You don't seem to have your facts lined up,  Neut, as usual:

Norway, and Japan

Toshiba, Norway Concern Assailed in Soviet Sale

LEAD: The Central Intelligence Agency has told members of Congress that a Japanese corporation and a state-owned Norwegian company have violated Western export controls by selling technology to the Soviet Union that makes submarines run more quietly.

The Central Intelligence Agency has told members of Congress that a Japanese corporation and a state-owned Norwegian company have violated Western export controls by selling technology to the Soviet Union that makes submarines run more quietly.

Five of the legislators introduced a bill today banning all imports of the two companies, the Toshiba Corporation of Japan and Kongsberg Vapenfabrik of Norway.

Toshiba, one of the leading Japanese electronics companies, has an American subsidiary, Toshiba America Inc., which sells about $1 billion a year and employs 2,000 workers.

Kongsberg, a weapons manufacturer, is currently adapting the Penguin anti-ship missile to the SH-60B Navy Seahawk helicopter. According to Jane's Defense Weekly, the loss of that contract would be ''financially disastrous for the company.'' Pentagon 'Seriously Concerned'

A Pentagon spokesman, Robert Sims, said today that the Defense Department is ''seriously concerned'' about the matter and has begun a formal investigation.

The State Department raised the issue with both Norwegian and Japanese authorities last month, and both countries have begun investigations, officials of those governments said.

''Japan is making a determined investigation because, if this kind of thing has actually happened, it would be serious for the national security of both Japan and the United States,'' said Koichi Haraguchi, a Japanese Embassy spokesman.

Other Japanese sources reported that earlier today police conducted a search of Toshiba facilities in Japan. The equipment was sold by the Toshiba Machinery Company, which is 51 percent owned by the Toshiba Corporation. The other stockholders are Japanese.

A Toshiba official in Washington said he had no comment. A Serious Violation

Military officials said that this incident was one of the most serious violations of export controls in the postwar period, a point echoed today by the legislators.

Representative Duncan Hunter, a California Republican who is a sponsor of the punitive legislation, reported that Toshiba earned $17 million on the sale, ''but it will cost the West $30 billion to regain the superiority that we lost from the sale.''

The equipment that the two companies sold the Soviets includes four milling machines that make advanced submarine propeller blades. These blades eliminate the noise that enables the United States to easily detect Soviet submarines. Ten Minutes From U.S. As a result, Mr. Hunter contended, the Soviet submarines can get within 10 minutes of missile-flying time from the United States coast.

Intelligence officials said they began receiving reports about six to eight months ago that Soviet submarines were having significantly more success at evading detection by the United States.

The Soviet Union made its acquisiton based on information it obtained from the spy ring of John A. Walker Jr., the former American Navy radioman, intelligence officials said.

Transfer of the equipment represents a violation of regulation IL 1091 of the Allied Coordinating Committee for export controls, which includes most members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Japan.

According to a fact sheet provided by the legislators, Toshiba sold the room-sized milling machines and Kongsberg the numerical control systems to the Soviet Union.

The legislators said that Toshiba went to some lengths to conceal the sale of sensitive equipment from the authorities. It changed the name of the machine, made certain other changes and submitted a new machine for export licenses as an uncontrolled vertical lathe.

A Soviet team of technicians tested the controlled propeller milling machine at the Toshiba plant in Japan. Later, it was installed in a Soviet shipyard by Toshiba and Kongsberg employees.

The milling machines were useless without the COMPUTERS and PROGRAMS,  you dumb cluck.


From Parliament.

