Two things I find odd though...

 

1. Why would we only get 50% of the sale price. Are these not owned by RAN/Oz Gov?

 

Why should Kaman get any profits on the sale?

 

2. Why is the Oz Gov helping an American private company with transitional arrangements for its workforce, skilled or otherwise? Isn't that up to Kaman?

 

Curious and a little befuddled.

 

 

 

Our friendly sheep shaggers.

 

I'm sure their airworthy certificate process is different in some aspects and that the RNZDF could use them or some for utility.

 

Failing that, donate them to Timor or PNG as SAR birds in their mountainous regions.

 

 

How could it have happened?

13 Mar 2008

That's what Defence analyst Allan Behm asks in a recent column in The Australian, commenting on the $1 billion Seasprite debacle.

Acknowledging that Defence Minister Fitzgibbon did the right thing in canning the project, he says the pity is that the project was not cancelled years ago when it became progressively clearer that the Navy?s operational targets were unachievable.

Although under considerable operational pressure, the ADF?s performance is outstanding, but the same cannot be said of the Department?s project management, Behm says.

He sees the problem as going to the heart of the capability selection, development and decision-making processes within the department.

Failure in these areas is costing billions in waste and delay.

Behm suggests the rot started with the 1997 decision to abolish the FDA (force development and analysis) division.

The FDA ran the fingers of its considerable analytical capability over all substantial acquisition proposals and in consequence ?was loathed by the military?.

Behm says the FDA morphed into a new capability systems division that brought together the various ADF groups against which FDA had been battling.

The highly qualified and experienced analysts dispersed within weeks.

They have never returned, he says.

?In Australia there is no other organisation that deals with the complexity of technological systems and human interfaces such as those that distinguish the Defence Department?s key acquisitions.

"Risk is intrinsic to such. But as the Seasprite fiasco demonstrates only too clearly, risk is not brought to book and ministers are left looking incompetent.

?According to defence industry insiders the vultures are already circling above the air warfare destroyer project due to unresolved risk in project design and management.?

Comment
Allan Behm?s remark re vultures circling the AWD program is disturbing.

Are the so-called industry insiders referring to those aspects of design which is concerned with ?Australianising? the F100 design?

Wasn?t the SH-2G(A) an ?Australianised? version of the USN?s SH-2G Seasprite?

I know a few on the US side who were quietly relieved that the AB lite didn't get up.  They were quite concerned about the competence of the ASC exec and were expressing concern some 6 months ago.  I dealt with 2 suppliers who pulled out from wanting to sub to the US nominal Prime due to their own concerns.

More to the point we lost access to some very tricky tech due to their lack of confidence.

 

Behm is dumbing down quite considerably the complexity of procurement within the org though.  Focussing on the uniforms as the primary cassus vivendi is a bit rich.  He needs to factor in that establishing KPI's that focus on completed projects means that some will focus on sign off to meet benchmarks etc... The current push by govt is also likely to corrupt the model as well.

 

It needs attention, but the current attempt is just as flawed as prev govts.

I wouldn't worry too much about the AF-100 though, the Austalianisation mainly consists of restoring features deleted from the first 4 Spanish ships on cost grounds and incorporating improvements that Spain is already pushing forward with on F-105.

 

There are a couple of other gold plating proposals that may cause some grief but these can be addressed by either returning to the original baseline or going for a bigger hull, which I believe Navantia has on the books anyway.  Navantia have a current family of designs for AEGIS ships of Corvette, Light Frigate (for Norway), Frigate and Destroyer size available with the AF-100 being a sort of Frigate + size.  Jumping to a full Destroyer would be a cinch and probably cheaper and less risky than trying to shoe horn the whole wish list into a Frigate hull.

 

What I would actually like to see happen is maximum effort to get the original contracted baseline into service ASAP to cover the hole left by the FFG debacle.  It would be nice if we could actually accelerate the program in some way so the FFG upgrade could be cancelled and the ships disposed of early. I hear Pakistan is looking for up to 6 used Frigates, that may be economically more sensible than creating additional dive wrecks, US allowing of course?

