"I was describing a conventional war in which Southern armies would enter the North to lay waste to its economy by scorched earth tactics and to spur the migration of masses of refugees within the North. That is, to do what Sherman did in his march to the sea."

Isn't that essentially what the South's actual strategy was? Your argument is very persuasive but I've formed the opinion that such half measures seem always to result in failure.

Turn the tables for a moment and consider what it took for the North to defeat the South.

One other point I guess is that this strategy might adversely affect the moral of the army used to undertake it.

Lee was the most beloved General in American history. D*mn Congress for not pardoning him. As a southerner I wish to say that never did such a splendid General stand on American soil.

He swore an oath to the United States Constitution and broke it.

 

Whether he was beloved by the soldiers who served under him is not relevant. Grant was equally beloved as was SHERMAN.

 

You are also wrong about Gettysburg. Lee's army had no transport to pace the Army of the Potomac if he tried to go around it. Meade had already proved he could outmarch the ANV. How was Lee supposed to get around the Union left again with no cavalry and get through that terrain whoich was WOODS in those dayts? How was he supposed to get around Sugar Loaf the dominant hill terrain feature on the Union right? I would loive to see how that was possible. Part of the reason Lee didn;t try was because he was a BETTER general than the overrated Longstreet and understood just how infantry  march rates and interior lines worked.

 

He also didn't have good maps of the country. To remund you about Linciln who chose Meade; he said somethingf to the effect that "this beetle would fight well to defend his own dung heap" : that is Meade kinew the ground and Lee didn't.  

 

There are good reasons why men do what they do. Lee had his very good reasons for his center attack. He could not exceed his tactical radius of baggage train supplied movement or his topological knowledge. He could also not risk a converging column attack when he almost had the left of his army shattered by Sickle's lunatic movement into the Wheatfield.

 

Are you seriiously trying to tell me that after that debacle and the follow up mess Longstreet made of Devil's Den and Little Round Top, that Lee was in a mood to listen to Old Pete?  

 

This is where I fall behind.

I have no understanding of considerations such as logistics as they applied to Lee's and Meade's armies.

Lee seemed to have felt constrained to fight at Gettysburg rather than to fight a campaign relying on mobility and manuver.

For instance, I do not understand why he could not simply cut loose from his supply bases and move farther north trying to lure the AOTP into a disadvantageous situation. Sherman cut loose from his supply lines.

 

Why could not Lee manuver so as to keep the federals guessing whether his object was Washington, Baltimore or Philadelphia (or maybe New York)?

 

Also, how and where did Meade prove he could out manuver the ANV? Was Lee under a conviction that he was at a disadvantage with respect to mobility?

 

Of course after watching the movie one is left having to either conclude that Lee was an idiot or that he took a calculated risk perhaps based on a conviction that he must either seek victory at that moment no matter the circumstances or resign his cause to an eventual and certain defeat.

IIRC, from the various descriptions I've read about Pickett's Charge, Lee felt like this would be his last best chance at breaking the Union lines, and routing the AOTP. The Confederates preceded the Charge with a huge artillery bombardment which both obscured any attempts at direct observation of the Union lines as well as gave the Confederates the confidence that they would be advancing against a Union line that would be broken and shattered beyond the ability to effectively defend it - heights or no heights.

 

Of course, they found out what the British found out at the Somme, that artillery doesn't always solve all problems.

Ah well! I still cling to my pet delusion - the creation of an army on horseback, under the command, perhaps, of Bedford Forrest, for operations in the territory between the Rockies and the Mississippi.

 

Of course, in order to frustrate Union attempts to control the Mississippi River and thus cut the army's lines of communications, the Rebs develop, carry and deploy naval mines when and where practicable.

 

The army's mission would be to radicalize the plains Indians against the prospect of a Union victory, mine navigable rivers, suppress all overland federal communications with the western states, conduct raids east of the Mississippi, give the North's newspapers plenty to complain about, divert federal forces from Virginia and to generally outrun stronger forces while destroying weaker ones.