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Subject: Gettysburg Question
BasinBictory    4/29/2006 5:38:35 AM
Hello all,

Just recently visited the Gettysburg National Park, and did the self-guided tour (minus the benefit of audio cassette) and had a question about the defense of Little Round Top.

Now, I'm certainly not as well read as some of you on the Civil War, the majority of my knowledge of the battle comes from "The Killer Angels" and the movie it was based on, "Gettysburg" (the one with Martin Sheen as RE Lee and Jeff Daniels as Col. Chamberlain.

Anyway, at the actual battle site, one of the storyboards (or kiosks, or whatever you call those informational boards set up at historical sites) says that the left flank of the Union Army was severely threatened on the second day of battle, as Hood's division tried to break the Union left flank. As I read from "The Killer Angels," I thought it was the 20th Maine, led by Colonel Chamberlain, who led a heroic bayonet charge (because they were out of ammo) that routed the Confederates and saved the day. The storyboard at the park states it was the 140th New York! Is this mistaken? Or did the 140th also participate in a similar action?
 
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Carl S    RE:Gettysburg Question   4/29/2006 6:58:42 AM
Yes. I cant recall if the NY regiment charged with the 20th Maine, or if that was a seperate attack. The battle for Little Round Top dragged out for several hours and was spread over the entire hill. Between the woods, growing exhaustion of the attackers, loss of control by the senior commanders, and other battlefield friction it was more of cluster of fights rather than a single massed action like Picketts Charge. Had the Confederates suceeded in breaking any other Federal regiment on the hill it is probable the entire defense would have quickly fallen apart. All the Federal regimental commanders were experinced and reasonably trained and understood the situation. The brigade commander and I think the divsion commander had briefed them all on the situation and given 'hold at all cost orders' when they were originally deployed on the hill. As the fight developed and both sides neared their breaking point a counter attack became an increaingly attractive choice to the individual regimental commanders for getting rid of the confederates in their sector. I'd guess some of these counter attacks were not full blown charges like the 20 Maine or the New Yorkers. As Confederate regiments were rallying for a new advance just moving a little ways down the hill to fire a volley into them would have done a lot. The brigade commander was also directly commanding the battle and he may have initiated counter attacks. Published historys only cover a small portion of the events in a battle. It is likely that otherr ''charges' on Little Round Top have not ever been described by historians and are only documented in a few crumbling diarys and letters.
 
