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Aussiegunneragain Herald 11/26/2008 6:04:47 AM

Damn website just ditched my comprehensive answer so here is the simple one. Everything you just wrote is wrong or irrelevant except the bit about EW being important and the bit about FAC's being able to be destroyed from the air.

On the first point it obviously is but you don't rely on it. A spoofed missile can lock onto a new target (like a tanker your corvette is escorting) and destroy it. It happenned to the Atlantic Conveyer so there is no reason why some Aussie bulk freignter can't cop the same treatment. A hard kill is the most desirable outcome in in any instance you are facing an anti-ship missile, as the cost of failure is very high.

On the second point, of course FAC's can be destroyed from the air. The problem is that you can't rely on that because they may not be detected prior to firing, especially if they are operating inshore. Also ROE's may not allow us to fire first. Sure the FAC would probably be blown out of the water after attacking us, but that is cold comfort for everybody who dies on the ship that gets hit. That doesn't even start to account for the risk of shore based missiles which are far harder to detect.

On the rest Google young man Google and you will find the truth.

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Aussiegunneragain Herald 11/26/2008 6:08:08 AM

One last point, you aren't scared of those subs because you are a net surfer and not a sailor. So am I but I look at it from the sailors shoes when I make those sorts of statements.

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HERALD1357 11/26/2008 7:47:22 AM

On the first point it obviously is but you don't rely on it. A spoofed missile can lock onto a new target (like a tanker your corvette is escorting) and destroy it. It happened to the Atlantic Conveyer so there is no reason why some Aussie bulk freignter can't cop the same treatment. A hard kill is the most desirable outcome in in any instance you are facing an anti-ship missile, as the cost of failure is very high.

Atlantic Conveyer had no supporting countermeasures aboard her, AG much like that Egyptian freighter didn't have that was nailed by that Iranian CS-801, a while back when the INS Hanit was hit in what was supposed to be a two missile hi-lo attack.The Hanit in that attack had no countermeasures working either. As for the Conveyer, the incident was decades ago. The CM has markedly improved.

You might be missing what I say, AG. I think you might exaggerate the threat a wee bit. I don't dismiss it, but it isn't as extreme as many fiction writers out there make it out to be. Actual real world data suggests that one in five or more typical Western missiles will definitely hit against Russian style countermeasures, which are the best enemy CM we face. Going the other way it may be one in ten surface ship launched .Russian style missiles and close to ZERO sub-launched ones in a salvo without external guidance that could hit us.. If a shore based network with the best the Chinese have to offer Iran couldn't even coordinate a simple two missile hi=lo attack on a clay pigeon like the Hanit under ideal field conditions? I may not know much, but I do know a little something about this, AG.

On the rest Google young man Google and you will find the truth.

I am not a young man. I've been in this biz as a contractor and worker for over twenty years, AG-mainly the electronics end of it but also a little rocketry here and there.

Herald

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HERALD1357 11/26/2008 8:08:28 AM

One last point, you aren't scared of those subs because you are a net surfer and not a sailor. So am I but I look at it from the sailors shoes when I make those sorts of statements.

I am deathly afraid of torpedoes-especially Italian, British, and AMERICAN ones. I am not afraid of submarine launched cruise missiles-especially Russian ones. Those are bearing only launched and are only good against undefended, as in no countermeasures at all, sitting duck ships as described above.

Will one hit? Sure if it is command update guided . Out of how big a salvo? Four? Twenty? How long will the telemetry6 illumination source live? Not long if friendly air or countermeasures works. A Bear or an H-6 with its search radar active has to get close enough to see both the cruise missiles and the target set to guide the merge. It pops up to give a final telemetry update to the flock it shepherds toward the target. It turns on its radar to identify the tracks in the battlespace and then raqdios the data strweam to iots flock? Within range of a STANDARD or an ESSM? Not bloody likely-even though they have to get in that close to maqke their tactics work. As for the radar escort cruise missiles employed by the Russians as a means to provide some crude guidance to a salvo they blind fired without radar coverage or off missile telemetry targeting updating? Mimic.

