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Subject: USMC perform atsame level or higher than comparable SOCOM units proven in head2head comparison: DET1
SCCOMarine    12/21/2006 7:01:59 PM
Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment 1 (MCSOCom Det 1) was created with a charter to examine the issue of a permanent Marine Corps force contribution to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom). Formally referred to as a "proof of concept," Det 1 completed a successful deployment under the operational control of USSOCom, demonstrated that Marines are fully capable of operating at the level of our Nation's other special operations forces (SOF), and paved the way for the creation of a Marine component to the USSOCom. As we prepare to case the colors of Det 1 and stand up U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MarSOC), it is appropriate to review and discuss what made Det 1 successful and any potential pitfalls to avoid as we move forward. Although the idea of a Marine Corps force contribution to USSOCom had been discussed since USSOCom's inception in the mid-1980s, it came to fruition only with the renewed emphasis placed on special operations in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. That fall, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directed the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), Gen James L. Jones, and Commander, USSOCom (CdrUSSOCom), Gen Charles Holland, USAF, to explore ways for the Marine Corps and USSOCom to work more closely together in what came to be known as the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The subject of assigning a Marine Corps unit-a force contribution-to USSOCom was raised early in the discussions and took on added significance in many Marine leaders' eyes when two of the Marine Corps' "crown jewels"-the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)s)-were forced to sit on the sidelines during the early stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan. Resistance from SOF commanders already on the ground and indifference from the Navy chain of command under which they were operating left the 15th MEU(SOC) languishing offshore for over a month. Even when these and later Marine units did make it ashore they were most often employed piece-meal in supporting roles to provide capabilities that SOF were deficient in or lacked altogether. In October 2002 Gen Jones, in consultation with senior USSOCom decisionmakers, sought to answer the force contribution question and increase Marine Corps involvement in the GWOT by approving an initiative to establish a purpose-built Marine unit for employment by USSOCom. In a message to senior leaders in the Marine Corps, the CMC directed them to: . . . develop a plan to provide forces to the Special Operations Command on a permanent basis in order to cement the relationship of our two organizations at the institutional level and provide our nation with an expanded special operations capability.1 In response to the CMC's message, the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O) established a working group tasked with creating a rough table of organization (T/O) and table of equipment (T/E). The T/O they developed included only 86 line numbers divided among 4 sections-a 30-man reconnaissance element, a 29-man intelligence element, a 7-man fires element, and a lean headquarters. The intelligence element was further broken down into a 9-man radio reconnaissance team (RRT), a 6-man human intelligence (HumInt) exploitation team (HET), and a 12-man all-source fusion team. (See Figure 1.) The final administrative requirement was met in February 2003 when DC PP&O signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the Deputy Commander, USSOCom. The MOA was jointly drafted by the Marine Corps and USSOCom and established the parameters for the proof of concept, including the mission, command relationships, and resourcing for Det 1. A ceremony held aboard Camp Pendleton on 19 June 2003 marked the official activation of Det 1. Execution of the detachment mission training plan began in earnest the week following the activation and culminated with a 3week capstone exercise at the Nevada Test Site and Indian Springs Auxiliary Air Field, NV in December 2003. After participating in an Navy special warfare (NSW) certification exercise and conducting additional sustainment training, Det 1 deployed to Baghdad for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II (OIF II) in April 2004, just over 9 months after its activation. While operating as part of an NSW task group (NSWTG), Det 1 executed a number of direct action, coalition support, and battlefield shaping missions under the regional combined joint special operations task force (CJSOTF). By all accounts, Det 1 excelled and earned a reputation for professionalism, competence, and being "user friendly." A study conducted by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) found: The operational effectiveness of the MCSOCOM Det was high. . . . The trial deployment demonstrated the MCSOCOM Det could effectively conduct Direct Action (DA) and Special Reconnaissance (SR) in conjunction with a Naval Special Warfare Task Group
 
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SCCOMarine       12/21/2006 7:07:58 PM
The Marine Corps choice to opt out of SOCOM in 1986 was due to policy not capabilty, which seems to be the misconception of the people posting on this site. Its choice to join today is the same, a matter of policy and som strong arming from SecDef Rumsfeld. The 'Corps invented many of the tactics used by SOF today.
 
