Queen Elizabeth Class.

Falklands Lessons:

The Royal Navy learned three things:

Political:

1. There will be situations where British interests require action at a distance where the United States will either be neutral or will be hostile. For make no mistake, Alexander Haig and Jean Kirkpatrick were HOSTILE to British intents in the South Atlantic War. It took direct presidential intervention to change the US tilt towards London. An independent naval capability Britain needs like any nation to guard her own interests.

2. The need for a credible offensive naval strike capability to affect the policies of second or third tier powers is vital to limit the danger of overseas blackmail and war. There is no substitute for naval air-power when some twerp nation practices banditry against your nationals upon the ocean, or attempts to use a hostage blackmail gambit to force political concessions. An aircraft carrier is an option the Royal Navy would like to have if it has to mount a Cote d'Ivoire operation or another Falklands.

Military:

1. This was the FIRST MODERN type of amphibious attack, similar to the types of island assault operations that the USN conducted that the British have ever mounted. It was something of considerable interest to the United States Navy because it was frankly the first amphibious attack in modern times post WW II that pitted two WESTERN adversaries against each other. The British performed to their excellent standards but the USN was appalled at the heavy casualties the Royal Navy sustained in trying to support the landings. The Argentine Fleet Air Arm and the Argentine Air Force were very good. The US knew this, but I'm not sure the British understood just how deadly the Argentinians could be, even with outdated US defective equipment. The French equipment was a surprise to us. Fortunately that equipment was as rare and had as great a failure rate as it did, or the Falklands would have turned out differntly..

2. The defense of landings has to be primarily air based as the use of surface to air missile defenses and picket ships is too late to face even a second tier power's missile and aircraft threat.

3. Curiously, the choice of launch method, the sortie rate of your fighters the Royal Navy discovered during the Falklands impacts your CAP reinforcement rates. The RN prefers to keep a small CAP aloft and reinforce it rapidly when they detect the raid inbound. The RN also wants the ability to operate fighters on the beach rapidly to provide land-based air-cover in case the carrier is corked. A STOVL aircraft fulfills this capability from ship or from shire without waiting to build a runway for a CTOL fighter. A STOVL carrier with a large enough flight deck can put up an eight flight of STOVL fighters in as short a cycle time as two minutes or less. This can be as much as twice as rapid as a CTOL carrier with old style catapults and arrestor gear.

4. The fact that the RN is not likely to get a Hawkeye, or its RN equivalent makes the need for rapid CAP reinforcement for a late detected inbound threat vital for the RN carrier. Naval AWACs is expensive.

Economic:

1. The cost of carrier operations burns up a navy's logistics budget like there is no tomorrow during wartime. The Invincibles burned up a surprising amount of gas, were manpower intensive, and were barely able to cover the British fleet from their cover position. Small was/is not economical when it comes to aircraft carriers.

2. The RN discovered that it could not sustain operations without exposing extremely vulnerable logistics ships to direct air or surface attack. The fact that US carriers could fuel US destroyers during fast combat operations had to impact as a Falklands lesson on RN officers who constan