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S-2    RE:Gettysburg Question/1st Minnesota?   4/29/2006 8:00:01 AM
Check this out. I pulled this down off the NPS Gettysburg site- "At approximately 6:30, General McLaws sent forward his Mississippi brigade commanded by Brig. General William Barksdale, who had waited impatiently with his men at Pitzer's Woods. The Mississippi attack rammed through Union regiments near the Peach Orchard and other Confederate units rushed from Seminary Ridge to exploit the break. The battered Union line wavered and slowly collapsed under the relentless Confederate pressure that swept across the Abraham Trostle Farm at the center of Sickles' line. Here the southerners found themselves at the doorway of a sizeable gap in the Union line between Cemetery Hill and Little Round Top, held by a handful of Union artillerymen and one regiment of foot soldiers, the 1st Minnesota Infantry. The Minnesota regiment was about to do the impossible- stop the Confederate attack before they reached the center of Cemetery Ridge. The Minnesotans charged into the Confederates and succeeded in slowing their attack, but at a terrible cost. Union reinforcements arrived and drove the Confederates back, but not before they had threatened the Union line right up to its center." Damned if that doesn't sound like it happened right next to 20th Maine. So who REALLY anchored the Union left flank? Googled up the 20th Maine. Here's Chamberlain's AAR, written 6 July, 1863- REPORT OF COL. JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN, Twentieth Maine Infantry. FIELD NEAR EMMITSBURG, July 6, 1863. SIR: In compliance with the request of the colonel commanding the brigade, I have the honor to submit a somewhat detailed report of the operations of the Twentieth Regiment Maine Volunteers in the battle of Gettysburg, on the 2d and 3d instant. Having acted as the advance guard, made necessary by the proximity of the enemy's cavalry, on the march of the day before, my command on reaching Hanover, Pa., just before sunset on that day, were much worn, and lost no time in getting ready for an expected bivouac. Rations were scarcely issued, and the men about preparing supper, when rumors that the enemy had been encountered that day near Gettysburg absorbed every other interest, and very soon orders came to march forthwith to Gettysburg. My men moved out with a promptitude and spirit extraordinary, the cheers and welcome they received on the road adding to their enthusiasm. After an hour or two of sleep by the roadside just before daybreak, we reached the heights southeasterly of Gettysburg at about 7 a.m., July 2. Massed at first with the rest of the division on the right of the road, we were moved several times farther toward the left. Although expecting every moment to be put into action and held strictly in line of battle, yet the men were able to take some rest and make the most of their rations. Somewhere near 4 p.m. a sharp cannonade, at some distance to our left and front, was the signal for a sudden and rapid movement of our whole division in the direction of this firing, which grew warmer as we approached. Passing an open field in the hollow ground in which some of our batteries were going into position, our brigade reached the skirt of a piece of woods, in the farther edge of which there was a heavy musketry fire, and when about to go forward into line we received from Colonel Vincent, commanding the brigade, orders to move to the left at the double-quick, when we took a farm road crossing Plum Run in order to gain a rugged mountain spur called Granite Spur, or Little Round Top. The enemy's artillery got range of our column as we were climbing the spur, and the crashing of the shells among the rocks and the tree tops made us move lively along the crest. One or two shells burst in our ranks. Passing to the southern slope of Little Round Top, Colonel Vincent indicated to me the ground my regiment was to occupy, informing me that this was the extreme left of our general line, and that a desperate attack was expected in order to turn that position, concluding by telling me I was to ?hold that ground at all hazards.? This was the last word I heard from him. In order to commence by making my right firm, I formed my regiment on the right into line, giving such direction to the line as should best secure the advantage of the rough, rocky, and stragglingly wooded ground. The line faced generally toward a more conspicuous eminence southwest of ours, which is known as Sugar Loaf, or Round Top. Between this and my position intervened a smooth and thinly wooded hollow. My line formed, I immediately detached Company B, Captain Morrill commanding, to extend from my left flank across this hollow as a line of skirmishers, with directions to act as occasion might dictate, to prevent a surprise on my exposed flank and rear. The artillery fire on our position had meanwhile been constant and heavy, but my formation was scarcely complete when the artillery was replaced by a vigorous infantry assault upon the center of our brigade to my right, but it very soon involved the right of my regiment and gradually extended along my entire front. The action was quite sharp and at close quarters. In the midst of this, an officer from my center informed me that some important movement of the enemy was going on in his front, beyond that of the line with which we were engaged. Mounting a large rock, I was able to see a considerable body of the enemy moving by the flank in rear of their line engaged, and passing from the direction of the foot of Great Round Top through the valley toward the front of my left. The close engagement not allowing any change of front, I immediately stretched my regiment to the left, by taking intervals by the left flank, and at the same time ?refusing? my left wing, so that it was nearly at right angles with my right, thus occupying about twice the extent of our ordinary front, some of the companies being brought into single rank when the nature of the ground gave sufficient strength or shelter. My officers and men understood wishes so well that this movement was executed under fire, the right wing keeping up fire, without giving the enemy any occasion to seize or even to suspect their advantage. But we