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SCCOMarine       12/21/2006 7:43:25 PM
   The report done by Joint Special Operations University is called "MCSOCOM Proof of Concept Deployment Evalution Report ". If you read you'll read how the DET was supposed to conduct missions as a complete unit but many of its personnel were pulled away to perform tasks for the NSWTG that they were uncapable of and had never seen outside of Special Missions Units (Delta/DevGru).
   I hear alot about the DA skills of the SEALs but they're not comparable to that of FR DAP(Direct Action Platoons). The evidence of this is proir to '98 when SEALs deployed on the ARGs(Amphibious Ready Groups) they were the DA back boys for FR. They ran the reconnaissaince/surveillance role developing the target for FR to hit then providing security for FR during the strike.------Close Quarter Battle first developed and organised by the founding member of 1st Force Recon in 1956 he published a book on it and it is still to this day considered the bible of CQB and you can still by the book on Amazon.
   The ANGLICO Marines were pulled from the DET b/c the CCTs attached to the NSWTG were in capable of understanding how to coordinate and develop Fire Support beyond that of fixed aircraft.------CAS another first from the USMC.  The AF lobbied against the USMCs use of CAS after WWII to congress saying it was too dangerous. The Marines said it was the way of the future. We see who right.
   Most of what the Intel section does is CLASSIFIED but the report states it is the most interesting.
   Maybe you people should do more homework before you bad mouth what the Navy SEAL who was the Main writer of the report at JSOU,
   LtCDR Mark Divine wrote about the USMC, "the United States Marine Corps is the Greatest fighting force the world has ever seen!" when interviewed by Thomas Smith NRO(National Review Online).
 
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GOP       12/23/2006 9:32:29 PM
I hear alot about the DA skills of the SEALs but they're not comparable to that of FR DAP(Direct Action Platoons). The evidence of this is proir to '98 when SEALs deployed on the ARGs(Amphibious Ready Groups) they were the DA back boys for FR. They ran the reconnaissaince/surveillance role developing the target for FR to hit then providing security for FR during the strike.------Close Quarter Battle first developed and organised by the founding member of 1st Force Recon in 1956 he published a book on it and it is still to this day considered the bible of CQB and you can still by the book on Amazon.
 
Don't say that FR DAP are better at DA than SEALs...your 1 example proves nothing (except that you are extremely biased). The bottom line is that SEALs are DA experts, and they use the same basic CQB tactics as FR DAP, except for the fact that most SEAL operators have more experience (obviously this is a generalization, but pretty accurate). I agree though that MARSOC is going to be awesome at their role in SOCOM.

 
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mough       12/24/2006 11:00:53 AM

I hear alot about the DA skills of the SEALs but they're not comparable to that of FR DAP(Direct Action Platoons). The evidence of this is proir to '98 when SEALs deployed on the ARGs(Amphibious Ready Groups) they were the DA back boys for FR. They ran the reconnaissaince/surveillance role developing the target for FR to hit then providing security for FR during the strike.------Close Quarter Battle first developed and organised by the founding member of 1st Force Recon in 1956 he published a book on it and it is still to this day considered the bible of CQB and you can still by the book on Amazon.

 


 except for the fact that most SEAL operators have more experience (obviously this is a generalization, but pretty accurate).


More experience of what? GOP

 
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GOP       12/24/2006 12:55:43 PM




I hear alot about the DA skills of the SEALs but they're not comparable to that of FR DAP(Direct Action Platoons). The evidence of this is proir to '98 when SEALs deployed on the ARGs(Amphibious Ready Groups) they were the DA back boys for FR. They ran the reconnaissaince/surveillance role developing the target for FR to hit then providing security for FR during the strike.------Close Quarter Battle first developed and organised by the founding member of 1st Force Recon in 1956 he published a book on it and it is still to this day considered the bible of CQB and you can still by the book on Amazon.



 




 except for the fact that most SEAL operators have more experience (obviously this is a generalization, but pretty accurate).




More experience of what? GOP


More experience as operators and more realistic combat experience. Most SEALs have at least 2-3 deployments under their belts, whereas most FR guys are younger (age) and have less deployments...not to mention that they have seen less DA missions (another generalization, but pretty accurate). Of course, my knowledge comes from open sources, yours comes from real world experience. What's your view on this?
 
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Horsesoldier       12/25/2006 3:07:22 PM

The Marine Corps choice to opt out of SOCOM in 1986 was due to policy not capabilty, which seems to be the misconception of the people posting on this site. Its choice to join today is the same, a matter of policy and som strong arming from SecDef Rumsfeld. The 'Corps invented many of the tactics used by SOF today.



Right, the USMC, for all their fluff about being innovators and out of the box thinkers, have been the archest of conventionalists since about 1941 when they got the green light for converting a lean, mean organization into a bloated alterna-Army.  I've always found the disconnect between marines I've worked with (solid guys, mind you, but as creative as cinder blocks) and the USMC's party line to be humorous at best, annoying at worst.
 
