effects on performance.

actually the 4 cannon arrangement was used, the south african squadron all kept the 4 cannon arangement, the main reason for the reduction to two was not as you quote problems with firing 4 but that with only two more ammo could be carried, and as the 20mm was a very effective hitter the overkill of 4 was regarded as a small price to pay for more shots. your quotes on the luftwaffe vs raf pre d day are a bit one sided, some 90% of luftwaffe fighter bases were within range of the spit, but as there was little the luftwaffe would fight to protect in france and most of what they would was heavily defended by flak they could just sit out the raf fighter sweeps untill they could mount a favourable attack, when they did the spit usual gave a good account despit being in an unfavourable position. I would hardley class the squadrons the luftwaffe had in france as being substandard, check who flew with them! as for the jabo attacks on england, the attacks were fast, low and the aircraft didnt hang around for interception, a tactic thats still recomended for strike aircraft today.

"From the spring of '41 on, Luftwaffe forces opposite Britain were composed of two JGs, and those at less than full strength as sub units were constantly being sent as reinforcements to other theatures. Until well into '42 the only Spitfires the RAF had outside Fighter Command were a handful on Malta. You figure the odds." I don't know the odds, because I don't know the strength of a JG and I don't know how many Spits were committed to cross-Channel sorties. They still would have had to keep some back in case of a revived Blitz, so I suspect that the actual numbers fighting in France would have had to have been much lower than you are suggesting.

I'd also add to my last comment that until mid to late 42, there was no allied fighter that could have done a better job over coastal Europe. The P-40 had the range but its performance limitations would have seriously disadvanteged it.

To OBNW: I didn't say that the Luftwaffe in France was substadard, but rather that its units were understrength as subordinat staffels were detatched to reinforce other fronts. The Jabo attacks were no where near so simple. Luftwaffe units, especially II/JG26 often had withdrawl cover in position to ambush pursuing a/c. Biggin Hill Wing lost three squadron leaders and two wing commanders in only a few weeks in the spring of '43 in just that way. The usual problem of facing superior tactical doctrines.

AS the Luftwaffe had very few bombers in France, and only limited numbers of fighters, any attempt to revive the daylight blitz would have come with plenty of warning so Fighter Command could apply as much of its strength as it chose. FC ended the BoB with about 800 fighters, and only got stronger after that. I will try to look up the actual number of Luft fighter present, but there were only two JagdGruppen, which were the German equivalent of a wing (or USAAF Group), although larger in numbers that its RAF or USAAF counterparts, however, as I mentioned, neither of the JGs was anywhere near full strength.

To AGR: that's true enough, of course, but kind of dodges the argument. The Spitfire equiped Fighter Command had more than two years and couldn't do the job for lack of the needed range, new Spitfires with superior performance, but still without the needed range weren't going to change that. Only when compedative fighters with longer range became available (P47s and '38s, and, eventually, P51s) was the Luftwaffe forced to withdraw nearly all its fighters from the area and conceed air suprmeacy, without which the Invasion would have been impossible.

"Actually, the Spitfire had a comparatively poor zoom, another downside of the low wing loading, along with acceleration limitations, particularly in the dive. Either the Thunderbolt or Lightning could out-zoom a Spitfire easily, even a MkXIV. Only if the climb continued long for the momentum of the zoom to be lost, did the Spitfire's climbing ability come into play, and in acutal combat that would amount to disengagement." Yes, in a purely zoom climb the spit doesn't come off the best, however, real climbs in combat were RARELY pure zoom climbs. A pure zoom climb is done without any excess thrust. In a pure zoom climb a heavier aircraft will climb higher. However, as I said before, a climb is rarely a pure zoom climb. Aircraft with high thrust to weight ratios have more excess thrust more often in the climb than a heavier lower thrust to weight ratio aircraft. This means that the high T:W aircraft slows down slower after the initial part of the climb. For example, 2 aircraft both have the same engine but one is heavier, both have the same top speed, say 400 mph. Both start at 500 mph and pitch up into a steep climb at full throttle. Initially the heavier aircraft climbs faster but as soon as they hit 400 mph the lighter aircraft will climb faster and take longer to slow down to climbing speed. "Your comment on turning is exactly correct, and that is the essence of close combat tactics. Get on his tail and follow him until he reverses on you, you shoot him down, or he disengages. The problem is that the longer the combat has lasted, the less chance of actually shooting him down. Those accounts of individual dogfights are great reading, but they were relatively rare, and when they occured, usually ended with successful disengagement by the disadvantaged a/c. Short of a lucky hit, the only way to make a kill is if the pursued pilot makes a mistake, or is trapped into a predictable maneuver that the pursuer can follow." You've missed the important part of my post. Because the Spit can trade energy for angles more economically than most fighters it has longer firing windows for each pass. A Fw-190 will loose more energy when it is pulling lead and it won't be able to do it as long as a Spit. Thus he has less time to shoot and has to do it from father away than the Spit pilot in the same situation. The Spit has to shoot closer with less deflection than the Fw-190 and will be able to regain more energy when it breaks away to climb. "This is why its important to do the engage-disengage-reengage pattern. Its on the intitial engagement, when the target may be looking the wrong way, that you get kills." As a yo-yo and other similar verticle maneuvers are simply energy conservation maneuvers, which are so vital to "open combat", it is clear that an aircraft that retain energy throughout such maneuvers will do well. That's part of the reason why the Spit and Mustang were such good fighters.