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Herald12345 5/30/2008 10:57:17 PM

Erm, ok. What exactly is wrong with "not dissimilar" - it is not overly complicated or pretentious, while it is perfectly good English. Being only two words, it is not even any longer or harder to say than "is similar". The online Cambridge dictionary entry for "dissimilar", is in fact, "The new house is not dissimilar (= is similar) to our old one except that it's a bit bigger." Every idiot under the sun knows what it means, and given the poor standards of written word on the internet, it seems a funny thing to pick up on.

There is nothing wrong with it all, Yimmy. I just try to write as simply and directly as I can because I am simple-minded [joke] and like to communicate clearly.

With regard to the Falklands, big implications and meaning don't come into it. It was an inane little war over some worthless soggy islands, penguins and sheep. I don't care if the locals want to stay "British" (a seperate island chain altogether), there is only something like 3000 of them, and I am under the impression they don't pay taxes towards the British Crown. The only use for the Falklands, is if oil is located nearby, if we find a use for the areas of antarctica we claim through the Falklands geography, or if we start developing the place for cheap British housing. The results of the war said a lot for technology, weapons and tactics. It did not say much of anthing for global politics. In the great scheme of things it would not have mattered one iota had we lost - what would we have lost? A few soggy islands and (biologically likely given small numbers) inbred islanders? It would be a hit on our pride, but that's about it - in the great game that was the Cold War we still had many tanks and nukes. While with the Thatcher government gone (as many would cheer her leaving as her historic staying), and just another tin-pot dictatorship lasing a few more years, Argentinas economy would have still have gone to pieces.

I respectfully disagree.

1. The Argentinian junta, led by that criminal, Galtieri, used armed force to distract from their domestic troubles to commit naked armed aggression. Whether the Foreign Office was negotiating a transfer solution or whether there was a reason to even hang onto the islands ceased to be important; once YOUR national sovereignty was violated. Outpost or not, that was BRITISH territory invaded.
2. Aggression can be met three ways.
a. negotiated settlement.
b, acquiescence.
c. opposed by force.

I am not going to argue the merits of the Thatcher government decision. What I will briefly discuss is what the risks were, once the STUPID decisions the Argentinians and the British government of the day made, occurred as happened.

1. The US was immediately put into play as a major player. This was part of the Argentine calculation as they expected the US to either stay neutral, or do everything in its power to prevent a British military response, via seeking a UN solution. The US was definitely squeezed hard by this miscalculation and frankly by US anger over Buenos Aires and London stupidity over the issue. This was OUR sphere of influence into which the two governments were mucking about. The situation was not sitting too well with some of us, both US and other Western Hemispheric states that a European power was mucking around in our back yard in one of their pointless colonial wars. This wasn't my view, as I saw a Galtieri fascist regime, attacking one of our first tier allies, but I just want to give you some idea how it was playing in the OAS and among our State Department flacks. This meant that Thatcher was making the steepest gamble possible with the future of Britain. If the Falklands went badly, the US [Reagan] would be down on her with a vengeance. The Suez fiasco would be a puddle in comparison to the diplomatic and strategic deluge that would follow.

2. Sure Britain still would have her BAOR and her strategic forces, but if she did NOT RESPOND to aggression then somebody would have to stop Argentina. One way or another you cannot allow an international principle of unwarranted aggression-a violation of International Law stand. There was no excuse for the Galtieri government's actions. If not a British task force, it would eventually have been an Pan-American one or else the thin legal structure that held the post WW II system in check and balance wou

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Nichevo 5/31/2008 12:15:57 AM

I'm not quite sure what my teeth have to do with anything. For the record though, my teeth are all perfectly straight, with perhaps some mild staining in places. All in all, I would rather have my 100% natural teeth, which I have never had a problem with, than scrape away perfectly healthy teeth and have plastic white plates fitted (which look stupid).

And Orwell's books and the plays resulting are lame.

How excellent for you! Me too, not even a cavity. Take care of your teeth and they'll take care of you. Veneers, ugh! (if that's what you meant)

My point there was, it is about as fair and wise for me to stereotype about you that as you are a Briton, your teeth must be horrible, as it is for you to stereotype about incest on the part of faraway islanders.

