Future Navy (keep it real)

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interestedamateur RE:Future Navy (keep it real) 7/25/2005 11:46:17 AM

Some of this duplicates you PG, but this should fill in the holes. It's pretty clear what the Navy will look like in 2015: 2 x CVF (not yet ordered but highly probable) 8 x DDG (Daring Class) 17 X FFG (Duke + Broadsword Batch 3 class) 4 x SSBN (Vanguard Class - probably will be replaced, although debate regarding replacements will happen this parliament) 8 x SSN 1 or 2 LPH (Ocean plus Ark Royal probably) 2 x LPD (Albion, Bulwark) 4 x ALSL (Bay class) 6 x Amphib Transports (Point Class) 2 x AO (Wave Class) ? (unknown number) x MARS (future tanker / Stores ships). What is much less clear is what the Navy will look like in 2020. With the cancellation of the future frigates, its unknown what will replace the Dukes. Speculation has ranged from land attack cruisers to corvette type ships. Its also worth noting that the decline in the Navy isn't just about a shortage of ships. Even Janes Defence Weekly (which usually isn't that scare-mongering) has begun to describe lack of sea time, the fact that a quarter of the fleet is laid up because of a lack of fuel etc. Basically all the money is going into FRES (latest cost �14 bilion).

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Lawman RE:Future Navy (keep it real) 7/25/2005 3:01:10 PM

I am not so sure about having separate carrier and amphibious fleets, instead having the amphibs being part of the battle group. Instead of having a large amphib, like Ocean, it might be better to have two smaller vessels, along the lines of the old French Jeanne D'Arc design, crossbred with an LPD. It might allow the UK to have three carrier/amphib groups, each with: 1 x CV 2 x LPH (as mentioned, similar to the Jeanne D'Arc in design, but with a dock) 2 x LPD (Albion/Bulwark) 4 x LSD (Bay class) 4 x DDG (Type 45) 4 x FFG (Type 23, followed by their replacement) 2 x SSN (Astute) 4 x AOR (new, combining attributes of Fort and Wave class) This would be supplemented by a load of OPV(H) vessels, though ideally fitted to accomodate a SAM system - I have a feeling they designed a containerised Seawolf for use on the containership carrier program. If they could simply have a plug in module, allowing them to have SAM, SSM and other systems, then that would be ideal.

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Worcester RE:Future Navy (keep it real) 7/25/2005 6:26:28 PM

Lawman seems to want a shadow of the French imitation navy good only for flying flags. If you wish to disregard Expeditionary Warfare as the sole central context of current defense planning then dream on; if not, then you cannot disregard the Lessons Learned from amphibious warfare, the most difficult of all military endeavors. Point by point:- 1. "amphibs being part of the battle group". Perhaps Lawman fails to understand that a battle group and an amphibious group have different missions and are therefore tasked and commanded separately, usually from very different locations; control of air and getting ashore - quite distinct. Even in these days of over the horizon amphib insertion, an amphib group will always get as close as possible to maximize troop delivery and minimize time inshore. There may - with luck - be occassions when it is possible to dock the follow on amphib units for even more rapid unloading. The Commodore/Admiral of an amphib group will be commanding his own ships and working with the marine commander to get stuff ashore - amphib is an expert skill requiring very good planning and very experienced staff work. The commander of the carrier group will provide air cover but will have many wider threats to deal with such as surface and sub-surface. Different missions, different skills, different equipment, miles apart. 2. "1 CV". UK policy since 1964 has been to have "at least two or none", and since 1982 has been to have 3, later modified to 2. A single carrier creates a supremely vulnerable defense strategy - the entering of political commitments based on carrier power which, in extremis, cannot be delivered because you cannot afford to lose the carrier; even if engaged, it will do so with a defensive mind-set. Then of course, there is "availability", refits etc. 3. "2 LPH similar to Jeanne D'Arc". That is inferior to the old Fearless and Intrepid to be replaced by the Bay Class LPDs. 4. "4x T45" These are designed as carrier escorts; two are needed in each carrier group along upthreat and trailing arcs; three if you are facing a land-based air force. Then you will need some to escort the amphib operating group inshore. Notwithstanding their vastly increased capability over the T42 it is worth remembering that opponents will also be more capable. In the last opposed landing in 1982 the RN lost two T42 of the initial three and had to send two replacements. So a minimum five for this task, plus the 15% redundancy for refits requires six or seven. And these will be cheaper on a per unit basis than just four. 5. "4 DDG, 4 FFG" (Why does Lawman use American terminology for UK ships?!) Aside from expeditionary (littoral warfare) to deliver a brigade-sized, reinforcable formation to any theater, the UK navy has political and military commitments to the following tasks:- (a) STANAVFORLANT - NATO (b) STANAVFORMED - NATO (c) APT(N) - Atlantic Patrol Task North (the old West Indies Station - Commonwealth commitment) (d) APT(S) - Atlantic Patrol Task South (the old West Africa/Falklands Station) (e) Armilla Patrol - Arabian Gulf (f) Iraq support ops. (g) South-east asia - biannual patrols to support Five Powers Defense Agreement. That is seven separate distinct geographic taskings requiring at least one destroyer or frigate. To maintain these all on station as required and allow for refits, etc needs 12 destroyers/frigates alone. Add the required seven destroyer escorts (and perhaps four ASW escorts) for the carrier and amphibious groups and you get 23 absolute minimum with no reserve at all. Not that far from the reduced flotilla of 24 ships (16 frigates + 8 destroyers) proposed going forward. Put bluntly, the size is determined by commitments and the proposed RN strength has now reached a level at which other government departments (Foreign, Trade, Customs) are siding with the MoD against the Treasury. Below this leel and the UK has to shed political commitments and treaties which most are unwilling to do. P.S. "2 SSN" And your expeditionary recon will be done by...tourists? These are the most potent warships. Silly idea. Sould have 9 Astutes (with their thru life reactor cores) to provide the same readiness level as existing 11 SSN; currently planned as 8.

