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Subject:
Radical Plans for the ADF
VGNTMH
6/27/2008 8:36:16 AM
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| On Strategy Page Australia we often discuss replacing one type of fighter aircraft with another, or the merits of one class frigate over another. With a defence white paper in the offing I thought it might be opportune and interesting to see if anyone had any truly radical or revolutionary plans for the ADF. Not just replacing one asset or piece of equipment with another, but radical restructuring, procurement, or personnel initiatives for the ADF?
I have half a dozen ideas, but here is one to get the ball rolling:
I would combine the RAN and the RAAF into a new "Royal Australian Maritime Defence Force" (RAMDF)!
The logic and thinking behind this is as follows:
1) Australia is a maritime nation.
2) Many roles of the ADF are maritime in nature, where maritime is defined as something which operates over, on, or under the sea.
These roles include:
? Border surveillance and protection, that is stopping unauthorized people coming to Australia over or on the sea
? ASW and SLOC protection
? DOA against amphibious assault
? Regional Force Projection over the sea
? Deterring possible regional enemies over or from the sea
3) All of these maritime roles involve both sea and air platforms, and indeed some land based (JORN) and space (satellites) platforms as well.
For instance:
? Border protection involves JORN, surveillance aircraft, patrol boats and perhaps helicopters
? ASW and SLOC protection involves maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, frigates, and submarines
? DOA against amphibious assault involves strike aircraft and submarines
? Regional force projection involves transport aircraft and LHDs, as well as the land force being projected
? Deterring a regional enemy could involve strike aircraft, submarines, or cruise missiles
4) Maritime defence forces have been split on a largely platform basis between the RAN and the RAAF since 1921 or thereabouts, and the two services are both primarily organized along platform lines. That is the RAN is defined or delineated as being responsible for the surface ship, submarine, and maritime helicopter platforms and the RAAF is delineated as being responsible for the land based fixed wing aircraft platforms.
5) In this maritime environment and for these maritime services, "combat systems", "combat systems integration", and "Network Centric Warfare" are becoming more and more important.
By combat systems I mean electronic systems which:
? Take information from sensors (radars, sonars etc)
? Add navigational and mapping information to the sensor information
? Build a "situational picture database" of contacts detected by the sensors
? Assemble information about these contacts and try and classify them
? Visualize or display this information
? Possibly share this information with other platforms (data links etc)
? If necessary take action to attack these contacts with weapons (missiles etc)
For instance this definition could cover all of the following:
? AEGIS firing SM-2s and ESSMs
? Wedgetail AEW aircraft controlling F/A-18s or F-35s
? Assembling an ASW operating picture from information provided from frigates, submarines, P-3C Orions, helicopters etc and initiating action by one of these platforms
These "combat systems" are central to any operations conducted by either the RAN or the RAAF.
6) Meanwhile, both the RAN and the RAAF are "dominated" or "controlled" by the platform "drivers", seaman officers in the case of the RAN and pilots in the case of the RAAF. That is these two services have a "platform driver centricity". I get the impression that this is especially the case for the pilots in the RAAF.
7) Because of the platform delineation and driver centricity of the RAN and RAAF, I would assert that:
? The RAN and the RAAF focus on their own platforms rather than the wider picture
? The focus is on platforms (eg an AEGIS AWD) or groups of platforms (eg F/A-18 + Wedgetail + MRTT) which belong to the one service and which contain all of the combat systems and weapons needed for a task, and that it might be better to take a NCW approach with sensors, combat systems, and weapons on different types of platforms.
? Each service argues in favour of their own assets, that is the RAAF argued in favour of land based fast jet aircraft and against the CV aviation of the RAN in the 1970s and 80s.
? Combat systems are not integrated to the best degree
? The careers of "combat systems people" are limited (Has a non seaman officer ever headed the RAN? Has a non pilot ever headed the RAAF?)
(Am I correct in these assertions?)
8) I would also assert that, in a political sphere, there has been a history of angst, poor coordination, and outright political conflict between the RAN and the RAAF. (To be fair ? this is maybe less so now than in 1944 (trying to find U-862) or in the 1960s and 70s (arguments over HMAS Melbourne).
9) Meanwhile, technological change is:
? Decreasing the roles of "platform drivers".
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