Six Type 45s and a shrinking number of Type 23s, backed up with fewer new SSNs than the class they will replace and no Type 23 replacement. It doesn't look good.

Wow!  This thread is all over the place.  Let's see if I can focus on just a few points.

 

1) Carrier design--I'm not especially worried about China building a fleet of carriers any time soon.  Only three nations in history have successfully built and operated successful conventional carriers (the US, UK, and Japan).  The Soviets & French tried it without success despite a massive effort.  The reason is because carriers are very complex.  There is a steep learning curve--not only to build one but to operate it.  One can't simply copy a design (even if it were possible) and expect it to operate successfully.  If history is any guage (and it usually is), it takes about 20 years of concerted effort to build and operate a successful carrier.  But much of that knowledge is institutional (which is to say it is in the heads of the people who do the jobs more than it is written down somewhere).  If experience is not continuously re-learned, it is forgotten.  This is what has happened to Japan--and the UK to a lesser degree.  The succesful Nimitz-class design, for example, was built upon the experience of unsuccessful designs, like the Langley (CV-1), Lexington (CV-2), Ranger (CV-4), Wasp (CV-7), and Enterprise (CV-65).  It's all about learning from experience and building it into your designs.  For example, the stacks on a conventionally-powered carrier are placed aft (near the back) in order to keep smoke and soot of the exhaust from interfering with visibility and fouling sensitive equipment.  Clearly this was not in the experience of the current  QE-class carrier designers--a mistake that will have to be re-learned through painful experience.

 

2) Design choice--European nations have preferred smaller carriers on the presumption that they are more cost-effective.  The US considered a similar option in the early 1980's, but found that (because of economies of scale) the smaller carriers were almost as expensive to build and substantially less effective.  So, for example,  the QE-class carriers costs £4.2 billion for the pair ($8.2 billion US), while a larger, more capable Nimitz-class carrier costs $4.5 billion each.  Oh, and that is just the estimated cost of the ships, vs the actual cost of the US ships.  The QE's will probably end up costing more because of overruns.  Some design elements were left out to reduce costs (e.g. catapults).  These will probably be added on at a later date to the low-ball the purchase price--the French have already bought the catapults for their sister ship of the design.  Admittedly, a Nimitz will cost more to operate.  But this is a matter of being penny wise and dollar foolish.  It can do so much more.  As for the choice of conventional vs nuclear, this was a matter of politics, not economics or military considerations.  Nuclear power gives the ship numerous advantages, such as nearly unlimited range.  While the reactors may be more expensive to buy, they will be cheaper to operate (especially with the rising price of conventional fuels).

Comparing capital costs is only partially relevant.  It's the life cycle costs that matter (particularly in UK), of course this invites questions about assumptions for fuel.  It's also possible (probable?) that they are looking at life costs in 2 parts by seperating the ship costs from the airgroup costs.

 

Despite all the bluster there is still no convincing argument as to why Okinawa had to be captured at the first attempt.  As I said before delay, despite its 'knock-on' effects would have been a bother but not 'desperate'.  And all other island operations in the Pacific were the same, a setback would have caused delay but would not have altered the outcome of Japan's eventual defeat and I for one don't even think a string of failures would have altered US commitment to the defeat of Japan.  Of course any delay would have resulted in further reduction of Japanese overseas capability, particularly thru the USN submarine campaign of interdiction. 

 

I'd also suggest that the Soviet defeat of the Kwantung Army in a campaign of 3 weeks (yes I do know that there was another 10 days or so of fighting) would have been far more of a shock to Tokyo than the loss of Okinawa and quickly extinguished any euphoria that Japan might have felt in ejecting invaders from the island.    

 

I also advise against exageration and hyperbole, going over the top merely makes people look as if they lack judgement, perspective, etc, and suggests their opinions are worthless.

The Russians would not kick off until August, Keep your calendar straight will you? The Russians would not dare a Manchukuo offensive with a resurgent Japan until they were sure we had the Japanese by the throat, as historically proved the case. Or did you forget that they were committed to Germany on a one front war?

What exaggeration, amateur?  Losing one third of your starting fleet to damage and half your  starting  air force in a campaign that results in a victory is "exaggeration" when it is PUBLISHED VERIFIABLE DATA?

When are you going to get the point?  Where are your numbers, your data, your empirical explanations?

In short what do you have that is creditable, Neut, in all of your posting on this topic?

On the carrier-nothing.
On the Falklands-nothing credible.
On Okinawa-less than nothing.
On Madagascar, I've supplied most of the data and most of the correct observations, and comparatively I know next to nothing about that misbegotten operation.
     