 

Ideal situation, three Batch I AWD's punched out ASAP to replace the FFG's followed by three Batch II ships with a larger hull and all the bells and whistles that the RAN wanted with the G&C design but de risked by the Batch I build.

Oh there be rumours that the Block II RAM will be VLS compatible with Sextuple or possibly even Octuple Pack options for Mk. 41 VLS.  This could make the CIWS solution for our AWD's very interesting.

The base reality is that IMO we bought the wrong platform.

 

1) We can't help ourselves and always modify things to suit.

2) Instead of stuffing around with trying to shove everything we want into a smaller, but thrn stretched platform, get the damn right sized platform in the first place

3) The larger platform would have given us access to some technology which we won't get with the spanish.  We would have then had the capacity to size and fit systems appropriately rather than compromise (like we tend to do, and then wank ourselves stupid pretending that we made the smart decision in the first place to justify some short planned govt requirement to go in thin

 

the americans took the right approach, they had concerns about the role, our requirements fit and the competency of the management team on the opposite side.  The spanish only care about flogging the platform and are yet to experience the joys of dealing with an incompetent executive.

 

another project that could have offered so much and has ben rectally enhanced already....

 We can't help ourselves and always modify things to suit.

you'd be surprised at how many are regretting that we didn'y listen to the warfighters on this.  it's irrelevant anyway as the decision has been made, and we will continue to pat ourselves on the back in public for buying another surface warship that will invite 20 years of dislocated functionality with what we seek to do.

 

there are numerous reasons why we train and work with the usn. this wasn't one of our smarter decisions, no matter how much we gussy it up for the public or the local politicians.

 

Basically with the retirement of the CFA DDG's without replacement and the complete cluster f##k that ADI / Thales has made on the OHP FFG upgrade the F-100 may not have been the best choice, it was the only choice that was sure to see the RAN having an effective AWD capability before 2020.

 

The F-100 works, the same can not be said for Sachsen (and Tromp?) while Daring and the Horizons are yet to be proven in trials and the G&C Baby Burke was and now will remain a paper ship.  Compounding matters is the fact the RAN do not have enough people to man three Flight II Burkes bought MOTS from the US, which was probably the only other solution.

 

Basically its the same story as the SH purchase, the decision was left so long that our real options were reduced to one viable option to provide the required minimum capability and avoid a capability gap.

I didn't suggested that we shouldn't train and work with the USN and there is nothing about this ships that will preclude us from doing so, nor is there anything about them that will stop them from providing area air defence over their lifespan. All the extra crap that people are talking about, such as BM defence, UAV's and a land-attack capability, are not necessary for the missions that we need.

The whinges about this are symptomatic of the same old story really. "Warfighters" (or often noisy public advocates claiming to represent them) always want the biggest and the best for their pet services, irrespective of whether or not it is necessary for what the taxpayers want them to do and want to pay for. F-15A/C's vs F-18A's for the airforce in the early-80's, F-22's vs F-35's now, extra Collins class or nuclear submarines for the Navy etc, the story doesn't change. Personally I wish the "warfighters" would pull their ego's in and start giving realistic advice on what to buy, instead of constantly politicking for the latest unaffordable and unnecessary pen1s extension. It would make life a LOT easier for the bunch of non-experts in Cabinet to make complex decisions about how to provide an appropriately balanced force structure.

you're making some substantial bold claims about people involved in this process - and you certainly insult those who are involved (civilian, uniform, GBE) who are part of the process and have no need to feel that procurement is an extension of pen1le development.

just as there is a restricted version of the Seasprite decision, there is also one re this.  quite frankly, systems and capability evaluations are made dispassionately - and the quality of that comment is far more sophisticted than what you or I can articulate in a public forum.

You think the F-100 delivers all the goods, I don't.  You think that the people who are involved in the tech evaluations aren't sophisticated enough to be distracted from the manufacturers powerpoint demonstrations, or that the uniforms dominate decisions, thats clearly insulting, ill informed  and ignorant commentary to me. (The Hugh Whites of the world have done far more damage when they attached their signature to various documents when they were in the job, and they certainly have forced through some stupid requirements in complete contradiction of coherent advice, and yet the media regard such cretins as experts)

 

 

We'll leave it at that