Mr. Key: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the SA80 weapon system modifications proposed by Heckler and Koch in 1997; and if he has introduced a modification programme. [106182]

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if a modification programme for the SA80 weapon system was implemented following the proposals from Heckler and Koch referred to in the letter from the Minister for Defence Procurement to the Defence Committee of 2 June 1997; what estimate was submitted by Heckler and Koch of the cost of their proposals; and if the SA80s used in the Kosovo campaign were modified as a result of these proposals. [106173]

Mr. Kilfoyle: The Design Authority for SA80, formerly Royal Ordnance but now Heckler and Koch UK (Ltd.), was tasked in 1996 to investigate the reliability of the SA80 weapon system. Heckler and Koch reported in 1998 that there might be underlying problems with the reliability of the system and presented their proposals for modifications. A contract was placed in mid-1998 with Heckler and Koch for the modification of 200 weapons to be used for trials to determine the effectiveness of these modifications. Deliveries of these modified weapons were made in January 1999. The MOD conducted user trials in hot and cold climatic conditions with a range of NATO ammunition types. The trials were completed in July 1999 and the formal Design Authority report was delivered to the MOD in late December 1999. The trials confirmed that, after modification, there were significant improvements in the reliability of both the SA80 rifle and Light Support Weapon. Urgent work is in hand to assess the wider implications of the Design Authority report, including the cost, and we expect to make a decision on any modification programme by the end of March 2000.

Mr. Key: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if the SA80 weapon system remains suspended from the NATO Nominated Weapons List. [106183]

24 Jan 2000 : Column: 70W

Mr. Kilfoyle: The SA80 weapon system remains suspended from the NATO Nominated Weapons List, the list of weapons for use in the testing of NATO approved ammunition types. This suspension in itself has no impact on the operational effectiveness of the weapon.

The M-16 was NATO approved.

Furthermore;

From the BBC.

&O5533; 7 of 8 &O5533;

Since its introduction in 1985, the SA-80A1 has been dogged by a series of problems, some of them pretty serious.

The most serious of these was with the magazine release catch, which initially had no guard to prevent accidental release of the magazine. When the rifle was held in a sling, the catch was often triggered, especially when at a run, depositing the magazine on the floor, and frequently spreading live rounds everywhere. This problem was soon fixed by adding a thin strip of metal around the catch.

But things didn't get better. Since then, the rifle has been widely criticised for its intolerance of extreme temperature variations, continually seizing up and causing vast numbers of stoppages. The firing pin and bolt were found to have been made out of a type of iron that was far too brittle, and the cocking lever's proximity to several sharp edges has been known to cause servicemen serious lacerations when cocked in a hurry. There have been numerous other problems too

continuing with the SA-80 A2

Changes in the SA-80 A2 include a new breech block, breech bolt, cartridge extractor, cartridge ejector, recoil springs, extractor spring, firing pin, cocking handle, magazine (the whole magazine has been replaced), gas plug and cylinder, and the LSW has been given a new barrel and hammer.

In other words the ENTIRE OPERATING CYCLE critical components parts list has been replaced and REDESIGNED.. H.

The modified rifle has been tested in a variety of locations, (Alaska, UK, Brunei, and Kuwait): environments ranging from extreme cold and aridity to immense heat and humidity.

On average, the IW fired 25,200 rounds with less than two stoppages, and the LSW 12,900 [The lower figure for the LSW is explained by the fact that the LSW's test was a lot more severe (a fire mission of 960 rounds in 36 minutes as opposed to 150 in 10). ] . This is an incredible increase in durability, and transforms the SA-80's status from being one of the world's least reliable assault rifles into being one of the best [Bear in mind that for a USP (Universal Selfloading Pistol) the burn out time of the barrel is less than 20,000 rounds! ] .

Let\'s look at the Bowmans shall we?

DiD report.

Problems Forecast for BOWMAN System in NAO Report

23-Aug-2006 09:16 EDT

Related Stories: Britain/U.K., C4ISR, General Dynamics, IT - Networks & Bandwidth, New Systems Tech, Official Reports, Signals Radio & Wireless

The July/August issue of Battlespace News discusses a recent report by Britain?s National Audit Office regarding the UK?s keystone BOWMAN tactical radio/communications system, part of the overarching FALCON C4SI prgram. The system has suffered from a number of difficulties, many of which are the result of the radical changes in communications technology and needs since the program was conceived in the 1980s. The vast growth in bandwidth requirements due to UAVs et. al. transmitting video, the need for far greater capabilities without providing more money, the lack of robustness and modifiability in its closed architecture software systems, the effects of BOWMAN?s lack of definition on training and doctrine, and the effects of the program on the decimated British tactical radio industry are all discussed at Battlespace News.

