UK's Surface to Air defense capability

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flamingknives RE:Starstreak:reaction time and bearing rate 8/12/2005 6:20:14 PM

But against fast jets, same probs as any other ground-based system. Although Starstreak is very much faster than most GBAD, so engagement time is surely less of a problem. On top of that, it's designed for snap-shooting at fleeting targets.

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neutralizer RE:Starstreak:reaction time and bearing rate 8/13/2005 1:35:12 AM

The FI problem was not crossing tgts per se, it was 'pop-up' tgts, including short exposure crossers. In that original FS B form the issue was getting the operator to visually acquire the target in a very short time, and he could only do it with both eyes looking through the sight, the surv rdr got the sight on the correct azimuth, he then had to search vertically (they'd always trained to do this with crossers), in FI getting azimuth was also a last second matter due to the pop up/short exposure time, they tried manual orientating the sighting head by the Det Comd but it wasn't designed this way and wasn't successful. The solution was FS B1 with its 'pointing stick'. This was on a tripod, slaved to the sighting head, and used by the Det Comd with naked eyeball of the sky. (They also changed the live firing practices to simulate short exposure crossers by the simple expedient of potted shrubs). Of course today ADCIS gives some RAP info down to FU level (Rapier and HVM), and this is improving with full RAP access appearing at bde level (ie a Link 16 ground stn talking to AWACS) and the advent of Bowman means it can be more fully presented to FU level in real time, particularly once AD-BISA arrives. HVM's short time of flight doesn't give an a/c much chance, providing the operator can acquire and hold it. Given that HVM reflects the FI experience then I think we can assume that they've got the problem cracked. Whether other SHORAD systems have is another matter.

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Yimmy RE:Starstreak:reaction time and bearing rate 8/13/2005 12:12:18 PM

I am more a fan of ground based SAM's than I am of dedicated fighter aircraft, unlike Worcester. To remove the problem of the launcher losing line of sight and the likes of, why not make a SAM along the lines of a loitering anti-radiation missile? So, when forward sensors have detected an enemy aircraft, the SAM is shot straight up into the air from a verticle launcher, by a primary stage booster rocket, pushing it to say 30,000 feet. Then the primary stage booster falls away, and a parachute deploys, allowing the missile to very slowly drift to Earth. The nose of the missile should be fitted with sensors suitable for detecting aircraft against ground clutter, and on seeing one, jettesons the parachute, and starts up a secondary motor speeding the missile down onto the offending low flying aircraft.

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Worcester RE:Starstreak:reaction time/bearing rate: ground guidance vs. autonomous missile 8/13/2005 1:33:11 PM

Interesting comments. I think we're all describing the difference between (1) a ground-guided/controlled system (only effective when the LAUNCHER can see the target) and (2) an autonomous missile which, once seen, will follow the target no matter what. All ground based missile control systems, whether radar or laser or optical, are limited to what the ground launcher can see and "lose" whatever it cannot see. Some believe that by making the computer and missile faster it will increase the likelihood of success - this is certainly the "Short Bros" school of thinking. In this sense, HVM is little more than another much faster, more sophisticated successor to Startreak and Blowpipe; all "line of sight" systems which fail as soon as you cannot see the target. The other school is the self-guided missile school which gave us the "Stinger" family of fire and forget systems, which oddly have been preferred by those UK forces which are allowed to choose their own equipment, e.g. SAS. Of course the "line of sight" believers will say that Stinger et als are subject to counter-measures/decoys and lack target discrimination. They make much of HVMs "unjammable" beam riding nature. HVM may well be the limitation of the "line of sight" approach since the technology in computer and missile speed has reached its limits, and the uniqueness of their ECM tolerance is no more, whereas.... The introduction of new "planar array" technology which actually "sees" and can recognize and remember the specific shape of a specific target has had devastating implications. Javelin is the most common example of this "fire and forget" system (Israeli Spike is another as is the Spear project development at LMT for the Stinger etc successor) which allows an operator to see, lock fire and move on, leaving the missile to do it's thing. Which is why the UK (and Australia) have selected Javelin to replace Milan - because you need a system where the operator doesnt have to see the target all the time. It sees the target shape just as you or I see it - in fact better - and does not get confused by flares or chaff or smoke or electronic jamming or laser jammers. So, a planar-array SAM will lock on, launch and track while you can just walk away or even go for a second or third target. Completely autonomous. Against this technology, the "line of sight" systems, however quick or fast do seem, conceptually, to be very old fashioned. As for the concept of fighter vs SAM/AAA:- 1. In every conflict fighters have always caused more casualties than SAM/AAA. From 1914 Zepellin hunting through every war to the present, SAM/AAA have accounted for about 10% of enemy air attrition - a remarkably steady number. In the Falklands this was 9%, while the fighters took 26%. In GW1 the total air dominance of fighters meant that zero enemy aircraft were downed by SAM/AAA. It is fighters which dominate. 2. Which is NOT to say that SAM/AAA has no role. I have said before that it is wrong to measure the success of SAM/AAA simply by the number of aircraft downed; it is the overall "denial of airspace" and the forcing of enemy air to take circuitous routes (using fuel), fly at low level (using fuel) and limiting time on target (possibly missing the target) which are much more important. To take the Falklands alone, it is no coincidence that the most successful Argentine raid (on Sirs Tristram and Gallahad at Bluff Cove) happened when there was no effective SAM/AAA presence. Some would argue that the absence of Combat Air Patrol alone was responsible, but remember, there was NO CAP over the Missile Box at San Carlos and yet because the Argentines had to fly low and did not want to "pull up" at their Initial Point for their target run that so many bombs missed while 60%+ (!) failed to detonate because they were released below their arming safe height. By contrast at Bluff Cove, with nothing but a few GPMG firing, thre Argentine Skyhawks at over 3,000 feet had time to observe the targets, approach at low level, climb to a proper release altitude and bomb the sh!t out of the two ships; and fly away unharmed. So while fighters will always remain the overwhelming means of killing other aircraft, there is a requirement for SAM/AAA as point defense and its success cannot be judged by "kills" alone but also by the extent to which its mere presence restricts enemy options. This is not an excuse, however, for using the old "line of sight" methodology when new "fire and forget" technology is available.

