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Subject: USMC perform atsame level or higher than comparable SOCOM units proven in head2head comparison: DET1
SCCOMarine    12/21/2006 7:01:59 PM
Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment 1 (MCSOCom Det 1) was created with a charter to examine the issue of a permanent Marine Corps force contribution to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom). Formally referred to as a "proof of concept," Det 1 completed a successful deployment under the operational control of USSOCom, demonstrated that Marines are fully capable of operating at the level of our Nation's other special operations forces (SOF), and paved the way for the creation of a Marine component to the USSOCom. As we prepare to case the colors of Det 1 and stand up U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MarSOC), it is appropriate to review and discuss what made Det 1 successful and any potential pitfalls to avoid as we move forward. Although the idea of a Marine Corps force contribution to USSOCom had been discussed since USSOCom's inception in the mid-1980s, it came to fruition only with the renewed emphasis placed on special operations in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. That fall, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directed the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), Gen James L. Jones, and Commander, USSOCom (CdrUSSOCom), Gen Charles Holland, USAF, to explore ways for the Marine Corps and USSOCom to work more closely together in what came to be known as the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The subject of assigning a Marine Corps unit-a force contribution-to USSOCom was raised early in the discussions and took on added significance in many Marine leaders' eyes when two of the Marine Corps' "crown jewels"-the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)s)-were forced to sit on the sidelines during the early stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan. Resistance from SOF commanders already on the ground and indifference from the Navy chain of command under which they were operating left the 15th MEU(SOC) languishing offshore for over a month. Even when these and later Marine units did make it ashore they were most often employed piece-meal in supporting roles to provide capabilities that SOF were deficient in or lacked altogether. In October 2002 Gen Jones, in consultation with senior USSOCom decisionmakers, sought to answer the force contribution question and increase Marine Corps involvement in the GWOT by approving an initiative to establish a purpose-built Marine unit for employment by USSOCom. In a message to senior leaders in the Marine Corps, the CMC directed them to: . . . develop a plan to provide forces to the Special Operations Command on a permanent basis in order to cement the relationship of our two organizations at the institutional level and provide our nation with an expanded special operations capability.1 In response to the CMC's message, the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O) established a working group tasked with creating a rough table of organization (T/O) and table of equipment (T/E). The T/O they developed included only 86 line numbers divided among 4 sections-a 30-man reconnaissance element, a 29-man intelligence element, a 7-man fires element, and a lean headquarters. The intelligence element was further broken down into a 9-man radio reconnaissance team (RRT), a 6-man human intelligence (HumInt) exploitation team (HET), and a 12-man all-source fusion team. (See Figure 1.) The final administrative requirement was met in February 2003 when DC PP&O signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the Deputy Commander, USSOCom. The MOA was jointly drafted by the Marine Corps and USSOCom and established the parameters for the proof of concept, including the mission, command relationships, and resourcing for Det 1. A ceremony held aboard Camp Pendleton on 19 June 2003 marked the official activation of Det 1. Execution of the detachment mission training plan began in earnest the week following the activation and culminated with a 3week capstone exercise at the Nevada Test Site and Indian Springs Auxiliary Air Field, NV in December 2003. After participating in an Navy special warfare (NSW) certification exercise and conducting additional sustainment training, Det 1 deployed to Baghdad for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II (OIF II) in April 2004, just over 9 months after its activation. While operating as part of an NSW task group (NSWTG), Det 1 executed a number of direct action, coalition support, and battlefield shaping missions under the regional combined joint special operations task force (CJSOTF). By all accounts, Det 1 excelled and earned a reputation for professionalism, competence, and being "user friendly." A study conducted by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) found: The operational effectiveness of the MCSOCOM Det was high. . . . The trial deployment demonstrated the MCSOCOM Det could effectively conduct Direct Action (DA) and Special Reconnaissance (SR) in conjunction with a Naval Special Warfare Task Group
 
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SCCOMarine       1/1/2007 5:39:41 PM

SCCOMarine, what is your opinion of the new naval infantry the USN are forming?  Do you consider them to be stealing the job of the marines?

