RUSI prsentation by Wooner on Collins

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sinoflex 11/7/2009 2:15:05 AM

Well Greece has refused delivery of their german built Type 212 on quality and performance grounds. Canada is having diabolicals with their Upholders with only one in service some of the time, there is even a suggestion from some of their personnel, who have experience with the Collins class, that they regret that they didn't buy some when they had the chance.

geez, we dodged a bullet by not getting the Upholders as a second squadron. I was at the DefProc when Adm Barrie gave the speech to all and sundry as to why we wouldn't - everything that was identified as a problem with them came true. We analysed the Upholders closely - somewhere along the line the canucks had a brain fart and didn't do their homework. I used to have that session on tape - it was about 2 hrs and detailed all the probs - they apulled no punches and there were RN and CN snrs present.

Apparently, at least one Canadian naval officer served aboard an Upholder during an exchange tour in the early 90s.

I think a large part of Canada's decision to obtain the Upholders is that we basically got them in barter for free use of Canadian bases by British forces for training purposes. Politicians and bureaucrats thinking they were clever.

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Aussiegunneragain GF 11/7/2009 2:21:56 AM

I know about the Colin's long-range peactime electronic and acoustic intellegence, and special ops roles, and I know that they are important. However, the wartime role of sea denial is the principal reason that we have a submarine force and ensuring that we had ongoing access to modern submarines that could do this should have been the primary consideration in the minds of planners in the early 80's. On this count they failed miserably and we went without an adequate submarine force for nearly a decade and had we one to war we might have lost as a consequence. IMHO that is an absolutely outrageous occurrace, even more so than the waste of money.

Existing subs like the 209 were entirely adequate for the wartime role and would have been better in the sense that they have smaller crews so you can have more boats at sea at a time. I'm also not convinced that a solution couldn't have been achieved to let them do the recon/special ops roles either. Apart from the option of getting the Germans to produce a stretched version, I don't see why we couldn't have just removed the combat systems and weapons from a standard 1500 to make room for it to operate entirely for special operations and elint sub. From what I've read the Cold War recon patrols in the South China see only occurred once a year for 6 weeks anyway, so not all of our submarines need to be fitted out in that manner. That puts aside the fact that we have other assets doing the elint role anyway, specifically the two EP-3C's.

As for the politician's versus the military's role in procurement decisions, I know that the Minister is ultimately the boss but I also see daily the way that senior buereucrats influence decisions by deciding what information to provide and how to provide it. I have no reason to believe that military brass are any different. In the case of the Collins Class I suspect that the Governement of the day would have been committed to building the subs in Australia irrespective of what the ADF wanted. However, I find it very hard to believe that had the ADF come to the government and said "buying a completely untested design on top of having inexperienced australian companies build it is a recipe for operational and financial disaster. We can meet our core warfighting requirements using a tested sub and we have some other appraoches that will work for the recon role", that the Government would have persisted.

As for the recent quick OTS purchases like the the Globemasters and the Abrams, I know they have had some problems but it is generally just to do with a failure to ensure that the proper support services provided at the same time as the platform purchase. While that isn't good it is much more easily rectified than if a bleeding edge project is stuffed up, as it is just a matter of spending the money to get support gear which has already been developed. Comparing the Globemaster to the Wedgetail decisions and I know which approach I'd be supporting in in the future.

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gf0012-aust 11/7/2009 3:05:04 AM

I'm not going to add much detail beyond what I've said prev for a number of reasons. However, the "EP's" don't have the same flexibility in ISR. Or, more to the point, they cover off different points of tac and strategic importance.

there is a reason why only subs and SASR have discrete commands in the ADF. again, IMO, small subs can't do the mission sets that we cover.

we can't afford to maintain deep blue and green subs, so the subs that can carry the sensor fit, have the distance, have the weapons persistence etc and go where we want them to (again, we have custodial responsibility for 1/9 of the earths total water real estate).

its not that very well known, but a lot of the IP that was developed in australia to get collins to their capability has been used and provided offshore. we have the weapons, ewarfare, esystems and sensor smarts in country, the issue is about managing scope creep and within the boundary of what the govt will spend. in the case of collins, fixing a price to the vendor when we were implementing architecture concepts that wouldn't be realised until seawolf hit the water came with a price. fixing a price on the vendor when the very nature of weapons system development and architecture development was volatile was just stupid. in a lot of areas - esp sensor and hull management, we were 15 years ahead of everyone except the americans - and even they hadn't got the tile fixing business down pat. in some areas, in drive management concepts we were ahead of the americans - that wasn't swedish input, that was stuff developed by ex submariners who knew how to do their job.