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perfectgeneral RE:Future Navy (keep it real) - Worcester 7/25/2005 8:23:35 PM

You can almost hear the pips squeak, can't you? Thanks for that post. It's the fist time I have been aware of how our commitments break down. I feel that OPV(H) offers the cheapest way to get hulls out on the water that might make an impact, but I have doubts. Could they help after a hurricane in the Windies? They might offer increased anti-smuggling patrols alongside existing commitments in APT(N) or a greater presence supporting Sierra Leone's trade routes. Perhaps fuel oil is lacking for even that right now. Some financial slack must be found before any larger fleet is embarked upon. Crew rotation while abroad might offer a little more experience across the service, but this would be at the expence of duration. Low tide and waiting for a blue moon.

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Worcester RE:Future Navy (keep it real) - Perfect 7/25/2005 9:46:12 PM

Pips should squeak! Pleasure to be of help on commitments; that's what drives fleet size and shape. I do agree OPV(H) look like an attractive concept especially in littoral operations but they have four drawbacks:- 1. Range: smaller fuel tonnage and need to refuel/maintain a higher fuel load for stability (see below) so always "topping off". 2. Speed: less momentum in heavy sea states (which is precisely why the T45 are so heavy because the T22/23/43 cannot maintain headway with a carrier in even a medium sea state). 3. Stability: less able to operate helicopters; ballasting with sea water will reduce their ability to refuel. 4. Smaller crew therefore less "spare" for shore parties/disaster relief. In brief, OPV will have neither range nor speed nor escort capacity therefore you will need an awful lot more of them than just a 1:1 replacement to compensate for even a T23. Helicopters are probably THE most useful force multiplier on any small ship and you really have to wonder if losing this capacity maked an OPV even half he capability of a T23. 2. Financial slack. Yes indeed. The collision between capital budgets and operational budgets! I know there is a lot of concern right now but it pays to consider there are two overiding issues at work:- (a) Expeditionary Warfare: HUGE spend on Ocean, Bulwark, Albion, Bay Class and re-equipping the R Marines (who are now the largest component of naval manpower than at any time since 1918). (b) Reducing manning costs. Manpower is still a huge operating cost component especially since it all has to be trained from scratch and many have a pension attached. Looked at this way the training/active/pension bill is some 250% of the actual active personnel. The solution to (b) is twofold: use fewer people and get them to serve longer so you need fewer raw recruits. Equipment helps. The Swiftsure Class had crews of 106; the Trafalgars had 95+; the Astutes have 85. These things make a big difference. Added to which the Astute's "thru life" reactor cores dont need to be refuelled for 25 years so they will be available 15% more frequently. Thus 9 Astutes give the same readiness as 11 S/T types; and the T/S crews of 11 X 100 = 1100 will reduce by 39% to 8 x 84 = 672. Same readiness, same coverage but 39% lower manpower. With respect to your sympathies I must disagree on crew rotation. It would just produce twice as many crews as are actually needed, but all of them just half-trained. Better one fully trained crew than any number of half-trained. What has not been focussed upon is what used to be called the Rosyth Squadron - the RN warship reserve - which will receive and mothball the 4 T23 and (so I am told) some of the T42 Batch 3s giving a reserve of a dozen or so plus of course the Invincible carriers in due course. Crews are need for this, but they can usually be found - as in the Falklands when the squadron was activated but never used - by drawing experienced sailors/officers from training courses or staff jobs. Frankly personnel costs are a big problem: think of it in these terms...during its 25 year life, the average T42 with a crew of 115 has actually been crewed by 1,900 - 2,000 sailors, all of whom had to be trained and paid...and here's the rub, most of whom are still being pensioned today! That is a REAL running cost; 1,800 retired sailors vs 115 active crew. Quite a wage bill! Back to your point. OPV can be useful if they are always ore-positioned for specific locations in-shore (the Leeds Castle etc are useful examples in huarding the Falklands); but dont expect them to keep pace with the fleet (and certainly NOT keep up with a carrier) or to rush anywhere in a hurry.

