BOOK: Not A Good Day To Die

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Yimmy RE:BOOK: Not A Good Day To Die 1/15/2006 12:57:00 AM

Thats rather a hard one to answer without having read the book - what were the errors made?

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Horsesoldier RE:BOOK: Not A Good Day To Die 1/15/2006 10:56:28 AM

>>Thats rather a hard one to answer without having read the book - what were the errors made?<< It's been a while since I've read the book, so I may be overlooking some points, but the following are what I recall: a) Some of the SEALs deployed on Anaconda simply were not physically up to the task (primarily due to the altitude, I suspect). b) The SEALs took over command-level responsibility for the JSOC elements in the operation right before the active phase of Anaconda kicked off. The new USN commander was intent on getting "his" SEALs into the fight, which prompted him to push to pull the CAG recce teams who were already in place and hammering the enemy forces with air strikes and replace them with SEAL recce units. This is despite the fact that all the CAG teams were requesting was resupply (primarily they needed more batteries for radios, etc). The SEAL recce teams that were put in exhibited issue A, above (note however that the SEAL recce team that went in with the CAG teams performed very well; the failings were mainly the follow on SEAL personnel). c) The SEAL recce team that specifically was slated to occupy Roberts Ridge opted to fly directly to their OP on top of the mountain, rather than land at an offset LZ and move on foot to their OP. d) That same Recce Team, after Roberts fell out of the MH-47 moved back to the OP site, and again came under enemy fire. They then broke contact, but not before leaving their assigned CCT wounded on the mountain. e) SEAL units in Afghanistan in general demonstrated an inability to plan operations (requesting assistance in planning from their Ranger QRF on various occasions) and had a remarkably half-a$$ed approach to certain key issues like redundant communications compared to their Army counterparts. As for the why question of the above, much of it appears to owe directly to the SEAL officers in the picture (though the physical conditioning issue and the poor planning are indicative of systemic problems within the whole SEAL approach to training). The Captain commanding TF Blue demonstrated some questionable decision making abilities if his mission was to kill or capture Taliban and Al-Qaeda members and otherwise ensure Anaconda was a success; if his mission was to promote the SEALs and get a piece of the PR pie, he fought the good fight. Agitating for a bigger piece of the pie than they can eat appears to be a time honored SEAL tradition (i.e. Panama), so, while disappointing, it is not surprising I guess. The Lt. Commander that was his subordinate on the ground, however, should have been relieved for cause on at least two previous occasions (if not the first time he demonstrated what a jacka$$ he was, then certainly the second time . . .), and was instrumental in "hey, let's fly straight to our super secret OP and land right on top of it" operational plan.

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Yimmy RE:BOOK: Not A Good Day To Die 1/15/2006 11:59:17 AM

Not exactly happy days then. Was any action taken against the IC and 2IC mentioned?

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stratbert Armchair Quarterbacks 1/15/2006 9:48:03 PM

If anyone wants to find out what happened on Takur Ghar, you can read Roberts' Ridge. link It is frustrating reading posts from keyboard jockeys that do nothing but attempt to badmouth the SEALs. Horsesoldier, you seem to have some animosity towards the Teams. Why is this? I would bet a paycheck you ride a desk and bet two that you've never seen combat. I have heard the stories about what happened during both incidents in Afghanistan..FACE TO FACE FROM PEOPLE THAT WERE THERE. You weren't...and never will be. Go ahead and write a cute reply...I will be too busy training to read it.

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Yimmy RE:Armchair Quarterbacks 1/15/2006 10:05:07 PM

"Go ahead and write a cute reply...I will be too busy training to read it." If you re-read your own post, you will likely realise that your a hypocrite.

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ArtyEngineer RE:Armchair Quarterbacks - Stratbert 1/15/2006 10:51:27 PM

You are right SB, 99.9% of the guys on this forum havent "Been There" that aint the point, we like to discuss and learn, that is the purpose of this forum. If you can enlighten and educate us on the topic of this thread please do, dont just pop up and start throwing stones, remove chip from shoulder and join the debate please.

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longrifle RE:BOOK: Not A Good Day To Die 1/16/2006 1:35:47 AM

I haven't read the book yet and I don't know any current or former SEALS, so this is just a supposition. I hope it turns out to be a reasonable one. I believe anyone with the ability and tenacity to make it through BUDS could be an effective operator in any environment. If they are deficient in a certain area of the tactical realm I'd tend to blame that on higher leadership, not on the ability and talent (or the ability to be talented?) of the operator. I've heard/read several negative things about SEALS from soldiers such as: 1) Can't navigate. 2) Can run and swim forever but doesn't have endurance under a rucksack. 3) Uses a rifle like a bullet hose. 4) Believes a bullet hose and a Trident provides effective cover. Do these accusations have merit? I'd think they're probably exaggerated, but to the extent that they do have merit then I'd blame SEAL leadership for not training their men correctly. As stated, if you can make it through BUDS then land navigation is not beyond your ability, it's about who's writing the training schedule? One thing that does strike me as credible though. SEAL leadership's lack of experience in land operations. Why would it seem odd to a SEAL or SEAL supporter that the 75th Ranger Regiment could plan a land operation better than Naval Special Warfare Command? I'm a former paratrooper and I wouldn't want to be part of an amphibious operation planned by the 82nd Airborne Division!