were not a moment too soon; the enemy's flanking column having gained their desired direction, burst upon my left, where they evidently had expected an unguarded flank, with great demonstration. We opened a brisk fire at close range, which was so sudden and effective that they soon fell back among the rocks and low trees in the valley, only to burst forth again with a shout, and rapidly advanced, firing as they came. They pushed up to within a dozen yards of us before the terrible effectiveness of our fire compelled them to break and take shelter. They renewed the assault on our whole front, and for an hour the fighting was severe. Squads of the enemy broke through our line in several places, and the fight was literally hand to hand. The edge of the fight rolled backward and forward like a wave. The dead and wounded were now in our front and then in our rear. Forced from our position, we desperately recovered it, and pushed the enemy down to the foot of the slope. The intervals of the struggle were seized to remove our wounded (and those of the enemy also), to gather ammunition from the cartridge-boxes of disabled friend or foe on the field, and even to secure better muskets than the Enfields, which we found did not stand service well. Rude shelters were thrown up of the loose rocks that covered the ground. Captain Woodward, commanding the Eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, on my right, gallantly maintaining his fight, judiciously and with hearty co-operation made his movements conform to my necessities, so that my right was at no time exposed to a flank attack. The enemy seemed to have gathered all their energies for their final assault. We had gotten our thin line into as good a shape as possible, when a strong force emerged from the scrub wood in the valley, as well as I could judge, in two lines in echelon by the right, and, opening a heavy fire, the first line came on as if they meant to sweep everything before them. We opened on them as well as we could with our scanty ammunition snatched from the field. It did not seem possible to withstand another shock like this now coming on. Our loss had been severe. One-half of my left wing had fallen, and a third of my regiment lay just behind us, dead or badly wounded. At this moment my anxiety was increased by a great roar of musketry in my rear, on the farther or northerly slope of Little Round Top, apparently on the flank of the regular brigade, which was in support of Hazlett's battery on the crest behind us. The bullets from this attack struck into my left rear, and I feared that the enemy might have nearly surrounded the Little Round Top, and only a desperate chance was left for us. My ammunition was soon exhausted. My men were firing their last shot and getting ready to ?club? their muskets. It was imperative to strike before we were struck by this overwhelming force in a hand-to-hand fight, which we could not probably have withstood or survived. At that crisis, I ordered the bayonet. The word was enough. It ran like fire along the line, from man to man, and rose into a shout, with which they sprang forward upon the enemy, now not 30 yards away. The effect was surprising; many of the enemy's first line threw down their arms and surrendered. An officer fired his pistol at my head with one hand, while he handed me his sword with the other. Holding fast by our right, and swinging forward our left, we made an extended ?right wheel,? before which the enemy's second line broke and fell back, fighting from tree to tree, many being captured, until we had swept the valley and cleared the front of nearly our entire brigade. Meantime Captain Morrill with his skirmishers (sent out from my left flank), with some dozen or fifteen of the U.S. Sharpshooters who had put themselves under his direction, fell upon the enemy as they were breaking, and by his demonstrations, as well as his well-directed fire, added much to the effect of the charge. Having thus cleared the valley and driven the enemy up the western slope of the Great Round Top, not wishing to press so far out as to hazard the ground I was to hold by leaving it exposed to a sudden rush of the enemy, I succeeded (although with some effort to stop my men, who declared they were ?on the road to Richmond?) in getting the regiment into good order and resuming our original position. Four hundred prisoners, including two field and several line officers, were sent to the rear. These were mainly from the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Alabama Regiments, with some of the Fourth and Fifth Texas. One hundred and fifty of the enemy were found killed and wounded in our front. At dusk, Colonel Rice informed me of the fall of Colonel Vincent, which had devolved the command of the brigade on him, and that Colonel Fisher had come up with a brigade to our support. These troops were massed in our rear. It was the understanding, as Colonel Rice informed me, that Colonel Fisher's brigade was to advance and seize the western slope of Great Round Top, where the enemy had shortly before been driven. But, after considerable delay, this intention for some reason was not carried into execution. We were apprehensive that if the enemy were allowed to strengthen himself in that position, he would have a great advantage in renewing the attack on us at daylight or before. Colonel Rice then directed me to make the movement to seize that crest. It was now 9 p.m. Without waiting to get ammunition, but trusting in part to the very circumstance of not exposing our movement or our small front by firing, and with bayonets fixed, the little handful of 200 men pressed up the mountain side in very extended order, as the steep and jagged surface of the ground compelled. We heard squads of the enemy falling back before us, and, when near the crest, we met a scattering and uncertain fire, which caused us the great loss of the gallant Lieutenant Linscott, who fell, mortally wounded. In the silent advance in the darkness we laid hold of 25 prisoners, among them a staff officer of General [E. M.] Law, commanding the brigade immediately opposed to us during the fight. Reaching the crest, and reconnoitering the ground, I placed the men in a strong position among the rocks, and informed Colonel Rice, requesting also