And Horsesoldier and Longrilfe, I sware I asked this in some thread recently but I can;t for the life of me find which, so sorry if I'm asking you to answer twice.  What were you two, both army infantry?



I have a post on the subject from a few months ago.  I'll try and find it and pull it up for you.
 
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GOP       1/1/2007 6:32:40 PM




As far as the whole PMC thing, that's not important. As long as SEALs prove they can do their job in SOCOM, then what one PMC thinks doesn't mean jack sh*t. There are plenty of SEALs employed by DynCorp and Blackwater.



Well, as I've pointed out in regards to their peers in SOCOM, there are a lot of people who will not work with the SEALs if they can avoid it.  PMCs are not that different -- whatever your opinion of their actual ability level and skills, the SEAL community has an attitude that many people find annoying and/or unsuitable to missions requiring high levels of professionalism and maturity.

Saying Blackwater employing SEALs indicates there is not a problem is kind of a cheat, I'd say, since Blackwater was founded by SEALs and is the PMC version of their institutional culture (which probably explains, in part, why they tend to be the only PMC that laypeople have heard of, for a number of reasons).  There are people who find the SEAL mentality no more acceptable or professional when filtered through Blackwater than they find it firsthand dealing with serving SEALs.



No sources = No evidence = No case. Look, even if Iceman the SF operator told you this, it doesn't mean it's true. There is alot of professional jealousy inside of SOCOM, that's just a fact. Alot of people seem (including James Dunnigan) seems to think that SEALs are better than Army SF, as James Dunnigan mentions in his book "How to make War" that the SEALs were the best trained force in SOCOM until CAG came along.
 
Also, what's up with this whole "SEAL institutional culture/ie: "They talk alot of sh*t" stuff? I have never heard a SEAL talk sh*t about being better than anyone else because I have never met a SEAL. Neither have you. Maybe the bozos making the documentaries for discovery channel/whoever who mention SEALs being the best are to blame, but I highly doubt that your average SEAL goes around talking crap about being better than (name SOF group), as most SEALs like their anonymity. That's way too Marine like.
 
Alot of other PMC's employ SEALs aswell, you might want to check around a little more.
 


 
 
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SCCOMarine       1/1/2007 7:03:36 PM

SCCOMarine, what is your opinion of the new naval infantry the USN are forming?  Do you consider them to be stealing the job of the marines?

And Horsesoldier and Longrilfe, I sware I asked this in some thread recently but I can;t for the life of me find which, so sorry if I'm asking you to answer twice.  What were you two, both army infantry?




I was in the unit that's mission is now being tranferred to the Navy.
 
Although myself and every Marine who was ever been involved w/the Unit felt a very strong emotional bond to the it and the mission I think its for the best. 
 
But No, I don't feel that they're taking our jobs, b/c the Navy isn't forming an Infantry Unit. They're following the reccomendations of a report the Navy wrote btw '04&'05 after watching SCCO operate during that time in Iraq.
 
I think the mission belongs to the Navy and I think the mission will be better served in the Navy then it could have ever been in the Marine Corps, simply b/c of the way the MC brass thought of and treated the mission.  Do I think the Navy unit itself will conduct the mission better than we did, no. You have to read my post to understand why.
 
Thats not me being biased its b/c we revolutionized nature riverine warfare with the adhoc make up of our units personnel, most Marines having at least 1 tour to somewhere before coming to SCCO. We were mostly made up from Infantryman w/some Snipers, FAST Team, Recon, Force Recon, Comm Specialists, Combat Engineers, Navy Corpsman, Intel, and even Motor T. We had the self sufficiency of a Task Force and that came from our adhoc nature.
 