I'm sure if someone gives MARSOC a script and SOP on how to do special operations, they'll do fine.  Just don't ask them to do anything creative.
 
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GOP       12/25/2006 8:15:36 PM




The Marine Corps choice to opt out of SOCOM in 1986 was due to policy not capabilty, which seems to be the misconception of the people posting on this site. Its choice to join today is the same, a matter of policy and som strong arming from SecDef Rumsfeld. The 'Corps invented many of the tactics used by SOF today.





Right, the USMC, for all their fluff about being innovators and out of the box thinkers, have been the archest of conventionalists since about 1941 when they got the green light for converting a lean, mean organization into a bloated alterna-Army.  I've always found the disconnect between marines I've worked with (solid guys, mind you, but as creative as cinder blocks) and the USMC's party line to be humorous at best, annoying at worst.

 

I'm sure if someone gives MARSOC a script and SOP on how to do special operations, they'll do fine.  Just don't ask them to do anything creative.


While I do think that the thread starter was being way too biased on the subject, I don't think that most Marines are as "creative as cinder blocks". Is it just me, or do you hate every other branch in the US military outside of the Army ?
 
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SCCOMarine       12/27/2006 2:03:23 AM

I hear alot about the DA skills of the SEALs but they're not comparable to that of FR DAP(Direct Action Platoons). The evidence of this is proir to '98 when SEALs deployed on the ARGs(Amphibious Ready Groups) they were the DA back boys for FR. They ran the reconnaissaince/surveillance role developing the target for FR to hit then providing security for FR during the strike.------Close Quarter Battle first developed and organised by the founding member of 1st Force Recon in 1956 he published a book on it and it is still to this day considered the bible of CQB and you can still by the book on Amazon.

 


Don't say that FR DAP are better at DA than SEALs...your 1 example proves nothing (except that you are extremely biased). The bottom line is that SEALs are DA experts, and they use the same basic CQB tactics as FR DAP, except for the fact that most SEAL operators have more experience (obviously this is a generalization, but pretty accurate). I agree though that MARSOC is going to be awesome at their role in SOCOM
WRONG!!  You think you know what your talking about but you don't.  To know what your talking about you would have to know something about Force Recon which you don't. But thats why I opened up this thread to give you and the rest of the uninformed people like you knowledge.  The Bible says "when sword sharpeneth sword, both are better in the end " meaning if you want to challenge me on this then pls do you'll be better educated after you find out your wrong.
      First to your point of of experience (FRvsSEAL) you show your first "lack of knowledge card".  Do you know what the screening criteria is for the SEALs GOP? It used to be 3rd class P.O. preferably with 3yrs of good service.  Do you know what it is now GOP? Its open to all male sailors preferably with 2yrs service but it is offered as a enlistment option with automatic promotion to E4 (PO 3rd cls) to anybody off the streets once they graduate from BUDS. You could never try out for FR fresh off the streets, you would never make it past the screening.
   You've based your knowledge on your little SOF articles referring to the age of the Marine Reconnaissance field but that refers to the recon field as a whole, Battalion and Force not as Force alone.  But if you do a little research you'll find out  to even try out for FR you have to be Cpl or above with at least 3yrs of exceptional service, preferably in a Combat Arms field with at least one deployment, and preferably an Expert rifle qualification. All of those preferably's come to play later on at the screening board where even if you pass all the physical portion(which is much more intense than for the SEALs screening) you can still be sent home from the screening from a lack of preferably's.  Unlike screening for the SEALs, FR screening is a competion against the other candidates. This is b/c each FR platoon screens the candidates along with the FR screening SNCOs and Officers.  Which means if 40 Marines show up for the screening 5 may make it past the Phys. portion and of those 5 usually only 2 are asked to proceed into the FR training pipeline.  In the early days of FR the screening, up until the 80's, it was left up the platoons alone to conduct S.B.'s (screening boards).  It was common for any two finalist to be asked by the platoon to square off "bull in the ring" to see who wanted it more.
   Experience Round 1.....Force Recon!
   Next in the experience comparison we'll talk about the quality of the individual candidate. A 3yr Marine vs. for the sake of argument to help GOP we'll use the old SEAL criteria, of a 3yr sailor.
   First off I can't speak for individuals, but since this is a Direct Action/Combat Skills experience comparison I can speak of the exp. level that each individual brings to each unit prior to joining.  A 3yr Marine NCO vs3yr navy PO is no comp. as far as combat skills and competency are concered.
   Each
 
