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Subject: Does the RAN have a need for a Corvette?
hairy man    11/17/2008 6:31:29 PM
Does the RAN have a requirement for a Corvette type vessel? The one on the Austal website, which carries a helicopter and is equipped for ASW looks promising, although I would prefer it to be larger and better armed.
 
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HERALD1357       11/27/2008 11:16:10 AM

All I have to say is that your "she'll be right mate" attitude to anti-ship missiles is belied by the fact that world navies are spending an absolute fortune on PAR based anti-air defences at present. If they thought that they could rely exclusively on CM's then the market for AEGIS and like systems wouldn't exist. The reality is that while only one in four anti-ship missiles has ever hit its target the consequences of a hit are so high that the expense of the defences is justified. I'm sorry but I'm more impressed by those realities than I am by the unverified claims of an anonymous web surfer.

Counter-argument- a similar amount of funding is given over to countermeasures. Furthermore your realitioes were based on the following incidents.
 
First incident Israeli destroyer sunk by Egyptian Styx-no countermeasures, engagement range within radar horizon, on radiatede Israeli radiation bearing only launch. The Israelu destroyer was a sitting duck.
 
Second incident series, lndian Navy launchers a Styx attack against Pakistani ships and shore installations TWICE. No Pakistani countermeasures. Again a generated bearing launch in at least one case with airborne radar supported guidance.   
 
Third incident, Israeli/ Syrian naval surface battle-first ever between missile boats. One sides use countermeasures and cruise missiles. The other side uses missiles and NO countermeasures at all.
 
 
 
 

The Battle of Latakia

(October 7, 1973)

 

Few naval battles change the course of maritime warfare. Of those that do, a very select group ever become recognised as doing just that. Perhaps these engagements change the balance of world power, as was the case with Trafalgar. Or maybe these milestones bear witness to the introduction of a totally new concept in the conduct of naval warfare; as was the case at Midway.

The battle of Latakia did two things: it proved to the world that the Israeli Navy was up to par with its bretheren in the Air Force and Armored Corps, and it was the first naval battle in the history to see actual missile combat conducted and electronic warfare deception measures taken. The battle of Latakia demonstrated to the world the power of the fast attack craft and the effectiveness of missile evasion techniques. The small skirmish off of the Syrian coast during the first moves of the YomKippur War was a sign of things to come in naval warfare and changed the way that navies saw themselves in their ever-deadlier environment.

During the first day of hostilities, the Israeli Navy was dispatched to lure the Syrian missile boats out of port and engage them. Anumber of things made this order difficult:

  • The Israeli anti-ship missile, the Gabriel, had yet to be used in anger. Its performance against a real-life hostile target was as of yet unknown.
  • The Gabriel had only half of the effective range of the missiles the Syrians were using,the Soviet SS-N-2 Styx; a missile which had already sunk an Israeli destroyer six years earlier.
  • The Israeli defenses against the Styx consisted of electronic counter measures which had never been used in any real-life engagement. If they failed, the Israeli boats would be easy prey for the radar-homing Styx missile.

These challenges notwithstanding, an Israeli task force, operating in two parallel columns of three ships out at sea and two more closer to the shore, swung right towards the Syrian port of Latakia. On their radar screens, a surface contact appeared due north of their position. Unsure of its intent, the Israelis fired a battery of 76mm shells over its bow, to which it responded with desultory 40mm fire. Contact had been made.

Michael Barkai, the officer in charge of the operation, ordered the Hanit out of the three ship column to engage the Syrian torpedo boat, now positively identified. The Syrian was easily sent down to the bottom, picked off at extreme range by the Hanit's 76/62 gun. Not knowing whether the lone PT boat had reported their position, the Israelis hurried for the shore and braced for the coming showdown.