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interestedamateur RE:Future Navy (keep it real) 7/26/2005 5:24:33 AM

Just to clarify Worcester's taskings, things are now changing with the reduction of the fleet: - APT (N) will now only last 6 months in the Hurricane season. - The Armilla Patrol/Iraq (Indian Ocean) Ops (originally two ships) are now being combined into one The source for this is the MOD's response to the Defence Select Committee's March report. The MOD described this reduction as "the routine business to reassess tasking priorities". Bit of spin methinks. As a matter of fact I also agree with getting some large OPV's (or a sort of Floreal class) to patrol some of the lower threat areas. Although I take your points about their capability Worcester, at least you would have something there.

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Lawman RE:Future Navy (keep it real)- Worcester 7/26/2005 10:29:52 AM

I do not appreciate the vitriol, which is unwarranted, especially as you are making an incorrect assumption. I was not referring to having only one carrier, I was laying out my proposed battle group, not the entire navy! I use American terms, because they are the shorthand, and used by most nations, therefore I do not consider it necessary to change terms to fit the RN! I recognise that the amphibious tasking needs to be closer to shore, however, it does need the air support of a carrier group. The best option is to bring amphibious shipping closer to shore for the launch of the assault, then retreat within the radar/air defence umbrella of the destroyers and carrier. I do not advocate the UK buying a 'French imitation navy' as you put it, I was simply suggesting buying a different design of amphibious ship. In terms of the Jeanne D'Arc, if you actually read what I said, I was simply referring to buying an amphibious ship with greater aviation capacity than an LPD. I was not suggesting actually buying a Jeanne D'Arc class ship. In terms of the OPV(H), it is a good design, and might be very useful if fitted to take a combat module, allowing the high-cost weapons systems to be installed when necessary.

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perfectgeneral RE:Future Navy (keep it real)- Worcester 7/27/2005 11:54:34 AM

In brief, OPV will have neither range nor speed nor escort capacity therefore you will need an awful lot more of them than just a 1:1 replacement to compensate for even a T23. Helicopters are probably THE most useful force multiplier on any small ship and you really have to wonder if losing this capacity maked an OPV even half he capability of a T23. I don't expect OPV(H) - The H stands for helecopter - to replace the Dukes. I was intending to use them in addition to existing ships. The Wave that will patrol outside of peak hurricane season should have help from an OPV(H) prepositioned in the caribbean. The Gulf and waters around Singapore would also benefit from this added presence. The Brunei ships might have been okay(ish) for this, had we been lumbered with them. The the River class aren't really suited to open waters are they? An ocean going (truely) OPV(H) might be more like a full scale Triton: longer, wider (between outriggers) and yet faster. We are getting into the realms of big budget wish lists here. Maybe when the Dukes are finally replaced it will be by a mix of re-roled Darings and such a trimaran corvette. In answer to your second point (about cost due to Amphib. capability increase and through-life costs of crew), I think that the RN should let the Army pick up more of the cost of amphibious warfare. The 16th Air Assault Brigade and the 19th Light Brigade will be using RN ampibious assets as well as 3 Commando. Tihs is robbing Peter to pay Paul, but the senior service seems to be third to the trough at present. Reducing crews will reduce shore parties, but will multiply out (training, retention and pension) into a major saving. Retention is the key to greater savings, I feel. Partial crew rotation to allow time with family will enhance retention. Only time will tell if it is worth the extra/spare crewmembers. This also offers the flexibility to add a watch in an emergency (cancel leave) for shore party work or greater readiness. I agree with what you said about half-trained crews (re-read my post). I'm interested to here that Rosyth Sqn will recieve 4 Dukes. I thought we would sell them off to Chile, Belgium, etc. Certainly some mothball fleet will remain and I would hope that 'home leave watch' would be another option to help crew these ships.

