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Subject: Was There Such A Thing As A Possible Winning Strategy For The South?
CJH    4/21/2007 2:18:06 PM
I believe the War Between the States was decided in the West and not the East where it was indecisive.

Lee was an able defensive general but was unable to make the transition to an effective offensive strategist in his two forays north of the Potomac. He could have turned the tables on the Army of the Potomac in Pennsylvania but his ethical mores were adverse to this.

I believe the Confederacy could have prevailed in the West had it fashioned an army designed for mobility and maneuver and employed scorched earth methods in the Midwest.

However, in Lee's case in Pennsylvania he could have drawn Meade out of his defensive positions at Gettysburg.

I remember reading about one of Rome's early wars with a neighboring city-state. Rome's enemy's army holed itself up in the walled city to avoid a battle. Seeing this, the Roman consul set fire to the crops in the farm land which supported the city. This apparently forced the erstwhile beseiged enemy army to risk an engagement which it lost.

Scipio Africanus forced the Carthaginians to concede that he had control of their territory when he laid waste to their breadbasket crop lands.

Lee, had he been willing, could have laid waste to the Pennsylvania countryside, casting Meade into the state of psychological dislocation born of being forced to act precipitously by newspapers, politicians to say nothing of a sense of honor.

But I am sure that Lee would say that while that may have been true, a Southern victory would not have been worth being guilty of the commission of such an offense against God and humanity.

If Jackson had been alive and was in Lee's shoes at Gettysbug, I wonder what he would have done.
 
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NapoleonVIII       6/23/2009 10:54:44 AM
Lee was the most beloved General in American history. D*mn Congress for not pardoning him. As a southerner I wish to say that never did such a splendid General stand on American soil.
 
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Herald12345    Lee was a traitor.    6/24/2009 5:31:28 AM

Lee was the most beloved General in American history. D*mn Congress for not pardoning him. As a southerner I wish to say that never did such a splendid General stand on American soil.

He swore an oath to the United States Constitution and broke it.
 
Whether he was beloved by the soldiers who served under him is not relevant. Grant was equally beloved as was SHERMAN.
 
You are also wrong about Gettysburg. Lee's army had no transport to pace the Army of the Potomac if he tried to go around it. Meade had already proved he could outmarch the ANV. How was Lee supposed to get around the Union left again with no cavalry and get through that terrain whoich was WOODS in those dayts? How was he supposed to get around Sugar Loaf the dominant hill terrain feature on the Union right? I would loive to see how that was possible. Part of the reason Lee didn;t try was because he was a BETTER general than the overrated Longstreet and understood just how infantry  march rates and interior lines worked.
 
He also didn't have good maps of the country. To remund you about Linciln who chose Meade; he said somethingf to the effect that "this beetle would fight well to defend his own dung heap" : that is Meade kinew the ground and Lee didn't.  
 
There are good reasons why men do what they do. Lee had his very good reasons for his center attack. He could not exceed his tactical radius of baggage train supplied movement or his topological knowledge. He could also not risk a converging column attack when he almost had the left of his army shattered by Sickle's lunatic movement into the Wheatfield.
 
Are you seriiously trying to tell me that after that debacle and the follow up mess Longstreet made of Devil's Den and Little Round Top, that Lee was in a mood to listen to Old Pete?  
 
 
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CJH       7/2/2009 7:27:29 PM
This is where I fall behind.
I have no understanding of considerations such as logistics as they applied to Lee's and Meade's armies.
Lee seemed to have felt constrained to fight at Gettysburg rather than to fight a campaign relying on mobility and manuver.
For instance, I do not understand why he could not simply cut loose from his supply bases and move farther north trying to lure the AOTP into a disadvantageous situation. Sherman cut loose from his supply lines.
 
Why could not Lee manuver so as to keep the federals guessing whether his object was Washington, Baltimore or Philadelphia (or maybe New York)?
 
Also, how and where did Meade prove he could out manuver the ANV? Was Lee under a conviction that he was at a disadvantage with respect to mobility?
 
Of course after watching the movie one is left having to either conclude that Lee was an idiot or that he took a calculated risk perhaps based on a conviction that he must either seek victory at that moment no matter the circumstances or resign his cause to an eventual and certain defeat.
 
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BasinBictory       7/4/2009 3:30:07 AM
IIRC, from the various descriptions I've read about Pickett's Charge, Lee felt like this would be his last best chance at breaking the Union lines, and routing the AOTP. The Confederates preceded the Charge with a huge artillery bombardment which both obscured any attempts at direct observation of the Union lines as well as gave the Confederates the confidence that they would be advancing against a Union line that would be broken and shattered beyond the ability to effectively defend it - heights or no heights.
 
Of course, they found out what the British found out at the Somme, that artillery doesn't always solve all problems.
 
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CJH       7/13/2009 9:22:00 PM
Ah well! I still cling to my pet delusion - the creation of an army on horseback, under the command, perhaps, of Bedford Forrest, for operations in the territory between the Rockies and the Mississippi.
 