Map of the battle

- The Battle of Latakia, the first missile battle in naval history -

As the Israelis headed towards the shore, another radar contact was picked up, this time twenty five kilometers northeast of their position. One of the Israeli boats fired a snap shot Gabriel, but because the target was running for the shore and drew itself out of range, the missile dove ineffectually into the sea. But the chase still continued, and once in range the Reshef, in the starboard column, fired a Gabriel at eighteen kilometers range which struck the 560-ton Syrian Minesweeper dead on. But the Israelis knew that the real challenge was the Styx, not some vulnerable hulk of a vessel. The Israelis continued their dash towards Latakia.

Three contacts appeared on the radar screens as the Israelis neared the coast. They were Syrian missile boats, one Osa and two Komars, which had come to meet the interlopers. As the Israelis approached, the Syrians fired their missiles at a range from which the Israelis could do nothing. Once the missiles drew closer, however, the Israelis began firing their chaff rockets and used the jamming systems on board their ships to send out false radar signals to the incoming missile in an attempt to confuse its on-board computers. All of this technology was Israeli-developed and produced, and this was the first time it had ever been used in actual combat.

Chaff diagramJamming diagram

As the Styx missiles drew closer, it was apparent that all of the electronic defenses had worked - the missiles either flew harmlessly overhead or dove into the water. The Israelis pressed on with their apporach, confident in themselves and in their boats. The tactics that the Israelis had invested so much in were sound:approach stealthily, and let your opponent fire his missiles at maximum range as you close; as the enemy missiles near your position engage your deception countermeasures and hope for the best.

Only one Syrian boat still had missiles left - the Osa. It turned to face the Israeli flotilla as the two Komars made their mad dashes towards the protection of Latakia. But it would be to no avail. The Israelis closed at full speed, and let loose a devastating salvo of Gabriel missiles and managed to defeat two more Styx missiles with their chaff and jammers. The 150kg warhead on the Gabriel was more than enough to destroy the missile boats, and they sank quickly. After Latakia, the Syrian navy would be bottled up in its home ports. Acorner in naval warfare had been turned.

The Israeli navy, previously a fifth-rate mess of floating hand-me-downs, had proven itself at a time when even the vaunted Air Force and Armored Corps could not. The Israeli innovations in the Sa'ar IV-class FACuse of chaff and radar jammers set a precedent in the way ships defend themselves still to this day.Indeed, even the Arab navies now employ the same techniques that the Israelis found so useful off of Latakia. The Israeli-designed Gabriel worked flawlessly. It was able to pick up small targets and, although its range was limited, it was able to earn a name for itself in the war rooms of nations everywhere; today it is employed by Taiwan, Sinagpore, SouthAfrica, and many others. Due to actions like the one off of the Syrian coast on October 7, 1973, the Israelis have made a name for themselves in the field of missile boat warfare and have proven themselves capable of not only joining the elite of military trendsetters but also of leading that prestigious group.


Source: The Israeli Navy (Tzva Hagana L'Yisrael Heyl Ha'Yam )
 
The engagement ranges of all incidents I mention were within the direct observation radar horizona fo the combatants.
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
 
Now we turn to the Falklands war where for the first tome wqe see modern Western missil;es used agaionst a western Navy.
 
Every Exocet was fired from aircraft within less than fifty kilometers above the radar horizon ion the slant of the intended target on a radar generated bearing only launch. Where the missile faced no countermeasures at all Atlantic Conveyer, it succeeded. Where the missile flew among a flock of stationary ships that were caught by surpise with countermeasures dormant, it succeeded.  SheffieldReaction times were on an average 100 seconds for each inbound to generate a DATE solution. In the case of Sheffield, they didn't even have tome to generate a rocket merge solution, so asleep were they on radar. I think they had all of ten seconds to firm ip a track. They didn't have the right rockets to try anyway. An infrared detector that auto-fired last chance chaff and flare launchers might have helped them. Exocet was and still is a rather dumb cruise missile. 
 
The next incident, Stark, was a case of faulty ROES, a watch asleep to the present danger ariound them and poor ship handling.   
 
In every case mentioned, the defense was either lax at watch, there were no countermeasures, or the engagem,ent tomes were so short that an active defense was useless.  
 