ammunition and some support to our right, which was very near the enemy, their movements and words even being now distinctly heard by us. Some confusion soon after resulted from the attempt of some regiment of Colonel Fisher's brigade to come to our support. They had found a wood road up the mountain, which brought them on my right flank, and also in proximity to the enemy, massed a little below. Hearing their approach, and thinking a movement from that quarter could only be from the enemy, I made disposition to receive them as such. In the confusion which attended the attempt to form them in support of my right, the enemy opened a brisk fire, which disconcerted my efforts to form them and disheartened the supports themselves, so that I saw no more of them that night. Feeling somewhat insecure in this isolated position, I sent in for the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, which came speedily, followed by the Forty-fourth New York, and, having seen these well posted, I sent a strong picket to the front, with instructions to report to me every half hour during the night, and allowed the rest of my men to sleep on their arms. At some time about midnight, two regiments of Colonel Fisher's brigade came up the mountain beyond my left, and took position near the summit; but as the enemy did not threaten from that direction, I made no effort to connect with them. We went into the fight with 386, all told - 358 guns. Every pioneer and musician who could carry a musket went into the ranks. Even the sick and foot-sore, who could not keep up in the march, came up as soon as they could find their regiments, and took their places in line of battle, while it was battle, indeed. Some prisoners I had under guard, under sentence of court-martial, I was obliged to put into the fight, and they bore their part well, for which I shall recommend a commutation of their sentence. The loss, so far as I can ascertain it, is 136 - 30 of whom were killed, and among the wounded are many mortally. Captain Billings, Lieutenant Kendall, and Lieutenant Linscott are officers whose loss we deeply mourn-- efficient soldiers, and pure and high-minded men. In such an engagement there were many incidents of heroism and noble character which should have place even in an official report; but, under present circumstances, I am unable to do justice to them. I will say of that regiment that the resolution, courage, and heroic fortitude which enabled us to withstand so formidable an attack have happily led to so conspicuous a result that they may safely trust to history to record their merits. About noon on the 3d of July, we were withdrawn, and formed on the right of the brigade, in the front edge of a piece of woods near the left center of our main line of battle, where we were held in readiness to support our troops, then receiving the severe attack of the afternoon of that day. On the 4th, we made a reconnaissance to the front, to ascertain the movements of the enemy, but finding that they had retired, at least beyond Willoughby's Run, we returned to Little Round Top, where we buried our dead in the place where we had laid them during the fight, marking each grave by a head-board made of ammunition boxes, with each dead soldiers name cut upon it. We also buried 50 of the enemy's dead in front of our position of July 2. We then looked after our wounded, whom I had taken the responsibility of putting into the houses of citizens in the vicinity of Little Round Top, and, on the morning of the 5th, took up our march on the Emmitsburg road. I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN, Colonel, Commanding Twentieth Maine Volunteers. Lieut. GEORGE B. HERENDEEN, A. A. A. G., Third Brig., First Div., Fifth Army Corps. REPORT OF CAPT. ATHERTON W. CLARK, Twentieth Maine Infantry. CAMP NEAR BEVERLY FORD, VA., August 14, 1863. LIEUTENANT: In compliance with circular of August 12, from headquarters Army of the Potomac, I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 5th ultimo this regiment moved forward on the battlefield of Gettysburg, and occupied the Carolina road during the day. At night, marched 10 miles in the direction of Emmitsburg, and bivouacked at midnight near Marsh Creek. Early on the morning of the 6th, marched 1 mile, and bivouacked. Resumed march on the 7th through Creagerstown, and bivouacked 6 miles above Frederick City and 18 miles from bivouac of previous night. On the 8th, moved in heavy rain 12 miles across the Catoctin Mountains, and encamped near Middletown in the afternoon. On the morning of the 9th, the regiment crossed over South Mountain (a detachment of it assisting the train in its passage), and encamped near Boonsborough in the afternoon, 8 miles from Middletown. The regiment moved early on the day following, and in the vicinity of the enemy, on the Sharpsburg pike, near Jones' Cross-Roads, was thrown forward to act as skirmishers. It was soon warmly engaged, and, after a severe and protracted skirmish, held the pike. The loss to the regiment was 2 killed and 6 wounded and missing. On the 11th, the regiment moved along the pike and westward, through field and wood, 2 miles, and bivouacked. On the morning of the 12th, advanced to the Williamsport road, and the next day crossed the Williamsport road and threw forward pickets. On the 14th, marched to Williamsport, and the morning following returned, marching through Keedysville, over South Mountain, and encamped near Burkittsville, having marched 20 miles. Moved forward on the 16th to vicinity of Berlin, where the regiment bivouacked until the afternoon of the 17th, when it crossed the Potomac, and marched 5 miles to Lovettsville. On the 18th, 19th, and 20th, marched to Goose Creek, 30 miles from Lovettsville. Resumed march on the 22d, and bivouacked near Rectortown, 10 miles distant from Goose Creek. The regiment took part in the operations of the 23d and 24th, in Manassas Gap, returning on the 25th, and encamped near Orleans, after a march of 20 miles. Resumed march in the morning, and on the 27th ultimo encamped 2 miles south of Warrenton. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, A. W. CLARK, Captain, Commanding Twentieth Maine Volunteers. Lieut. JOHN M. CLARK, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Brigade.
 