But most of the Infantry Marines and Comm guys were coming off of float (MEU(SOC) Cycle) so they were well trained in Comb/Scout Smwr, Cliff Assault from the sea, MSPF Trailer CQB(which incl's VBSS and GOPLAT), Urban Designated Marksmen Courses, Long Range Comm and many other skills.
 
Also most of the Officers and SNCOs were also from the MEU(SOC) so their training was very advanced. One requirement of them on the MEU b4 coming to SCCO was the MEU's R2P2. Rapid Response Planning Process which meant on the MEU they had less than 6hrs from intial notification, to plan-prepare/brief their Marines for-and execute any mission anywhere in their MEU(SOC)'s theater, if sitting in the PerGulf that could be anywhere in CENTCOM ect.
 
So when you combined all of those Marines together train them to Conduct Riverine operations, give them an open play book and 15yrs to write, you came up w/ a revolution of RivWar, we weren't confined to the river.
*Need a Sniper mission, done.
*Recon on something, done.
*Raid, no problem.
*Land patrol/ambush/or VCP.
*Need to diseminate and process the intel gather, easy.
 
Thats what lead the Navy report to recommend at least they should rec'v basic Inf. training for them. But its just a Dash of what were were capable of. So do I think their stealing Marines jobs as in "can do it better than us" Hell No.
 
But do i think the Navy will do a better job with the mission, yes b/c they see it as a priority. Truthfully everything we brought the table was over kill. In '93, long b4 I ever join the MC, I heard there was talk of our unit going to SOCOM attached to a detachment of Recon, ANGLICO, and RRT Marines but it never materialized.
 
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SCCOMarine       1/1/2007 7:41:27 PM
Also SCCO Marines are the ones providing their training down at Court House Bay, NC part to Camp LeJeune. The same place were after 911, we along with the II MEF's SOTG (Special Operations Training Group) trained the Coast Guard's Anti-Terrorism Special Missions Unit.
 
This is my post from a few months ago its not directed at any of you. There was an written that it was directed at:
 
 
   The writer of the article has some knowledge of the subject and some knowledge of the Marine Corps, but not enough to make him dangerous or give the reader of the article enough info to understand the reasoning behind the basic infantry training of RS-1.  Yes, the Marine Corps was once under the direct control of the Navy.  No, they were never sailors in the Navy, although they had shipping background.  And No, the Navy is not trying to get into the business of Naval Infantry.
 
    To understand the basis for the emphasis on the amount of ground combat training that the sailors of the riverine unit are receiving you first have to read the report done by the Navy when they were deciding on how to take on the mission of riverine ops.  Although they had experience from the Vietnam era the new unit is less like the "River Rats" and more like the unit fielded by the Marines, per the recommendations of the report done btw '04 to early '05.
 
   In the 80's the Marines saw the need for a Small Craft riverine force to deploy abroad and protect US interest in brown water, the biggest being the Panama Canal, and approached the Navy about creating one; the Navy declined.  So the Marines with extremely limited resources tasked 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force to create such a unit with a limited scope emphasizing riverine security and conventional troop transport.  II MEF tasked 2nd MarDiv to provide the TTPs (training, tactics, and procedures) for the unit and for deployments to Panama; various countries in S. America; LF6F(Landing Force 6th Fleet, the Navy's Atlantic Fleet); and where tasked by SecNav or CMC.

   The unit, Small Craft Company or SCCO, never became an official unit recognized by HQMC it was considered a sub-unit of the Division attached to div. HQBN. This is what helped shape the NECC's present design and training for RS-1 more than anything else. B/c the unit was not an official Marine Corps unit it did not rate its own MOS, there was no recruiting for the job, the positions (crewmen, captain, gunner) weren't MOS's.  Only B-billets staffed by mostly infantrymen, diesel mechs, engineers, and communications specialists. As a sub-unit it could only acquire personnel already in the Division. The Division's first responsibility was to the Line companies of the infantry battalions which were constantly on a deployment rotation. SCCO usually received the short timers(less than 2yrs on their contracts) returning from MEU(SOC) cycles.

