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Subject: Is Afghanistan more dangerous for our troops without extra support?
Aussiegunneragain    3/18/2009 4:06:29 AM
The article below seems to indicate that by sending our Army trainers out with Afghan Forces alone, we are putting them at greater risk due to lower levels of competence amongst the latter. Could the prospect that by sending our own infantry to patrol in greater numbers with the Afghan's we might reduce casualties, be just the thing for the Army getting to deploy the extra troops there that it wants to?
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www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25203373-31477,00.html

Digger's death exposes Afghan roleFont Size: Decrease Increase Patrick Walters, National security editor | March 18, 2009

Article from: The Australian

MILITARY chiefs have defended the support given to Australia's new army training teams in Afghanistan following the death of another soldier, killed in a firefight with the Taliban.

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The latest Australian soldier to die in Afghanistan became a father just days ago. 3/09 Sky News
Views today: 1089Sorry, this video is no longer available.The soldier, the ninth Australian serviceman to die in Afghanistan, was a member of the army's newly established operational mentor and liaison team, which is helping to train an Afghan National Army battalion.

He was badly wounded while on patrol with the ANA soon after 9am (3.30pm AEDT) on Monday near the village of Kakarak, 12km north of the Australian base at Tarin Kowt.

Defence chief Angus Houston said yesterday the infantryman had suffered a serious gunshot wound after his patrol became involved in an intense firefight with about 20 Taliban insurgents using small arms and rocket-propelled grenades.

Air Chief Marshal Houston said an aero-medical evacuation was called in and two Apache helicopters sent from Tarin Kowt to help fight off the insurgents.

The soldier was evacuated by helicopter to Tarin Kowt but declared dead on arrival.

The young soldier, from the Darwin-based 7RAR, was the first member of the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force to be killed since its formation last October. His death has brought into sharp scrutiny the roles and missions being performed by Australian soldiers in Oruzgan province. A fortnight ago, an officer with the first of the OML teams in Oruzgan, Lieutenant Jake Kleinman, said he would like more infantry to support operations.

"If we were going to increase troops here, I think infantry should be the first step, followed by more engineers to support their operations," he told Sky News. Lieutenant Kleinman said while it was not his job to talk about numbers, up to an extra battalion of infantry (about 750 troops) would be "excellent" for Oruzgan.

Some Australian trainers are also understood to have expressed reservations about the fighting prowess of the Afghan army while on joint patrols.

Air Chief Marshal Houston said yesterday he was satisfied that OML teams had enough support when on patrol with Afghan soldiers.

"I'm satisfied that, in these circumstances, these soldiers had all the support they needed, given the circumstances that they came up against," he said. "If you're up against 20 people who are well-armed and are engaging you with rocket-propelled grenades, small arms, there is going to be considerable risk associated with what you're doing."

Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon said the Government constantly reviewed troop numbers in Afghanistan and was guided by advice from defence chiefs.

Kevin Rudd said he was deeply saddened to learn of the soldier's death and the nation mourned.

"He was a fine and courageous soldier in the great Anzac tradition," the Prime Minister told parliament.

Army trainers working in the OML teams are embedded with Afghan army units in forward operating bases away from the main Australian base at Kamp Holland. They help ANA soldiers plan operations, accompany them on joint patrols and advise on tactics.

 
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Arty Farty       3/19/2009 2:25:52 AM
 "Could the prospect that by sending our own infantry to patrol in greater numbers with the Afghan's we might reduce casualties, be just the thing for the Army getting to deploy the extra troops there that it wants to?"
 
The more 'boots on the ground' the more patrolling that can be done - reduces the ability to plant IEDs (especially the big and sophisticated ones) and the ability to organize large attacks.
 
It is probably true that having a company tied to an Afghan battalion is safer and better than having a platoon.
 
(Australian casualties are still relatively light even compared with some battle-shy allies)
 
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Volkodav       3/19/2009 5:54:01 AM
How hard would it be to issue enough small UAV's to allow them to conduct sweeps in advance of patrols? That way our guys could be given a heads up on any thermal signatures up ahead.
 