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BasinBictory    RE:Gettysburg Question/1st Minnesota?   4/30/2006 6:00:34 AM
Actually, I just read the wikipedia.com article about the battle of Little Round Top, and while indeed the stand and charge of the 20th Maine is in it, the 140th NY was the leftmost (southern) of the adjoining brigade and had to move quickly in order to plug the gap that was being opened by the 4th and 5th TX regiments between Vincent's (Rice's) brigade and the adjoining brigade. The article mentions that the 140th "charged" into action, but does not say whether it was a bayonet charge or simply a quick movement to get in position in order to lock up the Union line. Also, while I was in that room where they do the electric light map of the battle, the Battle of Little Round Top is given less mention and not than the fighting on the right flank of the line, up around Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. The narration says it was the bloodiest fighting of the war.
 
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AlbanyRifles    RE:Gettysburg Question/1st Minnesota?   5/1/2006 3:08:49 PM
1. The assault by the 1st Minnesota occured about 800 yards farther north of the ROund Tops up Cemetary Ridge into the area of the Wheatfield. 2. The 140th NY did conduct a local counterattck to close the gap in the line. The 20th ME launched its coutnerattack with bayonets when it was out of ammo and had to handle an assult. 3. Teh fighting around Culp's was exceptionally bloody....but there are definitely worse places to fight during the war....The Round Forest and the Slaughter Pen at Stones River, The Bloody Angle at Spotsylvania, The Peach Orchard at Shiloh, The Cornfield, East Woods and West Woods at Antietam...they all were bloody.
 