Those constitute the bulk opf cruiose missile naval engagements to date.
..
 PAR/SAM defenses have  much more to do with avoiding being bombed by aircraft as it does with dodging rockets. The FALKLANDS LESSON was that manned aircraft are incredibly dangerous.  The US, which has mnore experince with air attack at sea than anybody except Britain is landing Phalanx and beefing up its countermeasures and turning to auto-detection launched  last ditch rockets as its last chance cruise missile defense.. What do they and I know that you don't?
 
 
Incidentally, anti ship missiles don't need a mid-course update to accurately find their targets over normal ranges for sea skimmers. The original Exocet which is over 30 years old now and relied on an INS to get it withing homing distance could be fired accurately based on recieving an initial firing solution from the linked radar alone. The Argentinans even managed to fire an MM-38 off the back of a jury-rigged truck and hit a British destroyer, presumably after it was programmed using visually acquired co-ordinates.
 
Those ranges were SHORT with time of flyout  engagements of less than two minutes. Well less than fifty kilometers which is just inside the Earth  LOS radar horizon at most surface ship radar mast heights. When you introduce the curvature of the Earth to obscure LOS you have to UPDATE offplatform, mate. A target will maneuver out of threat axis bearing the minute ot detects launch and will throw garbage at your missile to blind and spoof it  provided thatg ship has a standing watch that knows what it is doing..  

PS. Do you like to tell the lemon tester how to suck lemons, too?


Herald
 
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gf0012-aust       11/27/2008 4:33:07 PM
I'm more concerned about the torpedo threat than the anti-shipping cruise threat.  the latter is at least able to be identified and effective counter measures and suites are either in place or at a level where they can be fast tracked to another sophisticated level. eg the comms atmosphere can be mapped, satellite data can be used to back track and recollect sig emissions etc...

torps otoh, are a nightmare.  the new generation torps like CBASS, the poms and the italians heavies are far more dangerous.

add in the new technologies like long range swimmers and USV dismounts, sea mines, intelligent sea mines (which are more or less torpedoes with a different "haircut") and you have some very nervous drivers.

in fact, every UDT Conference I've been to in the last 4 years (Europe and the US) has focussed on the torpedo threat being the bigger worry than the air launched threat
 
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Aussiegunneragain       11/28/2008 5:27:39 AM
Counter-argument- a similar amount of funding is given over to countermeasures. Furthermore your realitioes were based on the following incidents.
 
Yes, so modern navies know we need both. I get that, why can't you?
 
First incident Israeli destroyer sunk by Egyptian Styx-no countermeasures, engagement range within radar horizon, on radiatede Israeli radiation bearing only launch. The Israelu destroyer was a sitting duck

..... blah, blah. I think you will find that even Russian missiles have come a long way in terms of resistance to countermeasures since the Styx and for that matter the AM-39. None of this is relevant beyond demonstrating how much damage an AshM can do. Incidentally, it would take a lot less time for an enterprising Western missile manufacturer to design a launch capsule to allow their modern missile to be fired from all those Kilo's out there, than it would take Australia to design a new class of Corvettes to protect our coastal fleet. I'm surprised that somebody hasn't done it yet. 

PAR/SAM defenses have  much more to do with avoiding being bombed by aircraft as it does with dodging rockets. The FALKLANDS LESSON was that manned aircraft are incredibly dangerous. 
 
Rubbish. AEGIS/SPY-1 was designed to counter-multiple attacks from missiles. The only reason that manned aircraft with dumb bombs caused so much damage in the Falklands was because the British early warning and air defences were  inadequate, especially when the Argentineans could approach shielded by land features. Against modern missile systems I doubt that anybody would even try the types of raids the Argies did back then.
 
The US, which has mnore experince with air attack at sea than anybody except Britain is landing Phalanx and beefing up its countermeasures and turning to auto-detection launched  last ditch rockets as its last chance cruise missile defense.. What do they and I know that you don't? 
 
They know that Phalanx is ineffective which is completely irrelevant to this discussion.