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Raven22       3/19/2009 6:04:18 AM
The fact that the OMLT might suffer slighly more casualties working alone with the Afghans than if they had more Australian combat power with them is kind of missing the point. It is that kind of force protection or bust thinking that lead to the shitfight in Iraq. The OMLT is obviously there because the Afghanis are crap soldiers - they train them and advise them, but the Afghanis themselves do the actual fighting. If we put more Australian soldiers working with the Afghanis, all that would happen is that the Aussies would do all the fighting, the Afghanis wouldn't get any better, and the coalition would end up being in Afghanistan foreever.
 
The idea is of course that the OMLTs can train the Afghanis up to a standard where they can fight for themselves and take over the job from the coalition, who can then go home, which is exactly what happened in Iraq. The OMLTs aren't exactly on their own now anyway - there is always a coaliton RRF not too far away that can respond to any contact.
 
The short term army increase in Afghanistan will be one or two combat teams to provide extra security during the elections later in the year. Whether that turns into a permanent Australian battlegroup in Oruzgan remains to be seen.
 
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BLUIE006       3/19/2009 8:17:43 AM
Indigenous fire support wouldn't go astray...
 
120mm Mortar
155mm Artillery
UCAV
GMLRS (my preference)
ARH
 
 
 
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Aussiegunneragain       3/20/2009 5:55:58 AM

The fact that the OMLT might suffer slighly more casualties working alone with the Afghans than if they had more Australian combat power with them is kind of missing the point. It is that kind of force protection or bust thinking that lead to the shitfight in Iraq. The OMLT is obviously there because the Afghanis are crap soldiers - they train them and advise them, but the Afghanis themselves do the actual fighting. If we put more Australian soldiers working with the Afghanis, all that would happen is that the Aussies would do all the fighting, the Afghanis wouldn't get any better, and the coalition would end up being in Afghanistan foreever.

 The idea is of course that the OMLTs can train the Afghanis up to a standard where they can fight for themselves and take over the job from the coalition, who can then go home, which is exactly what happened in Iraq. The OMLTs aren't exactly on their own now anyway - there is always a coaliton RRF not too far away that can respond to any contact.
 
The short term army increase in Afghanistan will be one or two combat teams to provide extra security during the elections later in the year. Whether that turns into a permanent Australian battlegroup in Oruzgan remains to be seen.

Reasonable points. The big question in my mind is why after 8 years of war are the Afghan Army still crap soldiers that need to be trained by an army that to be frank doesn't have a huge amount of combat experience outside the special forces? Its weird, like all the good fighters have gone to the other side.

 
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gf0012-aust       3/20/2009 6:37:44 AM

How hard would it be to issue enough small UAV's to allow them to conduct sweeps in advance of patrols? That way our guys could be given a heads up on any thermal signatures up ahead.

well, Raven22 can't shoot me as it's been in the public domain :)  - but there are reported instances of UAV's wandering ahead of some Oz force elements.
 
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AdvanceAustralia    A few possibilities   3/20/2009 2:30:56 PM




The fact that the OMLT might suffer slighly more casualties working alone with the Afghans than if they had more Australian combat power with them is kind of missing the point. It is that kind of force protection or bust thinking that lead to the shitfight in Iraq. The OMLT is obviously there because the Afghanis are crap soldiers - they train them and advise them, but the Afghanis themselves do the actual fighting. If we put more Australian soldiers working with the Afghanis, all that would happen is that the Aussies would do all the fighting, the Afghanis wouldn't get any better, and the coalition would end up being in Afghanistan foreever.



 The idea is of course that the OMLTs can train the Afghanis up to a standard where they can fight for themselves and take over the job from the coalition, who can then go home, which is exactly what happened in Iraq. The OMLTs aren't exactly on their own now anyway - there is always a coaliton RRF not too far away that can respond to any contact.

 

The short term army increase in Afghanistan will be one or two combat teams to provide extra security during the elections later in the year. Whether that turns into a permanent Australian battlegroup in Oruzgan remains to be seen.




Reasonable points. The big question in my mind is why after 8 years of war are the Afghan Army still crap soldiers that need to be trained by an army that to be frank doesn't have a huge amount of combat experience outside the special forces? Its weird, like all the good fighters have gone to the other side.



