I don't think there's any disagreement about FI being a fairly high risk op.  The TF had been dispatched by CNS while CDS was out of town, and with minimum joint service discussion.  The main risk was concentrated air attack on the concentrated forces at the point of landing (this seems to have been CDS' view).  Another risk was the possiblility of delay and the onset of winter.  The question is what would have happened if the Arg AF had had significant success at San Carlos and/or significant delay was imposed on the land forces advance.  Would UK have aborted (with all the risks of evacuation) or what?  Would UK have abandoned FI or would they have maintained SF and SSN pressure and tried again?  We'll never know.  Of course it's also possible to criticise the RN and Dwin Bramall's biograper does, citing Arg actions in 1976/7 and how an SSN dealt with these.  There's also a case for arguing that a delay of 4 months (but using SF ashore, perhaps attacks on airfields in Arg, and SSNs enforcing the blockade) and a landing in the southern spring after time to fully prepare land forces and perhaps have a third carrier available would have reduced risk.

 

Okinawa was strategically totally different.  The strategic objective was not Okinawa, it was Japan, with the island as a stepping stone.  As far as I'm aware UK was not going to use FI as a stepping stone to invading Arg.  If the US had failed at Okinawa they would have undoubtedly either tried again or tried another island in the Ryukyus.  Sure it would have lost time and momentum but by no means the end of the cricket match.  And of course the bomb was coming down the track and a decision to wait for that and skip Okinawa entirely would have been an option.

 

This difference in strategic relevance applies to any island in the Pacific campaign, failure at one didn't stop the advance, it merely made it a bit more difficult.  So not only were the forces involved of a different order of magnitude, the overall situation was also totally different.  Turning again to Madagascar, you know I can't resist it, this was an objective in its own right, it was not a stepping stone.  The concern, whether or not it was well founded, was that the Japanese intended to establish an operating base there.  Such a base would have been astride the sea routes to India and that used to support operations in the mid East.  Clearly grabbing Madagascar before the Japanese managed to establish a presence was strategically highly desirable.  If the Japanese had got there first removing them would have been strategically vital and required as soon a possible, pre-emption was better.   However, once done it was more a rerun of Iceland - denying it to the enemy, a task devolved to S African forces.

Nice try  but WRONG.across the board. EXAMPLE: The intended USN strategy out of Okinawa was BLOCKADE and air campaign, with Downfall as the last  resort. You get a fail mark. Don't try to plan anything CRITICAL,  Neut.

Herald

 

 

 

 

 

 

 Of course it's also possible to criticise the RN and Dwin Bramall's biograper does, citing Arg actions in 1976/7 and how an SSN dealt with these.  There's also a case for arguing that a delay of 4 months (but using SF ashore, perhaps attacks on airfields in Arg, and SSNs enforcing the blockade) and a landing in the southern spring after time to fully prepare land forces and perhaps have a third carrier available would have reduced risk.

 

I appreciate that this is a ludicrously hypothetical scenario, but if the UK government had asked Newport News (or whatever it's called now) to design and build the new carriers (and assuming that US government have allowed the contract to go ahead) how much do you think they would have cost if you assume:

 That is something I have considered.  $6-> $8B US before you add the air wing: the EM catapults would be very experimental and developmental-the three lifts also add to the cost. I think you would wind up with something like this, but modernized;




 

- non nuclear power

This adds to the overall displacement and usable internal volume penalty.   There are some good reasons for going nuclear to increase bunkerage and reduce engine plant footprint [cost is NOT one of the advantages]. This however is not an UK  politically acceptable option.

- catobar configuration for 40 strong airgroup 

That gives a flight deck area similar in size and configuration to the Midway Class.

- carrier role only (no secondary role as LPH, no consideration given to role in disaster relief, no facilities for flagship or command role, no carrying of marines or SF, no oversized hospital facility) 

Why suppress this?  You trade off hanger footprint for it, but if you design the flight-deck correctly you can do most of your aircraft storage topside. You penalize your garage [repair bay] capabilities somewhat, but the trade-offs versus the additional capability is justifiable-especially given an air-wing half the size of a Nimitz..

Also, given the physical restrictions at Portsmouth do you think it would have been possible to get this into a hull of around 55,000T full load and less than 10m draught?

Btw has anyone heard any news about the upgrades to Portsmouth required to accomodate the CVFs? Seems odd that nothing was said following the recent announcements re the contract.

Don't know a thing about this. Why not a deep berth?  Britain does have a deep berth port-just NOT at Portsmouth.   

When the Galtieri regime threatened to invade the Malvinas the first time, the British government announced it was sending a sub. Do you see the lesson here?

This is how I believe the Falklands should have been handled.  Although the conflict, being so clinical, and using so many new relatively un-tested weapons systems and technology makes for interesting study, I don't think it was necessary to jump on our ships and go on a crusade like angry Vikings.

Once eleven thousand Argentinians showed up as univited guests you were going to expel them HOW?

As far as I can see, we could easily have used SSN assets to blockade the Falklands and indeed Argentina, until the Argentinian economy collapsed through lack of trade and the jaunta overthrown.  The only obvious advantage to a quick invasion, was the possibility of a quick victory, while public support was strong.  Had the invasion been postponed, and negotiations lengthened, the matter would drop out of the spot-light and public support would reduce, while Argentina may have won concessions.

Of course, I don't really see any reason (other than international opinion from some quarters), why our blockading SSN's shouldn't have been sinking the Argentinian navy and any blockade runners at will - our torpedoing their sailors is hardly any worse than their shooting at our RM element on the islands after all.  Hardly even any need to mount a 200nm exclusion zone.

If they still failed to surrender in negotiations and withdraw, then we could have mounted a better prepared invasion, with the Argentinians in a far weaker, starved, position.

Starving the garrison out requires air blockade. 11,000 idle soldiers needing something to do ='s them  building a pick and shovel AIRFIELD and C-130s or Carribous flying in supplies once the airfield is complete and the Falklanders sent out. Then come the Argentine colonists and the plebescite.

It winds up in the  UN  with predictable results.

End of exercise. The only thing left British will be the sheep.

Why do  I say this? Truk or Chuuk. It fell only AFTER Japan surrendered, though they were starved.

The Malvinas garrison will not fall until it is kicked out. They will get tired of crackers and mutton, but they'll sit there; thin, starving, and unhappy.

International opinion is one of the reasons the Afghanistan and Iraq wars are doing so well. [SARCASM]  

You cannot ignore the role of opinion in trying to mount an operation.

Herald