I know it was pre DOA but it was in the spirit of DOA and that is the cancelation of the Carrier replacement program.  This one act saw the disposal, without replacement, of about 10% of our air combat capability, 30% of our maritime patrol capability and for a period of almost a decade, the loss of an effective shipboard ASW helos capability.  I have wondered, on occassion, what a new build post Falklands RAN carrier would have been like.

 

Plusses carried over from DOA include the ASLAV and Bushmaster while the proposed mine protected, commercially maintained Mulgara would have been a plus had it proceded.

 

A big minuss was the cancellation of Project Whaler (M-113 replacement).

 

Something I wouldn't mind seeing a return of from DOA would be hardening and motorising the both ARES RAINF and Light CAV as well a a return of the reserves focus on VAP, their by freeing up the ARA for out of area deployments while the ARES handled many of the regional policing, peacekeeping and disaster relief missions.

Something I wouldn't mind seeing a return of from DOA would be hardening and motorising the both ARES RAINF and Light CAV as well a a return of the reserves focus on VAP, their by freeing up the ARA for out of area deployments while the ARES handled many of the regional policing, peacekeeping and disaster relief missions.

 

Could you please clarify what you mean i.e. did DOA advocate hardenning and motorising the reserves and what does VAP stand for?

 

DOA, or more specifically Army 21,  aimed to motorize the reserve infantry btn's with Bushranger 6x6 Perenties cascaded down from the Ready Reserve once the IMV's were delivered.  Long term this would have seen the Bushrangers replaced with armoured 6x6 G-Wagens or even Bushmasters.

 

In line with this the Light Horse was to be expanded with Mulgara rec vehicles which were to be mine protected wheeled vehicles.  The contenders included a Humvee derivative and believe it or not an armoured Holden Rodeo!  My old unit was flagged to form a new Squadron at a new location to be one of the trial units.

 

VAP, Vital Assets Protection, was what the ARES spent the 90's training for.  Perimeter defence, vehicle check points, active patrolling, route security, community engagement and assisting civil authorities.  i.e. pretty much what we do in Timor and the Solomons.  The idea was that the ARES protected the general population and the stuff the insurgents were targeting while the Hardened (IMV, M-113, ASLAV, Leopard) ARA hunted them down.  Much of what we were doing was based on British experience in Northern Ireland with a number of (very) senior NCO's officers also touring the former Yugoslavia, as observers, to gain more up to date experience.

 

It's only my personal opinion, but if the ARES can take on this DOA role protecting our strategic assets, (i.e. population centers, mines, ports and other critical infrastructure), then the ARA can be trained and deployed as an expeditionary force where ever and when ever required, secure in the knowledge the home front was being looked after.

The ARes is already responsible for VAP of our major population centres etc. Each Reserve brigade is required to maintain a high-readiness company for that very reason - being called out for terrorist attacks and things of that nature. Considering that most regional centres don't have a large ARA presence, there isn't much choice.

 

In reality, this is about as major a job the ARes can be given. The training level of the ARes is too low to give them any major combat equipment, or to send them overseas as a formed unit in anythng but the most benign environments. The main purpose of the ARes will continue to be as a recruiting tool and a source of individual reinforcements for the ARA.

 

 

Gotcha. Personally I think that sort of work is obviously what the ARes should be doing either here in the instance of a terrorist threat or for more stable contingencies in places like the Solomons. I'd note however that those roles came after the end of DOA. 

 

I personally don't find the scenario that the Army (ARA, RRES and ARES) trained for during DOA, i.e, protecting assets in Northern Australian against enemy special forces, very credible. Northern Australia is too hard to get a worthwhile force into and it is even harder to sustain a force there. IMHO if it could be done with any degree of certainty the Japs would have operated sabotures there in WW2 before the advent of assets like JORN.  Gearing our Army towards that tasking was just an excuse for reducing its capability.

Thanks Raven, I didn't know VAP was still going, it makes sense to give the role to the reserves.
 

Based on my (somewhat limited) personal experience I still believe motorising the Ares Inf Btn's would greatly increase their effectiveness.  I would rate getting them into some form of mine protected section vehicle, with desent rough terrain performance, as more important and cost effective than any other capability they could be provided with.  Provided there was some form of commercial TLS contract a reserve unit should have no problem operating Bushmasters or similar, if the Light Horse could keep clapped out M-113A1's running then the grunts should have no problem looking after Bushies with commercial support.