Of course, in order to frustrate Union attempts to control the Mississippi River and thus cut the army's lines of communications, the Rebs develop, carry and deploy naval mines when and where practicable.
 
The army's mission would be to radicalize the plains Indians against the prospect of a Union victory, mine navigable rivers, suppress all overland federal communications with the western states, conduct raids east of the Mississippi, give the North's newspapers plenty to complain about, divert federal forces from Virginia and to generally outrun stronger forces while destroying weaker ones.
 
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Tancred    CJH Cutting loose   7/16/2009 9:02:21 AM
When Sherman cut loose he knew that Hood had gone north to invade Tenn, and Thomas was on the way to block him. So Sherman had a longish but unopposed march to the sea - where the USN can supply him from any number of fine ports and a march through not unfriendly friendly country (getting on for 50% of the population of the deep south were slaves).
 
Lee cutting loose in Penn is condemning the ANV to a constant struggle for lunch declining ammunition supplies every time you fight and a short time frame to do anything - at the time of Gettysburg the Army of the Cumberland was not committed irrevocably, and Vicksburg surrendered on the ?second day of Gettysburg.
 
How long did it take Hooker & Slocum to get to Chattanooga ?5 days, say 4 weeks from Vicksburg to Washington/Philly/Baltimore for a couple of Grant's Corps.
 
Interesting hypothetical - between Meade and say Thomas and Sherman - who has seniority of either of the latter get sent East. (assume Grant and Rosecrans stay in their departments)
 
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Britelitecomp       8/23/2009 10:10:14 PM
 

The South made a serious error by attacking Fort Sumter becoming the ?aggressor? initially. Allowing the North to make the first offensive movement would have served the CSA far better in the foreign political arena. Although England would have had issues mustering large ground units commitment of the Royal Navy could have ended the blockade of Southern ports. A large scale sea battle between the USN and the RN would have likely resulted in the destruction of the USN. The South was dependent on cotton export to generate cash for arms purchases. Removal of the blockade would have allowed the South to trade freely on the world market.


Lees' skill maintained a balance militarily in the Eastern Theater but he had not achieved the decisive victory necessary to bring England into the fray nor force a war weary North to negotiations: total annihilation of the Federal army. Logistically, the South was in poor shape by the time of the 1863 Pennsylvania invasion. One of the primary reasons for moving North was the AoNV would gather supplies off Northern soil as Virginia's resources had been severely depleted with no respite. Another goal of the campaign was to disrupt Federal operational planning in the short term. Jeff Davis hoped the move would divert attention and forces from the Western theater away from Vicksburg.


Prior to the Battle of Gettysburg quality of the rank and file of the AoNV had been eroded in virtually every action. Specifically the officer corps had suffered losses that Lee had few qualified replacements. The reorganization of the Corps created more vacancies. Men though brave and willing were assigned leadership roles they were not qualified to adequately perform. Lee correctly foresaw that attrition would ultimately destroy his army. IMHO his actions and performance at Gettysburg were influenced by the need to destroy the Army of the Potomac. Lee carried a document signed by Davis requesting negotiation if Lee was successful in this destruction. The following quotation is from R E Lee by Douglas Southall Freeman, Vol III, Chapter 5, P 59. "Our army," he was quoted long afterwards by Trimble as saying, "is in good spirits, not overfatigued, and can be concentrated on any one point in twenty-four hours or less. I have not yet heard that the enemy have crossed the Potomac, and am waiting to hear from General Stuart. When they hear where we are, they will make forced marches to interpose their forces between us and Baltimore and Philadelphia. I shall throw an overwhelming force on their advance, crush it, follow up the success, drive one corps back on another, and by successive repulses and surprises, before they can concentrate, create a panic and virtually destroy the army."

Link:link


The successful implementation of the Anaconda Plan dictated the manner in which the War was fought. The blockade substantially weakened the Confederacy. The Vicksburg and Atlanta Campaigns cut manpower that might have come to Lee from those areas.


Lee sought and found the decisive battle he wished for. For the CSA unfortunately, the army destroyed was his own.



 
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CJH       9/12/2009 11:18:19 PM
Hannibal's army was in Italy for some 14 years. I am at least not aware that he had an organized system of supply of the kind that Rome did for its army. Hannibal's army had to disperse forces to forage. Yet, Hannibal still had considerable freedom of movement for most of those 14 years while Rome was in learning mode.
 
The Duke of Marlborough took his army up the Rhine on the way to Bavaria and Blenheim during the War of the Spanish Succession.
 
I guess that's why I was wondering about Lee in PA.
 