  1. Lack of motivation among political leaders to create a competent military
  2. Lack of motivation among the troops themselves
  3. It seems more difficult to defeat an insurgency than to conduct one. Hence, the National Army appears less competent in comparison to the Taliban
  4. The National Army is still expanding so there is a significant proportion of troops who are still inexperienced
  5. By what standard are the National Army soldiers ?crap?? By Australian standards, certainly. Australian infantry are among the best trained in the world. Australian infantrymen also have the benefit of a Western education to at least the age of 15 or 16 (and even longer these days I?d suspect) so even the ?lowest common denominator? can comprehend more and display initiative. Afghan soldiers just might be OK compared to regional standards.

 Just some ideas.

 Cheers.
 
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FJV       3/21/2009 9:11:02 AM
The logistics in Afghanistan are more difficult.
 
This may make some forms of extra support impossible. (to keep supplied)

 
 
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neutralizer       3/21/2009 10:02:51 PM
The ANA is going to need a lot of training for many years.  Training an army from close to scratch when most of it is committed to operations is a challenge.  The ANA is also expanding greatly and this means there's a problem with training commanders.  Add to this reported problems with finding enough guys with enough education to be officer candidates, and add to that desirability of including some at western officer training establishments as peers where education will need to be better than the 3Rs.
 
Another method of employing the ANA is to add an ANA coy (with Omlette) to an ISAF battlegroup for specific operations. This has benefits in many ways.
 
Omlettes are the access path to ISAF fire support, etc, another problem is that although the ANA has 122mm D30s and both the US and UK have been training them (UK gets D30 familiarisation training from central European armies) ANA manpower shortage means they keep taking the men away to be infantrymen.
 
155mm fire support is available in Oruzgan from NL artillery.  I'd suggest that the current UK GMLRS coverage also extends into Oruzgan, the question is how far.  However large dumb munitions, eg 120mm mor and 155mm HE are not a great idea, they may be ideal in the wide open empty spaces but most of the action is in the vicinity of the local population, this makes a mix of smart munitions and fairly small dumb ones (eg 81mm and 105mm) generally better.  The issue is the best way of delivering the smart ones.
 
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WarNerd       3/22/2009 2:16:12 AM

Reasonable points. The big question in my mind is why after 8 years of war are the Afghan Army still crap soldiers that need to be trained by an army that to be frank doesn't have a huge amount of combat experience outside the special forces? Its weird, like all the good fighters have gone to the other side.

Simple, most of the ones you had 8 years ago are not there any more.  It is possible that you may not have enough Afghan soldiers with more than 4 years experience in the army to form decent cadre.
 
Afghan allegiances generally run first to his extended family, then local leader or warlord, then usually the tribe, religion, and finally the nation.  A large percentage just do not care much about the success or failure of the Afghanistan the country, and may not fully understand the concept.
 
Many Afghan warriors just show up to get the paycheck, weapons, and some training to qualify themselves for a better paying job in a private warband.  For others, it is a paying job between planting the crops and the harvest, the traditional season of warfare in most parts of the world.
 
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BLUIE006       3/22/2009 6:20:27 AM
155mm fire support is available in Oruzgan from NL artillery.  I'd suggest that the current UK GMLRS coverage also extends into Oruzgan, the question is how far.  However large dumb munitions, eg 120mm mor and 155mm HE are not a great idea, they may be ideal in the wide open empty spaces but most of the action is in the vicinity of the local population, this makes a mix of smart munitions and fairly small dumb ones (eg 81mm and 105mm) generally better.  The issue is the best way of delivering the smart ones.
 
The XM395 PGMM (Precision-Guided Mortar Munition) - tests demonstrated its ability to hit within 1 m of the laser designated aim point.
Capt. Mike Hoffman, Co. I commanding officer of the Marines of 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiments said the 120 mm mortars give the Marines of 3/8 an increased range to engage effectively and eliminate their targets, and illuminate the battlefield during hours of darkness.
The 120 mm mortars have been instrumental to our success in Afghanistan,? Hoffman said. ?They provide us certain advantages as opposed to the previous 81mm weapon systems.
- They could be a cost effective medium range Australian controlled precision Non Line of Sight fire support system...
 