as for the C17's, there is a far bigger ferk up in the wings than what you state, but it will be ignored. the impact is that the odds of getting more units is just about zero while everyone works out how to get over the embuggerance of applying rapid acquisition methodology to a platform that requires through life sustainment for 30-35 years. because it was a rapid acq, someone dropped the ball - and on some of the very reasons why we bought them in the first place.

what we need is a combination of the Singaporean project management methodology crossed with the changes made within USN.

part of the problem is not understanding that the warfighters don't make ambit claims, but they do know that if they don't fight for what they actually need, then they end up with a hald arsed asset that a politician and a suit think is what they need (often with zero appreciation for what the task and need is, and often through a prism of thinking that they can equate if not transfer commercial business models to military procurement processes) In contemp terms, Nelson was good at it. Fitzgibbon was a woftam.

could we get smaller subs? sure. but if the budget is low we're also expected to provide value for money and do everything. telling ministers that you can't go off and do "x" because they didn't provide you with the capability is not something that they like hearing. they still expect both the sub service and the SASR to be jacks of all trades. they're the ones who effectively sign off on doctrine - and in some cases have made the service chiefs rewrite things because it wasn't politically palatable. the white paper (class version) is a stellar example of that.

I'm on one of the working groups in a week and halfs time :), so I guess all these things will be thrown into the hat.

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Aussiegunneragain 11/7/2009 3:56:45 AM

I don't think its a matter of them making ambit claims. Its more a matter of them wanting assets that can do missions that they aren't being asked to undertake, because it is what is sexy at the time. The Army in the late 80's wanting to be able to deploy brigade sized armoured formations to the Korean peninsula is one example. The Navy banging on about getting customised AWD's with 80 launch cells is another. Apart from land attack which we have a perfectly good airforce for, there is no need whatsoever for that number of cells for a regional navy like ours. The uniforms approach acquisition like boys looking to have the biggest toy, and that isn't just an impression I've acquired through publicly available sources.

The Minister also isn't going to like hearing that he cannot only go off and do x but he or she can't do y or z either because the asset doesn't work properly yet despite having been in service for nearly a decade. IMO there is still a place for frank and fearless advice. Some Ministers don't want to hear it and there isn't much anybody can do about that, but I'm pretty sure that there are a few who do but don't get it because of agendas being run by their advisors.

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Volkodav 11/7/2009 4:07:14 AM

Wow I step outside to exchange colourful adjectives with my knob of a back neighbour and the thread takes flight.

Took a while to catch up again but basically I am with gf on this as he knows more of the history of the sub project as well as the inner workings of the procurement system (having worked on both sides of the fence) than I. My perspective from working on both a unique to Australia project involving extensive local industry involvement with design authority and a MOTS solution with local assembly is that often the unique project provides advantages that the MOTS solution can't.

To start with we won't have design authority for the MOTS solution, so if our operators have an issue that the parent defence force don't give bucklies about any fix will be very low priority if it get addressed at all. Even when a timely solution can be implemented it will cost what ever they chose to ask and we will often find ourselves totally reliant the good will of the parent service. The lack of control and flexibility can be extremely frustrating and lead to schedule delays while comparatively simple tasks get lost in transit.

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gf0012-aust 11/7/2009 4:20:21 AM

IMO there is still a place for frank and fearless advice.

that luxury died with Keatings Govt, was perfected under Howards and has been finessed to an art by Rudd. The white paper was rewritten so many times its not funny.

Some Ministers don't want to hear it and there isn't much anybody can do about that, but I'm pretty sure that there are a few who do but don't get it because of agendas being run by their advisors.

CREF Fitzgibbon

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gf0012-aust 11/7/2009 4:36:00 AM

I don't think its a matter of them making ambit claims. Its more a matter of them wanting assets that can do missions that they aren't being asked to undertake, because it is what is sexy at the time. ..... The Navy banging on about getting customised AWD's with 80 launch cells is another. Apart from land attack which we have a perfectly good airforce for, there is no need whatsoever for that number of cells for a regional navy like ours.

Nope, they have to provide solutions against the doctrine that the Govts signs off on (and often modifies to suit their ideology at the time). In the case of the AWD Govt was still smarting over the c0ck ups with the ANZACs - another example of political interference which gave us a substandard asset due to the govt wanting to penny pinch. Those ships have only now just reached capavility - and basically due to them being a political football of convenience. So the Service view is that if they neuter the capability we need, then overspec the asset so that when its pruned back we end up with what we want. In the case of the F100 choice, my view is that picked the wrong asset as it has less growth opportunity througout its nominal life. It also came with negative reports from the Norwegians, but the ministers staff elected to ignore that feedback.