As for Orwell - gad, sir, you are a brute. I think there's nothing more that can be usefully said, although curiosity demands to know what if anything you do like to read. You stick with your not unblack dogs chasing those not unsmall rabbits across them not ungreen fields, if it makes you feel better.

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flamingknives 5/31/2008 3:48:27 AM

Nichevo,

Given comments from some Americans, nominal pretty much covers it.

Granted most are much better than that, but it doesn't take much Anglophobia to sour things, especially when it's in high places.

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neutralizer 5/31/2008 4:34:33 AM

Incidentally, at least some Japanese midget submariners (boats not men were presumably the midgets) were rounded up but elected to die rather that become prisoners and British troops were forced to oblige them.

Strategically and politically UK had no option but to attempt to retake FI, even if they were thought to be valueless at that time. The debate in the Commons on the Saturday morning after the Arg invasion was totally clear and reflected the overwhelming attitude of the British people. Dictators making land grabs on dodgy historical grounds was neither acceptable behaviour nor a good precedent that could be allowed to stand. Although poor old Saddam Hussein didn't get the message. Ah - a strategic comparison with GW1!

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Herald12345 5/31/2008 5:19:27 AM

I actually think the FI operation was unique and there is no comparable operation, and most definitely not any of the operations in the Pacific. In terms of scale and various other features Madagascar is the closest match. Of course I'm open to better suggestions but despite mountains of bluster haven't had any. There's another parallel between them as well. FI was entirely regular UK forces. Madagascar was 29 Bde and bdes of 5 Inf Div. The infantry that went ashore were all regular battalions (less No 5 Cdo), as was the artillery regiment although by 1942 they were all obviously somewhat diluted. As I say the similarities just keep coming, I'm amazed. There is a difference however, 29 Bde had an outstanding comd, Frank Festing, who subsequently became CIGS.

Why don't you try this?

Naval operational art....

Before you try to match wits with me, amateur, it might help if you and I spoke the same language and understood the same concepts.

When I look at an operation, I look at friendly means, goals, objectives, logistics, and then I LOOK at the battle-space and the likely enemy 's own set of means, goals, objectives, and logistics.

At that point I might have enough information to do a force on force ratio with quality modifiers and be able to predict possible outcomes.

Falklands was a dangerously close match-up. A few things going wrong the British way or a few things NOT going wrong the Argentine way could have tilted the balance decisively. In fact I mentioned some likely examples, where it was technology that let the Argentineans down as well as the British. The British were able to adapt. The Argentineans were not quite as quick to overcome their operational and technical faults and so they lost..

Okinawa is the similar problem set in that the problems were similar as also the force ratios between attacker and defernder, as I explained patiently.

If you ever read some of my other stuff, HERE, you've read me reference something I called the Guam variant as a possible operation in a PRC attack on the first island ring.

I"ve compared that to Pearl Harbor. Why? See if you can figure it out and read back to me why.

If you can do that SIMPLE exercise, then I might pay attention to your Madagascar ravings.

But you see, Neut, as long as you fail to back up your assertions with something CONCRETE to show me that you have a clue as to what is really going on or what some of us discuss, I have to treat you with a certain amount of derision.

Second chance, Neut. Are you up to it?

Herald

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Yimmy 5/31/2008 12:31:10 PM

Herald, I didn't say we shouldn't have re-invaded the Falklands. Our hand was forces when the Argentine jaunta opted to challange us so. What I said, was that it was a pointless and regrettable little war. It had implications for technology and tactics, and is interesting for its clinical test of military mettle - however I stand by my opinion that as far as global politics goes, it meant little.

And Nichevo, your stereotyping my having bad teeth is not the same as my assuming the Falkland islanders to be inbred. With only 3,000 persons on the islands, and accounting for age groups, I would say it is biologically likely that they are. Plus it's cold, wet and foggy outside, so what else are they going to do.

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Herald12345 5/31/2008 1:28:25 PM

Herald, I didn't say we shouldn't have re-invaded the Falklands. Our hand was forced when the Argentine junta opted to challenge us so. What I said, was that it was a pointless and regrettable little war. It had implications for technology and tactics, and is interesting for its clinical test of military mettle - however I stand by my opinion that as far as global politics goes, it meant little.