Spoofing is a bit easier and more successful than shootdown. You only light up and shoot when you have absolutely no choice as when you are painted or seen.

Herald

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Aussiegunneragain Herald 11/27/2008 6:22:17 AM

All I have to say is that your "she'll be right mate" attitude to anti-ship missiles is belied by the fact that world navies are spending an absolute fortune on PAR based anti-air defences at present. If they thought that they could rely exclusively on CM's then the market for AEGIS and like systems wouldn't exist. The reality is that while only one in four anti-ship missiles has ever hit its target the consequences of a hit are so high that the expense of the defences is justified. I'm sorry but I'm more impressed by those realities than I am by the unverified claims of an anonymous web surfer.

Incidentally, anti ship missiles don't need a mid-course update to accurately find their targets over normal ranges for sea skimmers. The original Exocet which is over 30 years old now and relied on an INS to get it withing homing distance could be fired accurately based on recieving an initial firing solution from the linked radar alone. The Argentinans even managed to fire an MM-38 off the back of a jury-rigged truck and hit a British destroyer, presumably after it was programmed using visually acquired co-ordinates.

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HERALD1357 11/27/2008 11:16:10 AM

Counter-argument- a similar amount of funding is given over to countermeasures. Furthermore your realitioes were based on the following incidents.

Second incident series, lndian Navy launchers a Styx attack against Pakistani ships and shore installations TWICE. No Pakistani countermeasures. Again a generated bearing launch in at least one case with airborne radar supported guidance.

Third incident, Israeli/ Syrian naval surface battle-first ever between missile boats. One sides use countermeasures and cruise missiles. The other side uses missiles and NO countermeasures at all.

Latakia...

The Battle of Latakia

(October 7, 1973)

Few naval battles change the course of maritime warfare. Of those that do, a very select group ever become recognised as doing just that. Perhaps these engagements change the balance of world power, as was the case with Trafalgar. Or maybe these milestones bear witness to the introduction of a totally new concept in the conduct of naval warfare; as was the case at Midway.

The battle of Latakia did two things: it proved to the world that the Israeli Navy was up to par with its bretheren in the Air Force and Armored Corps, and it was the first naval battle in the history to see actual missile combat conducted and electronic warfare deception measures taken. The battle of Latakia demonstrated to the world the power of the fast attack craft and the effectiveness of missile evasion techniques. The small skirmish off of the Syrian coast during the first moves of the YomKippur War was a sign of things to come in naval warfare and changed the way that navies saw themselves in their ever-deadlier environment.

During the first day of hostilities, the Israeli Navy was dispatched to lure the Syrian missile boats out of port and engage them. Anumber of things made this order difficult:

The Israeli anti-ship missile, the Gabriel, had yet to be used in anger. Its performance against a real-life hostile target was as of yet unknown.
The Gabriel had only half of the effective range of the missiles the Syrians were using,the Soviet SS-N-2 Styx; a missile which had already sunk an Israeli destroyer six years earlier.
The Israeli defenses against the Styx consisted of electronic counter measures which had never been used in any real-life engagement. If they failed, the Israeli boats would be easy prey for the radar-homing Styx missile.

These challenges notwithstanding, an Israeli task force, operating in two parallel columns of three ships out at sea and two more closer to the shore, swung right towards the Syrian port of Latakia. On their radar screens, a surface contact appeared due north of their position. Unsure of its intent, the Israelis fired a battery of 76mm shells over its bow, to which it responded with desultory 40mm fire. Contact had been made.

Michael Barkai, the officer in charge of the operation, ordered the Hanit out of the three ship column to engage the Syrian torpedo boat, now positively identified. The Syrian was easily sent down to the bottom, picked off at extreme range by the Hanit

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gf0012-aust 11/27/2008 4:33:07 PM

I'm more concerned about the torpedo threat than the anti-shipping cruise threat. the latter is at least able to be identified and effective counter measures and suites are either in place or at a level where they can be fast tracked to another sophisticated level. eg the comms atmosphere can be mapped, satellite data can be used to back track and recollect sig emissions etc...

torps otoh, are a nightmare. the new generation torps like CBASS, the poms and the italians heavies are far more dangerous.

add in the new technologies like long range swimmers and USV dismounts, sea mines, intelligent sea mines (which are more or less torpedoes with a different "haircut") and you have some very nervous drivers.

in fact, every UDT Conference I've been to in the last 4 years (Europe and the US) has focussed on the torpedo threat being the bigger worry than the air launched threat

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Aussiegunneragain 11/28/2008 5:27:39 AM

Counter-argument- a similar amount of funding is given over to countermeasures. Furthermore your realitioes were based on the following incidents.