   What appeared to be a negative was actually a positive. Coming from the MEU(SOC) was experienced young Marines and NCOs, mostly from the Boat Co. of the MEU. The Boat Co. Marines have spent the last 18 mths training for small scale midnight raids from the sea in zodiac's(CRRC's). Within the Boat Co. there were combat Scout/Swimmers, Assault Climbers(platoon sized unit trained to assault cliffs and mountain ledges from the sea), and the MSPF trailer platoon(well trained in CQB) which sweeps behind the Force Recon DA plt. Many of these Marines transferred to SCCO along with a few short timers from the STA plt. ("stay" Scout/Snipers), the Recon plt. and occassionally 1 or 2 Force Recon Marines.
Also the support Marines, Engineers and Comm. Marines from the MEU as well as Security forces and FAST Co. (Marines highly skilled in all forms of CQB).  These were all experienced Marines well versed in Ground Combat, a point which was repeatedly noted throughout the report.  It was something that the report realized the Navy could never duplicate, but  it could see that infantry skills had been proven to be imperative to the success of the new unit (RS-1) and survival of its
 
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Horsesoldier       1/2/2007 5:06:21 PM

No sources = No evidence = No case. Look, even if Iceman the SF operator told you this, it doesn't mean it's true. There is alot of professional jealousy inside of SOCOM, that's just a fact. Alot of people seem (including James Dunnigan) seems to think that SEALs are better than Army SF, as James Dunnigan mentions in his book "How to make War" that the SEALs were the best trained force in SOCOM until CAG came along.

 Also, what's up with this whole "SEAL institutional culture/ie: "They talk alot of sh*t" stuff? I have never heard a SEAL talk sh*t about being better than anyone else because I have never met a SEAL. Neither have you. Maybe the bozos making the documentaries for discovery channel/whoever who mention SEALs being the best are to blame, but I highly doubt that your average SEAL goes around talking crap about being better than (name SOF group), as most SEALs like their anonymity. That's way too Marine like.

 Alot of other PMC's employ SEALs aswell, you might want to check around a little more.

 

Will Strategy Page ban me if I point out Dunnigan isn't exactly considered a defining authority on the SOCOM community?
 
As for PMCs and former SEALs, see Robert Young Pelton's License to Kill:  Hired Guns in the War on Terror.  Possibly the best attempt to date at an insider's view of the PMC world out there (Pelton is not a contractor, but he's got a solid background dealing with PMCs prior to 9/11 during journalistic work in Africa in the 1990s, etc.).  He gets pretty good access to Blackwater's training facilities and executives, likewise Triple Canopy, as well as some of the Brit companies.  Less access to DynCorp, but that seems to be about par for the course.
He interviews Billy Waugh, one of the guys who was a mover and shaker in the initial CIA-related PMC contracts post-9/11.  To quote that source (who's credentials in special operations and the CIA are pretty impressive) on the recruitment of SEALs for PMC work related to CIA operations, "There is a big difference between SEALs and SF.  That's why a lot of them [SEALs] don't want the job.  They [SEALs] want short missions. . . . My first pick is always SF. . . . The SEALs just want to go in, blow a lot of people away, talk about it, write it up, and plan for the next mission.  SF wants to go in and stay.  That's why we recruited SF."  (page 31)  It should be noted he did hire some SEALs, because he needed bodies on the ground fast, but they were, as stated, not his first choice for competent operator types.
 