 
 
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cwDeici       9/13/2009 6:07:00 PM

The weakness of the Unionists was political.  They did not have as broad support as the sucessionists did in the South.  The Republicans barely took through the election of 1860.  The anti federalists/states rights advocates, antiwar groups, Democratic party loyalists, ect... together were a significant group but unorganized and not effectively drawing support from the general electorate.  Had the South won a few more decisive victorys in 1861-63 support for the Uniionist/Federalist agenda would have weakend and the various other factions in the North gained enough strength to undermine the Republicans in Congress & the Lincoln/Seward government.  With Congress shifting towards the anti war factions and several states ceasing support for the war the money and volunteers would be insuffcient to hold a large Federal army together.  The election of 1862 would be key.  Were the war to go worse for the North a significant number of the Radical Republicans, and pro Unionist Democrats would be likely to lose their seats.  In that case the new Congress might force some sort of reconciliation with the Confederate government and a eventual peace.

Were Jackson or Lee in the spring or summer of 1862 able to close to Washington DC and threaten to invest it the political consequenses would be imense.  Even the possiblity of the Federal governement leaving the capitol would be a severe embarassment, and a relocation lasting just a few weeks could be catastophic to the Republican government.

Great defeats or victorys are seldom a product of just the battlefield.  While the military battles may be indecisive in themselves their effect on the general population can result in a feeling of defeat & consequent shift in leadership & policy.  

The converse of this is true for the South as well.  Jefferson Davis was president of a weak confederated government.  Had McDowell or McClellan defeated Johnston and marched onto Richmond it is possible the Southern coalition would have fallen apart, leaving the indivdual states to fight on in a uncoordinated manner and some even reconcilling with the US government. 


 Tet Offensive - Immense Tactical and Strategic Victory (with heavy losses to rural nativization), led to loss of Vietnam
Mogadishu (Black Hawk Down) - Tactical and Subsequent Strategic Victory (the day after in particular) led to withdrawal from peacekeeping mission in Somalia 
 
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cwDeici       9/13/2009 6:23:16 PM
Strategically, on the battlefield, I believe Lee should have been more aggressive early on. Of course this would either risk him expending his supplies or would require cruelty to sustain.
 
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cwDeici       9/13/2009 6:27:26 PM
Those armies were somewhat smaller and crueller (at least Hannibal's was, starting at about 50k+).
Most importantly though you're comparing Lee to the arguably finest General in the history of mankind. And I am no fan of Hannibal, this is what I have been convinced by others:
 
quote, wiki: Hannibal excelled as a tactician. No battle in history is a finer sample of tactics than Cannae. But he was yet greater in logistics and strategy. No captain ever marched to and fro among so many armies of troops superior to his own numbers and material as fearlessly and skillfully as he. No man ever held his own so long or so ably against such odds. Constantly overmatched by better soldiers, led by generals always respectable, often of great ability, he yet defied all their efforts to drive him from Italy, for half a generation. Excepting in the case of Alexander, and some few isolated instances, all wars up to the Second Punic War, had been decided largely, if not entirely, by battle-tactics. Strategic ability had been comprehended only on a minor scale. Armies had marched towards each other, had fought in parallel order, and the conqueror had imposed terms on his opponent. Any variation from this rule consisted in ambuscades or other stratagems. That war could be waged by avoiding in lieu of seeking battle; that the results of a victory could be earned by attacks upon the enemy?s communications, by flank-maneuvers, by seizing positions from which safely to threaten him in case he moved, and by other devices of strategy, was not understood... [However] For the first time in the history of war, we see two contending generals avoiding each other, occupying impregnable camps on heights, marching about each other's flanks to seize cities or supplies in their rear, harassing each other with small-war, and rarely venturing on a battle which might prove a fatal disaster—all with a well-conceived purpose of placing his opponent at a strategic disadvantage... That it did so was due to the teaching of Hannibal.[13
 
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cwDeici       9/13/2009 6:37:52 PM







The South resorting to a massive guerilla war against the North?  Sounds like a good idea at first, but the South will have to pay a hefty price.  Since a war with guerillas can easily be interpreted by the conventional side as a war with rebels and terrorists, if I were the North, I would treat the South as a terrorist sympathizers and their civil population do not deserve to be treated fairly.  The South will face much more humiliation and destruction if they go guerilla ...




Your answer is the logical one. However, it is quite possible that Reconstruction Era Southerners would have said that this is how they had been actually treated anyway.



But I was not describing an asymmetrical war. I was describing a conventional war in which Southern armies would enter the North to lay waste to its economy by scorched earth tactics and to spur the migration of masses of refugees within the North. That is, to do what Sherman did in his march to the sea.




I think the South doing 'scorched earth' into the North would still not bring any better results to the South.  The most they could probably do is to attack bordering Northern states, but not much more beyond that.  Not to mention that even wish such a tactic, that is not going to seriously dent the Northern economy.  Would the Northern population become intimidated by the Southern 'scorched earth'?  The exact opposite would have nappened:  The North would become enraged and prosecute the war more brutally upon the South.  If the war turned that ugly, I would not mind wiping out the South and even entertaining the though to of genocide.

... genocide and scorched Earth are not the same...
 
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