Yes, so modern navies know we need both. I get that, why can't you?

First incident Israeli destroyer sunk by Egyptian Styx-no countermeasures, engagement range within radar horizon, on radiatede Israeli radiation bearing only launch. The Israelu destroyer was a sitting duck

..... blah, blah. I think you will find that even Russian missiles have come a long way in terms of resistance to countermeasures since the Styx and for that matter the AM-39. None of this is relevant beyond demonstrating how much damage an AshM can do. Incidentally, it would take a lot less time for an enterprising Western missile manufacturer to design a launch capsule to allow their modern missile to be fired from all those Kilo's out there, than it would take Australia to design a new class of Corvettes to protect our coastal fleet. I'm surprised that somebody hasn't done it yet.

PAR/SAM defenses have much more to do with avoiding being bombed by aircraft as it does with dodging rockets. The FALKLANDS LESSON was that manned aircraft are incredibly dangerous.

Rubbish. AEGIS/SPY-1 was designed to counter-multiple attacks from missiles. The only reason that manned aircraft with dumb bombs caused so much damage in the Falklands was because the British early warning and air defences were inadequate, especially when the Argentineans could approach shielded by land features. Against modern missile systems I doubt that anybody would even try the types of raids the Argies did back then.

The US, which has mnore experince with air attack at sea than anybody except Britain is landing Phalanx and beefing up its countermeasures and turning to auto-detection launched last ditch rockets as its last chance cruise missile defense.. What do they and I know that you don't?

They know that Phalanx is ineffective which is completely irrelevant to this discussion.

Those ranges were SHORT with time of flyout engagements of less than two minutes. Well less than fifty kilometers which is just inside the Earth LOS radar horizon at most surface ship radar mast heights. When you introduce the curvature of the Earth to obscure LOS you have to UPDATE offplatform, mate. A target will maneuver out of threat axis bearing the minute ot detects launch and will throw garbage at your missile to blind and spoof it provided thatg ship has a standing watch that knows what it is doing..

So what, sub-launched cruise missiles aren't going to be launched from ranges longer than that. That doesn't stop them from being dangerous.

PS. Do you like to tell the lemon tester how to suck lemons, too?

If you are asking if I'm impressed by your ability to collect a load of irrelevant information and draw incorrect conclusions from it, then you are going to be sourly

disappointed.

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Aussiegunneragain GF 11/28/2008 5:32:21 AM

torps otoh, are a nightmare. the new generation torps like CBASS, the poms and the italians heavies are far more dangerous.

in fact, every UDT Conference I've been to in the last 4 years (Europe and the US) has focussed on the torpedo threat being the bigger worry than the air launched threat

That may be true but I doubt that anybody at those conferences are saying that we should be ignoring the missile threat. They can still sink ships and navies are investing heavily to counter them. We need to be able to counter all credible threats which is the point that Herald can't seem to get because he is in one of his self-congratulatory lathers.

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gf0012-aust 11/28/2008 5:40:33 AM

That may be true but I doubt that anybody at those conferences are saying that we should be ignoring the missile threat. They can still sink ships and navies are investing heavily to counter them.

true, and I wasn't suggesting or trying to trivialise air launched threats - but at a technology level - what comes from below is harder to deal with. ASW skill degradation has also been a universal problem across most of the tier 1 and tier 2 navies since the soviets went arse up.

eg there are no commensurate strides in sub detection like there have been in above sea level battlespace management with techs such as AESA/MESA/PESA, Aegis, and other billboard theatre threat detection systems.

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