  Those ranges were SHORT with time of flyout  engagements of less than two minutes. Well less than fifty kilometers which is just inside the Earth  LOS radar horizon at most surface ship radar mast heights. When you introduce the curvature of the Earth to obscure LOS you have to UPDATE offplatform, mate. A target will maneuver out of threat axis bearing the minute ot detects launch and will throw garbage at your missile to blind and spoof it  provided thatg ship has a standing watch that knows what it is doing..  
 
So what, sub-launched cruise missiles aren't going to be launched from ranges longer than that. That doesn't stop them from being dangerous.
 
PS. Do you like to tell the lemon tester how to suck lemons, too?
 
If you are asking if I'm impressed by your ability to collect a load of irrelevant information and draw incorrect conclusions from it, then you are going to be sourly  disappointed.


 

 
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Aussiegunneragain    GF   11/28/2008 5:32:21 AM

I'm more concerned about the torpedo threat than the anti-shipping cruise threat.  the latter is at least able to be identified and effective counter measures and suites are either in place or at a level where they can be fast tracked to another sophisticated level. eg the comms atmosphere can be mapped, satellite data can be used to back track and recollect sig emissions etc...

torps otoh, are a nightmare.  the new generation torps like CBASS, the poms and the italians heavies are far more dangerous.

add in the new technologies like long range swimmers and USV dismounts, sea mines, intelligent sea mines (which are more or less torpedoes with a different "haircut") and you have some very nervous drivers.

in fact, every UDT Conference I've been to in the last 4 years (Europe and the US) has focussed on the torpedo threat being the bigger worry than the air launched threat


That may be true but I doubt that anybody at those conferences are saying that we should be ignoring the missile threat. They can  still sink ships and navies are investing heavily to counter them. We need to be able to counter all credible threats which is the point that Herald can't seem to get because he is in one of his self-congratulatory lathers.
 
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gf0012-aust       11/28/2008 5:40:33 AM
That may be true but I doubt that anybody at those conferences are saying that we should be ignoring the missile threat. They can  still sink ships and navies are investing heavily to counter them. 

true, and I wasn't suggesting or trying to trivialise air launched threats - but at a technology level - what comes from below is harder to deal with.  ASW skill degradation has also been a universal problem across most of the tier 1 and tier 2 navies since the soviets went arse up.

eg there are no commensurate strides in sub detection like there have been in above sea level battlespace management with techs such as AESA/MESA/PESA, Aegis, and other billboard theatre threat detection systems.

 
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Volkodav       11/28/2008 5:55:42 AM
Good damage control can save a frigate or destroyer following a hit from an Exocet or Harpoon sized ASM, nothing will save then from a Heavy Weight Torpedo. 
The torp doesn't actually hit the hull it explodes under the keel creating a massive gas bubble that first pushes the hull up and then collapses pulling it back down again.  You can't save a ship when its been broken in two.
 
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HERALD1357       11/28/2008 7:07:54 AM

Counter-argument- a similar amount of funding is given over to countermeasures. Furthermore your realitioes were based on the following incidents.
 

Yes, so modern navies know we need both. I get that, why can't you?
 
Modern navies know that countermeasures mass less than the rocket/radar combo you keep arguing and they [read I] also know that the CMs + silence are more effective than lighting off in a cluttered environment for a small boy. MOST AShM missiles rely heavily on an ARM seeker to steer them in on a target before they either snap on their IR or RH seekers. Russian missiles in p;aerticular rely on this feature.   
 
First incident Israeli destroyer sunk by Egyptian Styx-no countermeasures, engagement range within radar horizon, on radiated Israeli radiation bearing only launch. The Israel destroyer was a sitting duck



..... blah, blah. I think you will find that even Russian missiles have come a long way in terms of resistance to countermeasures since the Styx and for that matter the AM-39. None of this is relevant beyond demonstrating how much damage an AshM can do. Incidentally, it would take a lot less time for an enterprising Western missile manufacturer to design a launch capsule to allow their modern missile to be fired from all those Kilo's out there, than it would take Australia to design a new class of Corvettes to protect our coastal fleet. I'm surprised that somebody hasn't done it yet.
 