Let me suggest to you what the lesser observed outcomes were in the Western Hemisphere, so that you can understand what the Falkland fallout was.

1. The South Americans were given a a frank demonstration of America's Europe preferred first policy. Some of our current problems with our South American brothers date from the Falklands War. Not that our name wasn't already MUDD but the Falklands just made it much much worse.
2. Instead of Argentina being number two on the South American Continent, as they were, they are now about number five.
3. Argentina and Brazil, historic competitors, are now ALLIES.
4. Britain is not regarded kindly at all.
5. The US had to shut down an Argentine ballistic missile program that we discovered when we found it in progress. The Argentinians went into high gear on that somnolent program immediately after their Malvinas defeat. Iraq and Egypt joined them in the development. WHY?

From Global Security....

6. Brazil wants submarines, preferably atomic submarines. She saw what happened to Argentina and drew the correct lessons. A hostile Western Hemispheric state with even a half dozen AIP boats, that knows what it is doing, is going to be a big USN bellyache. Kettledrum was only 66 years ago, Yimmy.

There is a whole laundry list of geo-political changes the Falklands War brought to South America, NONE of them good., Yimmy.

Herald

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Yimmy 5/31/2008 7:35:30 PM

Herald, none of your points are actual notable geo-political events as a result of the war. You could claim each and any without even mentioning the war.

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Herald12345 5/31/2008 7:44:04 PM

Once again I respectfully disagree.

The South American continental politics as a whole, was not exactly friendly to the US before the Falklands War, but at least when we asked for cooperation against the communists and the caudillos from the South American democracies we got it. After the Falklands War, the OAS became a lot less friendlier with even the democracies very hostile, and very anti-American. The cleave date for that was the Falklands War.

Herald, none of your points are actual notable geo-political events as a result of the war. You could claim each and any without even mentioning the war.

Just a difference of viewpoint. Nobody pays much attention to South and Central America in Europe. We are within ROCKET range of Brazil.so we have to pay attention, or we SHOULD.

Herald

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neutralizer 6/1/2008 1:36:56 AM

I don't think there's any disagreement about FI being a fairly high risk op. The TF had been dispatched by CNS while CDS was out of town, and with minimum joint service discussion. The main risk was concentrated air attack on the concentrated forces at the point of landing (this seems to have been CDS' view). Another risk was the possiblility of delay and the onset of winter. The question is what would have happened if the Arg AF had had significant success at San Carlos and/or significant delay was imposed on the land forces advance. Would UK have aborted (with all the risks of evacuation) or what? Would UK have abandoned FI or would they have maintained SF and SSN pressure and tried again? We'll never know. Of course it's also possible to criticise the RN and Dwin Bramall's biograper does, citing Arg actions in 1976/7 and how an SSN dealt with these. There's also a case for arguing that a delay of 4 months (but using SF ashore, perhaps attacks on airfields in Arg, and SSNs enforcing the blockade) and a landing in the southern spring after time to fully prepare land forces and perhaps have a third carrier available would have reduced risk.

Okinawa was strategically totally different. The strategic objective was not Okinawa, it was Japan, with the island as a stepping stone. As far as I'm aware UK was not going to use FI as a stepping stone to invading Arg. If the US had failed at Okinawa they would have undoubtedly either tried again or tried another island in the Ryukyus. Sure it would have lost time and momentum but by no means the end of the cricket match. And of course the bomb was coming down the track and a decision to wait for that and skip Okinawa entirely would have been an option.

This difference in strategic relevance applies to any island in the Pacific campaign, failure at one didn't stop the advance, it merely made it a bit more difficult. So not only were the forces involved of a different order of magnitude, the overall situation was also totally different. Turning again to Madagascar, you know I can't resist it, this was an objective in its own right, it was not a stepping stone. The concern, whether or not it was well founded, was that the Japanese intended to establish an operating base there. Such a base would have been astride the sea routes to India and that used to support operations in the mid East. Clearly grabbing Madagascar before the Japanese managed to establish a presence was strategically highly desirable. If the Japanese had got there first removing them would have been strategically vital and required as soon a possible, pre-emption was better. However, once done it was more a rerun of Iceland - denying it to the enemy, a task devolved to S African forces.

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