-------------------------------
If we have 155mm & British Rocket fire support? where was it ?
 
In the article it states the incident happened 12km north of the Australian base at Tarin Kowt.
Two Apache helicopters were sent from Tarin Kowt to help fight off the insurgents.
 
GMLRS-The firing battery requires a total processing time of three to four minutes from the time the CFF is sent until the report of "Ready" by the launcher. Upon the command to "Fire," the launcher takes an additional 12 seconds to update the rocket's GPS before firing. Rocket speed ? Approx 15000 km per hour
-  at 15km time to target is about 4.5 - 5 minutes.
It can be fired in close proximity to troops with minimal chance of collateral damage to personnel or structures. The RED for GMLRS unitary is lower than the joint direct attack munition.
 
ARH-64 Maximum speed: 158 knots (182 mph, 293 km/h) = 4 minutes flight time (approx) + dispatch time
(say 3-4 minutes) Time to target= a very optimistic 8 Minutes
 
Is 3 Minutes - is a long time in the heat of battle?
How many bullets/RPGs can be fired at you in three minutes ?
 
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Aussiegunneragain       3/22/2009 6:57:57 AM
Fair points all. I've read that the ANA is about 80,000 strong at the moment but that they need to get it up to about 200,000 to secure the country. Even if they had good retention rates it would be hard to keep anybody in long enough to provide enough high quality officers and NCO's. Then again perhaps it is unfair to compare them against the standards of a professional volenteer army. I'd imagine that if the predominantly special forces personel who are training and fighting with  the ANA fought alongside Australian Vietnam or WW2 conscripts, that they would feel less secure than they would if they were fighting alongside soldiers trained to their own standards.
 
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Aussiegunneragain       3/22/2009 7:01:03 AM
What the upshot of all this is of course is that rather than talking about how we are "not winning" in Afghanistan, the ISAF leaders really need to take the longer term perspective and be prepared to do a lot of the fighting for the Afghan's for another decade, while they get their military up to a size and standard where they can do it themselves. We should be contributing to that I think.
 
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neutralizer       3/25/2009 3:27:43 AM
I suspect AH64 times are a bit more, unless they are sitting on the ground with crew aboard and most pre-flight checks completed (not forgetting having a suitable weapon load).
 
On the other hand GMLRS may be a bit shorter, you can't do much about time of flight and we're talking up to 70 km range.  However, last year the Brits reported a US GMLRS contingent visited them to see why their response time was significantly faster than the US one.  I'd have to consult the MoD online maps to see if North of TQ is in range to current positioning, but N is probably not a favourable direction.  Of course for GMLRS precise mesuration is vital and perhaps Aust don't have the appropriate devices to give the necessary small spherical error in tgt loc?
 
As for mortars, the answer may be to use 81mm with a prox fuze, unless range is the issue.
 
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Aussiegunneragain    Fire Support   3/25/2009 9:55:05 AM

I suspect AH64 times are a bit more, unless they are sitting on the ground with crew aboard and most pre-flight checks completed (not forgetting having a suitable weapon load).

 

On the other hand GMLRS may be a bit shorter, you can't do much about time of flight and we're talking up to 70 km range.  However, last year the Brits reported a US GMLRS contingent visited them to see why their response time was significantly faster than the US one.  I'd have to consult the MoD online maps to see if North of TQ is in range to current positioning, but N is probably not a favourable direction.  Of course for GMLRS precise mesuration is vital and perhaps Aust don't have the appropriate devices to give the necessary small spherical error in tgt loc?

 
As for mortars, the answer may be to use 81mm with a prox fuze, unless range is the issue.

The obvious solution for Australia would be to deploy an M-198 Battery and try to get the Yanks to fast track the FMS process for Excalibur, and send a few of those pre-production shells our way for those scrapes where we can't use unguided rounds. They would probably appreciate the extra troops on the ground and we could assure that our infantry have the support then need.
 
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