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SCCOMarine       12/27/2006 6:41:26 AM

I hear alot about the DA skills of the SEALs but they're not comparable to that of FR DAP(Direct Action Platoons). The evidence of this is proir to '98 when SEALs deployed on the ARGs(Amphibious Ready Groups) they were the DA back boys for FR. They ran the reconnaissaince/surveillance role developing the target for FR to hit then providing security for FR during the strike.------Close Quarter Battle first developed and organised by the founding member of 1st Force Recon in 1956 he published a book on it and it is still to this day considered the bible of CQB and you can still by the book on Amazon.

 


Don't say that FR DAP are better at DA than SEALs...your 1 example proves nothing (except that you are extremely biased). The bottom line is that SEALs are DA experts, and they use the same basic CQB tactics as FR DAP, except for the fact that most SEAL operators have more experience (obviously this is a generalization, but pretty accurate). I agree though that MARSOC is going to be awesome at their role in SOCOM.



   To finish up on the experience comparison of FR/SEALs for GOP. I hope your taking notes and verifying what I'm saying, I'd hate for you to dismiss it and say something stupid if you reply.
Basic Marine 
     What was discussed in the last thread was the level of experience and high quality training already resident in the FR candidate before he even applies to the screening.  Another thing that is over looked by you is the fact that besides all of the specialized training many Marines receive b4 considering applying to FR.  There's still the fact that the candidate is a Marine, a basically trained Marine not matter what his Job is has as much training field craft as any basic infantryman in any service.
*rifle quals annually out to 500yrds, mandatory!
*swim qual SW1&2 are harder than Ranger swim qual, SW3 is about the same as Ranger, SW4 a little less
* 3x week PT runs of 3-6mi at 9min pace, most units also do 2 days of close combat per week.
*Semi-annual PFT. 1st class is a 225 and is the lowest expected score, anything less is an automatic referral to remedial     PT which you'll do until you get a 1st class. Marine Corps PFT, (max-min): 3miles 18-28min, 100-65 situps, 20-3 pull     ups. Run -10pts/per min after 18min (1pt/6sec); 1pt per situp; 5pts per pull up. 300 is high score 195 low anything less     than 225 you remediate until 225.
   GOP crunch those numbers and you'll find that a Marine 225 PFT is higher than the screening PFT for most SOF units, but 225 its borderline acceptable for most Marine units. MC is also famous for small unit leadership and discpline. Which keeps those PT number so high. 
 
FORCE RECON CANDIDATE
   That represents the high training level of the average Marine from any MOS.  Add to that any combination of the specialized schools and courses from the previous thread, then raise the bar and and make them compete just for the chance to make the training pipeline. Thats the level of talent you get b4 these Marines can even make it to the FR basic pipeline which would be BUD/S for SEALs.  That bar looks like this: Its a 2 day nonstop no sleep screening course.
*First 0500 formation and PFT. 285 PFT(1st time) Marine Off. 275 PFT score(1st time) Enlisted. Grab 50lb pack and    run 1mi to next. 
*o-course(2x under 5min). Run 2mi to pool w/pack.  
(All Swimming Done In Fatigues) 
*25 meter 10 lbs brick swim.
*12ft brick retrieval.
*30min tread water.
*50m 50lbs pack & rubber rifle swim.
*500m swim in 30min.
*30km land nav course.
*10mi ruck run 50lb pack.
*PFT all heart shoot for 225.
*Individual screening board.
   That is day -1 for FR b/c they have to get pass t
 
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SCCOMarine       12/27/2006 7:11:37 AM




The Marine Corps choice to opt out of SOCOM in 1986 was due to policy not capabilty, which seems to be the misconception of the people posting on this site. Its choice to join today is the same, a matter of policy and som strong arming from SecDef Rumsfeld. The 'Corps invented many of the tactics used by SOF today.





Right, the USMC, for all their fluff about being innovators and out of the box thinkers, have been the archest of conventionalists since about 1941 when they got the green light for converting a lean, mean organization into a bloated alterna-Army.  I've always found the disconnect between marines I've worked with (solid guys, mind you, but as creative as cinder blocks) and the USMC's party line to be humorous at best, annoying at worst.

 

I'm sure if someone gives MARSOC a script and SOP on how to do special operations, they'll do fine.  Just don't ask them to do anything creative.



When I get sometime I'm coming back on to embarrass your *ss for being a dumb enough to even write something that stupid on my thread.
 
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