He also talks about how Blackwaters' SEAL based culture is considered . . . ill conceived by the people running HART, one of the British PMCs largely based on an SAS institutional culture.  "While [Erik] Prince [former SEAL, founder and owner of Blackwater] paints a picture of a flashy, high-tech, road-warrior style military company that could solve any client's problem by application of sheer brute force and advanced weaponry, Richard [Bethell] and George [Simms] [both HART executives, both former SAS operators] calmly promote the idea of low-key and culturally integrated solutions.   One more time before the meeting breaks up, George repeats his mantra for Erik:  "It's the application of minimum force." "  (page 301).
Now, that said, I never claimed that PMCs don't hire SEALs at all.  I simply pointed out that some prefer not to work with them, and there is every reason to see why a PMC might specify in a contract that former SEALs were not welcome for a specific contract.  Particularly one requiring more maturity, finesse and mental endurance than your typical SEAL is known for -- I'm not sure of the source of the contract that was discussed, but I can see this as especially likely if it was being done through a British PMC or for a British maritime company.
 
As for the SEAL institutional culture . . . look, I know you want to be one.  That does not change the fact that they are regarded, with some legitimacy, as, if not the "loudest professionals" than at least the "least quiet professionals" in SOCOM.  (Or, as one guy I know puts it, "the used car salesmen of SOCOM.").  As Robert Pelton Young notes, when discussing Triple Canopy and how it differs from Blackwater, "Triple Canopy likes to promote their corporate culture as derived from Delta, in comparison to Blackwater's SEAL legacy and HART's SAS ethos.  P
 
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mough       1/2/2007 9:06:04 PM
that reminds me of the story about how all the different SOF/SMU operate, in tryng to get into a house, the SF guys being cuturally aware will try to talk their way in smartly, the Rangers will insert 10 klicks away FM there then do a large scale assault on the building completly destroying it, the FR guys will crawl for 3 days to set up an OP and watch the place then attmpt to sneak in, but failing that blow the crap out of it, CAG guys will do a cool mission impossible type insert, you know where Tom Cruise hung inside the building on the wires. then turn on the invisability cloaks and sneak down the chiminey, then insert themselves into a pieces of furniture...SEAL's won't find the house in the first place, but they will have a good time looking for it, and get laid trying., who would you rather be?


stupid silly anecdote, but I'm bored

 
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longrifle       1/2/2007 10:55:47 PM
mough,

This was on the Srategypage joke page.  All things considered I like the SF option!



The Chief of Staff of the Army asked his Sergeant Major, who was both Ranger and Special Forces qualified, which organization he would recommend to form a new anti-terrorist unit. The Sergeant Major responded to the General's question with this parable: If there were a hijacked Boeing 747 being held by terrorists along with its passengers and crew and an anti-terrorist unit formed either by the Rangers or the Special Forces was given a Rescue/Recovery Mission; what would you expect to happen?

Ranger Option

Forces/Equipment Committed: If the Rangers went in, they would send a Ranger company of 120 men with standard army issue equipment.

Mission Preparation: The Ranger Company First Sergeant would conduct a Hair Cut and Boots Inspection, while the officers consulted SOPs and held sand table exercises.

Infiltration Technique: They would insist on double timing, in company formation, wearing their combat equipment, and singing cadence all the way to the site of the hijacked aircraft.

Actions in the Objective Area: Once they arrived, the Ranger company would establish their ORP, put out security elements, conduct a leaders recon, reapply their camouflage, and conduct final preparations for Actions on the OBJ.

Results of Operation: The Rescue/Recovery Operation would be completed within one hour; all of the terrorists and most of the passengers would have been killed, the Rangers would have sustained light casualties and the 747 would be worthless to anyone except a scrap dealer.

Special Forces Option

Forces/Equipment Committed: If Special Forces went in, they would send only a 12 man team (all SF units are divisible by 12 for some arcane historical reason) however, due to the exotic nature of their equipment the SF Team would cost the same amount to deploy as the Ranger Company.

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GOP       1/2/2007 11:24:17 PM

that reminds me of the story about how all the different SOF/SMU operate, in tryng to get into a house, the SF guys being cuturally aware will try to talk their way in smartly, the Rangers will insert 10 klicks away FM there then do a large scale assault on the building completly destroying it, the FR guys will crawl for 3 days to set up an OP and watch the place then attmpt to sneak in, but failing that blow the crap out of it, CAG guys will do a cool mission impossible type insert, you know where Tom Cruise hung inside the building on the wires. then turn on the invisability cloaks and sneak down the chiminey, then insert themselves into a pieces of furniture...SEAL's won't find the house in the first place, but they will have a good time looking for it, and get laid trying., who would you rather be?


stupid silly anecdote, but I'm bored


Now you all see why I want to be a SEAL.
 