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S-2    RE:Gettysburg Question/1st Minnesota?   5/1/2006 4:44:19 PM
Yeah, you're correct. I noticed that after re-reading the section. In another note, over 50,000 veterans of the battle from both sides gathered on the 50th anniversary of the battle to walk the grounds. All had to be 67 years or older. Traveling at that age in 1913 could not have been easy. Nor the memories.
 
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AlbanyRifles    RE:Gettysburg Question/1st Minnesota?   5/2/2006 9:48:18 AM
Supporting that reunion was the single biggest mission of the US Army that year. The Army provided over a regiment of troops to provide the logistics and manpower needed. There were special trains from all over the country running into Gettysburg.
 
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AlbanyRifles    RE:Gettysburg Question/1st Minnesota?   5/2/2006 10:02:43 AM
link Also A May 1908 Act of the Pennsylvania State Assembly initiated the organization of the 50th reunion of Confederate and Union soldiers on the battlefield at Gettysburg by creating the Battle of Gettysburg Commission. That commission formally invited all other states and the U.S. Congress to participate in the organization of a fitting observance of the semicentennial of the greatest battle fought in the Western Hemisphere. In June 1910, the U.S. Congress created a joint special commission of cooperation for the event, and during the next three years several conferences were held with representatives of the various states as well as the Grand Army of the Republic, the Union veterans association, and the corresponding Rebel organization, the United Confederate Veterans. The reunion was funded by a $185,000 appropriation from Pennsylvania and $150,000 from the federal government. As the date for the reunion grew near, most railroad companies offered reduced fares for the 40,000 veterans expected to travel to the event, and the commission started preparing the reception for the honored guests. A great camp was set up around the battlefield; the War Department provided camp and garrison equipment with all quartermaster, commissary, and hospital supplies necessary for the care of the attendees. The camp was opened on June 29, 1913, and the first meals were served to veterans at supper that evening. As the veterans arrived they were greeted by Boy Scouts, the Boy Scout organization had begun in England just Six years before the reunion, who escorted them to their respective camps, which were organized into state encampments. The Scouts, who were quartered in the Seminary on Seminary Ridge, were constantly available in the camps to run errands for the elderly veterans. The four days of events were organized into Veterans' Day, Military Day, Civic Day, and National Day, but the overriding activity of the veterans was intermingling and meeting with one another and talking over the events of 50 years before.
 
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S-2    RE: AR Reply   5/2/2006 10:25:08 AM
"These venerable men crowding here to this famous field have set us a great example of devotion and utter sacrifice. They were willing to die that the people might live. But their task is done. Their day is turned into evening. They look to us to perfect what they have established. Their work is handed unto us, to be done in another way but not in another spirit. Our day is not over; it is upon us in full tide." Woodrow Wilson, Gettysburg, July 4, 1913. What a marvelous gathering! How interesting could it have been to be a boy scout here? Old enough to "get it", their eyes must have been like saucers listening to these old guys.
 
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S-2    RE: AR Reply-Boy Scouts   5/2/2006 10:28:19 AM
You're a troop leader, correct? I assume that you've had your charges up there a time or two?
 
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AlbanyRifles    RE: AR Reply-Boy Scouts   5/8/2006 10:13:41 AM
Yup....but not my own troop....yet! I have taken probably 15 Socut troops/Cub Packs there ove the past few years. We are scheduling our troop in abaout 18 months for this. We also want to do Antietam. Its really a great place to bring the kids.
 
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Carl S       9/23/2007 7:04:11 AM
Somewhere in the film archives there is a segment made after sound was introduced.  In the scene several elderly but spry men walk up to a stone wall and shake hands.  One man then waves his hat over his head and lets out a shout, then faces the camera and said "And, that is the Confederate Yell."   The narration overlaid on this film claimed it was shot on the Gettysburg battlefield.  The recording of the film with on site sound suggests it was made after 1925.  This may have been the last reunion of the Gettysburg soldiers.
 
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