I think there has been a fair slab of artistic creativity applied to this piece....

I would argue that it would make more sense for the Navy to look at getting a pair of large RoRo vessels, perhaps like the UK's new Point class RoRos. They would be more capable for the basic transport role, and be a fraction of the cost of the new LHDs. Ideally, they could also have a helo deck on top - sufficient to allow helos to operate when necessary, e.g. vertical replenishment, but also to allow them to be 'spare decks' when necessary. Two LHDs and two RoRos would probably be more useful than having three LHDs - and a lot cheaper. As for getting the F-35Bs, I am in two minds; part of me feels that it would be a good idea, boosting offensive support (it is always easier to provide lots of support from close-by than from a distant land base); part of me is against diluting the LHD role. If we are talking in terms of providing a US Marine-style detachment of a few aircraft to support ground forces, I have nothing against it; if, on the other hand, they are wanting to use them as full scale carriers, i.e. squadron strength on them, then I am against it on cost grounds.

 

As for boosting the AWD fleet to four, this could be a good move, though I still disagree with the decision they made by going for the Spanish ship rather than the baby Burke - my suspicion is still that a full size Burke, with some manpower-savings would have made more sense, and been cheaper. Four ships would certainly help protect Aussie forces when deployed, especially if any Northern neighbours decide that acquiring advanced anti-ship capabilities would be desirable. I also wonder whether a bigger Anzac class - built from the ground up with the CEAFAR radar and lots more VLS cells - would have been better. They could have had a good degree of commonality with the Anzacs, and given a lot of the newer Meko designs (and their decreased manning requirements) could probably have been crewed with fewer problems. Heck, a good build program might have seen them slowly replace the Anzacs, i.e. not stopping at four, but retiring the oldest Anzac as the fifth comes online, etc...

 

OTOH, there are a  few surprises coming up.....

OTOH, there are a  few surprises coming up.....

It's less of a matter of whether the said ship is better than anything in the region, than whether the ship could handle multiple ASM's, which even the small navies have been able to field for decades off FAC and from coastal sites. As such some sort of PAR would have been a minimum requirement.  Were CEA PAR or the smaller AEGIS integrated radars (e.g. SPY-1f or g) available in the timeframe that would have been necessary for an "ANZAC DDG"? If so it probably wouldn't be a bad idea, though it would still be expensive.
 

As such I'd imagine that it would require different planning from as far back as the eighties, e.g. perhaps a smaller build of Collins class (3 or 4) with 1 or 2 O Boats kept in service, a smaller build of standard ANZAC's (say 6 instead of 8) and/or the mothballing of a squadron of Pigs. There is nothing to say that we couldn't build extra vanilla ANZAC's and Collin's class after the DDG replacement had been completed and bring the extra Pigs out of retirement if the regional threat started to look grimmer.   

 

Of course the alternative would have been to join the Spanish in a consortium for the ships we are buying now. If we built them in Aussie docks we could have had them in service starting from 2002 like the Spanish did, nearly dovetailing with the dates of retirment for the DDG's.

The mysterious "defence source" is probably some Airforce officer who is trying to put the kybosh on further spending on the navy and in particular anything that threatens airforce roles. The third support ship and the optional fourth AWD have been on the agenda since before the change of government, so reporting that as "news" is artistically creative indeed. The Navy might be pushing to make the support ship a F-35 capable amphib but I don't see why that would cost much if anything more, as they would just buy the "b's" as part of a reduced F-35 order. If they decide they can afford the extra amphib it would be a bloody good idea to make them fixed wing capable, IMO.  As for TLAM's, I think they would be a waste of money and torpedo tube space when we have a perfectly good airforce which will have JASSM's to do that job, but they wouldn't really be making much contribution to the $5 billion figure.

Ah huh.  That would have worked and would have been a good move.  Unfortunately defence was not a high priority in the late 90's, there were no votes in it so no money was spent with the ADF of 1999 actually being smaller and less capable than the ADF of 1996

Re: RoRo's.

 

Does any other nation have provision for such platforms exercised away in some sort of reserve facility during peace time ?

 

For example, if a subsidy was given to have an otherwise civilian Melbourne-to-Launceston ferry to be made milspec, with the military budget paying the difference in upgrading, and some sort of payroll tax concession for employing reservists as its staff.

 

Thus we wouldn't be burdened with a potential white elephant in peace time, but the capaicty there if needed.

 

Production time for naval platforms I would say is greater than most other platforms, and if it can be tucked away to provide redundancy, yet fulfilling a productive role in the private sector, would that not be a good procurement method ?

Ro-Ro's, erk!

 

They aren't known as Ro-Ro-Ro's for nothing. Roll on, roll off, roll over.

 

They should be banned from every shipping lane in the world. Check out the Lloyd's Register to see how often these tubs go down.

 

Even if that were true (it isn't, see below), it is irrelevant. The decision to build such AWD's would have had to have been made in the early nineties at the very latest. As I have detailed previously to operate within the Hawke Government's 25% tighter post-Dibb (1986/87) defence budgets, it would have necessitated an alteration to overall force structure, with reduced numbers of other major assets such as ANZAC's, Collin's and/or F-111's. Of course had the Hawke Government not  decided  to slash defence spending in the first place and build that spending into peoples expectations of a "social wage" as a buy off to the Unions, then we might have afforded AWD's as well as all the other equipment, but that would just be too much to expect now wouldn't it.

 

I disagree that the ADF being less capable in '99 than '96 ,as the Howard Government kept defence spending at the percentage of GDP that he recieved it at and GDP increased over those three years. Also, they benefitted from the efficiency measures that were introduced in 1996. As a result the Navy and Airforce pretty much continued ALP acquisitions, but the Army got an extra regular battalion and the reserves started all began to undertake 6 week basic training, longer IET training and more days in service, alibeit at the expense of the Ready Reserve scheme. I'd say the changes created a more capable force in terms of overall numbers of deployable regulars and high quality reserves.

 

 

 

I'd say the changes created a more capable force in terms of overall numbers of deployable regulars and high quality reserves.

 

And you would be wrong but thats my opinion.

 

What I saw was a reduction in training days, less live firing and the need to buy much of our own equipment and uniforms, a very big difference from my experience when I joined in 91.  In my last three years I was only issued with blank rounds on one exercise and then it was only 12 rounds, not even half a mag, and that was it.  IMO the lack of blanks for training resulted in a false sense of security as you can't UD a unloaded weapon so instead of learning from their mistakes with blanks while training the UDs were happening with live rounds on deployment.

 

The other big difference was the IR changes under Reith that enabled unscrupulous employers to discriminate against any employee who had a life outside of work i.e. sports, study and Reserve service had to give way to working when and as required.  This resulted in a very large number dedicated individuals being forced to go inactive or leaving all together as they were no longer able to meet their training obligation.

 

True basic training for reserves was increased to 6 weeks but this served mainly to reduce the recruiting pool as far fewer potential reservists could get 6 weeks off work.  End result fewer new people, better trained or not, joined and many many more long serving dedicated people were forced to leave due to pressure from work.

 

After Timor the Government registered that they screwed up and legislated to protect reserves but it was too little too late for many.

 

Until Timor and then September 11 defence was very low on John Howards list of priorities.