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Horsesoldier RE:Armchair Quarterbacks 1/16/2006 9:55:39 AM

>>It is frustrating reading posts from keyboard jockeys that do nothing but attempt to badmouth the SEALs. Horsesoldier, you seem to have some animosity towards the Teams. Why is this? << You mean besides the fact that if they were half as good as they think they are they'd be twice as good as they really are? It's not just Roberts Ridge. It's also Panama, Grenada, the Thailand drug busts, etc., that pretty solidly indicate that something is not quite right within NAVSPECWAR. >>I would bet a paycheck you ride a desk and bet two that you've never seen combat. I have heard the stories about what happened during both incidents in Afghanistan..FACE TO FACE FROM PEOPLE THAT WERE THERE. You weren't...and never will be.<< So let me get this straight -- you're accusing me of having not been there and done that . . . but the fact that you've heard stories from other people gives you some superior and informed position? >>Go ahead and write a cute reply...I will be too busy training to read it.<< I'm sure you will be. Though I suspect that by 'training' you mean chipping paint and deck mopping . . .

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Cato RE:Armchair Quarterbacks...Cest' Moi 1/16/2006 3:53:17 PM

link I have not read the book, but the link I posted refers to an hour and a half long AEI event discussing Op. Anaconda with Naylor, Fred Kagan, Kalev Sepp, and Tom Donnely. It is worth watching in lieu of that Simpson's rerun you were tuning into. ***DISCLAIMER*** ARMCHAIR Q.B. AT WORK!!!!!! From what Naylor said in this event, the effup on Roberts Ridge, and some of the other faux pas committed by the Spec Ops guys, pale in comparison to the dismal planning on the conventional side. To begin with, the plan to air assault a brigade into the Shah-i-Kot was bedeviled by poor staff work, an ad-hoc command structure, and a lack of understanding of the enemy we were fighting (Al Qaeda hard-cases rather than the Taliban tribal trash). It seems strange that in order to clear an area greater than sixty square miles of godforsaken terrain we used less than 2,000 soldiers. Naylor said straight up that the 10th ID guys who were put in charge of the task force A)had never worked with their kamaraden form the 101st, so there was a great deal of friction during the planning process, and (if true, I'm apoplectic with rage)B) Hagenbeck (10th ID GOC) was authorized to conduct the largest battle of the war against AQ ONLY with resources already in theatre. The reason why requests for further forces or, more importantly further lift resources were denied was that the invasion of Iraq was already being planned. Naylor said that Iraq was the elephant in the room when planning for Anaconda was going on. Naylor also criticized the micro-managing of the combat from Tampa and Doha (specifically the Navy personnel involved), and the self-congratulatory attitude of the military following the rout of the Talibs from Kabul. They refused to believe that there was a qualitative difference between the Taliban and the AQ holdouts who would fight to the death when cornered. Ergo the Afghan relief column was stopped in its tracks, and provided totally insufficient air support. Naylor said that the SF guy "advising" the Afghan commander was told that they would receive air-support coming out the ass, but when the column kicked off into the valley; one B-1 made one pass and dropped maybe 10 bombs. Needless to say, the column didn't get far. CAS issues plagued the op. the whole way through. From my comfy chair in sunny 70 degree Los Angeles, it looks like this: 1)There were insufficient forces allocated for the conventional assault 2)Rumsfeld's notion of "plug and play" failed its first test. Taking units that don't live, train, f*ck, and fight cheek and jowell with each other, slapping them together with an ad-hoc command structure, and sending them into harms way didn't work. Units aren't generic, any more that individual men are, and sticking disparate units and staffs together, expecting great results, you are bound to be disappointed. 3)Missteps in the planning and execution of the Spec Ops aspect of the plan. Allocating the wrong forces for the wrong fight. That being said, Naylor goes out of his way to point out that possibly the most valorous act of the whole op was performed by one of the SEAL recce teams (breaching of a minefield in the snow to take out a Triple A battery in line of sight of the planned air assault ingress route) 4)Hubris of the brass and especially the civilians at the DOD. Tampa and Doha went into Op Anaconda with an inflated sense of American abilities and an unrealistically poor opinion of the bad guys up in them thar hills. I believe that this problem would rear its ugly head a year later, and I'm not convinced that it has been satisfactorily addressed to this day. 5) Serious problems with CAS promptness, and quantity, especially pertaining to #s 2&4. 6)NO ARTY!!!!!!!! From this post, its probably obvious I don't know sh!t about sh!t, but these are simply observations. Feel free to rip them to tatters. ***ARMCHAIR Q.B. RANT OFF*** Thanks, Cato

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GOP RE:Armchair Quarterbacks...Cest' Moi 1/17/2006 8:50:08 PM

We can knock the SEALs all day long about their crap during operation Anaconda, but alot of it has to do with the NAVSPECWAR not having much true to God combat experience. Look at the SEALs history in land warfare...as someone mentioned before, the crap at Grenada shows a lack of land combat experience, while Panama shows louzy leadership in the operation against Noriega's Lear...while the Sea operation against Noriega's boat was a great success (the SEALs did what they were trained to do, they acted as frogmen). Afghanistan was a learning experience for NAVSPECWAR, and not all of it was bad. You can bet that the SEAL pre-deployment training cycle has reflected their experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. One thing is for certain, SEAL operators have a reputation as being extremely 'proud', and they haven't backed up their bs in combat.

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