The details of how Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist and "father of the Islamic atomic bomb" ran a "nuclear bomb plans for sale" operation, have come out. In a situation so typical of Pakistan, corruption and willingness to use a government position for personal gain led Kahn to go into business for himself, selling nuclear weapons technology to anyone who could pay (North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and possibly others).

The CIA picked up hints of this business in the 1990s, some ten years ago. Bit by bit, the evidence piled up. Finally, Pakistan's president was forced to confront Kahn, and Kahn was forced, by the weight of the evidence, to admit his guilt. But Kahn is so popular in Pakistan (as "the father of the Moslem bomb") that is was considered political suicide to try and prosecute him for his crimes. So Khan agreed to admit his guilt (phrased as "errors in judgment"), in return for a pardon.

Actually, Khan's crimes were quite extensive. He had begun by stealing plans for uranium processing equipment (centrifuges and such) while working for a European nuclear power engineering company three decades ago. He was later convicted for this crime, but he was by then safely back in Pakistan and working his way towards the leadership of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. Khan was energetic and opportunistic. Although his technical contributions to the bomb design effort were mainly contained in the technology he had stolen, he managed to take credit for much of the efforts other Pakistani scientists and engineers contributed. Khan also abused his position as head of the nuclear weapons program by giving sweetheart contracts to friends and family, skimming money for himself and taking bribes. But this is so common in Pakistan, that no one really noticed. Even the sale of nuclear weapons technology (but not a complete bomb) to foreign nations was not considered all that unusual. There were dozens of others, both in the nuclear weapons program, and outside it, who worked with Kahn to move the goods, and collect and hide (and share in) the money. Khan's pardon allows him to keep the money. But the CIA, and European intelligence agencies, believe that Khan's group are still in business. So the investigation continues, and Pakistan has been told that members of Khan's group (including Khan) are fair game if caught outside Pakistan.

American nuclear security experts are working with Pakistan to equip Pakistani nukes with electronic locks that prevent the weapons from being used by anyone who does not have the proper codes. This means that if any Pakistanis try and sell an actual a-bomb, they will have to get the codes as well. This won't make it impossible for a Pakistani bomb to be sold, just more difficult. And Khan has shown that you can sell nuclear secrets and get away with it. It's a bad precedent.

North Korea has denied being a Khan customer, but Iran and Libya were caught red handed with material from Pakistan (Libya admits it, Iran is stonewalling). Evidence collected in Iraq indicates that Saddam was approached by Khan's salesmen, but had not yet put down the five million dollars required to get the weapons information coming.