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Worcester RE:Future Navy (keep it real)- Perfect 7/27/2005 5:41:52 PM

Interesting expansion of your original thesis. It would seem hard to justify fleet expansion beyond that required for the agreed political tasks and commitments - I'd love to be a fly on the wall of the Cabinet OPD when a Def Sec tried to explain that one! As for the army paying more, two points: (1) army already pay the RAF whenever they use airlift (e.g. 16AABde finances a large part of SHF and the C130 fleet) and I suspect the book-keepers do exactly the same for troops on transports. (2) Do you really want the army to claim any "territory" in amphib operations? Soldiers are passengers, Marines are vastly more useful and integrated, which is precisely why the Navy has decided to fund the RM to such a high level, hardly touched by the end of the Cold War - in fact, even better equipped. If you start asking for army budget "help" when you ae not even carrying them, the army will start helping themselves to amphibious jobs. Fair is fair. OPV(H). Yes, I realize what the "H" means. But my point (which I didnt make clearly enough) was "does it really mean H?" The smaller the platform the less capable it is and the less space for hangars or stability for landing. From memory (so excuse any slight errors) the earliest small ships to carry helos were the Rothesay and later Leanders of some 2,250 tons and they carried Wasp and most certainly couldnt carry Merlin and forget Chinook. Going down to corvette size of say 1,000- 1,500 tons is a significant quantum (not linear) drop in stability which will restrict helo ops as well as helo size. It is all very well saying it would be nice to have OPV(H) or corvettes in various regions...but - big question - what are they going to do? If the Malacca Straits (Singapore) is not currently a Patrol Task, then why have anything there at all? If the Malacca Straits should become a Patrol Task then why not patrol it properly with a frigate or destroyer? The real danger in such a scenario is creating the appearance of a defense task without having either the political need or the defense means to back it up. In extremis the OPV cant do much and the government has to explain that it wasnt really meant to anyway. Why lose a ship for no reason? Pointless embarrassment. Which is why political commitments come first - and defense means flow from these. Current taskings are pretty broad anyway.

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Worcester RE:Future Navy (keep it real)- Perfect 7/27/2005 5:59:35 PM

Oh please excuse me if that seemed brusque - wasnt meant to be. I do agree that the OPV(H) is an interesting concept but I dont see it replacing larger fleet vessels nor as a means of taking on even more long-range tasks. The RN allready has a great advantage in sea command training since the off-shore patrol role (which is handled by our Coast Guaard) gives young officers (and senior rates) a very good early experience of command upon which they can build in larger warships. This explains the diversity of experience between the excellence of RN ship command and the rather more mixed USN experience. We generally take good people who are bright and can pass exams ans get good fitness reports, but we dont get to test them in command until they are well into their 30s by which time it is too late to learn "command". Some of them are very good; quite a few have to be relieved. Lot easier (and cheaper) if we'd tested them on a minehunter when they were 25; or on Perisher, which we now are doing. So I'm not anti-small ship; quite the contrary. Just trying to figure out what they DO? Is an OPV(H) that much more capable and sustainable than a simple OPV? Can they do 50% of a T23 job (range, speed, escort, patrol duration) or is it a false economy? Like the old T21s which were seen as "cheap and cheerful" but could never quite make the grade for full frigate duties. Is an OPV(H) just a T21 "lite"?

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perfectgeneral RE:Future Navy (keep it real)- OPV(H)/GCo(Trimaran) 7/28/2005 12:20:35 AM

I see the small littoral waters vessel as an anti-smuggling patrol craft. Trade in drugs and people help fund terror. This is a new commitment to an old problem. I only mention the Global Corvette (Trimaran) in reply to doubts over the OPV(H) design in terms of speed and for supporting a helecopter (lynx?). Sometimes it is easier to ask others to act on an issue if you are already showing willing. Politics and diplomacy sometimes follow the gunship rather than lead it. It is a lot cheaper to play gesture politics with a patrol vessel than a battleship. I have no specific plan to be pinned to, but my intention lies somewhere among these comments. Distant postings early in a career are less likely to disrupt family life. Given the prospect of fishery protection and customs work until a major warship posting, a little patrol work in a sunny clime might be welcome?

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perfectgeneral RE:Future Navy (keep it real)- German 130 7/28/2005 12:59:43 AM

is about 1,500 tonnes full load and as wide as the OPV(h), but can/will reach 30 knots and carry two rotorcraft. It is possible.

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interestedamateur RE:MARS 9/15/2005 11:18:37 AM

I've read somewhere that the requirement for the Maritime Replenishment and Stores ship is for the UK to get 17 of them. Can't remember the source but may have been Janes IDR. Sounds rather alot quite frankly.

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Donkey RE:MARS/interestedamateur 9/17/2005 8:14:49 AM

17 Maritime Replenishment and Stores ships Sounds rather a lot. Well that depends on what plans the MOD has for these vessels I suppose. With the reduction in the Destroyer/Frigate fleets, the RFA seems to be taking over some of the less FRONT LINE roles from the RN; perhaps the MOD sees this as a solution to front line cuts. We need to replace the RFA ships, so give them a duel role; Maritime replenishment & OPV no need to build anymore OPV?s. Donk

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interestedamateur RE:MARS/interestedamateur 9/19/2005 4:56:43 AM

Richard Beedall states that between 8 - 15 hulls are likely to be built. Here's his web-page with the latest news: link

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