Should the RAAF divest non core capabilities to the other services?

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Volkodav 10/17/2009 6:21:09 AM

Army and Navy operate helos for medium airlift and seem happy to hitch rides on Boos, Hercs and C-17 for their other needs. Couldn't see those services operating and providing a better system than what the RAAF currently provides. Besides, easier to stream all major fixed wing aircrews through the one course and there are financial savings having the system not split three ways.

Curious.

Aircrew training would remain centralised or even become more centralised. Tactical transport (i.e. what ever replaces the Caribou) would mesh well with 5 Aviation Regt as would C/RC-12's, and AT-6's (or similar). Our bases are being rationalised into a smaller number of multi service super bases so rebasing is not an issue, it is already happening. What it would do is give each service greater controland say in the airpower assests that directly affect them. This will be a better system as the assets and their crews will be a part of the service they are directly supporting.

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south2 10/17/2009 8:54:25 PM

Honestly I dont think it is a good idea. It will lead to a diversification of the number of airframes being used to attain the same tasks.

I'll use fast jets as an example.

CAS, well yes I'm sure that our Army would love to have A-10's and AC-130's supporting them. These platforms are of limited utility for other roles. However, the money still has to come from somewhere, and it will likely lead to reduced number of tactical fighters.

Likewise Fleet air defence / Maritime strike. Yep, we would end up with a number of assets, suitable for that role, which is going to take money away from the tactical fighters. Would these guys, operated by the navy train for FAC? Would they train for land based strike? Are they going to be carrier capable, not to mention the cost that that will bring.

So likely what we would end up with would be 2 sqn of RAAF operated fast jets. 1 short squadron of A-10's. 1 short squadron of AC-130's. 1 squadron of RAN operated fast jets.

If you compare that to what we have now, we have 4-5 Squadrons of fast jets that are adept in all of the roles you have proposed, and with a limited workup will be quite good at the roles they will be used in when in the AO. Not to mention that they are also adept at DCA, OCA, BAI, self escorted Land based strike, etc.

Alternatively if you take it further and propose that Maritime Patrol are going to be given to the navy, what happens to the P3's that are now being used and trained in ISR? Does that mean that the army gets half the P3's and the Navy gets the other half? Or now does the Navy have to support the Army with what was previously RAAF Assets?

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Volkodav 10/18/2009 2:53:10 AM

ISR: P-8 to the FAA, MC-12W (or similar) to the Army, EP-X and Wedgetail for the RAAF.

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south2 10/18/2009 5:08:36 AM

I'm still not getting it...

I honestly do not think that there would be any improvement in overall capability, if anything I believe it would promote interservice rivalry further as the money would be divided into smaller packages with more competition to get to it. All this would do is to dilute the money out to where the money would be spent on smaller niche platforms (fixed wing light strike) that may suit the service that owns them but not the ADF as a whole.

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thruster 10/18/2009 7:53:56 AM

my 2c worth:

i reckon the key operational point to this issue is to ensure that the required asset is provided in a timely manner, regardless of who actually operates it.

this of course implies that theres no conflicting priorities. good command and control should [theoretically] resolve that problem.

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Volkodav 10/18/2009 8:33:21 AM

I'm still not getting it...

Why would the army be any better at FAC than the RAAF when the RAAF has had FACDU/4Sqn for as long as it has. Indeed the formation of 4Sqn shows the RAAF's ongoing commitment to FAC/JTAC/Spec Ops. These guys have a lot of experience and get constant feedback from the operators who do the job for real.

FACDU is the perfect example of why I believe the overall capability of the ADF can be improved through the RAAF divesting non core activities. No one denies that this is a vital capability, yet it still consists of only four(?) unarmed, undeployable trainers, who's primary sensor is the Mk I eyeball, in what is aptly named a "Development Unit". A deployable FAC capability is still years off as they don't even know what aircraft they are going to use in the role with the dedicated, highly professional personnel in 4 Sqn left hoping that what ever eventually spins out of the PC-9 replacement project is more suitable for FAC.

Why would the RAN handle Maritime Patrol / Strike better when the boys and girls at 92WG have been doing it for as long as they have. What I was mentioning before is that the P3 operations in the MEO been doing a lot of overland ISR. By your definition previously this is an Army support task, so should they be operated by the Army?

The Army should already be operating the MC-12, or similar, in tactical ISR supporting our deployed forces. In addition the RAAF should continue to provide a strategic ISR capability, which is why suggested the EP-X. Interservice rivalry already exists and I admit my view is from the Naval side but Maritime Patrol is a much better fit with the RAN than the RAAF, ISR though should be the responsibility of all three services.

Take the light strike fixed wing role I have suggested for the Army as an example. A couple of dozen these aircraft could be purchased for the price of a single F-35. Apart from the obvious that they are cheaper to buy, maintain, and operate than either the F-35 or Tiger, they will also free up these types for the tasks they are best suited for. Why waste an expensive high capability platform like the F-35 in the CAS role when something much cheaper could do it as well if not better.

On the same line why use one of our 18 P-3's, or in the future, 8 P-8's to do a job that the smaller cheaper MC-12 was specifically developed to do?

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StevoJH 10/18/2009 10:39:54 AM

Volkadov,

Remember the PC-9 and T-6 are both variants of the same aircraft, and the T-6 has been developed into the AT-6 COIN aircraft. Remember that the US also used the slightly larger OV-10 Bronco as a COIN and FAC aircraft as well.

With a purchase of AT-6 aircraft, could the FAC role be developed into a deployable capability?

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south2 10/18/2009 5:39:55 PM

the question more importantly : "is there a need for a deployable FAC capability when JTAC's are getting the job done?"

Could we do it, of course we could. Is there a need? What percentage of CAS engagements in Afghanistan have been controlled by a FAC-A as opposed to a JTAC? How survivable in Afghanistan would a AT6 type be when it is loaded up with FLIR pod, 2xGBU-12's, 2x fuel tanks? Lets look at the platforms the USN and USMC are using - A-10's and FA-18's respectively.

WRT the army and FAC, considering they apparently feel that it is so important, why give the job to pretty much non deployable Kiowa's for the best part of the last two decades? How would a Kiowa go in afghanistan?

Perhaps this could move to another thread

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Aussiegunneragain 10/19/2009 3:52:21 AM

IMHO the manned light strike and FAC role has basically been rendered obsolete by UCAV's/UAV's. Why would you put a pilot in an AT-6 in harms way when you can wallop the enemy from 15000 feet from a Reaper with a JADM? Why would you have that AT-6 flying around at low level firing smoke rockets when you can have an small tactical UAV spiking targets or being used to direct WP artillery rounds onto the target for marking? I don't know why we even have that flight of PC-9's doing the FAC role, its a complete WOFTAM.

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Volkodav 10/19/2009 4:44:20 AM

The Army used the Kiowa because it was the best they were allowed to have at the time. They did operate Porters and later Nomads for FAC and surveilance roles prior to their retirement without replacement. Ironically the AH-1 Cobra was ordered for the RAAF in the late 60's / early 70's with the serial A16 being allocated but cancelled as the RAAF saw the type as unecessary, ordering Huey Bushrangers instead.

The RAAF PC-9 trainer has a derated engine and was specifically ordered without provision for armament. Our Hawk LIFT's were also ordered without provision for armament as the RAAF wanted to ensure that the type was of absolutely no value for CAS. This was at the same time the RAAF was refusing to make the F/A-18 available for training with the Army and RAN as it was too valuable to be risked / wasted in such a manner.

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