First, the way you spoof a missile is to feed it a garbage signal into its receiver that the primitive computer on board will interpret the way, you the defender want that computer to see and intepret. Example. I am a Perry class  frigate and an Indonesian sub was lucky enough to get off a Klub off on a sound gene3rated bearing only attack from about fifty kilometers away. For 120 seconds it flies toward me at Mach 1 homing in on my radiation. If my sound watch has been awake they might have heard a slight launch transient as it lit off as it broached. Usually you don't hear it. For the last 17,600 meters when your radar does finally pick it up you have it go fast burn at about Mach 3. You have 21 seconds.
 
In that 21 seconds, as the Perry frigate, I want to shut down my main radar go to a local radar that is off ferequency that the Klub has nio abuiklity at all to receive and I want to fire off decoys that makes it look like there are two or three Perrys floating around. The enemy missile gets to play three card monte, whil;e my last ditch defense goes into passive track to laincgh my last ditch defense missiles [RAMs] in  case the rocket's dumb computer picks the correct image I show him out of the clutter and garbage I throw at him..  
 
Statistically my best chance is with the decoys and some other EW measures I will not discuss
 
PAR/SAM defenses have  much more to do with avoiding being bombed by aircraft as it does with dodging rockets. The FALKLANDS LESSON was that manned aircraft are incredibly dangerous. 

Rubbish. AEGIS/SPY-1 was designed to counter-multiple attacks from missiles. The only reason that manned aircraft with dumb bombs caused so much damage in the Falklands was because the British early warning and air defences were  inadequate, especially when the Argentineans could approach shielded by land features. Against modern missile systems I doubt that anybody would even try the types of raids the Argies did back then.

Counter-rubbish-see example above. The AEGIS and the STANDARD were designed to kill high altitude aircraft carrying anti-ship missiles. Combat radars and computer systems good enough to firm up engagement AshM tracks cannot use OTH backscatter techniques to obtain firm distance and bearing data [the wavelengths are wrong] over the radar horizon. To date, onl;y mannwed aircraft can jink violently enough to throw off AAA and SAM solitions within the last 17,000 meters and still maintain a target lockj against countermeasures. The British had good radars and rockets against the type of Russian attack they expected. They didn't expect Skyhawks on the deck coming in below radar coverage. Wrong rockets and wrong radars for sea skimming AIRCRAFT..
 

The US, which has mnore experince with air attack at sea than anybody except Britain is landing Phalanx and beefing up its countermeasures and turning to auto-detection launched  last ditch rockets as its last chance cruise missile defense.. What do they and I know that you don't? 

They know that Phalanx is ineffective which is completely irrelevant to this discussion.

They know Phalanx is ineffective precusely because of the specifics I supply you in this discussion. Phalanx.doesn't kill deep enough. You have to stop the cruise missile at least 3000 meters out to drop it into the water or you'll get a hot motor, burning fuel and blast fragements shredding you topside. That's physics. Newton you know.


  Those ranges were SHORT with time of flyout  engagements of less than two minutes. Well less than fifty kilometers which is just inside the Earth  LOS radar horizon at most surface ship radar mast heights. When you introduce the curvature of the Earth to obscure LOS you have to UPDATE offplatform, mate. A target will maneuver out of threat axis bearing the minute ot detects launch and will throw garbage at your missile to blind and spoof it  provided thatg ship has a standing watch that knows what it is doing..  

So what, sub-launched cruise missiles aren't going to be launched from ranges longer than that. That doesn't stop them from being dangerous.
 
They aren't as dangerous as you seem to think. You have to be totally asleep or blind to be hit.

 

PS. Do you like to tell the lemon tester how to suck lemons, too?
 

If you are asking if I'm impressed by your ability to collect a load of irrelevant information and draw incorrect conclusions from it, then you are going to be sourly  disappointed.

I am not sure that you aren't pulling my leg. You seem to like to engage in a rousing good argument for the joy of it. This is one time you deal in my subject area.

You are the one who will be dissappointed I'm afraid.
 