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GOP       1/2/2007 11:43:54 PM




No sources = No evidence = No case. Look, even if Iceman the SF operator told you this, it doesn't mean it's true. There is alot of professional jealousy inside of SOCOM, that's just a fact. Alot of people seem (including James Dunnigan) seems to think that SEALs are better than Army SF, as James Dunnigan mentions in his book "How to make War" that the SEALs were the best trained force in SOCOM until CAG came along.



 Also, what's up with this whole "SEAL institutional culture/ie: "They talk alot of sh*t" stuff? I have never heard a SEAL talk sh*t about being better than anyone else because I have never met a SEAL. Neither have you. Maybe the bozos making the documentaries for discovery channel/whoever who mention SEALs being the best are to blame, but I highly doubt that your average SEAL goes around talking crap about being better than (name SOF group), as most SEALs like their anonymity. That's way too Marine like.



 Alot of other PMC's employ SEALs aswell, you might want to check around a little more.



 



Will Strategy Page ban me if I point out Dunnigan isn't exactly considered a defining authority on the SOCOM community?

 

As for PMCs and former SEALs, see Robert Young Pelton's License to Kill:  Hired Guns in the War on Terror.  Possibly the best attempt to date at an insider's view of the PMC world out there (Pelton is not a contractor, but he's got a solid background dealing with PMCs prior to 9/11 during journalistic work in Africa in the 1990s, etc.).  He gets pretty good access to Blackwater's training facilities and executives, likewise Triple Canopy, as well as some of the Brit companies.  Less access to DynCorp, but that seems to be about par for the course.

He interviews Billy Waugh, one of the guys who was a mover and shaker in the initial CIA-related PMC contracts post-9/11.  To quote that source (who's credentials in special operations and the CIA are pretty impressive) on the recruitment of SEALs for PMC work related to CIA operations, "There is a big difference between SEALs and SF.  That's why a lot of them [SEALs] don't want the job.  They [SEALs] want short missions. . . . My first pick is always SF. . . . The SEALs just want to go in, blow a lot of people away, talk about it, write it up, and plan for the next mission.  SF wants to go in and stay.  That's why we recruited SF."  (page 31)  It should be noted he did hire some SEALs, because he needed bodies on the ground fast, but they were, as stated, not his first choice for competent operator types.

 

He also talks about how Blackwaters' SEAL based culture is considered . . . ill conceived by the people running HART, one of the British PMCs largely based on an SAS institutional culture.  "While [Erik] Prince [former SEAL, founder and owner of Blackwater] paints a picture of a flashy, high-tech, road-warrior style military company that could solve any client's problem by application of sheer brute force and advanced weaponry, Richard [Bethell] and George [Simms] [both HART executives, both former SAS operators] calmly promote the idea of low-key and culturally integrated solutions.   One more time before the meeting breaks up, George repeats his mantra for Erik:  "It's the application of minimum force." "  (page 301).

Now, that said, I never claimed that PMCs don't hire SEALs at all.  I simply pointed out that some prefer not to work with them, and there is every reason to see why a PMC might specify in a contract that former SEALs were not welcome for a specific contract.  Particularly one requiring more maturity, finesse and mental endurance than your typical SEAL is known for -- I'm not sure of the source of the contract that was discussed, but I can see this as especially likely if it was being done through a British PMC or for a British maritime company.

 

As for the SEAL institutional culture . . . look, I know you want to be one.  That does not change the fact that they are regarded, with some legitimacy, as, if not the "loudest professionals" than at least the "least quiet profess
 
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