The Army in the late 80's wanting to be able to deploy brigade sized armoured formations to the Korean peninsula is one example.

No shortage of examples on both sides. Unfort its the classified c0ckups that hurt the most but don't get airplay

The uniforms approach acquisition like boys looking to have the biggest toy, and that isn't just an impression I've acquired through publicly available sources.

I can't say that I've seen the disease, I've worked both sides of the fence and understand why the services take their stance. They have ministers who think in 2 year cycles (1 year wasted at start and the 4th quarter is spent on stabilising the fence during an election runoff). nelson and beasley were the only ones who took the long view

thats true, but they also don't like hearing that part of the problem has been the way that the Govt mandates the process. The services and the procurement agency are bound by cabinet processes - so when there are c0ckups, they conveniently forget that it was under the very processes that they craft and legally bind those orgs under. Whats funny is that all the Ministers acknowledge that, but none change it. We can't do diddly without approval and sign off from the nat security council. we don't make up the rules, we have to act and operate under the ones that we are provided with. The diarchy acts under the delegation of the Minister.

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Volkodav 11/7/2009 5:48:39 AM

The Army in the late 80's wanting to be able to deploy brigade sized armoured formations to the Korean peninsula is one example.

I still laugh at Howard wanting to contribute an armoured brigade to the invasion of Iraq but us not having one to contribute. Who could have foreseen we may want to support our staunchest ally in such a way (besides of course the senior defence personnel who were pushing for the creation of such a capability since before WWII)

Then again the average person assumes we have a much larger more capable defence force than we actually have which is why they can't see the harm in cutting defence spending and are horrified when they hear we are struggling to deploy one boat. There is no concept of the roll on effects stuffing around with the maintenance schedule of a critical asset will have down the track, no regard to the impact of reducing the numbers of assets will have on availability.

It is very easy to blame the services, the department or the contractors for what happens today but the true culprit is often protected by time and has moved onto bigger and better things, often helped along by their reputation of being able to squeeze out savings while maintaining capability. When things fall apart down the track because sustainability has been compromised it's usually everyone but the ones who forced the cuts or started the short cuts that gets blamed.

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Aussiegunneragain 11/7/2009 6:26:30 AM

In the case of the F100 choice, my view is that picked the wrong asset as it has less growth opportunity througout its nominal life. It also came with negative reports from the Norwegians, but the ministers staff elected to ignore that feedback.

If the Navy was indeed providing a solution against the doctrine that the Government signed off on then I don't see how you could go past the F100. It was purchased as an area air defence asset with secondary anti-surface and submarine capabilities. I have yet to have anybody tell me how the vessels will need more than 48 cells (including some with 4 ESSM each) and one helecopter to fulfill this role in the future. The only reason that the Navy wanted bigger ships was to build in the prospect for them to extend the scope for the vessels in the future. That prospect is not worth the risks to the timeline and budget that it would have posed. We are already behind the curve in area air defence and we need to get our ships into service ASAP. If we need ships that can do more then we can build that into the specification for the new big vessels that they are planning to replace the ANZAC's with in the 20's. Another expensively screwed up procurement process will just waste the resources that we need to do that properly.

True but there is asymetric information between the ministers and the diarchy, and the diarchy don't mind abusing it. It is ultimately the Ministers job to get across it but it isn't made any easier by uniforms and suits running their own agendas.

that luxury died with Keatings Govt, was perfected under Howards and has been finessed to an art by Rudd. The white paper was rewritten so many times its not funny.

Depends on the Minister, the smart ones know how to establish good relations and when to listen and ....

CREF Fitzgibbon

... the dumb ones don't to their detriment.

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Volkodav 11/7/2009 6:46:19 AM

On the AWD's, the selected design would make perfect sense if:

a) We were building a half dozen or more of them instead of just three (I would be very suprised if we get a fourth)

b) Their primary role was to escort the RAN's (strike) carriers. (i.e. we actually had carriers to escort)

c) The intention was for each hull to be replaced after 16 to 20 years, prior to the need for any major upgrades or capability enhancements.

d) We also built a class of ASW DDH's (Hyuga?) to complement them.

Other wise we should have gone for a larger more capable, multi role platform with considerable provision for future upgrades and enhancements designed in. I am not talking Baby Burke, rather a larger "bleeding edge" design specifically tailored for our perceived future needs. Even then we would still need 5 or 6 of them but could probably do without the carriers and DDH's relying on each AWD to form the core of a surface action group rather than being an escort in a carrier or amphib group.

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