As those who have followed DID?s coverage of the US JTRS program are aware, many of these challenges confront other militaries as well. While BOWMAN is derived from Canadian and Australian implementations and so represents much less near-term technical risk than JTRS, the most serious deficiency over time for BOWMAN may well be the difficulties involved in modifying it to meet future needs over the next 20-30 years. Battlespace notes, for instance, that the cost of upgrading the GD Command Systems software on Bowman is about $1,000 per line of code. As such, it could prove cost-prohibitive to keep it modernized over its entire service life in order to meet the demands it will face.

Those wishing to read the NAO report in full, which mentions both BOWMAN?s successes and its shortcomings, will find the full report here [HTML page | PDF format, 1.5 MB].

HELLO? Who gets the blame? That is not US. We have our  own problems  with JTRS which is our own tech tree.  Goofed you did  again, Neut.

US Navy contracts.

Electric Boat Corp., Groton, Conn., is being awarded a $144,848,826 cost-plus-fixed-fee modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-04-C-2100) for Design Agent, Planning Yard and engineering and technical support for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Submarine programs. The contract provides services for United Kingdom Astute-Class Submarine in the area of design support. The contract will provide for U.S. submarine design and production expertise; assisting with the development of computer aided design (CAD) tools and their use in submarine design and production processes; producing Astute-Class production drawings; and assisting/exchanging of expertise on submarine construction techniques. Work will be performed in Groton, Conn. (90 percent) and Barrow-in-Furness, Cumbria U.K. (10 percent), and is expected to be completed by January 2007. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This modification supports the United Kingdom (100%) under the Foreign Military Sale Program. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity.
And you are welcome.

Some good jokes, a CIA briefing to congress as a reliable source, LOL.  As I said Japanese company sold hi precison machine tools to the USSR, and this was brought up as a diversion for my equally valid point about another CIA stuff up over mis-assessment of Soviet mathamatical skills.

 

Turning to SA80, which I've commented on.  For an up to date info google 'desider' and read the SA80 article published a week or so ago.  My logic is impeccable, if SA80 is unrivalled then after decades M16 still has some way to go.  QED.

 

Bowman, the radios are US designed, although being assembled in UK.  Australia has subsequently purchased an upgraded version of one or more of the ITT sets.  They did not use these before Bowman was ordered by UK (Australian army radios are mostly Raven (plus some old PRC88s), a family of radios designed by Plessey some 15 years ago).  The classic part of the Bowman problem is that the UK infantry have refused to accept the set specially purchased for their low level use, with the Director if Infantry making some extremely pertinent remarks!  But there's other issues as well, including the way callsigns have to be setup, complete non interchangeability of the battereis between the ITT and Harris sets (Clansman didn't have this problem even though the radios were designed by different coys) and the problem of the complete discharge of batteries with no warning signal.  It all seems small but to real users this a big issues.

 

I've been doing some research on Okinawa, etc, despite forlorn attempts to divert the subject to the strategic level and gloss over previous nonsense.  Okinawa was planned as an opposed landing, with a total invasion force of 8 divisions.  It was expected to be opposed because all other Pacifc Island invasions had been.  The fact that the Japanese changed tactics and deployed otherwise and this was not discovered before the US tps hit the beaches is of course, yet another in the glorious traditions of US intelligence failures.

 

Conversely Madagascar is far closer to the Falklands that I had remembered.  Invasion force 7 bns in 2 bdes (yes OK a reserve bde remained afloat) plus No 5 Cdo.   FI 2 bdes with 8 bns plus SF.  4 btys in M, 5 in FI.  Two carriers at each, not disimilar numbers of escorts and the use of a similar number of troop ships. FI cas were somewhat higher compared to 100 KIA in M.  All in all the similarities between CORPORATE and IRONCLAD are surprisingly close.