Herald


 





 
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Aussiegunneragain    Herald - From Janes   11/30/2008 7:42:30 AM
"During the 1960's, advances in anti-ship missiles meant that reaction time, firepower and operational availability in all environments did not match the threat. To counter this, an operational requirement for an Advanced Surface Missile System (ASMS) was promulgated and a comprehensive engineering development programme was initiated. ASMS was renamed AEGIS in December 1969."

www.janes.com/defence/naval_forces/news/misc/aegis010425.shtml
 
In short your claim that AEGIS was designed primarily to hit aircraft and not missiles is complete and utter rubbish. Even the SM-2ER doesn't have the range to engage launch aircraft firing missiles like the AS-4, which was one of the premier Cold War era that the system was designed to counter. The system was designed as a backstop to protect CGB's against any missiles that TU-16's and TU-22's that had escaped the Tomcats managed to fire.
 
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Aussiegunneragain    Anyway Herald ....   11/30/2008 7:54:23 AM
.... I've had enough of this discussion. I don't believe that you have any special background in these matters from which I am going to learning anything and I am finding debating your easily refutable points increasingly odious. Feel free to have the last say because I am through.
 
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HERALD1357       11/30/2008 12:04:18 PM

"During the 1960's, advances in anti-ship missiles meant that reaction time, firepower and operational availability in all environments did not match the threat. To counter this, an operational requirement for an Advanced Surface Missile System (ASMS) was promulgated and a comprehensive engineering development programme was initiated. ASMS was renamed AEGIS in December 1969."



www.janes.com/defence/naval_forces/news/misc/aegis010425.shtml
 

In short your claim that AEGIS was designed primarily to hit aircraft and not missiles is complete and utter rubbish. Even the SM-2ER doesn't have the range to engage launch aircraft firing missiles like the AS-4, which was one of the premier Cold War era that the system was designed to counter. The system was designed as a backstop to protect CGB's against any missiles that TU-16's and TU-22's that had escaped the Tomcats managed to fire.



Incorrect. I said that BRITISH SAM defense was originally designed to hit high altitude aerial threats not sea skimmers. I further said that during the Falklands war that the Asrgentianeans used lpow altitude attack profiles because they knew that British countermeasures and defehnases such as they were, were designed to fight the high altitude threat.
 
 
I firther said that AEGIS radar was designed to look out at the slant to DATE Russian high altitude aircraft that they needed to guide or launch theoir cruise missiles, and that the STANDARD missiles that went with AEGIS were given enough reach to shoot those aircraft and their missiles, if they managed to launch them, out of the sky-that the poriginal AEGIS was nopt designed for low altitude sea skimmers.
 
THAT is what I said exactly. REREAD the discussion. Its there in black and white.
 
Endit.
 
Herald
 
 
.   
 
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hairy man       11/30/2008 4:26:55 PM
Subject: Does the RAN have a need for a Corvette?
Get back on subject you two.
 
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Aussiegunneragain    HM   12/1/2008 4:54:39 AM

Subject: Does the RAN have a need for a Corvette?

Get back on subject you two.


I think the general consensus is that it would be a good purchase to allow us to undertake local tasks (even if we don't agree on the local tasks) while freeing up Frigates and Destroyers to operate elsewhere. If they ever decide to expand the surface fleet I would support this as an efficient way to do it.
 
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Volkodav       12/4/2008 6:47:59 AM
I can't help but wonder if recent events in India will result in the RAN increasing its border protection capability through acquiring a a class of heli / UAV capable corvettes / OPV's to supplement and support the ACPB's?
 
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LB    What's the mission?   12/4/2008 9:01:57 PM
Before picking out a platform one might wish to define the mission then pick a platform based on requirements.  Given the problems in manning the RAN has perhaps the major requirements in new ships should be lowest possible manning requirements.
 
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gf0012-aust       12/5/2008 3:03:49 AM

I can't help but wonder if recent events in India will result in the RAN increasing its border protection capability through acquiring a a class of heli / UAV capable corvettes / OPV's to supplement and support the ACPB's?
Customs is about to go through a recycle and rinse.  so RAN won't but Customs (or whatever they elect to call it) may well do so.



 
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