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neutralizer RE:Starstreak:reaction time/bearing rate: ground guidance vs. autonomous missile 8/14/2005 4:31:19 AM

A msl going up to tens of thousands of feet certainly won't be SHORAD, because it will weigh quite a lot, this means lots of large vehicles, MHE, all the clagg. Basically SHORAD is limited to short range, around 6-8 km, because that gives a missile of about 50 kg which is about the limit for one man or woman to lift. SHORAD is basically defensive AD, although it can be successfully used offensively through deployment planning to put it onto en flypaths if you can id them. This means that it is generally dealing with aircraft approaching directly or diagonally (because defensive positioning means you are defending something (point, area, column) that is a target for air attack so a/c have to fly to it. Exposure time is an issue, but this is a function of aircraft altitude. Arg were like the RAF they flew very, very low. Brit AD had trained to drop Sov jets and heli. Heli being slow moving are an easy target once you've spotted them. Sov jets, like USAF, flew relatively high giving very good exposure times, particularly when they don't know they are being engaged until msl launch. Today the SHORAD target has changed, air launched msls and UAVs, heli; fast jets depend on the overall air situation and the success of the counter-air campaign. If they fly at traditional 'low' alt then they are easy, if they fly low as the RAF used to then they are still difficult but if they fly into an a SHORAD defended area then their chances of getting out are low, particularly when the FUs are getting the RAP so know when and where to look. Smaller tgts (msls and UAV) will present a problem but they're relatively slow moving and the latest HVM upgrade seems to have given x60 optics. Problem in FI was that Arg air was mostly attacking ships, which were not fully inside the GBAD area, naturally the FU dets tried to engage if they came in range. My understanding is the GBAD area was designed to protect the beachead, you could argue that it was a planning failure not to have seized other ground around San Carlos water so as to give it proper GBAD cover over the ships, my guess is they firstly lacked resources to secure all the necessary sites and secondly RN thought they could cope. As it happened there were other problems notably that RN was not part of the specified EMC environment for Rapier so FUs that could see ships sometimes encountered a bit of e-bother. Digital terrain based tools have greatly improved GBAD deployment planning to maximise FU engagement times against the expected attack flying. This was available for FI but it had to be done in UK and the tools were very first generation so replanning was difficult, which I suspect they had to do when they found how low Arg were flying. The problem with Blowpipe was that it took a hell of a lot of operator training, IIRC 600 'shots' on the simulator before being cleared for live firing, it was not SACLOS. Despite that both Brits and Arg used them successfully. However, Javelin, S15 and HVM didn't/don't suffer this problem because they are SACLOS. IR homers have the 'advantage' that you can quickly train any illiterate peasant to use them and they are great if all a/c are hostile (ie no air force of your own). Other than that we hit the air control problem and rules of engagement (which afflicts all SHORAD). The IR homer issue is that once you've launched that's it, if the operator has wrongly identified the aircraft then tough (SIFF is a big improvement so this problem may ease a bit but in the end air forces dictate the ROE, hence the importance of the RAP and effective ADC3 to FUs). This leads to very strict ROE. UK doesn't use IR because of this concern (and off course today lots of a/c have IR counter measures).