 

The repeated refs to Ivory Coast pass me by.  The French 'peacekeeping' arrival a few years ago was a logisitic landing to support on of Chirac's African chums.  As a logisitc landing it was similar to the more recent UN logistic landing in Lebanon or the Aust, etc, landing in the Solomons.

 

I think there may be some on this list who are a tad slow on the uptake.  Listen carefully I will say this very slooooowly.  UK CVF is designed to provide the capabilities that UK wants (we'll ignore the issue that in the ideal world the RN would like something all singing all dancing).  They have designed a ship for this purpose.  It doesn't matter a sod if some parts are less than ideal in the minds of some people.  All design involves tradeoffs, you can never have the perfect solution to every element of a requirement.  This is system engineering 101.  Obviously one of the governing requirements for a carrier is its ability to sustain the required sortie rate.  As long as CVF can do this it doesn't matter whether it has 1 island or 10.  All the ship has to do is meet all the customers requirements.  Self-evidently two islands have some advantages and if these don't compromise more important requirements then it makes sense to have them, it's the same with any other feature that offends the prejudices of any Tom, Dick or Harry.  Now what's difficult about understanding this?  I apologise for having to use some polysyllabic words.

Maybe you'd have a better source than the people who actually tracked down the machines-no I didn't think so.?  As for Russian mathematicians, your assertions ignore one simple FACT. You can have the best  estimators for a cavitation function curve in the world; but if you don't have the CNC technology or the engineers who know how to use test it and use it to make the actual propeller -there isn't a thing you can do with all your paper calculations.  Otherwise the Russiansd wouldn';t have has to sneak the milling machines out or steal the computer programs including the CODE.

As for the CIA under-rating Russian mathematicians it is no-where as grievous as the KGB under-rating ours.
 

I read that crap PR fluff piece. Lots of glittering generalities and no specifics as expected from a List 2er. I've given technical specifics and history chapter and verse with sources on the SA 80, Neut. Your appeal to authority is how should I put it? PATHETIC.

Since you didn't have the guts to directly cite the article hoping others wouldn't read it and see it for what it truly is,, I provide the crap for them to read in context.

PDF-fluff  PR piece is on page 16.

Tch, tch, a shreiking bs artist.  Most amusing.   Unfortunately shouting and ranting c**p doesn't turn it into pearls of wisdom. 

 

I realise the truth is sometimes unpalatable.  I'd like to think that the message about system engineering and tradeoffs has got thru, at least the discussion has moved on from calling it design by committee and since then instant expertise. Amazing.

 

Last time a looked ITT and Harris were US companies, the shrill handbag swinging in trying to sheet home the blame on the poor old Canucks is merely pitiful.  As eveyone knows SA80 is now an excellant rifle, it's just a pity that MoD won't release the results of their comparitive reliability trial.  I don't think an FoI request would have much luck yet, I'd get guff about it not being in the national interest (ie we don't want to embarass allies about their small arms), but give it 10 years and we could be in luck.

Travelling to work on the train this morning, having read the newspaper, scrateched my arse, etc, I put my brain to thinking about the Soviet mathamaticians source.  Obviously it was something well beyond the intellect of US intelligence.  After thinking about what countries I was in and when, I concluded it must have been 1990 or 91 and in UK.  The problem is that I'm not sure whether it was the computer press or general press, but tend towards the latter, the former had been incensed a few years ealrier about US attempts at extra-territorial jurisdiction over alleged 'offenders.'  (I won't puursue this one, I don't want to cause any heart attacks).  Problem in that I don't think these archives are available on line, doesn't worry me because I know.

 

Also thinking about Madagascar.  I reckon (I haven't measured it) Madagascar must be about the same distance from UK as FI.   Of course Durban was a far better and somewhat closer to objective base than Ascension.  Still its another interesting similarity.

 

I see some bletherer is back wittering on about the island count.  Do I really have to repeat myself that it doesn't matter?  Once you have a solution to the capability requirement then you use up the slack to meet other requirements.  System engineering isn't rocket science - although it's taken MoD a long time to learn this.