 

Anyway training the reserves in VAP was one of the few sensible parts of DOA and I would rather have seen 5/7 RAR and B Sqn 3/4 CAV get AIFV's, the RAN get a replacement carrier and the RAAF* get what ever it was they missed out on due to DOA.

 

*an ex RAAFie did tell me the plan with the carrier was that there would be a combined RAAF/FAA force of about 50 Harriers to provide Fleet and Army support.  I haven't heard or read anything about that any where else so I put the story down to senility and wishful thinking.

Granted that a MPV would be useful if the reserves were to operate in an enhanced low-level scenario in the region. I just don't think that it would every be used on continental Australia. Basically any enemy special forces here wouldn't have organic transport capability to lug enough mines around to make a difference as they would necessarilyhave to arrive by submarine. I doubt that having come all this way an opposing general is going to want his best troops to be spending their time blowing up the odd road-train or mog in the Pilbara and risking getting caught doing it.

I agree 100% on the replacement carrier and AIFV issue as both of those things are really problematic legacies of the thinking of the time. The only things that I can think of that the RAAF missed out on was a refuelling capability for the

F-111's (too hostile, might scare the neighbours) and that 8 of its 12 chinooks got canned.

Broadening the discussion beyond different bits of kit it is apparent to me that the real implication of the DOA that still lingers is the impact on the Australian Defence budget, on the technological advancement of the ADF, on corporate knowledge and on defence planning. The DOA policy heralded a 20% - 25% budget cut in ADF funding from around 2.5% (where it had been since Vietnam) in FY 1986/67 to 2% 1987/88. That percentage has wavered between 1.8% and 2% ever since. We have gotten away with this (but only just in the ET operation) because of a reletively benign strategic environment, because the US is such a deterrant to aggression against Australia and because strong economic growth has led to reasonable growth in defence spending in real terms.

However, times are achangin' in our region as is being discussed on the other thread about China. The problem for us is that our low level of Defence expenditure is politically entrenched, as the Australian public now expects the excess to be spent elsewhere or handed back to them in tax cuts. This is re-enforced by the sense of security which Australians hold which may become increasingly false over coming decades. We could be in for a nasty shock down the track.

 

As mentioned the technological advancement of the ADF has also been hampered by low defence spending. For example instead of replacing the DDG's with an AEGIS class ship at the turn of the century when similar sized developed nations like Spain and Netherlands were doing, so we won't be getting our first AWD until the middle of next decade. The DOA thinking was of course that our naval forces would always operate under RAAF air cover whilst they were "defending the moat". The throw up is unless the next combat systems and range of weapons can be easily fitted to the AWD hulls or unless we replace them early that puts us more than a decade behind the technology curve from where we should be for a nation of our size. Other examples are the way that we are only just starting to operate UAV's despite the fact that the Yanks have been operating them for over 40 years and the Israelis since the 1980's, the way that we are only just getting a modern gunship helecopter when they have been around since Vietnam etc, etc. For a nation that always spouts on how it needs to maintain its technological edge because of its small population we haven't really been making an effort.

 

Corporate knowledge. Its just a suspicion but I bet that had the Defence Force not been gutted in the late 80's and early 90's then a lot of soldiers, swabbies and raffies who left disollusioned after 4 or 5 years would still be around now as Senior officers and NCO's. We all know the difficulties that this is causing us.

 

Finally Defence planning. I think that the fact that the 2000 White Paper and subsequent amendments had DOA as the first concentric circle shows that the DOA thinking has yet to be purged.The White Paper should have made clear that the prospect of an attack on Australia is remote and virtually any contingency can be dealt with without continuing to specifically orienting such a substantial degree of our defence planning towards DOA. In the meantime we have to do elsewhere and we should raise it in our order of priorities.

Back when our defnce budget was 2.5% there were papers and articles outlineing how we should actually be spending 3% minimum and that 5% would actually pay for itself through making our defence industry self sustaining, increasing the average level of technical training and education not to mention infrastructure in Australia which would benifit other industries as well.

I wouldn't be at all surprised if that were the case. The example that comes to mind for me whose defence industry has done wonders for the rest of the economy is Israel . It will be interesting to see what the costs/benefit ratio for Singapores investmnet in defence is as well. Incidentally I reckon that if we are serious about being able to look after ourselves in the region in the future then those are the two nations that we are going to have to look to as a model for our defence doctrine.