At Yalta Stalin committed the USSR to attacking Japanese forces in mainland Asia 3 months after the war in Europe ended.  He did, almost to the day.  He also made sure he had the troops for the job, total force just over 1.6 million, and they were competant.  For example the armies selected for the breakin battle thru the Japanese border defences in the NE were the armies that had fought their way into Konigsberg, they knew their job and they had operational commanders who knew what to do.  Almost all the attacking forces and their equipment was moved from the Western theatre.  When you realise that the attacking Fronts totalled some 11 armies (call them equivalent to a US corps) between them and that all these troops and equipment were moved from the West (the 40 odd divs in the Soviet Far East keeping a eye on the Japanese seem to have been kept in reserve) you get an idea of what logistics really means.  Of course they had the benefit of internal lines of communication, even if it was only a single railway.

 

The loss of Manchuria and Korea would have severely disrupted Japanese war production.  Even if Japan in mid 1945 was building ships faster than the USN could sink them (which I doubt, and a nett loss is a nett loss however small it is, not forgetting the loss of crews) the loss of their main source of key raw materials would have caused problems, to put it mildly.   It's worth remembering that Japan basically went to war because of their internal shortage of key raw materials.  By mid 1945 they'd lost oilfields in Burma and Borneo, not to mention other stuff from SWP and SEA, the loss of mainland China further deprived them of resources.  They wern't going anywhere apart from into a deepening hole.

 

I find the suggestion that one failure at Okinawa would have put the entire US war effort into doubt laughable, for starters for the USN it was a grudge match.  As I keep saying delay, nothing more.  Of course this could have meant the USSR island hopping down into Hokkaido.

 

 

Why thank you Captain Obvious. I wouldn't have known that. [DERISION]

Obviously it was the Soviet lack of amphibious capability that enabled them to island hop south and seize 4(?) Japanese Islands that remain Russian to this day and in sight of Hokkaido.  Given that there are rivers in Russia with estuaries wider than this then it was just a matter of waiting for suitable weather.  The old trap of  'because we do it this way everybody else must' still beckons (mathamaticians and models was the last).

 

This leads to another point about carriers.  I agree that if archaelogists were faced by a bare carrier they'd spend centuries arguing over what it was, what it was for and how it did it.  However, once you know what it is you can decompose the problem fairly easily (eg primary functions: present airworthy machine, fuel it, arm it, launch it, recover it, disarm it (optional), maintain it), of course there's all the planning stuff but airmen do this the whole time on land so no rocket science there.  You can happily keep decomposing by functions and processes.  Then design an arrangement to do them all efficiently, modern software tools are quite good for this (architects do something similar with complex buildings, factories, etc) and with 3D modelling you can try all sorts of things (off course you have to have suitably trained designers).  Obviously having people with experience to spot the pinch points and flaws in reasoning are a help and save time, but given time and testing you can probably sort it out with a close to optimum solution.  Of course the tools to do this weren't available 20 years ago.

 

However, a bit of lateral thinking also helps.  Eg a few years back the UK AAC was working on their refuel/rearm procedures for Apache.  Presumably they talked to other users, and they had relevant experience of their own.  However, they wanted a really slick operation so they engaged a F1 consultant, an expert on pit work, and apparantly he helped them develop very fast and efficient procedures.  When you think about it, it was a smart idea, motor racing is intensely competitive, seconds really matter and high octane fuel is a bigger handling risk than AVTUR or whatever.  The interesting thing is that since it seems operating Apache is a CVF requirement then it may be that this expertise has benefitted some aspects of the design. 

Neutralizer, you do understand that simply ignoring Heralds point-by-point dismantling of every single one of your posts with verifiable data does constitute a reply let alone a successful argument right?

 

Are you ever going to respond with appropriate data and factual information?  The more you try to paint in vague broadstrokes and ignore the thorough breakdown of all of your arguments the more your credibility falls...

 Well it is true that the USSR was a tad cavalier by western standards when it came to casualties. However, they suffered remarkably few casualties when they defeated the main body of the Japanese forces (which no western nation caan claim, you have to admire Uncle Joe, he was a man of his word in this case). By any standards the speed and dimensions of this campaign were awesome. They also occupied Japanese islands in the Kuriles however unpalatable that may be. Perhaps the USN should have followed the Aleuts instead of the sunshine route. 

Returning to the non-importance of Okinawa, its useful to remember that despite what some US admirals might have thought the allied Grand Strategy was ?Germany First?. This means that until Germany was defeated the Pacific was a secondary theatre. Therefore a defeat at Okinawa before German surrender would have been no more than local in strategic terms. As I keep saying comparing FI to operations in the Pacific is irrelevant.

I?m not sure what the lecture about metallurgy is trying to ?prove?, other than another diversion to cover flaky arguments. However, it may be useful to remember that a number of UK Apaches are marinised to permit shipborne operations. This means the Apache handling experience is directly relevant, never mind the lesson of using external expertise that is a bit left field.

Finally, as I keep saying, the endorsed capability to be provided by CVF is what matters.  Wittering on about some particular design feature is irrelevant unless it is in the context of the overall design and its ability to provide this capability.  I?m reminded of obnoxious IT salesmen always blethering on about their wonderful ?solution?. The reality is the only design that matters is the one that meets the customer?s business needs and this is the successfull design.   The rest has as much value as a pronouncement from Paris Hilton.