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Worcester RE:Starstreak:reaction time/bearing rate: ground guidance vs. autonomous missile 8/15/2005 4:57:02 PM

but then "planar array" is far more sophisticated and less jammable than IR. So the days of Line-of-sight AD are indeed limited. And the problem with an Carlos was not enough organic air power. (1) having been promised SHAR air superiority by the Flag, both Clapp and Thompson realized belatedly they wouldnt get it; but then 24 SHAR with 31 pilots scored a total 26 a-to-a kills and, more importantly, killed over 1/4 of all Argentine sorties from May21 (alnding) to May 24, a terrible toll of Argentine squadrons. (2) an all ground/surface based defense - doesnt matter whether on land or sea; radars surrounded by hills dont wont well; and the Rapier was a "bolt on" battery which had never worked before with 3 Cdo Bde, never mind the RN. Having said this, they had full access to all the computer models for positioning their launchers optimally around San Carlos and were a sizeable drain of scarce fuel and helicopter time, and yet their peformance was dismal. The naval systems all worked much better (even Sea Cat for heavens sake!) which does lead to the conclusion on every basis that Rapier was simply not very good, or even worthwhile.

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neutralizer RE:Starstreak:reaction time/bearing rate: ground guidance vs. autonomous missile 8/16/2005 6:05:23 AM

SHORAD has never been easy, but as long as the tgts operate at low level it will have a role, and the tgt array is increasing although the fast jet component is not. Direct fire is always limited, tanks, rifles, msls, doesn't matter, all tarred with the same brush. Ie range limited to line of sight and can be greatly hindered by good tactics. AD is by its nature primarily defensive but as I previously pointed out can be used offensively in some circumstances. Rapier btys don't need any great 'integration' with the formations they support because they deploy in isolation to their own plan. MANPADS is a bit different, but since it's very defensive it also needs to be close to the tgs it's defending. This makes life fairly simple and providing they get enough warning and can spot the a/c in time then they can engage. These msls are all hittiles, which is why pilots make strenuous efforts to stear clear of them. The ultimate success of Rapier in FI is obvious, negligable casualties to troops ashore. That is GBAD success, the defended were OK.

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interestedamateur RE:UK SAM Order of Battle 8/16/2005 11:57:24 AM

After the defence cuts of Dec 2004 I understand there will be: 24 x Rapier FSC in 4 batteries. 84 x Starstreak in 7 Batteries. 12 Starstreak operated by the Marines in one troop. I think that the TA are losing all of their SAM's but that the TA regiments will remain to provide reinforcements to the regular units as required. This is pretty thin to say the least.

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Yimmy RE:UK SAM Order of Battle 8/16/2005 12:14:29 PM

Eh? TA are losing their SAM's? Where did you hear that? And what exactly do you mean by 84 x Starstreak? I mean, the missiles are completely self contained and disposable, I would assume us to have several thousand, are you counting the clip-on fire control units?

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Worcester RE:Starstreak:reaction time/bearing rate: ground guidance vs. autonomous missile 8/16/2005 1:00:03 PM

Neutralizer: "Direct fire is always limited, tanks, rifles, msls, doesn't matter, all tarred with the same brush. Ie range limited to line of sight and can be greatly hindered by good tactics." Not true with planar array which provides autonomous missiles which are severed from the encumbrance of line of sight controllers. Look at Javelin as an example of the next generation SAM. "The ultimate success of Rapier in FI is obvious, negligable casualties to troops ashore. That is GBAD success, the defended were OK. " Simply not true. You are mis-reading the campaign. 1. The Argentines were targetting ships as a priority and the testimony from Arg pilots indicated that gunfire and ship-launched missiles were their most visible adversaries; there is not one recorded mention of a SAM launch which can be directly attributed to Rapier. 2. Rapier was sited around San Carlos/Ajax known as the Missile Box and belatedly moved to Teal Inlet (35 miles away) when it became the forward BMA. 3. The vast majority of the land forces (i.e. 8 major units) were operating well outside any Rapier coverage for most of the campaign. As soon as 3 Para moved to Teal, 2 Para to Goose Green and 45Cdo to Douglas on May27 and 42 Cdo started moving to Estancia, these were all outside the Missile Box within 2 hours of commencing their march. Only 40 Cdo and the Cdo Logistics regt remained inside the Missile Box. Rapier had great trouble "settling down" and was a major drain on MOGAS fuel which had to be carried (with the repair parties) in scarce helicopters. The fuel shortage was so accute that the Blues & Royals had to delay their move forward with 3 Para precisely because their fuel was given to Rapier. The ground troops were protected by the three Combat Air Patrols well to the north, west, and south. The Sea Harrier CAPS did kill 26 Argentine aricraft and frightened many others; Arg pilots have given testimony that after May27 they were ordered not to "mix it" with SHAR and turned back as soon as they got a Blue Fox radar warning. Not one Arg pilot mentioned hearing or seeing Rapier; Sea Dart and Sea Wolf yes, guns yes, but not one mention of Rapier. All of the major "break-in" battles of Twin Ssisters, Harriet, Wireless Ridge, and Mt Longdon and the follow-on Mount William and Sapper Hill were well outside any Rapier post. Indeed the neares Rapier at Teal couldnt even protect 3Cdo Bde HQ from a Canberra night bombing mission! It is very clear what the commanders thought of Rapiers minimal "productivity" and drain on both helo time and fuel; I particularly recommend you read Thompson's memoirs "No Picnic" or the definitive work "Air War South Atlantic".

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