 

I'm still aawaiting proof that ITT and Harris have ceased to be US companies.  Lots of bluster, smoke and bs so far, pitiful really.

I am going to spell it out for you neut on one point where your sheer unwillingness to learn and concede that is irrepressibly irritating. 

 

Madagascar is not a good comparison for the Falkland islands conflict.  AT ALL.  The ONLY thing it has going for it is the size of the operation and that its an island.  Thats it.  Both of which are irrelevant.  What you are doing is, to look at it mathematically, comparing a multiplication problem to a division problem but the numbers involved are all the same.  The important part isn't the numbers but the nature of the problem.

 

Madagascar was not supported/defended by mainland air.  Madagascar was not significant on a global political scale.  Madagascar was not defended by anything close to resembling competent units.  There was no significant opposing naval forces (lucky midget sub doesnt count, shouldn't have mattered...)  A huge portion of the Royal Navy was at risk in the operation.  The list goes on, but those are the obvious ones.

 

Now, with Okinawa the numbers might be wildly different, but those are just the variables.  What is important is the problem(s) is/are mostly the same. 

Okinawa and the Falklands were both supported by significant and skilled land-based air.  Herald drew you a fine map: you should actually glance at it.  The Argies may not have distinguished themselves on the ground but in the air they were performed admirably and bravely. 

Both places saw an unopposed landing followed by fighting inland.  There was also the Belgrano incident which Herald already drew a parallel with the Yamato for the sea component. 

Geopolitically the importance of the Falklands and Okinawa dovetail nicely.  Okinawa was the true last final fight Japan had before the mainland, its all they had left.  The United States had to take Okinawa for airbases for the final fight and a loss here would indicate the U.S. couldn't get the mainland.  The Falklands would indicate that the British still were a powerful, worldwide force, or an impotent ex-colonial power on the wane.  The Argentines would either look like a petulant child or the big boy of South America.  It had vast consequences even of the islands themselves werent too important. 

Lastly, the percentage of the attacking fleets involved were similar.  A huge portion of the U.S. Navy was at risk at Okinawa just as a huge portion of the Royal Navy was at risk at the Falklands. 

 

Now, I dont honestly believe you are having this much trouble appreciating why the little addition problem of Madagascar was so different from the far more complex calculus of the Falklands.  The differences are obvious as is the logic behind Heralds argument.  You have lost a good deal of credibility parroting about the same assertions you have stated a dozen times already.  Herald presented a good, logical argument with actual data backing him up.  Are you going to respond to that or keep trying to duel him with that fish in your hand?

It may be better to simply build more smaller CV's than two large floating targets....

Compared to one 65,000 tonne carrier, two 30,000 tonne carriers need twice as many radar sets, twice as much communications equipment, twice as many trained bridge officers and heads of department, more crew of all stripes and they can't operate as many planes for as long, even when you've got two of them together. Plus the consumables goes up much more than the layman would think, as the larger hull isn't twice as hard to push through the water. That's why a 100,000 tonne carrier can outrun a 4,000 tonne frigate.

As for survivability, no carrier has been successfully engaged, to my knowledge, since WW2.

More smaller carriers are more expensive, no more survivable and are less capable. There are limits on size imposed by available crew, production facilities, harbours and the like, but half the size does not mean half the cost.

 

 

The thing about multiple smaller units is that the cost and logistics don't scale linearly.

Herald;

And risk = civil serpents running away, with their buckets of money.

Nichevo;

Don't be an arrse.  The US were fairly obviously superior in the Pacific - it was their stomping grounds and by the time they reached Okinowa they'd had a lot of practice. Equally, had the US tumbled ashore in France in the same manner as they did in Algeria the Wehrmacht would have been able to invade the UK by walking across the American dead floating in the Channel.

Neutralizer may be having some kind of strange turn where Madagascar is anything like the Falklands in terms of military threat, but I see no reason to disparage nominally allied nations over a personal spat.